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# RUSSO-CHINESE DIPLOMACY

KEN SHEN WEIGH, PH.D.

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## RUSSO-CHINESE DIPLOMACY



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# **RUSSO-CHINESE DIPLOMACY**

**BY**

**KEN SHEN WEIGH, Ph.D. (Johns Hopkins)**

**CHIEF OF BUREAU, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE NATIONALIST  
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

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**1928**



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## FOREWORD

IN not a few respects China is one of the most interesting and important countries of the world as a subject for study by the international lawyer and by the historian of international relations, and this interest and importance has been testified to by the extensive literature which exists relating to international rights and obligations as applied to China, and to the history of the relations between China and the other powers. However, much remains to be done, especially in the way of monographic treatment of specific topics, and especially is it desirable that Chinese scholars should more fully occupy this field, for, to undue extent, has China had her domestic history and institutions as well as her international relations and rights dealt with by foreigners. What Chinese scholars can do when their attention is directed to their own country is seen in the published writings of such scholars as Wellington Koo, M. T. Z. Tyau, P. W. Kuo, M. J. Bau, S. Y. Cheng, P. C. Hsieh, C. L. Hsia, in the various monographs by Chinese authors which have appeared in the *Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law* of Columbia University, and in the scholarly contributions of the *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, which has completed its eleventh volume.

First, in point of time, of the countries with which China has entered into formal treaty relations, and among the first in point of importance in her international relations, has been Russia. Yet, until the appearance of the present work by Dr. Weigh, no other writer, except Dr. C. T. Hoo, had attempted to deal in any comprehensive manner with the international relations between these two vast and contiguous

countries,—and Dr. Hoo's "*Les Bases Conventionnelles des Relations Modernes entre la Chine et la Russie*" is now nearly ten years old, during which period there have been not only important developments, but the rendering accessible of additional information regarding the earlier years. It may be expected, therefore, that a hearty welcome will be accorded to Dr. Weigh's volume in which, in a scholarly manner, he has dealt both with the essential facts of his subject and with the significance of those facts. Especially, in this latter connection, will the reader find much to interest and inform him in the chapters dealing with White and Red Russian intrigues in Mongolia, Bolshevism in China, and the part played in Sino-Russian relations by the Chinese Eastern Railway. The time is rapidly approaching, if, indeed, it has not already arrived, when the relations of China with all the other powers will have to be placed upon an entirely new basis, and the answers to the questions as to why this new basis is needed, what its character should be, and the way or ways in which its establishment should be brought about, are largely to be found in a knowledge of China's past experiences in dealing with the other powers. Information such as Dr. Weigh supplies in the present volume cannot, therefore, but be of practical as well as of historical value.

W. W. WILLOUGHBY.



## PREFACE

WELL-NIGH two years ago the author's interest in Russo-Chinese affairs was occasioned by the sweeping victories of the politico-national Revolution going on in China, the preponderance of Russian influence in its successes, and the alleged Communist tinge which the Western world characterized the whole movement, thus giving umbrage to all kinds of apprehensions and misgivings that China was being converted to the vicious doctrines of Moscow and that in no time would the whole country be turned into an oasis of Communism. Hence this book, which is but an outline of the diplomatic relations of China and Russia, covering a period from September, 1689, when was concluded the Treaty of Nertchinsk, the first international engagement entered into by the Celestial Empire with a foreign power on the basis of equality and reciprocity, to May, 1924, when was signed at Peking China's last important treaty, the Agreement on General Principles, with the same power on the same basis. It is interesting to note that it was Russia that concluded this first and last bilateral treaty with China.

Since writing, so many great events have taken place in China and the conclusions then arrived at, though being, in the main, correct predictions of the trend which present events would take and of the probable outcome that is given birth to by the contact of two of the world's greatest political and social forces, namely, Nationalism and Bolshevism, have, nevertheless, to be redrawn and amplified. In the concluding chapter of this book the author insists that what was thought to be Bolshevism was a misnomer for Nationalism, that China was merely using the

Bolsheviks as a means to an end in the realization of a politically liberated China, free from the shackles of the internal and external enslavers of the people, and that Soviet Russia was using China as a means to an end, also, in bringing about the world Soviet revolution. Thus, between the Chinese Nationalists and the Russian Communists a grim kind of "hide and seek" was being played, each trying to outwit the other in the attainment of its designs and purposes. For, we know, the Chinese Nationalists, though believing in national liberation, do not believe in a social revolution in China; while the Bolsheviks, believing in national revolution, believe also in a social revolution.

We find, therefore, that Dr. Sun Yat-sen, when at the lowest ebb of his political power, sought alliance with Soviet Russia, she being the only nation then treating us as equals. He also opened the portals of the Kuomintang to the Communists, who, it should be clearly understood, were taken in not with their badge of Communism on their arms but as individuals with no political affiliations, as it was the hope of the leaders of the Party that, while availing themselves of the Communists' sacrificing spirit and methods in reaching the masses, they might bring them in the meantime within the orbit of assimilation to the tenets and principles of the Party. But contrary to their expectations the Communists not only refused to be "Kuomintangized" but sought to pollute the true principles upon which the Party was founded in order to carry out their radical ideas. Fortunately, these motives were detected in time, which led to the break with Hankow and the establishment of a new government at Nanking under the leadership of General Chiang Kai-shek in April, 1927. The Hankow régime was amalgamated, however, with the Nanking administration, in September of the same year, after the Wu-Han leaders had awakened from their Communist



delirium and had come to a realization of the fact that to save the Party and the Revolution they must needs break with the Communists.

The separation of Nationalism from Communism was thus complete, overtly at least, but the root of trouble had not yet been extirpated. Driven from Hankow, the Communists made their way to Canton and availing themselves of the use of the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet State Commercial Agencies as an asylum and headquarters, they staged on the eleventh of December, 1927, the horrible *coup d'état* which culminated in the forcible occupation of all government offices and in the unprecedented massacre and plunder in the annals of the city. This drove the Nationalist Government to the end of its patience. On December 14, 1927, in a Mandate it declared:

The Nationalist Government has, for some time, been informed by various reports that the Soviet Consulates and the Soviet State Commercial Agencies in areas within the jurisdiction of the Nationalist Government have been used as headquarters of red propaganda and asylum for Communists. An exposure of these facts has been so far withheld by the Government in view of the international relations existing between China and Russia.

On the eleventh of the present month, an uprising took place in the city of Canton culminating in the forcible occupation of the city by the Communists who cut off all communications, and burnt, plundered, and massacred throughout the city. This startling event with all its disastrous consequences is mainly attributed to the fact that the Communists have availed themselves of the Soviet Consulates and Soviet State Commercial Agencies as a base to direct their operations. And the fear is entertained that occurrences of like nature may take place elsewhere.

With a view to maintaining peace and order and to preventing the further spreading of such disasters, the Government feels that such a state of things, fraught with incalculable dangers to the Party and State, can no longer be tolerated. Therefore it is hereby ordered that the recognition accorded to the Consuls of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stationed in the various provinces shall suspend their functions, in order that the root of evil influence may be eradicated and a thorough inquiry instituted.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is instructed to superintend its subordinate organs and to act in conjunction with the other government authorities concerned to put into execution this Mandate with all due care and to report thereon.

In reply to this Mandate of the Nationalist Government, Mr. B. Kozlovsky, Soviet Consul General in Shanghai, communicated on December 17, 1927, to Mr. Quo Tai-chi, the Shanghai Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, for transmission to the latter's government, the following Note from Comrade Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R.:

(1) The Soviet Government never has recognized the so-called Nationalist Government at Nanking in whose name the Note of December 15 was handed to the U. S. S. R. Consulate General in Shanghai. The "Nationalist Government" must be acquainted with the fact that all the Consulates of the U. S. S. R. exist on Chinese territory in consequence of the treaty concluded between China and the U. S. S. R., and signed in Peking in 1924 and that all the appointments of the Consuls for Shanghai as well as in any other place in China were made with the knowledge and consent of the Peking Government. The Shanghai authorities as well as all other local Chinese authorities have only taken notice of these appointments. In consideration of these facts the statement in the Note of the "Nationalist Government" concerning the cancellation of the recognition of the Consuls in the different provinces can only mean that the Generals who have seized the power in Nanking under the pressure of the imperialists have thought it advisable to have in the territory under their domination especially the Consuls of such Powers as are maintaining the "unequal treaties" with the Chinese.

(2) The Soviet Government has to repudiate in the most energetic manner the completely unfounded statement contained in the Note of December 15 to the effect that the Consulates and the State Commercial Agencies are to be considered responsible for the "Red propaganda and as an asylum for the Communists." We have to repudiate especially in the most energetic way the allegation that our Consulate in Canton was guiding the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants in Kwangtung. It is an old attempt to consider the revolutionary movement of



the workers and peasants in China as a consequence of the activities of the Soviet official institutions. For years already the enemies of the Chinese people, the imperialists of all countries have considered the great revolutionary movement of the Chinese people as a consequence of the intrigues of "exterior forces." The fact that the "Nationalist Government" in Nanking is repeating now the counter-revolutionary legends of the suppressors of the Chinese people proves better than anything else whose will the "Nationalist Government" is actually performing now.

(3) The Soviet Government is convinced that the attitude of the Chinese authorities in Shanghai will do harm first of all to the Chinese people and to the national interests of China and the people who so lightly start a hostile policy against the U. S. S. R. will be the first who will feel the damaging results thereof.

This document speaks for itself. The Soviet Government has at last discarded its cloak of hypocrisy and revealed its true self. It proves once more the insincerity of the much-advertised reiterations and repeated avowals of Soviet Russia's friendship for China. Whether the Nationalist Government has been accorded recognition by the Soviet Government is a matter of little material importance, as the latter itself is yet an outcast in the society of nations. But what passes our understanding is that against this severance of diplomatic relations, the Soviet Government should have protested with the Nationalist Government which it had not recognized and not have protested with the Peking Government which it had recognized.

The more unreasonable and unfounded is the assertion of the Soviet Government concerning the alleged pressure which was brought to bear by the imperialists upon the Nationalist Government in arriving at its decision, in as much as the Nationalist Government has never been dictated to and does not expect to be now or any time in the future; and, as a government of the people it will give expression to no word or deed that is not the popular will.

That the Soviet Government would repudiate in the most energetic way the accusation that the Soviet Consulates and the Soviet State Commercial Agencies had been used by the Communists as an asylum and base to direct their operations was not unexpected, for few willingly admit of their mistakes. But the fact remains that the wrong is done and no amount of legal ingenuity is able to refute what evidence purports to be against them. That Soviet Russia was involved in the Canton catastrophe is now conclusively established, as may be proved from a partly burned document taken from the Soviet Consulate in Canton and now in the possession of the Nationalist Government. This document numbered 12857 and indorsed by the Seventh Enlarged Plenary Executive Committee of the Communist Third International, besides explaining how the Communist Party must take command of the peasant movement in accordance with the program of the Agrarian Revolution, instructs, among other things, the disarming of the "Mintuan," or the Citizens' Volunteer Corps, and other forces of the gentry, at the same time arming the proletariat to form an army.

The threat as veiled in the last paragraph and the document as a whole would have been no surprise to the Chinese people if it had emanated from one of the imperialist powers, but that it should have come from a government that has professed time and again its sympathy for the cause of the Revolution surpasses truly the compass of an average person. It is very well for the Soviet Government to hurl all epithets of revilement upon such powers as are maintaining the unequal treaties with China; the Soviet Government is, however, to be reminded that the Chinese people consider that power which seeks to destroy the political and social institutions of China and to drag the country into an intolerable state of chaos and anarchy as a hundredfold more dangerous to the



national interests of the Chinese people than any number of imperialists, and that such an inimical policy simply cannot be tolerated.<sup>1</sup>

However, as far as we are concerned, the Rubicon is at last crossed. We have finally come to the parting of the ways with Bolshevism. While we may congratulate ourselves for having finally arrived at this decision, we have, nevertheless, cause to commiserate ourselves for having to come to this decision at all and for the price we have paid in coming to this decision. Had not the Communists machinated the dissensions within the Party, the wounds of which have not yet been healed, and had the Communists not disturbed our equilibrium in the rear, our vanguards would have taken Peking long ago and the Revolution would have been a *fait accompli*.

<sup>1</sup>Considering Comrade Chicherin's Note as "a bit of propaganda which those familiar with Soviet methods have quite expected under the circumstances," and therefore unnecessary for the Nationalist Government to make a reply, Dr. C. C. Wu, the Nanking Minister for Foreign Affairs, in an interview, gave his opinion about the Soviet Commissar's three points as follows:

"(1) Although the Soviet Government has had many dealings with the Nationalist Government, it is true that the Soviet has not recognized it as the Government of all China, just as the Nationalist Government has never recognized the Soviet Government. But the fact remains that the consuls appointed by the Soviet Union and stationed in territory under the jurisdiction of the Nationalist Government, have been recognized by the Government as such and permitted to function.

"But the Government, having discovered that the Consulates, contrary to international practice and fair dealing, have been used for other than consular purposes, namely, Communist propaganda and agitation, dangerous to the safety of the Government and indeed of society, as witness the recent reign of terror at Canton, has considered it necessary to withdraw recognition from the Soviet Consuls and expelled them.

"These are matters of fact and political action. Mr. Chicherin's note as to nonrecognition, as well as the view of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo that Nanking's declaration has no validity from the legal point of view, are therefore both beside the point.

"(2) As regards the denial of Mr. Chicherin that Soviet Consulates and State Commercial Agencies have been used for Communist propaganda and that the Soviet Consulate in Canton has had anything to do with the recent Red uprising, we are in possession of documents, taken from the Soviet Consulate in Canton, which prove conclusively the Soviet's complicity in the Canton catastrophe.

"A partly burnt document, numbered 12857, and indorsed by the Seventh Enlarged Plenary Executive Committee of the Communist Third Inter-

That Bolshevism is not suitable to China has been dealt with at length in the last chapter of this book. The author's convictions have since been strengthened, however, by what he saw with his own eyes in Russia during the trip he took to that country in the past spring, after the conclusion of his studies in America. With a view to informing his countrymen that even in Russia itself the Bolshevik experiment has been a failure, he ventures to avail himself of this opportunity to tell of some of his impressions gathered during this short sojourn in Moscow.

It is needless to say that only those who profess, apparently at least, a sympathy for the Soviet cause

national, explains how the Communist Party must take command of the peasant movement in accordance with the program of the Agrarian Revolution, and instructs, among other points, the disarming of the "Mintuan," or Citizens' Volunteers, and other forces of the gentry, at the same time arming the poor and middle class peasants to form an army.

"Mr. Chicherin has labored the point that Soviet Russia signed the 1924 Agreement with the Peking, and not with the Nationalist Government. This new-born enthusiasm for the Peking militarists is amusing, and may be significant as a new orientation of Soviet policy, but I think the Soviet Commissar might have pursued the point further.

"Article 6 of the Agreement provides that each government pledges itself not to engage in propaganda directed against the political and social system of the other. He might, instead of a flat denial of complicity in events in Canton, have said that since the Soviet Government did not recognize the Nationalist Government, therefore this article had no application to Canton which was under Nationalist jurisdiction.

"(3) The friendship which the Nationalist Party and the Nationalist Government had in the past exhibited towards the Communist Party and the Soviet Government had been due to the belief that the latter were sincere in their sympathy for the Chinese Nationalist movement seeking freedom from bondage within and without and an unimpeded development of China's national destiny.

"Recent events have fully expressed attempts to denationalize the Nationalist movement and to convert China into a mere appendage of the Soviet Union, and their methods of destruction. Elementary considerations of self-defense require the removal of centers of hostile activity.

"In June last I informed the Soviet authorities that while we were compelled to take steps against Chinese Communists who were obstructing and endangering our national revolutionary movement we hoped that friendly relationship with the Soviet Government would be continued. Although I was of course aware of the intimate connection between the Chinese Communist Party, the Third International, and the Soviet Government, I had hoped that my statement would be taken as a warning. It seems that the warning had had no effect. In taking this purely defensive measure, it is immaterial to us to whom such action happens to please or displease."



and have filled a lengthy questionnaire touching the most minute details of their public and private life to the satisfaction of the Soviet authorities, can hope to enter Russia. Comparatively good fortune awaited the author, however, at the station in Moscow when his train pulled in. At the booking office in London he had learned that the only hotel available for English-speaking people was the Savoy Hotel. To his delight, when he alighted from the train a most dignified gentleman, white-haired and gray-bearded, came to meet him and greeted him in perfect English. On the way to the hotel he took the author into his confidence and revealed to him that in the good old days he was professor of international law in one of the big imperial universities and that it was because of his ability to converse fluently in English, French, and German that he was now employed by the government as an usher of the hotel at a barely subsisting wage.

Such was the fate that came upon the so-called bourgeoisie in Russia. Similar incidents might be multiplied. A stroll on the streets would bring one's attention to women selling fruits and other sundries, and should one purchase make a purchase one might at times meet with responses which only the most cultured and educated would be able to engage in. These, as the author was told, were none other than some of the remnants of the nobility of Imperialist Russia. Again, no matter where one should go one would see here and there boys and girls with a stick in one hand and a bag in another and faces that had long ceased to see the cleansing touch of the soap loitering around and clustering in gangs. These, the author's friend and guide pointed out, were some of the protegy of the bourgeoisie who had either been exterminated or had fled abroad. This element calculated by the Commissariat of Public Health numbers no less than two million in

Russia. It is the policy of the government, as the author understands, to let these helpless younglings alone and to perish of starvation and cold. It was indeed a pitiable sight as he rode along the Siberian Railway to see these children in every station and many of them begging for a free ride on the train to take them to where better fortune might be waiting but only to be refused admittance by the Soviet guards.

Economically, Communism has not only done away with the incentive for work which is the only key to progress and prosperity, but it has upset the whole economic structure of society. With the ascendancy of the Soviets, as every one is aware, all lands, industries, buildings, etc., were nationalized. Though private enterprises are permitted and every one may go to the government for an appropriation of land, yet, as seventy per cent of the net profits have to go to fill up the coffers of the state, little cultivation may be seen and few engage themselves in business. It is true that in the days of the empire the *ispravnik* used to take a score of eggs from the farmers, but now the *tovalistji* take not only the eggs but the hen as well. Again, labor in a Communist society, theoretically speaking, should be the most benefited. It is not so, however, in Soviet Russia. With all the industries paralyzed, capital eliminated, and profit reduced to the minimum, the inevitable result is unemployment, and those who are employed get so little that they have lost all interest and pride in craftsmanship.

Such being the economic order of the day in Russia, the social condition is no pleasanter. When one cannot be allotted more than sixteen cubit feet of space to live in, home life in Russia can well be imagined. People live all together in a genuine communistic collection regulated by the so-called "Rules for Living Together," some of the provisions of which stipulate that pigs, goats, sheep, rabbits, pigeons, or birds of any kind, should not be kept in the dwelling



except in a cage; that wood should not be sawed or chopped in the room; that tenants are obliged to take measures to get rid of parasites, and that screams and disputes are prohibited from 11:30 P.M. to 9 A.M.

Theoretically speaking, the communism of wives does not exist in Russia. But practically there is no giving nor receiving in marriage. Pairing is given the least conventional considerations and a couple becomes husband and wife upon putting their names on the police register of the district in which they choose to live. Separation and divorce may be effected at will and upon no cause whatsoever. Prostitution is non-existent, but a large percentage of the population is stricken with venereal diseases. From these facts we cannot infer, however, that there are no good women in Russia. Faces that beam with the purest maidenliness may yet be found everywhere, and Russian girls must be given the credit that they are more independent and more equal to men than their sisters in other lands. Aside from taking their places with men in the offices and other walks of life they go unescorted and with heavy bundles or luggage in the long-distance trains.

Politically, the Soviet Government is undoubtedly a successful experiment. But it is the most despotic government in the world, operated by force and maintained by a small minority, — the leather-legged and spurred Communists, who are arrogance *in excelcīs*, and are far mightier than the reviled bourgeoisie. They alone are the élite and all below them are in the deep and are more downtrodden and oppressed than the lower class had ever been in the days of the Czar. It is the only government in the world that has no opposition. Those who are not in sympathy with the policy of the government have the option either to keep their mouths shut or pay the penalty which the state chooses to impose. Hence politics is not a topic of daily conversation. The government decides what

the people shall read and what the people shall hear. Foreign newspapers and other anti-Communist literature are forbidden to be imported. A strict censure of mails coming in and going out of Russia is enforced. Propaganda on behalf of the Communist cause is broadcasted by day and night. Students are taught nothing that is against Bolshevism. No one can move about from one abode to another without first obtaining a permit from the government. The Soviet idea of equality or proletarianism exists only in theory as may be evidenced from a single incidence that instead of all being one class as in the American system, the Russian railways are divided into the first, second, third, and fourth classes, with the nepotic Soviet Bureaucrats always occupying the best quarters.

From what has been said, it is obvious that Bolshevism is not a panacea of all ills as the Communists have claimed it to be. On the contrary, it has economically paralyzed all industries, thereby increasing unemployment and draining the wealth of the nation; socially, it has lowered the standard of womanhood and done away with the institution of the home, which is so dear to the hearts of all peoples; and politically, with its carefully coördinated system of espionage and surveillance, it has made the country the most despotic of its kind in the world and the last place in which a decent person would choose to live. If one is not mistaken, dissatisfaction seems to be written on every face,—a sign which presages that the Soviet order will not long endure in Russia.

In concluding these prefatory remarks there remains for the author to perform the pleasant duty of making due acknowledgment of the assistance which he has received in the preparation of this work. First of all, he feels under the greatest obligations to Dr. W. W. Willoughby, Professor of Political Science of the Johns Hopkins University, formerly Legal Adviser to the Chinese Republic and Technical Expert and



Counsellor to the Chinese Delegation at the Washington Disarmament and the Geneva International Opium Conferences, for his constant advice and criticism which only his profound knowledge of Chinese affairs could impart. He is indebted also to Dr. Sao-ke Alfred Sze, Chinese Minister to the United States of America, for certain information and advice which could not be obtained from books; to Mr. Boris E. Skvirsky, formerly Delegate of the Far Eastern Republic to the Washington Conference and now Head of the Russian Bureau in Washington, D. C., for making accessible certain documents in Russian; to Dr. Herbert W. Briggs, formerly Assistant Professor of International Law of the Johns Hopkins University and now on the Staff of the Institute of International Relations, New York, and Mr. T. Reese Marsh, a fellow student and friend, for making many improvements in the author's English; and to Mr. Y. L. Liang, a former colleague, for reading over part of the proofs. Last but not least the author wishes to express his appreciation and gratitude to Miss Dorothy Lampen and Miss Li Faung Wang, not only for reading over the whole or a portion of the manuscript and making many suggestions therein, but also for their encouragement, inspiration, and friendship. In spite of all this assistance the author realizes that there must be many shortcomings for which he alone is responsible.

K. S. W.

NANKING,

DECEMBER 31, 1927.



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PART I  
CHINA AND CZARIST RUSSIA



# RUSSO-CHINESE DIPLOMACY

## CHAPTER I

### EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA

CHINA and Russia, with a boundary coterminous for over four thousand miles from the Pamirs in Turkestan to Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan, were first brought into contact with each other by the Mongol conquest of the thirteenth century. The Mongol domination was a short one, yet the Mongolian khans were once rulers over a territory that had seldom been equaled in extent, and Kublai Khan, founder of the city of Peking, when at the zenith of his power, was fittingly described by Marco Polo, the noted Venetian traveler, as "the most powerful man who existed in the world since our forefather Adam."

The story of this chapter of Russo-Chinese relations appears romantic as well as tragic, when we picture to ourselves the descendants of Ruik groveling and prostrating themselves at the feet of the successive great khans on the Amur, at Serai on the Volga, or wherever else the Mongol lords held court, humiliating themselves to curry their master's favor, intriguing one against another, and fighting and killing each other at his bidding. As a result of this Mongol invasion into Europe, thousands and thousands of Russians must have been brought to China who were,

as Professor Parker tells us, incorporated into imperial guards stationed at the Court of Peking.<sup>1</sup> Aside from these captives there were other Russians in China during this early period. Rubruquis met some Russians at Karakorum. Mendes Pinto related that he saw Muscovites in China in the suite of an ambassador from the emperor of Caran, probably Kazan, in 1544, in whose train were "tall blond men from the land of Moscovy armed with long broadswords and wearing robes lined with sables."<sup>2</sup>

Russian expansion toward Eastern Asia began, however, with the historic invasion of Yermak into Siberia in 1580. According to legend, this Robin Hood of Russia having no means of subsistence, betook himself with a few accomplices to robbing on the highways and soon became powerful and notorious; for he robbed only the rich and bestowed liberally on those who were in want. In time, the band grew in size and became troublesome to the state. On being pursued by government troops, they made their way to Perm, a settlement made by Straganov and his clan. In order to get rid of these uninvited guests, Straganov suggested to Yermak that he cross the Urals into Siberia, promising to supply him with provisions and ammunitions necessary for the conquest of the hostile natives. Yermak and his men took the advice and went over the mountains. In the following year, they conquered what is now the city of Tobolsk. Yermak then resolved to submit himself to the clemency of His Majesty in the hope of gaining his gracious pardon by the present of this newly acquired territory. This proposal was made at Court to Ivan IV through the medium of a friend, and was accepted by the King. Yermak was then brought

<sup>1</sup>Cf. Edward H. Parker, "China, Her History, Diplomacy and Commerce," p. 102.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. "Russo-Chinese Relations (1224-1912)," *Edinburgh Review*, Jan., 1912, Vol. CCXV, p. 192.



to Moscow under safe-conduct, pardoned, and restored to royal favor. Shortly afterwards, Yermak was furnished with a regiment of Cossacks for another expedition to conquer more lands for the Czar. In a battle with the Tartars on the river Irtysh, Yermak, observing the King's barge, ordered his crew to board her, while he, endeavoring to go at the head of his men, jumped short, fell into the river, and was drowned, to the great grief of his followers. But the Russians carried the day and the land was brought into the domain of Moscow.

The gate of the Urals was thus opened. Physically speaking, Siberia is merely a continuation of European Russia. The Urals, compared with the Italian Alps, the American Rockies, and the Asiatic Himalayas, are no mountains at all. Following Yermak, streams of adventurers, fortune seekers, political and criminal exiles, began to pour into Siberia year after year in increasing numbers. Although fabulous wealth in gold was never found in any great quantities, a not less powerful lure existed in the form of sableskins, which could be had in abundance. Indeed, this veritable "golden fleece of Jason" played no small part in Russia's advance toward the Pacific.

The first recorded migration took place in 1598. These emigrants did not go there on their own account. They came from Uglich after having enraged the Czar by the murder of Czarevitch Dmitri. As the story goes, exiled with them was a bell that had persisted in ringing when the Emperor demanded silence. It was ordered to be flogged, its ears chipped off, and, thus mutilated, it was banished to do time with the talkative inhabitants of Uglich.

Following the line of least resistance, the Russians took to northerly latitudes, and in less than a century they had reached the Pacific coast. In 1587, they founded Tobolsk; in 1604, Tomsk; in 1619, Yeniseisk; in 1632, Yakutsk; in 1638, Okhotsk. Heretofore, they

had met practically no opposition. But when they came to the Amur region they encountered the Chinese, who put a temporary halt to their advance.

The Russian hunters, following the river Lena to its source in the mountains, learned of the existence of the Shilka and the Dseya and the untold wealth of grain and silver along their banks. Reports brought from the Tungus natives confirmed these reports. Accordingly, Golowin, the *Woewod*, or Governor, of Siberia, in 1643 dispatched Bachteryarov, a book-keeper, together with seventy men, to look into the facts of these tales. Bachteryarov, being incompetent as a leader, returned without learning anything definite. Golowin fitted out another expedition in the same year on a larger scale and selected Poyarkov as leader of the party. Poyarkov was instructed to exact tribute from the natives and to war upon those who refused to comply with this demand. On arrival at the Dseya, Poyarkov and his men were disappointed as to foodstuffs, which were largely imported from China. He then sent seventy men to a neighboring settlement of the Dauri tribes, who refused to admit them into their habitations. On returning, they were denied the provisions of their own camps. Consequently, they had to feed on natives they killed and those comrades who perished of starvation. In the spring the party sailed down the Dseya. The natives along the banks had heard of these savage marauders, and had preceded them down the river. However, they captured three Giliaks and compelled others to give tribute. Having reached the mouth of the Amur, they camped for the winter. Another winter was passed at the mouth of the Ulja. They returned to Yakutsk in June, 1646. The expedition was successful in that they had seen the country at first hand, and were thus enabled to glean facts from myths. But they had struck terror into the hearts of all the natives with whom they had come in contact. The



natives had been paying tribute to China from time immemorial, and the Chinese tribute gatherers had never been guilty of such inhuman practices. Consequently, they did not for a moment hesitate to cast in their lot with the Chinese to whom they had remained ever faithful.

The next notable expedition was undertaken by Kharbarov, who, realizing the immediate advantages to be derived from the conquest of the Amur, put his whole time and money into the adventure. Besides his own zeal in the undertaking he was morally and financially supported by the new *Woewod*, Fransbekov. A hundred fifty volunteers were enlisted to form a company to force the natives of the Amur to pay tribute. Going by way of Olekma, the new route, Kharbarov and his men had no difficulty in crossing the mountains. But the inhabitants of the places he passed had all deserted before his approach. He found not a living soul in the first two settlements he came upon, but when he came to the third he was met by three horsemen. Kharbarov told them that they had come on a peaceful trade mission. But, on discerning that these strangers belonged to the same gang who had previously ravaged their fields and their homes, the three horsemen took to flight and could not be overtaken, although three days were spent in hot pursuit. In a fifth settlement, Kharbarov tortured an old woman, whom he found in a desolated village, to make her tell him things which he later found to be false. Baffled in every way, he turned his footsteps back to Irkutsk. He assured the *Woewod*, however, that if the country were conquered there would be grain enough to last for many years, because during this expedition he had discovered large stores of grain hidden in pits by the native inhabitants.

Kharbarov remained only long enough to recruit his company, and this time he set out heavily equipped and armed. When he reached Albazin, he encountered

the Dauri tribes and fought them one day from noon until evening, but finally bows and arrows had to yield to cannons and rifles. Albazin was made their headquarters and was hurriedly fortified. The village of Guigudar in the neighborhood of Albazin was surprised and ransacked. By threats of the same fate that had befallen Guigudar, tribute was extorted from the other natives. Many captives pleaded for leniency on the ground that they had just paid their tribute to China and that they had very little left now. Kharbarof suggested a conference of all the leading inhabitants in order to discuss matters. Three hundred citizens appeared, who promised him everything he asked for. The conquerors and the vanquished then lived for a time on the friendliest of terms. The Daurians visited the Russian camps and the Russians were asked to visit their homes and were amply supplied with provisions. These manifestations of friendship beguiled them. Kharbarov was taken off his guard and one morning he awoke to see that the whole village was deserted. This put him in a bad fix, because it was winter. Food had to be sought and provided for. To advance was therefore the only course to take in order to save himself and his followers from starvation. They sailed down the Amur and came to Achani, a fish-eating district, where they camped. They were attacked by the natives, but again the superiority of the cannons repelled the native onslaught and drove the inhabitants from their own abodes. The Russians then helped themselves to whatever they could lay their hands upon. Here they halted and thought they were safe.

But the Chinese, who had resented the loss of revenue in kind and subjects, real or subjective, and, in compliance with the petitions of the suffering natives, had begun to take drastic measures to cope with the Russians, were already advancing against the latter. A battle ensued. The Chinese forces had the



upper hand at the beginning; but, acting according to instructions from the Emperor, the general in command gave orders not to kill but to take the Russians prisoners. The latter, determining not to be taken alive, fought bravely and succeeded in driving the Chinese back. The Chinese soldiers were demoralized, since an army which was not allowed to return fire when shot at could not very well retain the field. In spite of this repulse, however, the boldness of the Russians had been checked, and the very rumor of the presence of the Chinese soldiers was enough to give them cause to fear and to refrain from going out to commit further atrocities on the helpless natives. This marked the end of Kharbarov's achievements. The morale of his troops had gradually broken down, and they mutinied shortly afterwards.

Kharbarov was replaced by Stepanov in 1654. Stepanov bravely sailed down the Sungari in May of the same year and was met by a contingent of Chinese troops. A battle soon followed. This time the Chinese general gave orders to kill, and the Cossacks were badly beaten. The Chinese continued to drive the Russians up the river and tried for a time to starve them out by ordering the natives, living at the mouth of the river, to abandon their homesteads and come to live in the interior where they were out of the reach of these undesirable soldiers. In the meantime, China was preparing for another battle, which was fought on the Amur, below the mouth of the Sungari, on June 30, 1658. As a result of this battle, Stepanov, with two hundred seventy men, disappeared and about an equal number of them escaped to the hills to become outlaws. The Amur was thus clear as far as Nertchinsk, and China, thinking the trouble over in this region, withdrew her troops.

But by the end of 1644 the Russians at Nertchinsk were greatly augmented by the Cossacks of Ilimsk, who, having killed their *Woewod* and having fled

across the mountains, settled along the great river of Sakhalin and Yalong, and fortified the fort of Albazin, called Yaksa by the Chinese and the Tartars. They continued to expand and colonize and built a chain of these fortresses, or ostrogs, and began to extort tribute from the Dauri and Ducheri tribes, who inhabited this place.

In 1683 twenty Chinese hunters were buried alive by a party of Cossacks from Albazin. China was greatly enraged and at once took up arms against this lawlessness. On June 12, 1685, the Chinese army planted its standard before Albazin and surrounded the place. After a few days' siege the resistance gave way and Albazin was completely destroyed. The Chinese troops then marched to Aihun, leaving the grainfields undisturbed. After the withdrawal of the Chinese troops the Russians returned in the winter and rebuilt Albazin. China answered this bold defiance by ordering her army to advance from Aihun, and on July 7, 1686, besieged the fortress for the second time. While the siege was in progress, a deputation arrived from Russia. They requested the Emperor, K'ang Hsi, to stay the siege, on behalf of the Czar who, "being apprehensive of the consequences of the war, desired the emperor to end it amicably." K'ang Hsi granted the petition and the siege was lifted.<sup>1</sup>

Negotiations for peace were delayed by the war then raging between the Eleuths and the Kalkas on the Russian frontier. A letter was duly dispatched, however, by the Chinese to the Russian authorities. In this epistle the Chinese blamed the inhabitants of the Russian frontiers for encroaching upon Yaksa and Nipchu, plundering, robbing, and illtreating the

<sup>1</sup> For details of these early Russian expeditions on the Amur, see Golder, "Russian Expansion on the Pacific," pp. 33-66, on which the account given above is largely based.



Chinese hunters. They blamed also Alexis, the Governor of Yaksa, who, "contrary to all manner of right and reason," took to arms and thus compelled the Chinese general to lay siege to Yaksa, in which he made himself master by capitulation. The epistle continues:

However, His Imperial Majesty, persuading himself that the dukes of Russia would not approve of the Governor's conduct, gave orders for treating the Russians according to their quality; so that though there were about one thousand soldiers in Yaksa when it was taken, not one of them received the least ill-usage; on the contrary, those who had no horses, arms, or provisions, were supplied with them, and were sent back with a declaration that our Emperor, far from delighting in hostilities, was desirous of living in peace with his neighbors. Alexis was surprised at His Imperial Majesty's clemency and testified his gratitude with tears.<sup>1</sup>

Then, after a short diplomatic parley, Nipchu was named by K'ang Hsi as the place of the conference between the Chinese and Russian plenipotentiaries. The Chinese delegation arrived at Nipchu on June 31, 1689, with a large assemblage of officers, soldiers, and servants—the whole might be put at nine or ten thousand men, three or four thousand camels, and at least fifteen thousand horses. The Governor of Nipchu complained that the Chinese had come not to treat of peace but as if to make war.<sup>2</sup> The Russian envoys did not arrive until the eighteenth, insisting that the conference should be held with an equal number of men on both sides. The controversy was finally settled by the agreement that the Russians likewise could have an equal number of men to accompany their representatives to the place of the meeting; that the guards on both sides should carry no arms but swords; that to avoid treachery the Chinese should

<sup>1</sup> *Chinese Repository*, Vol. VIII, p. 416.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 417.



search the Russians and the Russians, the Chinese; and that, in order that there might be an equality in everything, "the ambassadors should meet under their tents, which should be placed one beside the other, as if the two were but one; and that they should sit in their tents one over against another without any superiority on either side."<sup>1</sup>

The scene of the treaty was picturesque as well as solemn. The Russian tent was neatly fitted up and set off with Turkish carpets, while the Chinese tent was plain with a long bench in the middle. The two embassies, heavily guarded on both sides with colors flying and kettledrums beating, proceeded to the tents. The Russians alighted first to do the honors of their country and, advancing a few steps to meet the Chinese, invited them to enter the tent first. They sat opposite each other on benches with a table between them. The interpreters sat at the upper end of the table, while the retinue stood. After all had taken their seats, which was done at the same instant, the conference began. Both sides commenced with exorbitant demands, requiring much more than they could or did expect to obtain. In the words of Gerbillon, who accompanied the Chinese delegation as interpreter, "they have advanced two steps backward."<sup>2</sup> Several days passed by without any concrete results being reached. An open rupture seemed inevitable, but, thanks to the efforts of the Jesuit missionaries, an agreement was at last arrived at. The final draft of the treaty was written on September 6 and was read aloud, signed, sealed, and given to each side. After this, according to the contemporary historians, the High Contracting Parties, "rising together, and, holding each the copies of the treaty of peace, swore, in the name of their masters,

<sup>1</sup> *Chinese Repository*, Vol. VIII, p. 419.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 421.

to observe them faithfully, taking Almighty God, the Sovereign of all things, to witness the sincerity of their intentions."<sup>1</sup> After the exchange of presents the envoys departed. Thus was concluded, on a perfect footing of equality, on September 9, 1689, the first treaty of the Celestial Empire with another foreign nation.

The objects of the treaty, as clearly stated in the preamble, were: "To repress the insolence of certain rovers, who, passing beyond the bounds of their lands to hunt, robbed, murdered, and committed other outrages; as also for settling the bounds of the two countries of China and Russia, and in short, to establish an everlasting peace and good understanding."<sup>2</sup>

The bounds of the two countries were demarcated by the river Kerbechi and the long chain of mountains below the source of the Kerbechi, extending as far as the Eastern Sea. All the rivers and banks, great or small, on the southern side of those mountains, as well as all the lands and countries from the top of those mountains southward, were stipulated as belonging to the Empire of China, and all the lands, countries, rivers, and brooks on the other side of the mountains extending northward were stipulated as remaining the possession of the Empire of Russia. The territory lying between the said chain of mountains and the river Udi was undecided, but was to be settled by ambassadors specially designated for the purpose by letters when further details were available.<sup>3</sup>

The other important articles of the treaty provided that the fortress of Yaksa was to be completely

<sup>1</sup> *Chinese Repository*, Vol. VIII, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> For text of treaty, see Hertslet, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 437 ff.

<sup>3</sup> China made a great mistake in leaving this portion of her territory undecided, for the Ming Emperors, Hung Wu (1368-1398), and Yung Lê, in 1613, had sent expeditions to the lower Amur and built temples and erected stone monuments with inscriptions which still exist to-day.



demolished, that the hunters of the respective empires were not, upon any account whatsoever, to pass beyond the bounds settled above, that neither side was to receive any fugitive or deserter, that persons with proper passports should be suffered to come and go from the territories subject to either empire into those of the other and to buy and sell whatever they should think fit and to carry on a mutual trade, and, finally, that bygones were to be bygones and that "everything that has passed hitherto, of what nature soever it may be, shall be buried in everlasting oblivion." Two copies of this treaty were to be sealed with seals; the text of which was to be engraven in Turkestan, Chinese, Russian, and Latin languages upon stone which should be placed at the bounds settled between the two empires to remain there as a perpetual monument of the good understanding that ought to exist between them.

One of the practical results of the hostilities at Albazin was the capture by the Chinese of many Russians who were carried to Peking. Hence the origin of the Russian colony which still exists there to-day. According to Emperor K'ang Hsi's letter to the Czar, complying with the latter's request for peace, it was stated, however, that none of the prisoners were put to death, but were liberated and that "more than forty Russians of their own freedom preferred remaining amongst our people."<sup>1</sup> These Russians lived in small houses in the northwestern part of Peking. They taught the Manchus the elements of the Russian language and a Russian school was said to be in existence, but according to Timkowski, "the simplest rules of grammar were not observed" by the pupils, who "candidly confessed that they did not understand a word of what the Russians said." A church, the Church of Assumption, was built in this quarter "with

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Putnam Weale, "Manchu and Muscovite," p. 35.



the materials of a pagan temple," and decorated "with a picture of the Savior in prison seated and wearing the crown of thorns which was brought from Albazin."<sup>1</sup>

Timkowski, who was one of the early Russian missionaries in Peking, says:

In general, this quarter of Peking is very poor, though it contains the palace of a prince, which is situated to the southwest of our church. The descendants of the Albazins live at present in the western part of the city, which is assigned to the division of Manchoo troops to which they belong. They have lost all attachment to their former countrymen, the Russians. There are twenty-two among them who have been baptized but they are so connected with the Manchooks by marriages, and by their dependence as subjects, that it is very difficult to distinguish them. They speak Chinese; they dress like the Manchooks; and live entirely in the same manner as the soldiers of that nation — poor, idle, and attached to the superstitions of Shamanism."<sup>2</sup>

While the frontier war was going on after 1680, a war which China regarded as perpetrated by mere irresponsible persons not sanctioned by the Russian Government, attempts were made by St. Petersburg to establish cordial and diplomatic relations with Peking. Naturally, the first recorded visit of the Russians at Peking was rather an exploring expedition than an embassy. This was undertaken by two Cossacks, Petrov and Yallyshev, in 1567. They were instructed to find out as much as they possibly could about the customs, languages, etc., of the peoples who lived in the neighboring kingdoms of Russia. They were particularly instructed to extend their inquiries to "the kingdom of China, the land of the Mongols and the great river Ob." They seemed to have reached Peking by way of Kalgan, but, as they had brought no

<sup>1</sup>Cf. George Timkowski, "Travels of the Russian Mission Through Mongolia to China and Residence in Peking, 1820-1821," Vol. I, pp. 367, 286; Vol. II, p. 45.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 45.

presents with them, they were dismissed without seeing the Emperor, Lung Ch'ing.<sup>1</sup>

In 1608, an actual, though abortive, attempt to reach Peking was made by a trading embassy to the Golden King, whose help was desired to enable them to reach China. To avoid being attacked on the journey, a government caravan was formed, a system which was adopted and maintained until the end of the eighteenth century.

In 1616, two Cossacks, Tumenets and Petrov, were sent from Tobolsk on the same errand. They failed to reach China but spent some time at the Court of Altan, the Golden King, who received them well and even agreed to become tributary to Russia.

Using the scanty information which had been gathered, another expedition headed by Pettlin and his companion, Mundov, was sent out in 1619. They, also, were not granted an audience by the Chinese Emperor because they had brought no presents, and were dismissed with a letter with which they returned to Tobolsk. But no one there could make out what the imperial epistle said, nor did all the Oriental learning at St. Petersburg succeed in ciphering it, until Spathery took it to Peking in 1776 and had it translated by Verbiest, the well-known Jesuit priest.<sup>2</sup>

The third embassy was intrusted to Theodore Baikov in 1654 with a small caravan of government goods. After a journey of almost two years he reached the Chinese Capital. He was not granted an audience, because he refused to perform any ceremony derogatory to the dignity of his person and his country.<sup>3</sup>

In 1659, Perfiliev set out with a letter from the Czar, Alexei Mikhailovitch. He was received by Emperor

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Edward T. Williams, "The Middle Kingdom," Vol. II, p. 441.

<sup>2</sup> Hugh Murray, "An Historical and Descriptive Account of China," p. 359.

<sup>3</sup> Williams, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 411.



Shun Chih. Presumably he must have performed the kotow ceremony and was dismissed with ten poods of tea, which were brought to Moscow — probably the first overland tea on record. Two other caravans, one under Ablin in 1669, and again one in 1675 under Parshennikov, were sent to China by the Urga-Kalgan route.

In 1675, the first real embassy was sent by the Czar in the person of Nicholas Spathery. He was received by the Emperor and entertained with music and a repast of tea boiled with butter and milk. But because of his "obstinacy and bad manners" he was dismissed and his presents accepted as tribute from Russia.

In chronological order the diplomatic relations of the two countries culminated here in the negotiations leading up to the signature of the Treaty of Nertchinsk in September, 1689, which we have related in detail. In 1692, Peter the Great sent Evert Ysbrant Ides, a German in his service, on a mission to K'ang Hsi with the purpose of exchanging ratifications of the 1689 treaty and of improving the commercial conditions of the two countries. He spent eighteen months in reaching the city of Tsitsihar, and on arrival at the Chinese borders, he was met by a Chinese mandarin, a guard of eight, and a welcome of three iron guns. "We mutually approached each other," he writes self-complacently in his memoirs, "by slow advances and met about a mile short of the mentioned town, where I was civilly welcomed by the Chinese mandarin; and after the compliments were passed, we rode forward together in very good order, making a very good appearance, till we reached the town where a very good house was provided for me, and those of my retinue were well lodged suitable to their characters, as well as the Cossacks which I had with me, in the best houses in the town."<sup>1</sup> Here he was elaborately

<sup>1</sup> E. Y. Ides, "The Three Years' Land Travels of His Excellency E. Y. Ides from Moscow to China," p. 52.



entertained by the Chinese official and in return Ides "entertained him in the European manner."<sup>1</sup> On his triumphant entry into Peking, "the crowd at the gates and concourse of people with which the streets were lined, gave us some interruption, . . . notwithstanding there were several of the Emperor's boschies or way makers appointed to make way for our passage, yet they had enough to do to make us bare passing room."<sup>2</sup> After three days' repose Ides was given a feast of welcome. Following a minute inventory of the dishes served he relates: "The table appointed for me alone was about an ell square, upon which the dishes, all of silver, and piled one upon another, amounted . . . to the number of seventy."<sup>3</sup> He was also entertained with "kumiss in a gold cup, a sort of brandy distilled from mare's milk."<sup>4</sup> On November 12, he had an audience with the Emperor, during which he presented his credentials. In tantalizing contrast to this minute and detailed description of his fare, he is discreetly silent on the most important objects of his mission, a silence which was probably kept by order of Peter, who, like his successors, seemed to have endeavored to keep Europeans as much as possible ignorant of Russian diplomacy with Asiatic courts.

Ides makes no mention of having performed the much-demanded humiliating ceremony of prostrations, but, according to Sir George Staunton, we may presume that Ides made no objection to the performance of this duty, as may be seen from the following passage: "The ambassador being reconducted by the adogedas to his seat, the Chinese all on a sudden placed themselves on the right side upon their bended knees, knocking their heads against the ground three times whilst the Emperor was descending from the

<sup>1</sup> Ides, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

throne. We were led by the adogedas to the same place, where we were obliged to perform the same ceremony." <sup>1</sup> Ides left Peking on February 19, 1694, after having had his final audience with the Emperor. He was accompanied out of the city gate with a numerous train of great officers of state.

Considerable light was thrown upon the early relations of China and Russia by the embassy of Tu-li-shen, 1712-1716, from Emperor K'ang Hsi to the Khan of the Tourgouth Tartars, who had migrated from their Mongolian homes to the banks of the Volga. Had Peter the Great not been occupied with his Swedish campaigns, he would undoubtedly have invited the Chinese envoys to his court, and a better understanding would have been reached between the two countries.

Ostensibly the embassy was sent to inquire into the health of Ayukee and to inform him of His Majesty's intention of restoring Prince O-la-pu-chu-eur, Ayukee's nephew, to the bosom of his family and to deliver the presents which His Majesty had been pleased to send to him. The imperial edict, which ordered this embassy, prescribed, however, a minute guide for the conduct of the mission should the embassy be so circumstanced as to go to St. Petersburg and have an audience with the Czar. These instructions concerned the weightiest of international queries regarding the frontiers and alliances, as well as the most commonplace questions of the imperial chase and the care of the aged and the infirm.<sup>2</sup> On arrival at the Russian frontier, Tu-li-shen was met by a Russian messenger and conducted with military honors to the town of Selinginsky where he had a conference with the Governor. On arrival at Tobolsk,

<sup>1</sup> G. L. Staunton, "Embassy to the Tourgouth Tartars," p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Text of edict given in Tu-li-shen's "Narrative of the Chinese Embassy to the Khan of the Tourgouth Tartars, 1712-1715," pp. 13-20.



the embassy was met by Prince Gazarin, the Russian Governor of Siberia, with whom Tu-li-shen had a long conversation touching on matters of state. Tu-li-shen was here informed that the Czar had been apprised of his mission and was on the field at the head of his army, otherwise His Majesty would be most pleased to receive the envoys from the great Celestial Empire.

Having performed his mission to Ayukee, Tu-li-shen returned to Peking and, in his report to the throne, he made the following observations magnifying His Majesty's benign influence far and wide:

Thus, although these Russian dominions are the unfrequented and desert regions of the northwest; although, from the most ancient times to the present, they have had no intercourse with our Chinese Empire; though they are not even mentioned in our histories, nor have ever before this time been visited by a single native of China; yet, even here, as in all other quarters, the godlike majesty of our Emperor's excellent virtues has been made manifest; all the ten thousand kingdoms of the world participate in the protecting care of his beneficent government. . . . Russia is only now beginning to open an intercourse with China; but as long as forty or fifty years ago, when the boundaries of the two empires were yet unsettled, even then, the many excellent virtues of our empire were well known to them by report. Their benign influence had already begun to produce among the Russians a disposition towards improvement.<sup>1</sup>

To go back to the Russian embassies to China, one of the arrangements made by Ides was that the Russian caravans should visit Peking at regular intervals under the superintendence of the Chinese Government, which was also to defray all the expenses incidental thereto. But the Muscovites were heavily addicted to the habits of intoxication, which resulted in frequent disorders, and which gave such umbrage to the sobriety and orderliness of the Chinese people that K'ang Hsi threatened to terminate the intercourse between the

<sup>1</sup> Tu-li-shen, *op. cit.*, pp. 200, 201.



two peoples. In order to avert this crisis, Peter the Great sent Ismaylov on a special mission to China in 1719.

For details of Ismaylov's mission we are indebted to John Bell, an English adventurer, who accompanied the Russians to Peking. It took them sixteen months to reach the Chinese border, and, on arrival at the frontier, they were congratulated by the imperial conductors who came especially to welcome them. On this occasion Bell mentions an inconsiderable circumstance not altogether devoid of interest. He writes:

Our conductor having seen some women walking in the fields asked the ambassador who they were, and whither they were going? He was told they belonged to the retinue and were going with it to China. He replied, they had women enough in Peking already; and, as there never had been an European woman in China, he could not be answerable to introducing the first, without a special order from the Emperor. But, if His Excellency would wait for an answer, he would dispatch a caravan for that purpose. The return of this messenger could not be sooner than six weeks; it was therefore thought more expedient to send back the women to Selinginsky with the wagons that brought our luggage to this place.<sup>1</sup>

The house where the embassy lodged was at first locked and sealed at ten o'clock at night with the Emperor's own seal so that no person might go in or come out. This practice was at last abandoned, however, upon the expostulations of the ambassador.<sup>2</sup>

Ismaylov at first refused to comply with the established custom of the Court of China as regards the three kneelings and nine prostrations when presenting credentials, but he later agreed to comply with this custom on the condition that "when the emperor sent a minister to Russia, he should have instructions to

<sup>1</sup> John Bell, "Travels from St. Petersburg in Russia to Diverse Parts of China," Vol. I, p. 307.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 357.

conform to the ceremonies of that Court.”<sup>1</sup> This was readily agreed to by the Emperor, who, no doubt, never for a moment believed that he would suffer himself to be degraded by dispatching an embassy to a barbarian court.

The audience which the ambassador had with the Chinese throne is vividly portrayed by Bell in the following illuminating passages:

“After we had waited about a quarter of an hour, the Emperor entered the hall at a back door, and seated himself upon the throne; upon which all the company stood. The master of the ceremonies now desired the ambassador, who was at some distance, to walk into the hall; and conducted him by one hand, while he held the credentials in the other. Having ascended the steps, the latter was laid on the table placed for that purpose, as had been previously agreed; but the Emperor beckoned to the ambassador and directed him to approach, which he no sooner perceived than he took up the credentials, and attended by Aloy, walked up to the throne, and kneeling, laid them upon the Emperor who touched them with his hand, and inquired after His Czarish Majesty’s health. He then told the ambassador that the love and friendship he entertained for His Majesty were such that he had even dispensed with an established custom of the Empire in receiving his letter.

During this part of the ceremony, which was not long, the retinue continued standing without the hall; and we imagined, the letter being delivered, all was over. But the master of the ceremonies brought back the ambassador; and then ordered all the company to kneel and make obeisance nine times to the Emperor. Great pains were taken to avoid this piece of homage, but without success. The master of ceremonies stood by and delivered his orders in the Tartar language by pronouncing the words ‘morgu’ and ‘boss,’ the first meaning to bow, and the other to stand; two words which I can never soon forget.<sup>2</sup>

Bell then goes on to describe the reception which followed. He and his colleagues were so elaborately entertained that they soon forgot all the hardships and indignities they had just suffered.

<sup>1</sup> Bell, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6 ff.



After the departure of Ismaylov, De Lange, his secretary, remained in Peking as resident representative of Russia. But he was a veritable prisoner of the Chinese Government. His house was strongly guarded by soldiers who were stationed there, as he was told, for his protection. His quarters were so poor that he wanted to hire a house near the Russian quarters with his own funds, but he was told by one of the ministers that as the Emperor himself had allotted the house no one could intimate to him that it was not satisfactory; and that without a special license from him no person in all Peking, were it even the prince himself, would dare to let him a lodging, since it would thereby seem as if the Emperor had not a habitable house for a foreigner. His house was finally repaired, however. But it was so carelessly done that when they made an end of it "there was little alteration for the better."<sup>1</sup>

In an application to the prime minister with respect to a memorial which De Lange wished to transmit on behalf of his merchants, he received the following answer:

Commerce is looked upon by us with contempt, and as a very trifling object.... For these reasons, go tell the agent that we shall not only refuse to receive the said memorial, but that in future he need not give himself the trouble of proposing anything to us which may be relative to commerce, because we shall not embarrass ourselves hereafter with the merchants of Russia.<sup>2</sup>

The difficulty in which De Lange was placed was precipitated by an unfortunate occurrence in the voluntary transfer, which took place about this time, of a whole clan of Mongols to Russian sovereignty. Pending a settlement of this question, China refused to admit any more caravans into Peking. Moreover,

<sup>1</sup> De Lange, "Journal of Residence at Peking," Vol. II, p. 194.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 258.



De Lange was so grossly insulted and subjected to such innumerable indignities that he was well-nigh driven to break off diplomatic relations with the Chinese Government, as may be seen from the following entry in his journal:

That as I had in my instructions orders to apply my utmost endeavors to the preservation of the good understanding between the two Empires, I thought, I might tell him, the Prime Minister, that I was exceedingly surprised at the proceedings of the Chinese Ministry on this occasion; that he could not be ignorant that it depended only on his Tsarish Majesty to finish the war with Sweden in the most honorable manner; and that perhaps this peace was actually made at the time I was speaking to him; after which I could see nothing that could prevent the Tsar, my Master, from turning his arms to this side, in case they exercised his patience too much. That I gave him my word, that all the great difficulties which perhaps might be imagined in China to attend such an enterprise would vanish immediately, if ever His Majesty should resolve on transporting himself to the frontiers; for he was a prince that did not suffer himself to be hindered by difficulties; and that they might then have sufficient cause to repent their having despised the friendship of a monarch who was not accustomed to receive offenses with impunity, and who was inferior to no monarch in the world, neither in grandeur nor power.<sup>1</sup>

But the Prime Minister was not to be moved even by such a threat, for the journal continues, quoting the Prime Minister's last statement:

That being His Majesty's custom, never to take any resolution without first weighing all circumstances, he never changed his measure for any reason whatsoever; and, after he had declared himself positively in regard to the caravan and my person, he had no inclination to propose to him a change of sentiment in this regard. That we had nothing to do but to make a beginning in complying with our engagements, after which they would see what they had to do as to the rest.<sup>2</sup>

Thus virtually De Lange was dismissed from the Court of Peking. Shortly afterwards, with a home-bound

<sup>1</sup> De Lange, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 302.

caravan, he left the Chinese Capital, after having stayed there seventeen months as an apparent prisoner of the Chinese Government.

In 1727, Empress Catherine sent Count Sava Vladislavich to Peking. His embassy was the most fruitful of all up to this time. The result of his work was the Treaty of August 27, 1727, which remained in force until June, 1858, over a century and a quarter, one of the most long-lived treaties in the history of the world. It delimited the frontier eastward from Kiakhta to the mouth of the Aigun, and westward from the same point to Shabina Dabeg, a pass in the Sanyan Mountains. Trading caravans might come to Peking once in three years. Regulations regarding the extradition and the execution of criminals were provided. Article V stipulated that a permanent Russian mission would be established in Peking; that Russians would be allowed to worship God according to the rites of their religion; and that "four young students, and two of a more advanced age, acquainted with the Russian and Latin languages, should also be received into the house of the ambassador in order that they might learn the languages of the country." They were to be maintained at the expense of the Emperor and were to be at liberty to return to their own country as soon as they had finished their studies.<sup>1</sup> The maintenance of the mission cost the Chinese Government annually more than 1,000 silver rubles and 900 pounds of rice, and the Russian Government, 16,000 silver rubles; of this last sum, 1,000 rubles were set apart for the maintenance and instruction of the young Albazins, the descendants of the Cossacks of Albazin, who were then living at Peking.<sup>2</sup>

Although, by this treaty, caravans were permitted to come to Peking once in three years, only six were

<sup>1</sup> Hertslet, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 439.

<sup>2</sup> These figures were given by Timkowski in his "Travels," *op. cit.*, p. 4.



actually sent between the years 1727 and 1762, the reason being that so many restrictions were imposed upon this trade to the advantage of the Chinese that the Russians became indifferent to their newly acquired privileges. In 1737, Empress Catherine, in consideration for the good feelings of the Chinese Emperor and the furtherance of trade between the two countries, transferred trade from Peking to Kiakhta and suppressed the caravan trade monopoly which had since been opened to all. Caravans then ceased to come to Peking and trade was carried on in Kiakhta on the Russian side and in Maimachen on the Chinese side.

In this frontier trade the Chinese Government assumed a strict surveillance and entire responsibility. No Chinese merchants were allowed to transact business with the Russians in Kiakhta after being there for a year. They must have partners resident in China who were to relieve them in every alternate year. Licenses were issued only to those who could write and speak the Russian language.<sup>1</sup> Chinese tea was exchanged for Russian woolens, camlets, plush stuffs, leather, lambskins, etc. Trade was by barter and the use of coins was absolutely prohibited. The Chinese merchants went first to Kiakhta and selected the goods they wanted; then the Russians came over to Maimachen for their choice. This mode of transaction was primitive from the modern point of view. The price of every article of import was fixed, by the commissioners who were appointed by their respective governments, in the terms of tea, which was the standard of measure. When once the commissioners had agreed on the prices, they became law for both countries.<sup>2</sup> In 1845, business amounting to 13,622,000

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Robert M. Martin, "China, Political, Commercial, and Social," Vol. I, p. 393.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 425.



silver rubles, or 2,156,816 pound sterling, was transacted, which was considerable in those days.<sup>1</sup>

The question of trade having been solved for the time being, there still remained the weightier question of the extradition of criminals, a problem which, since the beginning of Russo-Chinese relations, had disturbed the good understanding of the two countries. About this time, Amoursana, a prince of the Sungari district, sought refuge in Siberia. The Chinese Government made application to St. Petersburg for his surrender to the Chinese authorities. This was not complied with and shortly after the prince died. A second application was filed by the Chinese for the deliverance of his body and the transfer of all the Sungarian chiefs who were still in Siberia. This request also was not acceded to. Thereupon the Chinese Government seized all the Russian ecclesiastics then residing in Peking and imprisoned them as hostages.<sup>2</sup>

The question of extradition was complicated by the migration of the Tourgouth Mongols in the seventeenth century. They lived for a time in peace with the Russians, but as time went on their position was made unbearable, since they were hemmed in between the Russians and the Turks, and the thought of migrating back to China was constantly uppermost. Tu-li-shen's embassy, as we have seen, was partly dispatched to persuade them to return to their native land. In 1771, a war broke out between the Turks and the Russians, and the Tourgouths gave their help to the latter, and the Turks were badly beaten. Animated by the success of their arms, the Tourgouths decided to break away once for all from their Russian tutelage, which had become galling as well as oppressive to them. On January 5, 1772, they migrated eastward with seven hundred thousand families. During

<sup>1</sup> Figures quoted from Martin, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 420.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 393.

this time the Russians tried in vain to recall their fugitives. Finally, after eight months' hard journey, the Tourgouths reached Ili, and were welcomed by the Chinese with open arms. Three hundred thousand persons survived this long journey, and each family was supplied with food for one year's consumption; land, money, and cattle were freely distributed, and that part of Ili adjacent to the Altai Mountains has since been settled by them.

The Russians claimed these subjects, but were reminded by China of the Sungarian princes who sought refuge in Siberia and of Russia's refusal to deliver them over to China. The Russians later retaliated by retaining some more Chinese who went across the frontier to reside in Siberia. The Chinese accordingly made representations for their return to Chinese sovereignty, but their efforts were all in vain. Thereupon Emperor Ch'ien Lung dispatched a strong note to the Russian Government in which he protested against the violation by the latter of the stipulations of the treaty. The imperial note goes on to say:

It is found upon examination that should a thief belonging to either nation be discovered on the border, he is to be examined in the joint presence of the authorities; and, if guilty, punished by death. Pursuant to this law, in the forty-fourth year two men who stole eleven horses from you were condemned and executed. Our great Empire acting according to law and the faith of the treaties did this, not for the preservation of friendship, but for the love of truth, which it greatly esteems. But you, not executing the thief, break the laws of friendship and the faith of treaties.

Our great Empire, perceiving that you wish to act according to your own will, by the obstacles you throw in the way, and your duplicity, will on no account permit the trade to be carried on.

Although our two Empires border upon one another, yet our Empire may call itself the elder brother. Thus holding in the rank of empires the place of elder brother, and having, at your request, punished the two thieves, while you refuse us the same satisfaction, shall our great Empire, including all the universe,



submit to this? Do you not think posterity would laugh at us? Ponder well, examine and consider, as you find fit and proper.<sup>1</sup>

In order to remove these causes of disagreement on the subject of arrest, brigandage on the frontier, and the extradition of criminals, Catherine sent Kropotov as emissary to China to sign a supplementary article to the 1727 treaty. Trade was then ordered to be continued by the Emperor, whereupon, it was recorded, all the barbarians jumped for joy and galloped up in post carts.<sup>2</sup>

In 1805 a Russian embassy under Count Goloykin was dispatched to Peking on a magnificent scale with an unusually large retinue. On arrival at the border, frivolous objections were raised by the Chinese officials and a long delay ensued. A formidable objection was finally started requiring the ambassador to kotow before a screen and a yellow-covered table representing the Emperor. This the ambassador refused to do, pleading the precedent recently established by the English embassy. This excuse was just what the Emperor had wished for. The whole embassy and the brilliant suit was ignominiously dismissed with a letter, cordially desiring the ambassador to make the best of his way home, as the Emperor was unwilling that they should extend their journey longer.<sup>3</sup>

In 1806, two Russian ships under the command of the able circumnavigator, Krusenstern, came to Canton and succeeded in unloading their cargo and taking a shipment. On hearing this, Peking issued at once an edict pointing out that interdiction existed against the Russians trading by sea, as they already had the privilege of trading by land. The authorities at Canton were accordingly ordered to detain the ships,

<sup>1</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 394.

<sup>2</sup> "Russo-Chinese Relations (1224-1912)," *Edinburgh Review*, Vol. CCXV, p. 195.

<sup>3</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 395.



but the mandate came too late to permit the local authorities to carry it into effect.<sup>1</sup>

On September 6, 1847, when the Czar passed through the Tula, he made an appointment, which later turned out to be the greatest appointment in the history of Russian expansion in the Far East. Here he gave the most important post of the empire, the governorship of Siberia, to a comparatively young man, Muravev, later of Amur fame. In the next few years the story of Russia's eastern career was the story of Muravev, who, by a single stroke of diplomacy, when China was in the throes of the greatest rebellion of her history, and when England and France were taking advantage of the situation, conquered for Russia, without shedding a single drop of blood, a strip of territory almost as large as France.

Before he set out upon this historic task, he secured the zealous support of Captain Nevelskoy, who afterwards contributed most effectively to the execution of his plans. The Russian naval ministry was at this time on the lookout for a new port in the Bay of Tungar at the southern extremity of the Sea of Okhotsk. Muravev, seeing the undesirability of such a location, suggested that Nevelskoy should explore the Amur in search of a more suitable spot. In 1849, a special committee was appointed by the Czar to study the Amur question, and a maritime expedition to explore the mouth of the river was confirmed with Nevelskoy in command. Before the instructions could reach him, however, Nevelskoy had proceeded up the river in a sloop with six armed sailors and a one-pounder, and had established, twenty-five versts from its mouth, a port which he named Nikolaevsk, in honor of the Emperor. On August 6, in the presence of the Giliak natives, the Russian flag was hoisted

<sup>1</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 395.

with the salute of the one-pounder.<sup>1</sup> Then Nevelskoy hastened to report this momentous event to Muravev in person. Upon hearing this, Muravev was greatly pleased, and he immediately returned to St. Petersburg to inform his Government of this memorable settlement. The matter was referred to the Committee on Far Eastern Affairs. The committee strongly opposed such an unauthorized step and insisted that Nevelskoy be severely punished, on the ground that such a settlement would inevitably lead to conflicts with the Chinese and consequent destruction and insult to the Russian flag. An immediate withdrawal was urged by the committee. This was strongly objected to by Muravev. The decision of the committee was then referred to the Czar for affirmation. To the chagrin of Muravev's political opponents, the Czar not only refused to back up the decision of the committee but also ordered that the settlement should be maintained. He said that "when the Russian flag has once been hoisted it must not be lowered," an utterance which has since become classic with the Russians.<sup>2</sup>

Having won his first battle, Muravev decided to push his scheme further. He realized that this tremendous enterprise could not be carried out without a large military force to back it up. But the ministries at home were opposed to any large army in the Far East. Muravev succeeded, however, in converting the peasants at Nertchinsk into Cossacks and he completely reorganized his Siberian forces.

Nevelskoy, who so nearly escaped degradation, had in the meantime returned to the Far East. In 1852, he explored the Sakhalin, and again occupied on his own responsibility De Castries and Kizi, the island of Sakhalin, and other strategical points in the Gulf of Tatary. In occupying these districts, Nevelskoy used

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Vladimir, "Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway," p. 83.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 185.



a method entirely different from that of Poyarkov or Kharbarov. Instead of striking terror into the hearts of all the natives, he showed them the utmost kindness, and good feeling existed between him and the natives to no inconsiderable degree.

In a conference at home on April 22, 1853, Muravev proposed to settle the question of the Amur with China, but he was misrepresented by the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Office, which forwarded a note to Peking, "conceived in terms so injurious to the interests of Russia on the Amur that a Chinese mandarin might have proudly claimed its authorship."<sup>1</sup> Thus, as long as this opposition and procrastination existed, Muravev could gain but little headway. But in the following year came the Crimean War, which gave him a good opportunity to realize the secret of his aspirations. The Turkish War of 1854, which crushed Russia's power in Europe, secured for her incidentally a lasting triumph on the Pacific coast.

In a confidential report to Duke Constantine, Admiral-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Muravev stated lucidly the precarious position of Eastern Siberia in case of a combined attack by the Franco-British naval forces. He set forth at length in this memorandum, therefore, his scheme of defense, the necessity of provisioning and otherwise relieving the Russian Pacific squadron, and other military requirements of the situation. The report so impressed the Emperor that on June 11, 1854, an order was issued to the effect that hereafter all questions relating to the Russian frontier in the Far East should be settled directly by Muravev and the Peking Government. After this he returned to the Far East to start his first famous expedition down the Amur.

Before he sailed down the river, he dispatched a note to Peking informing the Chinese Government of

<sup>1</sup> Vladimir, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

the coming expedition, with the explanation that the war in Europe had compelled him to use the river for the protection of His Majesty's Pacific possessions. On May 14, with a battalion of eight hundred, a sotina of Cossacks, a division of mountain artillery, seventy-five barges and rafts, besides the S. S. *Argun*, the whole flotilla extending for a length of two versts, Muravev started down the river Amur. On the twenty-eighth he reached the Chinese fortified town of Aigun. Here he sent some of his officers to inquire of the Chinese authorities if they had received any instructions from Peking. The governor of the town being uninformed, was embarrassed by such an unprecedented situation, and therefore preferred to get rid of his uninvited guests as soon as possible. Thus, unopposed, Muravev proceeded down the river and the rest of the journey was uneventful. On arrival at Petropavlofsk he started to fortify the place to meet the impending attack of the Franco-British fleet. The defense was so successful that the Allied forces finally gave up the attempt to storm the fort.

A second expedition went down the Amur in August, 1856, on a much larger scale, with over eight thousand persons of both sexes. To avoid confusion, the expedition was divided into three sections, each starting separately. The Chinese, perceiving that the Russians had now the intention of permanently settling on the lower Amur, protested and demanded an explanation when the expedition arrived at the town of Aigun. A conference was held at Marunsk on September 9. Muravev, who was sick, was unable to attend. He was represented by Admiral Zavoiko, who repeated to the Chinese the necessity of protecting the mouth of the Amur against the aggression of the foreign powers and he made the following proposals: that all the places, which had been occupied for the above-mentioned purpose, as well as all the coast line of such places, should definitely become



Russian, and that a chain of settlements on the left bank of the Amur should be granted to Russia in order that uninterrupted connections between the coast and the Russian inland possessions might be secured.<sup>1</sup> The Chinese only asked that the proposals be made in writing, which request was granted.

At the second meeting of the conference, the Chinese read to Muravev, who had since recovered, the foolish document that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had sent to the Peking Government some time before. Muravev skillfully evaded the effects of the weak dispatch with the explanation that it was due to the earnest desire of the Russian Government to maintain permanent and peaceful relations between the two great neighboring empires of China and Russia. He requested the Chinese plenipotentiaries to communicate to Peking his intention of a third expedition in the near future and the proposals which they had just made. After this, Muravev at once returned to St. Petersburg to secure his own appointment as plenipotentiary of Russia for the negotiation of a new treaty with China.

The third expedition started down the river in the middle of May, 1865, under the command of Korsakov. He had a conference with the Chinese authorities at Aigun. The Chinese intimated that they had no intention of restricting the free movements of the Russian vessels, but that they were strongly opposed to the permanent establishment of Russian settlements along the left bank of the Amur, and that they were disagreeably surprised that five hundred men were to be stationed at the mouth of the Zeya, opposite to Aigun. However, the third expedition went down the river without opposition.

Muravev returned to the Far East in 1857 and at once began his usual preparation for an expedition,

<sup>1</sup> Vladimir, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

which had now become an almost annual affair. This time Muravev brought with him as many colonists as cared to go. He was in dire shortage of men; therefore, he released a thousand hard-labor convicts, whom he persuaded to go and be free, to cultivate the land in order to make it Russian—and to start life anew. Those who had wives took them along, but those who had none asked Muravev what was agriculture without a wife; and told him that they, therefore, ought to be married. “Whereupon,” Kropotkin, an eyewitness, writes in his memoirs:

Muravieff ordered the release of all the hard-labor convict women of the place, about a hundred, and offered them the choice of the men. But there was little time to lose; the high water in the river was rapidly going down, the rafts had to start; and Muravieff asking the people to stand together in pairs on the beach, blessed them, saying: “I marry you, children. Be kind to each other; you men, don’t illtreat your wives,—and be happy.”<sup>1</sup>

The French and British naval activities along the Chinese coast attracted the attention of the Russian Government, which was resolved hereafter to participate in the new movement. Admiral Putiatin was therefore appointed Russian Minister to Peking. When the embassy was approaching the Chinese border, Muravev took great care to impress the Chinese with the importance of the new mission by sending his own band to Kiakhta and by ordering that the town be illumined, and that troops should parade and receive Putiatin with noise and pomp. But the Chinese, who were past masters in such things, were not dazzled by this display, and, with their usual dilatoriness, delayed answering the Russian communique until May, when they informed Putiatin with covert sarcasm that as they had no special business to discuss with Russia it was unnecessary

<sup>1</sup> Kropotkin, “Memoirs of a Revolutionist,” p. 185.



that a person of such importance should undertake the long fatiguing journey to Peking. Putiatin, incensed at this treatment, proposed to the Russian Foreign Office the forcible occupation of Aigun. Shortly after, he joined Muravev down the river in order to carry out his intention. But a step of such grave consequence without the authorization of the Government was opposed by Muravev. Putiatin asked the Chinese authorities at Aigun for permission to proceed to Peking by way of Manchuria, but this request could not be granted, for they had no instructions from the Emperor. Failing to reach Peking by land, Putiatin resolved to do so by sea. He sailed down the Amur and reached the mouth of the Pei-ho on July 24, 1857. There he engaged in a fruitless contest with the obstinate Chinese mandarins at Tientsin. Then he went to Shanghai and joined the British and French naval forces, and made the suggestion that the most effective plan for overcoming Chinese obduracy was to blockade the mouth of the Pei-ho.

China, having just emerged from the throes of one of the greatest rebellion in the history of the world, and pressed by the British and French bombardments on the coast, had no desire to make an enemy of the Russians, with whom they were anxious to preserve friendly relations. The Russians, on the other hand, were trying to get out of China as much as they could while China was in distress. The man who had waited for the moment to come now began to strike his deadliest blow.

On May 11, Muravev stopped at Aigun on one of his regular expeditions. Here he had a conference with Prince Shan, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese forces of the Amur, during which he presented his demands. The Chinese at first showed no signs of yielding to the Russian proposals, but they finally acceded to them upon the energetic remonstrances

of Muravev, who accused China of bad faith, of violating the treaties, and of insulting the Russian representatives. The last offense alleged was the affront upon Putiatin, which he said was more than sufficient to justify any country to go to war with China, but that the magnanimity of the Czar had preserved the peaceful relations of the two countries until now.

With unusual rapidity, lasting only six days, the negotiations were consummated in the treaty signed on May 16, 1858, known as the Treaty of Aigun. By this treaty the territory on the left bank of the Amur was recognized as Russian, and the territory on the right bank as far downstream as the Ussuri was recognized as Chinese, the territory between the Ussuri and the sea still to be left open for future delimitation. The right of free trade to the riverain inhabitants on both sides of the river was also acknowledged. A notable concession on the part of Muravev to the Chinese was the provision in the treaty that the Manchu inhabitants on the Russian side of the river, near Zeya, were allowed to remain in perpetuity under Chinese authority.<sup>1</sup> For this brilliant service which he had rendered to his master, the Czar, Muravev was granted the title of Count Amuriski, hereafter better known as Muravev Amuriski.

A week after the signature of the Treaty of Aigun, Putiatin's perseverance was crowned with success by the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation at Tientsin on June, 1858, which he signed in ignorance of the Muravev-Shan Agreement. The Treaty of Tientsin provided that the Russians might trade in the open ports, already opened to the nationals of other countries; that Russian consuls might be appointed to such localities as necessary;

<sup>1</sup>Hertslet, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 454 ff.



and that Russian vessels of war and other merchant ships might come and go, and might be repaired and revictualled according to existing regulations. It was also provided that disputes between the Chinese and the Russians were to be examined by Chinese authorities in concert with Russian consuls; Russian criminals were to be judged according to Russian law; and Chinese criminals, by their own law. Russians entering China and committing a crime were to be sent beyond the frontier or to the nearest consul to be tried. Freedom of worship was reaffirmed. Protection for Russian missionaries and Chinese converts was guaranteed. The ecclesiastical mission might stay in Peking; but its expenses, hitherto borne by the Chinese Government, were to be defrayed wholly by the Russian Government. A boundary commission to fix the unsettled limits of the eastern frontier was created. Above all, Article XII of this protocol gave to Russia the most-favored-nation treatment as to political, commercial, and other privileges, hitherto granted to other nations. This treaty was in the Russian, Manchurian, and Chinese languages, but in case of dispute the Manchurian text was to be authoritative.<sup>1</sup>

The British and the French, enraged by their abortive attempt to take the Taku forts in order to open Peking for the ratification of the Tientsin agreements, had about this time addressed to the Chinese Senior Secretary of State and to the Grand Council a communication requiring "immediate and unconditional acceptance" of four conditions; namely, an ample and satisfactory apology for the Taku episode, during which the Allied forces suffered heavy losses; the exchange of ratifications at Peking, the envoys going in national ships for this purpose; full effect to be given to the Treaty of Tientsin; and, finally, the payment of indemnities.

<sup>1</sup> Hertslet, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 461 ff.

The Chinese reply was an absolute rejection of the Franco-British ultimatum. Thereupon, on June 26, 1860, the allied governments notified the other Occidental powers that a state of war existed between them and China. After a short campaign, they succeeded in fighting their way to Peking, and here they ransacked the beautiful palace of Yüan-ming-yüan, an act which will be an everlasting disgrace to Western civilization.

It was during such a critical moment as this that Ignatiev, a clever Russian diplomat, emerged as a savior of the Manchu Dynasty and a peacemaker of the belligerent parties. The rôle he played at this opportune moment was indeed worthy of a von Metternich.

Prior to the Allies' entry into Peking, Ignatiev had learned at Tientsin from the French Minister, Baron Gros, that the Allies had no intention of permanently stationing their troops in Peking.<sup>1</sup> With this knowledge in hand, Ignatiev told Prince Kung that he would be most willing to exert his utmost effort to bring about the withdrawal of the British and the French troops from Peking on condition that the Chinese Government should recognize the Treaty of Aigun<sup>2</sup> and cede to Russia the territory east of the Ussuri to the sea, which was left over for future delimitation. China, willing to pay any price for the evacuation of foreign troops from the Capital, agreed to compensate Ignatiev adequately for his proffered services. The Allies consented to withdraw their troops from the Capital on the acceptance by the Chinese of their demands, which were readily acceded to; and, consequently, the two conventions of Peking, signed on

<sup>1</sup> Cf. H. Cordier: "Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales, 1860-1902," Vol. I, pp. 94, 95.

<sup>2</sup> This treaty was signed by a prince of the blood. The emperor discountenanced this agreement by exposing the second in command in a wooden collar on the banks of the Amur for three days and nights.



October 24 with England, and on October 25 with France, were concluded. By November 5, the evacuation of the Allied troops in Peking was completed.

The reward for the performance of this service by Ignatiev was the Sino-Russian Treaty of the same year, signed on November 14, by which China put her official sanction to the Treaty of Aigun and ceded to Russia the Primorski Province on the Pacific coast. It was not until a few days later that Prince Kung learned that the Allies had not intended to stay in Peking for any length of time and that he had virtually made a present of the whole territory east of the Ussuri to Russia. It is needless to say here that this underhand method which Ignatiev used as a means to realize Russian ambitions in the Far East, from the point of view of equity, is hardly to be justified, and it should be the first concern of Chinese statesmen to see that this strip of land is recovered when they sit down to write a new treaty with Russia.

From this introductory chapter of Russo-Chinese relations, it may be readily seen that three names stood out more prominently than the rest in Russia's advance toward the Far East; namely, Yermak, the discoverer; Kharbarov, the explorer; and Muravev, the achiever. These three men acted more or less on their own initiative and responsibility. Yermak "found" Siberia, because a price was set on his head and he had to flee from his native land in order to be out of reach of the law; Kharbarov's expeditions were undertaken without the knowledge of Moscow, and Muravev annexed to Russia the Amur region almost against the will of the authorities at St. Petersburg. Certainly he got no support from them; the Ministry of War could spare no men, the Ministry of Finance had no money for annexations, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was apprehensive of diplomatic complications with the Peking Government. The Russian Empire

was, therefore, not created by necessity or a national ideal, but by a few adventurers who acted irrespective of home conditions and instructions.

In their relations with the Chinese since the very beginning, the Russians have been accorded unusual privileges and facilities, when all the other "barbarians" knocked in vain at the Celestial door for admission. But, in spite of these advantages, the Russians made no great contributions to the literary and scientific world, with the single exception of a geographical description of China by Father Hayacinth, in the year 1820.

The attitude of the Chinese Government towards the Russians during this period may next be noted. Throughout this whole stage of early diplomatic intercourse between Russia and China, the same tone of haughtiness and insolence was maintained by the "Son of Heaven," who regarded the other races of the world as barbarians and tribute bearers; and who permitted, merely as a beneficence, caravans and trade to be carried on, which accordingly could be dispensed with at any time at his pleasure.

The latest developments of this period were pregnant with great results. It must not be overlooked, however, that it was largely due to the combined operations of the French and the British in the South, tying China's hand in the North, that the Russians were able to entrench themselves in the Amur; and it must also be remembered that it was through the dubious diplomacy of General Ignatiev in the negotiations of the Treaty of Peking that China ceded to Russia the Primorski Province, which gave Russia access to the coast.

Thus Russia at last reached the shores of the Pacific. But her appetite for the sea was by no means satiated with this unsatisfactory morsel of Vladivostok, which Muravev had just founded. Consequently, in



the next chapter of Russo-Chinese relations, we shall witness the Russian Bear struggling slowly, but gradually making his way from the icy regions of the north to the warmer and cozier waters in the Gulf of Liaotung.

## CHAPTER II

### RUSSIA'S POLITICAL AMBITIONS IN MANCHURIA

#### THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR

THE advent of Japan into the arena of Far Eastern politics at the close of the nineteenth century marks a new chapter in the history of Russo-Chinese relations. It was Japan's appearance upon the scene that accelerated Russian diplomacy and statecraft in the Orient. It was due to China's ignominious defeat in 1895 that Russia was able to secure the immediate execution and the ultimate realization of her political designs and ambitions in China. In point of fact, it was the Sino-Japanese War that gave Russia the opportunity to play so naturally and cleverly the rôle of the lawyer in Lord Brougham's familiar definition of that useful functionary as "a man who rescues your estate from your adversary and keeps it for himself."

The Sino-Japanese conflict arose over the question of Korea. From time immemorial China's sovereignty over this little Hermit Kingdom had been undisputed, but owing to China's lack of interest in, and misgovernment of, her dependencies, particularly Korea, Japan gradually, at the beginning of the nineties, began to assert her claim upon the continent.

The Nipponese encroachment upon Korea was first felt in 1876 when the latter was compelled to sign a treaty of commerce with Japan. Li Hung-chang, China's greatest statesman of his time, realized at once this imminent danger, and in order to combat this undesirable menace, advised the King of Korea to throw open his country to the commerce of the world, his policy being to "neutralize one poison by another,



to set one energy against another.”<sup>1</sup> Upon this advice, Korea entered into commercial treaties first with the United States of America, then with Great Britain, France, and Russia.

In 1885, China's sovereignty over Korea was further questioned by the Convention of Tientsin. By virtue of this understanding, China and Japan agreed not to send troops to Korea without first notifying each other, and to send equal number of troops there should the dispatch of the same be necessary.<sup>2</sup> Shortly after the signature of this agreement, an insurrection against the Korean Court was started by the Tonghaks at the instigation of some Japanese. The Korean King appealed to China for help. Accordingly, Peking notified Japan of its intention to send a small contingent of three thousand troops to Korea to suppress the rebellion. Japan, learning of this and in contravention of the Tientsin Protocol, sent a force of eight thousand to Korea on the pretext of putting down the insurrection.

After the rebellion was put down, China notified Japan that she was about to withdraw her forces and also requested the Japanese to do the same. This the latter refused to comply with on the ground that the insurrection was not completely quashed and that steps must be taken to prevent its recurrence. The Japanese further advocated fiscal, administrative, and other reforms for Korea, and asked the Chinese to join them in this undertaking. China considered these proposals as meddling with the internal affairs of another friendly country and declined to coöperate. The Japanese then insisted that if China was not willing to join them they would do it alone. Ito and Mutsu accordingly demanded that the King of Korea abandon Chinese sovereignty, dismiss the Chinese

<sup>1</sup>J. O. P. Bland, "Li Hung Chang," p. 160; quoted from Li Hung-chang's letter to the Korean king.

<sup>2</sup>Text given in "The Treaties Between China and Foreign States," Vol. I, p. 1316.

Resident, reform his civil, military, and legal systems, and also grant Japan railway and mining concessions. China was indignant at these gross insults to her dignity as Korea's overlord, and demanded, in the form of an ultimatum, the immediate evacuation of Japanese troops from Korea. The Japanese defied the Chinese threat by seizing the person of the Korean King, and sank without notice the S. S. *Kowshing*, the Chinese battleship riding at harbor at Seoul, with a heavy toll of lives. War was declared by China on June 25, 1894, which was answered by the Japanese declaration of war on August 1.

The military and naval operations of the war have no concern for us here, save that they resulted in the humiliating defeat of China after an unsuccessful campaign of nearly nine months. In March, 1895, Li Hung-chang was sent to Japan to negotiate a treaty of peace. On March 30, a fanatic attempt was made on his life, which resulted in a declaration of a twenty-one days' armistice which was later prolonged to another period of the same length on the expiration of the first. On April 17, 1895, the treaty of peace was signed at Shimonoseki, which was the price that China had to pay for her defeat.

#### THE ALLIED INTERVENTION

The sympathies of the great powers were with the Chinese. In fact, before the outbreak of hostilities, China had made representations to the powers soliciting their good offices to persuade Japan not to dispatch such a large force to Korea.<sup>1</sup> Downing Street, in an interview with the Japanese Minister in London, made it known that any breach of relations between China and Japan would be deprecated and that any infringement of British interests in China and impairment of the integrity or the independence of Korea

<sup>1</sup> J. W. Foster, "American Diplomacy in the Orient," p. 333.



would not be tolerated. The British Foreign Office also intimated that while Great Britain would welcome any amelioration of the internal affairs of Korea, she would not acquiesce in any territorial change of the *status quo*. This statement was accompanied by an explicit warning that Russian intervention was certain if any attempt was made on the part of Japan to control the Korean peninsula.<sup>1</sup> Russia had it made plain that she would intervene by armed force if Japan actually tried to control the affairs of Korea.<sup>2</sup> The German Minister at Tokyo, on March 19, before Li Hung-chang arrived at Shimonoseki to start negotiations, had also warned the Japanese Foreign Office, upon the instruction of his government, that any territorial cession of the continent would provoke an intervention by certain powers.<sup>3</sup> The Japanese Foreign Office was thus fully aware of intervention and its consequences. This was made more evident by the following entry in Count Hayashi's "Secret Memoirs":

Both the Premier, Count Ito, and the Foreign Minister, M' Mutsu, anticipated such action on the part of Russia, France, and Germany, but they were quite unable to anticipate what direction intervention would take, nor could they guess to what extent it would be carried out. They considered the matter and came to the conclusion that if they were to make less stringent terms with China than those which they had in view, it would still be impossible to avoid intervention from the side of the Powers, as it was quite certain that the latter had made up their minds to control China's action and also to deal a deadly blow at Japan. Consequently, the Japanese statesmen determined to make no alteration in terms of peace which they already had in mind, but to go as far as possible without paying any immediate attention to the prospect of intervention by the continental Powers.<sup>4</sup>

On the side of China, the Government was equally cognizant of the contemplated intervention on the

<sup>1</sup> Hayashi, "Secret Memoirs," p. 46.

<sup>2</sup> Foster, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

<sup>3</sup> Asakawa, "The Russo-Japanese Conflict," p. 69.

<sup>4</sup> Hayashi, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

part of some of the powers. For instance, Li Hung-chang in his farewell speech to Count Cassini, practically disclosed the fact that the dispatch of Chinese troops to Korea was the outcome of his advice. It should also be remembered that it was M. Pavlov who drafted the identic note, on behalf of the diplomatic corps, requesting the Chinese Resident, Yuan Shih-kai, and Mr. Otori, the Japanese Minister, to withdraw their troops, after the insurrection had been put down. And it was on the refusal of the Japanese to meet the wishes of the diplomatic body that Li Hung-chang sought Russia's advice as to the proper measures to be taken. Although Russia did not then assure Li definitely that she would come to the help of China with troops, yet Li was given to understand that Russia was ready to render all moral support available to maintain the *status quo* of Korea.<sup>1</sup> Thereupon, M. Hitrovo, the Russian Minister at Tokyo, called upon the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Count Mutsu was told that China had complied with all the conditions stipulated in the Convention of Tientsin and was prepared to withdraw her troops, and that it was hoped that this same step would be taken by the Japanese; and that, if Japan refused to take Russia's advice, she alone would be held responsible for any breach of peace that might follow. Moreover, before Li Hung-chang embarked for Japan to negotiate a treaty of peace, he made a special visit to the French and Russian legations,<sup>2</sup> and learned through Herr von Brandt that Russia, Germany, and France would intervene and annul any cession of territory that might be demanded by Japan.<sup>3</sup>

In the negotiations which finally led up to the signature of the Shimonoseki Treaty, a grim kind of humor truly characteristic of Oriental bargaining,

<sup>1</sup> Foster, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

<sup>2</sup> *North-China Herald*, March 22, 1895.

<sup>3</sup> Bland, *op. cit.*, p. 179.



cannot escape one's notice. We now know that the Japanese statesmen were not ignorant of the intervention of the continental powers; as a matter of fact, they were prepared to retrocede Liaotung, even without an additional indemnity.<sup>1</sup> We also see that China was aware that certain powers would come to her help. Consequently, Li Hung-chang was willing to sign away Liaotung in order that Japan might have the satisfaction of possessing the place as a preliminary to the chagrin of losing it. But as regards the cession of Formosa, an island which a short time before he had memorialized the throne to part with as a present to Great Britain, Li made a strong case out of it, and warned Japanese statesmen to proceed cautiously in as much as such an alienation would affect the interests of other powers.<sup>2</sup>

China was, nevertheless, humiliated and disgraced by the consequences of the war. She was forced to recognize definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, a recognition which was not reciprocally concomitant on the part of Japan. China was forced to admit that her age-old position of suzerainty had come to an end. China was forced to cede to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty portions of the Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur and Dalny, Formosa, and the islands constituting the Pescadores Group. Furthermore, China was forced to pay a monetary compensation of two hundred million Kuping taels.<sup>3</sup>

But at this supreme and psychic hour of China's defeat came a friend who, with one stroke of diplomacy, deprived Japan of the material results of her victory and the glory of her achievement. Russia had come forward to save the Manchu Dynasty from ruin, and

<sup>1</sup> Hayashi, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

<sup>2</sup> Foster, "Diplomatic Memoirs," pp. 130, 141.

<sup>3</sup> For text of treaty, see J. V. A. MacMurray, "Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919," Vol. I, p. 18 ff.

she did it with such success that she bound China to herself, by consideration, gratitude, and every obligation which finally won for her an empire.

When the report of the negotiations at Shimonoseki reached St. Petersburg, and when it was learned that the Japanese Government was bent upon territorial concessions on the mainland, the Czar was convinced that it was high time to intervene. A special commission of high officers was therefore appointed to deal with this momentous issue. The special commissioners met in a secret session under the presidency of Grand Duke Alexis, who was then head of the Russian Navy. During this conference, Count Witte, who was to play such an important part hereafter, insisted on the necessity of thwarting the execution of the peace treaty between China and Japan, pointing out that, to quote his own words, "Russia's best interests demanded that China remain unchanged and that no power be allowed to increase its territorial possessions at China's expense, that the integrity of the Chinese Empire be upheld, that Japan, as a victorious nation, be permitted to recover her war expenditures by imposing a more or less considerable indemnity upon China, and that, failing to obtain these results, to open active operations."<sup>1</sup> The secret session adjourned, however, without any concrete results having been reached, as the commissioners realized that the task was too great for Russia alone to consummate.

But to Count Witte nothing was too great to be accomplished. In order to give weight to his proposals in the secret session of the special commissioners, he called upon the Czar in person, and said to him that Japan could not be suffered to get a firm foothold on the continent, for that would wreck all that Russia had accomplished during the last century and would

<sup>1</sup> Witte, "Memoirs of Count Witte," p. 83.



prevent the still greater things yet to be achieved by the grandiose efforts made by his revered father, Alexander III. He also reminded the Czar of the promise he gave to Li Hung-chang that Russia would not permit Japan to keep Liaotung and that China now relied on Russia to fulfill that promise. "We have to stand for the principle of China's sovereignty," he said, "just as the United States stand for the Monroe Doctrine."<sup>1</sup> The Czar was so impressed by Witte's words that he called another conference on March 30, 1895, under his own presidency, and the following conclusions were reached:

1. To seek to preserve the *status quo ante bellum* in northern China, and in pursuance of this to advise Japan at first amicably to desist from the occupation of southern Manchuria, for such an occupation would injure our interests and would be a constant menace to the peace of the Far East; in case of Japan's refusal to follow our advice, to declare to the Japanese Government that we reserve to ourselves freedom of action and that we shall act in accordance with our interests.

2. To issue an official statement to the European Powers and to China to the effect that, while on our part we do not seek any seizures, we deem it necessary, for the protection of our interests, to insist on Japan's desisting from the occupation of southern Manchuria.<sup>2</sup>

Prince Lobanov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, according to Witte, knew no more about the Far East than the average schoolboy, was nevertheless intrusted with the execution of this intricate program, and with consummate diplomacy and tact he rendered Russia an immense service that made his name go down in history. Lobanov realized at once that it was unwise and ineffective for Russia alone to wound the susceptibility of a victorious and combative Japan by demanding the retrocession of the Manchurian littoral. It was manifestly necessary, therefore, to

<sup>1</sup> E. J. Dillon, "Eclipse of Russia," p. 240.

<sup>2</sup> Witte, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

associate Russia with two other nations at least in order to bring pressure to bear upon Japan conjointly and to oust her from the continent.

Great Britain was first approached; but, since her interests were diametrically opposed to those of Russia, she declined to consider the Russian proposal of joint intervention, declaring that not only were Great Britain's interests not jeopardized, but also that they were considerably benefited by the commercial and industrial privileges which Japan had extorted from China. Great Britain was, therefore, out of the question. Austria-Hungary was of little help. There remained France and Germany. France, being Russia's ally, could be easily won over, but Germany had to be reckoned with seriously.

Fortunately for Russia, Germany was, at this juncture, eager for a Franco-Russo-German alliance. Prince Hohenhole was then engaged in regaining Germany's lost position in Russia, and the German Government was really trying to curry the favor of the Czar. Moreover, the personal attitude of the Kaiser was rather favorable to intervention. He had just come to the realization that the future of Germany depended upon a strong colonial expansion and was convinced that the Far East was an ideal field for future German activity. He therefore attached great importance to having a part in the settling of the Far Eastern situation and a voice in all future dealings between Europe and Eastern Asia.

Furthermore, it must not be overlooked that for some time in the past Chinese diplomacy had been working to obtain the good opinion of the German Government towards China. And the man who was most influential in bringing this understanding about was Herr von Brandt. During his residence at Peking as German Minister, since 1883, he had been in close touch with Li Hung-chang, who appreciated his wide experience and was grateful for his counsel. It was



he who was requested by the Chinese Government to head a special mission on behalf of the Chinese Government to the great powers, after the battle of Yalu in September, 1894, to solicit their friendly intervention. This Herr von Brandt declined to do, but he volunteered to exert his influence in Berlin as China's confidential adviser and correspondent. It was he, also, who originated the Herr Detring mission to Japan to negotiate a treaty of peace for China, which failed to obtain Japanese recognition on account of his inferior position, and which resulted in the unpleasant rudeness and scant respect shown to the German flag.<sup>1</sup> Thus, with this background to work upon, Lobanov naturally had no difficulty in obtaining German support for the joint intervention.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on April 18, 1895, and twenty-one days were allowed for the ratification of the agreement. The three powers, Russia, France, and Germany, at first decided to prevent the ratification of the treaty which would probably compel Japan to fight. But the crisis was averted by the decision of the tripartite combination to let Japan proceed with the ratifications which were exchanged on May 8 at Chefoo.

It was now time to strike. Under the guise of polite and clever arguments, the three powers concerned made separate representations to the Japanese Foreign Office through their respective agents at Tokyo. The Russian note, which was used by the French substantially, was to the effect that

the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias in examining the conditions of peace which Japan has imposed on China, finds that the possession of the Peninsula of Liaotung, claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace to the Capital of China, would at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual menace to the

<sup>1</sup> "American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 1894," Appendix I, p. 83.

peace of the Far East. Consequently the Government of His Majesty the Emperor would give a new proof of their sincere friendship for the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan by advising them to renounce the definite possession of the Peninsula of Liaotung.<sup>1</sup>

The German memorandum, according to Count Hayashi, who was then carrying on the negotiations with the three powers concerned, was written in Romaji (Romanized Japanese); and, besides conveying the substance of the Russian and the French notes, it stated that Japan was weak and Germany powerful, and that it was hopeless for Japan to fight against Russia, France, and Germany; and that, therefore, it would be for the good of Japan if she would accept the advice of the three powers. Upon the remonstrance of Count Hayashi, this statement was later withdrawn because of "the error of wording the memorandum in Japanese."<sup>2</sup>

Fifteen days, ending not later than May 8, were allowed to Japan to deliberate whether to refuse or accept the friendly advice of the three powers. In the meantime, Russian, French, and German warships in the Far Eastern seas were steaming ahead to the troubled waters and the decks were cleared for action. The Japanese saw at once that their navy was out-matched because England was still neutral, as her common interests with Japan had not yet developed to such a degree as to justify her joining hands with Japan against the intervening powers. Japan seemed at first to have been willing to comply with the demands of the three powers, with the exception of the small strip of land containing the city of Port Arthur which she would like to keep. But no compromise would be acceptable to Russia, France, and Germany. Finally, on May 6, 1895, the Mikado and

<sup>1</sup> Hayashi, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.



his ministers, after long conferences, agreed to relinquish the Liaotung Peninsula in lieu of an additional indemnity of thirty million Kuping taels to be paid by China.

On May 30, simultaneous with the publication of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, was published a special decree countersigned by all the ministers, proclaiming in part the following to the whole world:

Earnestly desirous as we are for the maintenance of peace, nevertheless we were forced to commence hostilities against China for no other reason than our sincere desire to secure for the Orient an enduring peace. The Governments of the Powers are, in offering their friendly recommendations, similarly actuated by the same desire, and we, out of our own regard for peace, do not hesitate to accept the advice. Moreover, it is not our wish to cause suffering to our people or to impede the progress of our national destiny by embroiling the Empire in new complications, and thereby imperiling the situation and retarding the restoration of peace, and we do not consider that the honor and dignity of the Empire will be compromised by resorting to magnanimous measures and taking into consideration the general situation of affairs.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE RUSSO-CHINESE BANK

To further manifest her friendship towards China and to enhance her initial deed of patronage, Russia floated a four per cent loan of four hundred million gold francs from a Franco-Russian syndicate secured upon the Chinese customs, which was in turn guaranteed by the Imperial Government of Russia. In case the payments of the loan should for any reason fail to be made or should be delayed, the Russian Government undertook to make up on its part and to place at the disposal of the contracting parties to the loan, in due time and as fast as the payments should fall due, all the necessary sums for the payments of the coupons and the redeemed bonds of the loan.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 52.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

In return for the assistance of the French banking houses in raising this loan for China, and in compliance with the request of the French to help extend their financial market in China, Witte founded the Russo-Chinese Bank,<sup>1</sup> which was duly chartered under Russian laws on December 22, 1895. The Charter provided that the Board of Directors should be composed of eleven members at most, who were to be elected by the shareholders, and confirmed by the Russian Ministry of Finances, and that the Managing Directors chosen from the Board of Directors should be domiciled in St. Petersburg. Branches of the Bank, upon the authorization of the Ministry of Finances, might be established in Russia or abroad when they should be deemed necessary. The Bank was founded for an unlimited period. Its capital was originally fixed at six million gold rubles, formed by the issue of forty-eight thousand shares of one hundred twenty-five gold rubles each. This amount was increased on January 1, 1899, by two million gold rubles through the issuance of twelve thousand additional shares of the same nominal value of 187½ gold rubles each, and further increased on June 22, 1902, by three million seventy-five thousand gold rubles through the issuance of twenty thousand additional shares of the same nominal value as those issued in 1899. The Bank was to begin operations six months after the sanction of the Charter and after having presented to the Ministry of Finances a certificate proving that the payment of twenty-five per cent of the par value on each share of the original capital of six million gold roubles had been made.

The objects of the Russo-Chinese Bank were exclusively to develop the commercial relations between Russia and the Asiatic countries. Besides the manifold lines of business which an ordinary bank undertakes to perform, the Russo-Chinese Bank had the

<sup>1</sup> Witte, *op. cit.*, p. 85.



competence to execute the following functions ; namely, the collection of duties in China, the coinage of money in China upon the authorization of the Chinese Government, the payment of loans concluded by the Chinese Government, the acquisitions of concessions for the construction of railways within China, and the establishment of telegraph lines.<sup>1</sup>

The Russian Treasury at first invested heavily in this institution, but later on these shares were acquired by private holders and consequently its interest in the Bank became negligible. China bought an interest of six million Kuping taels in this enterprise under a subsequent agreement in connection with the Agreement for the Construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The majority of the shares of the Bank have, since its inception, however, been in the hands of the French, who, it is estimated, retain to this day over sixty per cent of the whole issue. The Russo-Chinese Bank was amalgamated with the Banque du Nord, under the new name of the Russo-Asiatic Bank, by a special Charter of the Russian Ministry of Finances, dated August 12, 1910.<sup>2</sup>

#### THE CHINESE-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE

China was relieved of the Japanese pressure and the Manchu House was saved from ruin. But the three powers naturally did not act for the mere sake of altruism, and their proffered services were not meant to be gratis. The price which China was to pay must be great. No doubt some sort of agreement must have been reached between the powers themselves as to the compensation that China was to give as payment for their assistance. Russia, acting on behalf of China, was said to have promised France her support in an eventual rectification of the Indo-Chinese frontier.<sup>3</sup> Germany, however, regarded the matter as

<sup>1</sup> Text of charter given in Manchuria: "Treaties and Agreements," etc., p. 17 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Hayashi, *op. cit.*, p. 53, cited according to a statement in the *Novoye Vremya* for April 22, 1895.

a pure business transaction for which she was to receive industrial and commercial concessions.

Russia's day of reward came scarcely a year later when Li Hung-chang was sent for by Nicholas II to attend his coronation solemnities. It must be remembered that Li was at this time in disgrace. The Court had already designated Wang Chih-chung to go to St. Petersburg for this purpose. But Wang was an official of a comparatively low rank, so Count Cassini had no difficulty in persuading the Tsungli Yamen to send a man, holding at least the rank of Viceregal, if a prince of the blood could not be available. To make the matter more personal and important the Czar himself sent word to the Empress Dowager almost at the last hour by telegraph to the effect that the appointment of Li Hung-chang would be most pleasing to him. Consequently, the yellow jacket, the peacock's feather, and the purple robe were instantly restored to Li to complete his paraphernalia of decorations. On March 28, 1896, Li set out with a large retinue and a magnificent coffin for the "barbarian" world.

A day previous to Li's embarkation for Europe, the Far Eastern world was startled by the publication of an alleged secret treaty, hereafter known as the "Cassini Convention," the substance of which was so similar to two other agreements entered into between Russia and China that it was thought for some time to have really existed. Before Li left for the Czar's coronation it was known that he had long and secret conferences with Count Cassini, which gave rise to the conjecture that Cassini must have convinced Li that the only recourse to restrain Japan from further attacks upon Manchuria was to let Russia have a stronghold and other strategic advantages in Manchuria, so that Russia might be able to come to China's aid in time of crisis.

Moreover, Russo-Chinese relations had by this time been greatly enhanced by the creation of the



Russo-Chinese Bank and the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which brought China and Russia much closer together. But for the Trans-Siberian Railway to connect Russia's possessions on the Pacific seaboard with the Russian possessions in Siberia it must needs circumvent the Amur, an undertaking calling for great engineering skill and heavy expense, although a line cutting through Manchuria would at once solve these problems. It was natural to believe, therefore, that Count Cassini must have urged Li Hung-chang to promise Russia a railway concession across Manchuria in return for the service which Russia had rendered to China at the Japanese crisis.

Aside from this railway concession, Count Cassini must also have impressed upon Li Hung-chang that it was necessary for Russia to acquire an ice-free port in which her naval forces might find shelter in time of war with Japan. A preliminary agreement along these lines must therefore have been reached between Li Hung-chang and Count Cassini; for Li, infuriated as he was by the defeat which his country had suffered at the hands of the Japanese, was bent heart and soul upon vengeance, and no concessions were too great for him at this sentimental hour of humiliation.

But when the newspaper men got wind of these secret parleys and conferences, they began to fill their columns with all kinds of surmises, and the most interesting and clever make-up was credited to the *North-China Daily News* in its issue of March 27, one day before Li left for Europe. Another version of the same agreement was divulged by the same newspaper on October 30, 1896, shortly after the conclusion of the Treaty of Alliance between China and Russia and the Railway Contract—two agreements with which we shall deal presently.

The story of the alleged Cassini Convention was made the more believable by the long delay of Count Cassini's contemplated trip to Russia. It was reported

by newspapers that his baggage had been packed three or four weeks and that the carts and the mules were actually waiting at the court of the Russian Legation for him to go. But he could not go until he could take with him an important document alleged to be the Cassini Convention, published a year ago. The substance of this historical document was summarized by the *North-China Daily News* as follows:

It gives Russia all she can want at the present. It gives her the right to carry her Trans-Siberian Railway to Kirin in two directions from some station in Siberia to the west of Kirin and Vladivostok. It provides that China may apply to Russia to build a continuation from Kirin to Shanhaikwan and Port Arthur, and it gives Russia the right to protect these lines when built with her troops. All these lines are to be built to the Russian gauge. China gives Russia the right to work mines in Manchuria, and provides for the employment of Russian officers to drill the Manchurian levies. It gives Russia (on lease) the port of Kiaochow and on emergency the use of Port Arthur and Talienwan, which are not to be ceded to any other Power; and it promises every facility to Russian merchants and travelers. All the important points in the secret treaty which we gave to the world in March last are embodied in this, and time will show whether this is the full extent of China's gratitude to Russia.<sup>1</sup>

That this convention had never existed and that these alleged secret texts were apocryphal are now established facts. A simple inspection, as M. Cordier points out, is sufficient to show that this piece of work lacks homogeneity, and that it consists of two distinct documents, namely, the one relating to the railway concession and the other relating to the treaty of alliance.<sup>2</sup> It is also pointed out by the French Minister at Peking, M. Gérard, in his book "*Ma Mission en Chine*," that it was the ratification of the Railway Contract that Count Cassini was waiting for on that day of his departure.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Full text given in MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 79-81.

<sup>2</sup> Cordier, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 347.

<sup>3</sup> M. A. Gérard, "*Ma Mission en Chine*," pp. 146-149.



To go back to Li Hung-chang's journey to Russia, when he reached the Suez Canal he was met by Prince Ukhtomski and escorted straight to St. Petersburg, a step taken by the Russians to prevent his being decoyed by England or other continental powers, since Li had been showered with invitations from all European countries to visit their capitals.

As soon as he had recovered from the fatigue of the journey, the matter of compensation for Russia's services in the Sino-Japanese crisis was broached by Count Witte, the Russian wizard of finance. In his own words, Witte says in his memoirs:

In my conferences with Li Hung-chang I dwelt on the services which we had recently done to his country. I assured him that, having proclaimed the principle of China's territorial integrity, we intended to adhere to it in the future; but, to be able to uphold this principle, I argued, we must be in a position, in case of emergency, to render China armed assistance. Such aid we would not be able to render her until both European Russia and Vladivostok were connected with China by rail, our armed forces being concentrated in European Russia. I called to his attention the fact that although during China's war with Japan we did dispatch some detachments from Vladivostok, they moved so slowly, because of the absence of railroad communications, that when they reached Kirin the war was over. Thus I argued that to uphold the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire, it was necessary for us to have a railroad running along the shortest possible routes to Vladivostok across the northern part of Mongolia and Manchuria. I also pointed out to Li Hung-chang that the projected railway would raise the productivity of our possessions and the Chinese territories it would cross. Finally, I declared, Japan was likely to assume a favorable attitude toward the road, for it would link her with Western Europe, whose civilization she had lately absorbed.<sup>1</sup>

Li Hung-chang, after hearing this, intimated to Witte that if this was the wish of the Czar he would agree to the proposal. The conversation of a railway concession was then continued with the Czar in a

<sup>1</sup> Witte, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

private audience. The results of this conference were reported by Li Hung-chang in a telegram to the Tsungli Yamen to the following effect:

Russia possesses enormous stretches of land, which are settled very sparsely. She will not, therefore, encroach upon one foot of soil owned by others. And, as for China, bonds of intimacy link her with that country. She has no motive for wishing to connect the railway in Manchuria, except the prompt conveyance of troops. And that again was wanted in order effectually to come to China's aid if at any time she should be in straits. So that the line would not be solely for Russia's benefit. The building of the railway is beyond China's financial capacity. But if she granted the concession to the Russo-Chinese Bank at Shanghai, she could, by means of fitting stipulations, secure for herself the right of control and no difficulties would arise. Transactions of this kind are in vogue in every country. On those grounds the Czar solicited me to turn over the offer in my mind, to close with it definitely. He urged that China did not know how soon trouble would be stirred up for her, . . . but she could at least make it possible for Russia to come to her rescue. In the discharge of my duty I note these words for the guidance of the Crown.<sup>1</sup>

The idea of a defensive alliance against Japan appealed to the eagerness of Li Hung-chang, who was willing, as we have noted, to pay any price for revenge for the late humiliation of his proud country by a people whom he held in the utmost contempt. So when he was assured that an alliance was really intended by Russia, he clinched the matter and agreed to grant the railroad concession to Russia. The alliance, in other words, was the peg upon which Li Hung-chang hung the concession; it was the price to be paid for the granting of the Charter.

Three provisions of a secret pact were then agreed upon between Li Hung-chang and Count Witte as follows:

(1) The Chinese Empire grants us permission to build a railroad within its territory along a straight line between Chita and Vladivostok, but the roads must be in the hands of a private

<sup>1</sup>Cf. *National Review*, Vol. VII, p. 177.



corporation. Li Hung-chang absolutely refused to accept my proposal that the road should be either constructed or owned by the Treasury. For that reason we were forced to form a private corporation, the so-called Chinese Eastern Railway Corporation. This body is, of course, completely in the hands of the Government, but since nominally it is a private corporation, it is within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finances.

(2) China agrees to cede a strip of land sufficient for the construction and operation of the railway. Within that territory the corporation is permitted to have its own police and to exercise full and untrammelled authority. China takes upon herself no responsibilities with regard to the construction and operation of the railroad.

(3) The two governments obligate themselves to defend each other in case Japan attacks the territory of China or our Far Eastern maritime possessions.<sup>1</sup>

It is interesting to note that Li Hung-chang only consented to have the road run in a straight line across Manchuria and to have the road constructed and operated by a private corporation, instead of by the Russian Government, as desired by Witte. These stipulations were undoubtedly meant by Li Hung-chang to keep the line from directly threatening the Chinese Capital, which would be easily attacked if the line had run southward from Mongolia, and to guard against its being used by the Russian Government as a weapon to further its political designs.

Prince Lobanov was again intrusted with the drafting of the treaty, which he did so well that Witte approved it without the slightest reservation. It was then sent to the Czar for indorsement. Witte then tells us that when the text came back to him the next day from the Emperor, a substantial alteration had been made in the clause, providing for a Russo-Chinese alliance against Japan, which was now made to mean an alliance not only against Japan but also against all the other powers. This was an exceedingly grave matter, for an alliance against Japan was one thing

<sup>1</sup>Witte, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

and an alliance against Japan and all the other powers was an entirely different thing. Thereupon, Witte says, he went to see the Emperor about it and accordingly asked Prince Lobanov to make the necessary correction of the text.

The date set for the signing of the treaty finally came, and all who were to partake in affixing their signatures to the document were gathered in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and everybody was ready to sign, in conformity with all the formalities prescribed by law and etiquette. But when the deed was almost done, Witte discovered to his horror that the clause relating to Russia's defensive alliance with China had not been altered, notwithstanding His Majesty's assurance that it had been done. The rest of the narrative in Witte's own words is as follows:

I approached Prince Lobanov-Rostovski, called him aside and whispered in his ear that the provision regarding the defensive alliance had not been changed in accordance with His Majesty's will. "My God!" he exclaimed, striking his forehead, "I clear forgot to tell my secretary to insert that paragraph in its original wording!" Nevertheless he was not the least taken aback. He clapped several times to call the servants and said, turning to the gathering: "It is past noon. Let's take luncheon. We will sign the agreement afterwards." We all went to have luncheon, except the two secretaries, who, while we were lunching, copied the document and made the necessary corrections. These new copies were quietly substituted for the ones which had been circulated before luncheon and were duly signed by Li Hung-chang, on one side, and by Prince Lobanov-Rostovski and myself, on the other.<sup>1</sup>

The story is interesting in that it shows the carelessness with which Russian and Chinese statesmen handled the conclusion of a document which, if carried out to all its intents and purposes, would have changed the whole course of human history in the Far East and would have saved Russia one of the most humiliating defeats that she has ever suffered in the annals of her

<sup>1</sup> Witte, *op. cit.*, p. 93 ff.



existence. The treaty was, nevertheless, signed and ratified without further delay by the Chinese and Russian Emperors, according to the authority of Witte. But the exact dates of both the signing and the ratifying of it have never as yet been definitely ascertained. There can be no doubt, however, that it was signed sometime in the month of May, in the year 1896.

The existence of this treaty was kept absolutely secret, and all that had penetrated into the press at that time was that Russia had secured from China a railroad concession for the Russo-Chinese Bank. An allusion to this secret treaty was, however, made by the Empress Dowager in her telegram to the Czar sometime in 1900, in which she requested him to come forward as arbitrator in the Boxer crisis. This may be seen from the following message :

On a former occasion I deputed Li Hung-chang to proceed to Your Majesty's Capital as my special envoy ; he drew up on our behalf and concluded with your country a secret treaty of alliance which is duly recorded in the Imperial Archives.<sup>1</sup>

The full text of the treaty was first published by Li Hung-chang's son, Li Ching-mai, who, in doing so, sought to vindicate his father from the unjust attack of his enemies, the treaty itself having at the time expired.<sup>2</sup>

The existence of this treaty was further confirmed by M. Gérard, French Minister to China, 1893-1897, in his book, with the following statement :

Although the treaty was intended to remain in secret, I one day had in my hands for a few minutes, during a visit which I made in the spring of 1897 to Li Hung-chang at his residence in Peking, a copy of the document which he had signed the previous year with Prince Lobanov.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bland and Blackhouse, "China Under the Empress Dowager," p. 336.

<sup>2</sup> *National Review*, "A Chinese View of the Situation by an Admirer of Li Hung Chang," Vol. VII, p. 177 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Gérard, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

The official text of the treaty had never been published, however, until 1921, during the Disarmament Conference at Washington, when, in response to Secretary Hughes' request for a list of all the secret treaties that had been concluded relating to China, the Chinese Delegation filed, in the official records of the Conference, the following telegraphic summary of the treaty:

Article I. The High Contracting Parties engage to support each other reciprocally by all the land and sea forces at any aggression directed by Japan against Russian territory in Eastern Asia, China, and Korea.

Article II. No treaty of peace with an adverse party can be concluded by either of them without the consent of the other.

Article III. During military operations all Chinese ports shall be open to Russian vessels.

Article IV. The Chinese Government consents to the construction of a railway across the provinces of Amur and Kirin in the direction of Vladivostok. The construction and exploitation of this railway shall be accorded to the Russo-Chinese Bank. The contract shall be concluded between the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg and the Russo-Chinese Bank.

Article V. In time of war Russia shall have free use of the railway for the transport and provisioning of her troops. In time of peace Russia shall have the same right for the transit of troops and provisions.

Article VI. The present treaty shall come into force from the day on which the contract stipulated in Article IV shall have been confirmed. It shall have force for fifteen years.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

The treaty of alliance having been concluded, Li Hung-chang and Witte began at once to negotiate the terms for the railway concession. In the meantime, Witte had entered into a convention with the Russo-Chinese Bank, the latter agreeing to cede the concession to the Chinese Eastern Railway Corporation, which was shortly to be formed. The final text of the

<sup>1</sup> "Conference on the Limitation of Armament," p. 1414.



contract for the exploitation of the railroad was not signed, however, until September, 1896, as Li Hung-chang was by no means in a hurry to give away this valuable concession, and he was trying to defer the matter as long as possible. The final negotiations of the agreement with the Bank were conducted by the Russian Assistant Minister of Finances, P. K. Romenov, and the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg and Berlin, Shu Kin-chen. The agreement was signed by Shu on behalf of China and Rothstein and Prince Oukhtomski on behalf of Russia.

The terms of the Contract were exceedingly favorable to Russia. The interest of the Chinese Government in this enterprise was fixed at five million Kuping taels, which were to be paid to the Russo-Chinese Bank. The Chinese Government agreed to intrust the construction and operation of this line between the city of Chita and the Russian-Ussuri Railway to the Russo-Chinese Bank upon the following terms:

First, a private company under the name of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company should be established for the construction and operation of the line; the shares of the Company should be acquired only by the Chinese and Russian subjects; the President of the Company who might have his residence in Peking should be named by the Chinese Government but paid by the Company. The prime duties of the President should be to see to the scrupulous fulfillment of the obligations of the Bank and of the Railway Company to the Chinese Government. He should be responsible also for examining all accounts of the Chinese Government with the Russo-Chinese Bank.

Second, the route which the line would traverse should be decided upon by the deputies of the President of the Company in mutual agreement with the Company's engineers and with the local authorities. In laying out the line cemeteries and tombs should, in so far as possible, be avoided.

Third, the Company should begin work within twelve months from the day when this contract was ratified by the Chinese Emperor, and the whole line should be finished within six years, beginning from the day when the route of the line was definitely established and all necessary lands were placed at the disposal of the Company. The Russian five-foot gauge should be used throughout the line.

Fourth, the Chinese Government should assist in the purchase of necessary materials and labor and in obtaining the means of transportation at current prices.

Fifth, the Chinese Government should be responsible for the safety of the line and its personnel.

Sixth, criminal cases and law suits upon the territory of the railway should be settled according to the provisions of the existing treaties.

Seventh, the ground space necessary for the construction of the line would be given free to the Company if it should belong to the Chinese Government; should it belong to private individuals it should be turned over to the Company at current prices.

Eighth, the Company should have "the absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands. (*La Société aura le droit absolu et exclusif de l'administration de ses terrains.*)"

Ninth, the income of the Company and all materials for the construction of the line should be exempt from duty.

Tenth, Russian troops and war materials dispatched in transit over the line should be carried through directly from one Russian station to another without stopping on the way longer than necessary.

Eleventh, non-Chinese passengers leaving the territory of the railway should be supplied with Chinese passports.

Twelfth, the Chinese Government should install customs offices at the frontier points of the line to



collect such transit taxes as provided for all merchandise imported and exported into the interior of China or Russia.

Thirteenth, the Company should fix the rates for the transportation of passengers and merchandise; Chinese official letter post should be transported free and Chinese land and sea forces and also Chinese war materials at half price.

Fourteenth, the Chinese Government would in no case be responsible for any deficit whatsoever of the Company during the time allotted for the work and thereafter for a period of eighty years beginning from the day when the line was open to traffic. On the expiration of this period, "the line, with all its appurtenances, will pass free of charge to the Chinese Government. At the expiration of thirty years from the day when the entire line is finished and traffic is in operation, the Chinese Government will have the right to buy back this line upon repaying in full all the capital involved, as well as all the debts contracted for this line, plus accrued interest. If—in case the profit realized exceeds the dividends allowed to the shareholders—a part of such capital is repaid, that part will be deducted from the price of purchase. In no case will the Chinese Government enter into the possession of the line before the appropriate sum is deposited in the Russian State Bank. The day when the line is finished and traffic is in operation, the Company will make to the Chinese Government a payment of five million Kuping taels."<sup>1</sup>

The Russo-Chinese Bank had thus obtained from the Chinese Government the construction and exploitation of the Manchurian Railway. The next step it had to take was to found the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, which was duly formed, according to

<sup>1</sup> Text of contract given in MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 74 ff.

statutes, and chartered by the Russian Government on December 4, 1896.

These Statutes, aside from confirming the principle clauses of the September Contract between China and the Bank, contain the following features which should be noted. According to this instrument it was provided that the capital of the Company should be formed by the issue of shares and bonds. The share capital of the Company should be fixed at five million nominal credit rubles, divided into one thousand shares at five thousand nominal credit rubles each. These were not to be guaranteed by the Russian Government. The remaining portion of the capital should be formed by bonds issued from time to time subject to the sanction of the Russian Minister of Finances. The interest on and amortization of these bonds would be guaranteed by the Russian Government. It was also provided that, if the gross receipts of the Company were not enough to meet the working expenses and the yearly payments due on the bonds, the Russian Government would make the necessary advances, which would be charged to the Company at a rate of interest of six per cent per annum.

The Board of Management should consist of nine members elected by the shareholders and a President to be appointed by the Chinese Government. The Vice-Chairman was to be chosen by the members of the Board from among themselves. The Board might meet either at St. Petersburg or at Peking at least once a year for the examination and direction of the Company's business. An Audit Committee of five members should be created to check the Company's accounts and budgets as well as its general activities. All the members elected to serve in these capacities, except the President, would have to be approved by the Russian Minister of Finances. To make the enterprise a virtual appendage to the Russian Government, it was specifically provided that in recognition of the



guarantee furnished by the Russian Government the Company should coöperate in the running of the Chinese Eastern Railway in conformity with the Russian system and guided by the direction of the Russian Minister of Finances.<sup>1</sup>

From the foregoing two documents the following observations may be made: Metaphorically speaking, the whole arrangement as expressed by Dr. C. C. Wang, one-time President of the Railway Company, suggests a series of wheels within wheels.<sup>2</sup> The Russian Government obtained the concession from the Chinese Government. But Li Hung-chang refused to consider the proposition that it should be undertaken or even run by the Russian Government. Consequently, it was intrusted to the Russo-Chinese Bank, a hybrid institution which was nothing more than an adroit and intangible agent of the Russian Ministry of Finances, for all purposes which were permitted to private individuals but forbidden to the states. Then another wheel was added to the whole machinery in the form of a joint-stock company to which was given the right by the Russo-Chinese Bank to construct and operate the railway.

An analysis of these instruments reveals at once certain ambiguities, omissions, and inconsistencies of which Russia had not failed to take due advantage in their interpretation. For instance, it was provided that only Russians and Chinese could be the shareholders of the Company. But the issue of these shares was handled in such a way as to leave no room nor opportunity for the Chinese to participate in the enterprise. What was actually done, as Dr. Wang tells us, was that the shares were open for sale at one o'clock on a certain afternoon in St. Petersburg and closed

<sup>1</sup> MacMurray, *op cit.*, Vol. I, p. 84 ff.

<sup>2</sup> C. C. Wang, "The Chinese Eastern Railway," in the *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science*, Nov., 1925, p. 60.

five minutes after the announcement of the sale.<sup>1</sup> But the mystery of the thing is that no one since then seems to have seen any shares. They were not provided for, as we have seen, in the Contract. Only the Statutes of the Company made the assumption of their existence possible, and the practice has been that any Russian or Chinese might be recognized as a shareholder in the shareholders' meeting on the presentation of a certificate from the Russo-Chinese Bank or from the Bank of Russia.

As to omissions, the provision for the redemption of the road serves as a good example. It was provided that the surplus of the net earnings of the Company, after the allotted dividends were divided among the shareholders, would go towards the redeeming of the road by the Chinese Government. But nothing was said as to the extent the surplus might be divided as dividends. This omission is important in that a railroad of such magnitude, traversing a portion of China which holds great possibilities, and with only a capital of five million gold rubles, may in time earn a surplus several times the original capital. Then the question of division would grow proportionately. As long as the road is not a paying concern no such difficulties would arise. But in anticipation of the necessity for such a provision, this point was raised in 1920 by China and, through an exchange of letters, a certain scale was agreed upon between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank, now the Russo-Asiatic Bank, whereby certain proportions of the surplus were to be set aside as dividends and certain proportions set aside as redemption funds.

The clauses providing for the question of jurisdiction within the domain of the road were exceedingly ambiguous. It was, in fact, upon these hazy stipulations that Russia, and Japan later on, based their claims of

<sup>1</sup> Wang, *op. cit.*



political jurisdiction in Manchuria, which gave rise to considerable differences of opinion not only between China and Russia, between China and Japan, but also between Russia and Japan and all the other powers having treaty relations with China.

Take, for another example, the clause providing for "lands actually necessary for the construction, operation, and protection of the line, as also lands in the vicinity of the line necessary for procuring sand, stone, lime, etc." This is extremely vague, for it does not specify the exact amount to be required. This ambiguity, as we shall see later, gave rise to the acquisition by Russia of extensive areas of Chinese territory upon which grew cities and towns over which Russia claimed jurisdiction.

China's interest in this road was provided for in the share of five million Kuping taels which China was to pay to the Russo-Chinese Bank. This sum of money seems to have been paid out of the Russo-French loan to China after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War. According to a contemporary historian, the Chinese Government had been paying to the French creditors the stipulated four per cent interest on this sum of money, and the Russo-Chinese Bank at Newchwang, during the Russian occupation of this port in August, 1900, had received from the Chinese Maritime Customs there the returns amounting to five million Kuping taels.<sup>1</sup> This principal, plus accrued interest, had never been paid to China. But it is important not to confuse this sum of money with the five million Kuping taels which the Chinese Eastern Railway Company agreed to pay China on the completion of the road. These two sums of money were totally different things and they had nothing to do with each other.

<sup>1</sup> Asakawa, *op. cit.*, "The Russo-Japanese Conflict," p. 81.

One more important point should not be overlooked with regard to these two documents as a whole. Strictly speaking, they could not have the same validity, for the one was bilateral in character, while the other was unilateral. The Railway Contract was duly ratified by the Chinese Government, but the Statutes of the Company were registered under Russian law and had never received the indorsement of the Chinese Government. Moreover, certain provisions in the latter were inconsistent with those contained in the former. For instance, one provision in the Statutes of the Railway Company stipulated that the police agents of the Company should be intrusted with the preservation of law and order in the railway zone; while in the Contract with the Russo-Chinese Bank it was specifically provided that this duty was to be assigned to the Chinese Government. This difference could not but beget grave consequences, as future events will show. Again the Statutes made the Company wholly responsible and subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Finances. Of this the Contract gave no inkling whatsoever. However, as a whole, the terms were exceedingly favorable to Russia, and there was plenty of room for coöperation as a commercial enterprise for China and Russia. But unfortunately the jingoistic elements in Russia turned the railway intended for commercial purposes into a political weapon to further their expansionist and colonial policies.

#### THE LEASE OF KIAOCHOW, PORT ARTHUR, DALNY, AND WEIHAIWEI

Germany had by no means forgotten the service she had rendered to China during the tripartite intervention. In fact, when the Russo-Chinese Bank was being formed, she insisted on going half and half with Russia in the supply of capital. Russia at first intimated



that she would consider the German request, but she announced afterwards that all the necessary funds had been furnished by Russia herself, and therefore there was no need of foreign capital. German diplomacy was not to be fed by such cheap fiction, however. Driven as Germany was, in the game of political and commercial spoliation in the Far East from the front door, she now sought admission from the back door. She had for some time earmarked Kiaochow as the ideal port for her activity in Eastern Asia, and this she was going to demand from China as the reward for her services in the Sino-Japanese War. But there was the secret understanding between China and Russia that in the eventual partition of this territory, Russia was to have the claim of priority.<sup>1</sup> Russia had to be persuaded, therefore, to forgo the prospect of owning this harbor, if Germany was to get it. In this, German diplomacy was eminently successful.

The story of Germany's acquisition of this port is an interesting one. Count Witte tells us in his memoirs how the Kaiser tricked his cousin Nicholas into waiving Russia's pretension to the ownership of Kiaochow. According to Witte, it was on a certain afternoon when the two potentates were driving in an open carriage in the country at Peterhof, that the Kaiser suddenly broke away from the topic of conversation in which they were engaged and exclaimed to the Czar: "I want you to do me a favor. You are in the happy position of being able to help your friends as well as to punish your enemies. As you know, I am badly in need of a port. My fleet has no place worthy of the name outside of my Empire. And why should it be debarred? That may, perhaps, serve the purpose of our covert enemies, but not Russia's. And I know your friendly sentiments towards me and my Dynasty. I want you now to say frankly, have you any objection

<sup>1</sup> Dillon, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

to my having Kiaochow?"<sup>1</sup> The Czar was taken by surprise and for the sake of courtesy and hospitality could not very well refuse this request, and accordingly replied that he had no objection whatsoever. It was only a few hours later that he realized the gravity of his concession when he said to Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovitch: "I feel put out with the Kaiser. To-day he has tricked me into consenting to let him have Kiaochow. Of course it is not downright annexation that he aims at. He is only going to lease it. All the same, it is a nasty trick."<sup>2</sup>

On November 1, 1897, two German Catholic priests were murdered by a mob in Shantung. On November 17, three German men-of-war arrived at Kiaochow and six hundred marines were landed there. Meanwhile, Baron von Heyking, the German Minister at Peking, had presented his six demands, including the punishment of Governor Li of Shantung, the payment of an indemnity, and the preference for German capital and engineers in the future railway development in this province. Shortly after this, Prince Henry, who had just heard the Kaiser's famous "mailed fist" speech in dealing with China, arrived on the scene of trouble and presented his demand for the lease of Kiaochow Bay and its surrounding promontories. On March 6, 1898, China was forced to sign the agreement leasing the port of Kiaochow to Germany, together with mining and railway concessions.

When the news of the German lease reached St. Petersburg a council was convoked by Muravev, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which council he moved that Russia should take Port Arthur as a set-off against Kiaochow. Witte, who knew nothing of the personal arrangement between the Kaiser and the Czar,

<sup>1</sup> Dillon, *op. cit.*, p. 247; Witte, *op. cit.*, p. 416.

<sup>2</sup> Dillon, *op. cit.*, p. 248.



strongly protested against the adoption of this measure. He quotes himself as saying in the council meeting:

We should immediately adopt one of two measures, acquiesce in what has been done and abide by the consequences, or else insist on Germany's withdrawal from Kiaochow and take our stand on the integrity of China. There is no third way out of the difficulty—at least none that I can approve. I certainly cannot perceive the logic of seizing Port Arthur as an answer to the leasing of Kiaochow. Are we not on good terms with China? Why spoil these relations? Have we not a treaty with China? Why violate it? If we take either of these courses we put ourselves in the wrong. But if we decide to advise Germany to quit or else to fight her, we should have reason and morality on the side of our political and economic interests, and I feel that she would give way.<sup>1</sup>

Accordingly, the Council resolved not to take Port Arthur. But a few days later Admiral Dubassov had entered Port Arthur with a few of his men-of-war to "winter" there. Witte, according to his own testimony, was unspeakably angry with Muravev on hearing this, and made no secret of his feelings. Then the cat was let out of the bag by Muravev, who told Witte that His Majesty the Czar had arranged everything with regard to Port Arthur and Kiaochow; that he was not consulted in this, and, therefore, knew nothing of it; that the seizure of Port Arthur was the direct consequence of Kiaochow; and that it was entirely an imperial deal.<sup>2</sup>

Such was the inside story of the occupation of Port Arthur. To the outside world an entirely different version was presented by the Russian Government. Hardly a month after the German occupation of Kiaochow, five Russian men-of-war had obtained the permission of the Chinese Government to winter at Port Arthur. The reasons for such an action on the part

<sup>1</sup> Dillon, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 251.

of the Russian Government, according to Muravev, were the difficulty of keeping more than a certain number of war vessels in Japanese ports at one time and also the convenience of Port Arthur for the repair of Russian ships, since it was nearer to Vladivostok than any of the Japanese ports. And it was because of these reasons, Muravev said that the Imperial-Russian Government was glad to accept the "offer" of the Chinese Government to allow the Russian squadron to winter at Port Arthur.<sup>1</sup>

Japan, having just been deprived of this choice morsel herself, was deeply concerned with the movement of Russian men-of-war into Chinese waters. She made due inquiries of the Russian Government concerning their motives. An official communication came in response to this memorandum to the effect that "Port Arthur has been lent by China only temporarily as a winter anchorage." The Japanese Government in reply to this Russian note duly "credited this assurance and accordingly took note of it."<sup>2</sup>

Great Britain was no less concerned. She sent two of her warships to the scene to watch the movements of the Russian men-of-war.<sup>3</sup> The presence of the British vessels was complained of by the Russian Government, which protested that the ships had made a bad impression in Russia,<sup>4</sup> that their proceedings were looked upon as an unfriendly act which set afloat rumors of war with Great Britain,<sup>5</sup> and that as the Russian Government had always attached great importance to the maintenance of the most friendly relations with Great Britain in the Far East, it was hoped that she would show her desire to avoid any friction in the Russian sphere of influence.<sup>6</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> "China," No. 1 (1898), No. 27 (British Parliamentary Papers).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 29.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 31.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 48.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 61.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 66.



British reply to this warning was unfortunately weak. Instead of persisting in staying at Port Arthur, where she had as much right as Russia, the British Foreign Office replied that the visit of the British men-of-war was "by the order of the Admiral issued at his own discretion and not under the directions from Her Majesty's Government,"<sup>1</sup> and that "in the ordinary course they would soon leave for some other anchorage."<sup>2</sup> Shortly afterwards, the British war vessels departed from Port Arthur.

Russia could not help feeling jubilant over this diplomatic victory in compelling the British men-of-war to withdraw. Having thus won the first move, Russia boldly made another step forward in opposing the opening of Talienwan to foreign trade, which was one of the terms of a British loan of sixteen million pounds sterling to help China pay the remaining portion of the indemnity incurred as the result of the Sino-Japanese War.<sup>3</sup> The opening of Talienwan, so Muravev told Sir N. O'Connor, could not be regarded by Russia as a "friendly action," but as "encroaching on the Russian sphere of influence and denying her in future that right to the lease of Port Arthur to which progress of events had given her a claim." Asked by Sir N. O'Connor what possible objection Russia could have to making Talienwan a free port if she had no designs on that territory, Muravev replied that "without any such designs it was generally admitted that Russia might claim a commercial *débouché* upon the open sea, and that in order to enjoy the advantage fully she ought to be at liberty to make such arrangements with China as she could obtain with respect to the commercial rights which were to prevail there."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "China," No. 1 (1898), No. 63.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 48.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 46.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 59.

British diplomacy on this occasion was again disappointing. Instead of taking a firm stand, insisting upon Talienwan being opened as a treaty port, the British Foreign Office simply reminded Russia of the existence of the most-favored-nation clause which forbade Russia from getting more privileges than those enjoyed by other treaty powers, and that, if Russia should lease Talienwan, she should not infringe upon the privileges accrued from this clause.<sup>1</sup> The weakness of such a representation is evident. It was tantamount to not only abandoning the desire to open Talienwan as an open port but also to acquiescing in, and even recognizing, Russia's right to lease the port. However, upon further British representations Russia finally gave out the assurance on January 28, through M. de Staal, Russian Chargé at London, that should Russia lease the port from China "it would be open to all the ships of all the great powers like other ports on the Chinese mainland. It would be open to the commerce of all the world, and England, whose interests are so important in those regions, would share in the advantage."

The culmination of Russian diplomacy came on March 7, when M. Pavlov demanded of the Chinese Government the lease of Talienwan, together with Port Arthur and the right to construct a railway from Petuna on the Trans-Manchurian Railway to the sea-ports. The sole reason given for this demand was "to assist in protecting Manchuria against the aggression of other powers."<sup>2</sup> "The Russian Government," replied Muravev to the British protest that such an act constituted a violation of the principle of China's integrity, "did not in any way desire to abrogate the sovereignty of the Chinese Government over these

<sup>1</sup> "China," No. 1 (1898), No. 56.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 100.



ports, but that they only required a lease of them for twenty-five years for which they would pay an annual rental. The Russian Government considered that China owed them this for the services they had rendered her in her war with Japan, and these services must be properly requited."<sup>1</sup>

China was forced to sign against her will the convention for the lease of Liaotung. She had appealed to Great Britain for help,<sup>2</sup> but help was not forthcoming except in the form of diplomatic protestations, which availed but little. Shortly after the signature of this agreement, M. de Staal, under instructions from his government, gave the Marquis of Salisbury the following notification garbed in a language truly characteristic of a great triumph: "Ports Arthur and Talienwan as well as the adjacent territories have been ceded to Russia in usufruct by the Chinese Government. These ports and territories will be immediately occupied by the troops of His Majesty the Emperor, my august Master, and the Russian flag will be hoisted beside the Chinese flag."

British diplomacy had broken down. Nothing short of war could compel Russia to undo what she had done. All Great Britain could now do was to put on record the grave objections to the occupation of Port Arthur by Russia, to retain her entire liberty of action to take what steps she might think best to protect her own interests, to diminish the evil consequences anticipated,<sup>3</sup> and to request the Russian Government to make a written assurance of Russia's declared intention that Port Arthur and Talienwan would be open to the commerce of the world, that Russia would respect the principle of equal opportunity in commerce, that Russia would respect China's sovereignty in the

<sup>1</sup> "China," No. 1 (1898), No. 114.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 75.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 133.

leased areas and that the right of foreign ships of war to visit these ports would not be denied.<sup>1</sup>

Muravev's reply to this British memorandum is worthy of note. It begins by reminding the British Foreign Office that the ideas which he had so far expressed in regard to the opening and leasing of the two ports "ought never to have been interpreted as 'assurances' and could not in reality have such a signification," for "no government," he argues, "could pretend to the privilege of being made acquainted with negotiations in progress between two perfectly independent and friendly powers."<sup>2</sup> As to the right of foreign war vessels to visit the leased ports, Muravev says in his note that "Port Arthur will be open to British ships on the same conditions as it has always been, but not that Russia shall abuse the lease which has been granted to her by a friendly power to arbitrarily transform a closed and principally military port into a commercial port like any other."<sup>3</sup>

Such being the orientation of Russian activity in North China, Great Britain was compelled to lease Weihaiwei in order to maintain the balance of power there, at China's expense, of course. Japan was dumfounded by the Russian lease of Liaotung. Although she made no protest at this time against the alienation of this territory by Russia, her sentiments in this matter were unmistakably indicated by the tacit approval which she gave to the British lease of Weihaiwei and the speedy evacuation of her troops, then still in occupation as a result of the war with China, in favor of the British.

The Sino-Russian Convention of 1898 for the lease of Liaotung was signified with the avowed objects of "still further strengthening the friendly relations existing between the two Empires and mutually wishing

<sup>1</sup> "China," No. 1 (1898), No. 133.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 151.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*



to insure the means whereby to show reciprocal support" and "for the purpose of insuring that the Russian naval forces shall possess an entirely secure base on the littoral of Northern China." The terms of the lease was for a period of twenty-five years which might be prolonged by the mutual consent of the two governments. During the term of the lease the entire military command and the supreme civil administration should be vested in the Russian authorities. Port Arthur, as an exclusively military and naval port, "shall be used solely by Russian and Chinese vessels and shall be considered as a closed port to warships and merchant vessels of other states." Talienwan, however, would be considered open to foreign commerce and free entry to it would be granted to the merchant vessels of all nations. The Russian Government agreed to fortify the leased area with its own resources and at its own expense for the proper defense from hostile attack. A neutral zone north of the leased territory would be established within which the civil administration should be vested in the Chinese authorities. Chinese troops might be admitted to this zone only with the consent of the Russian Government.

The extension of the Manchurian Railway southward to the newly leased area was provided for in the following stipulation:

The Chinese Government agrees that the concessions by it in 1896 to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, from the date of the signature of the present agreement shall be extended to the connecting branch which is to be built from one of the stations of the main line to another more convenient point on the littoral of the Liaotung Peninsula. . . . All the stipulations of the contract concluded by the Chinese Government with the Russo-Chinese Bank on August 27 (September 8), 1896, shall apply scrupulously to these supplementary branches. . . . Consent to the construction of the railway on the basis indicated shall never under any form serve as a pretext for the seizure of Chinese territory or for an encroachment on the sovereign rights of China.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Text given in MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 19 ff.

On May 7, 1898, an additional agreement was entered into between China and Russia defining the boundaries of the leased areas. The terminus of the branch line was fixed at Port Arthur and Talienwan and at no other point in the said peninsula. It was agreed also that "railway privileges in districts traversed by this branch line shall not be given to subjects of other powers. As regards the railway which China shall (may) herself build hereafter from Shanhaikwan in extension at a point as near as (lit., nearest to) possible to this branch line, Russia agrees that she has nothing to do with it." It was also stipulated that no concession in the neutral zone defined by the agreement would be made to the subjects of other powers, and that no ports on the seacoast and west of the said neutral zone should be opened to the trade of other powers without the consent of Russia.<sup>1</sup>

On July 6, 1898, an additional agreement concerning the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway was reached. This branch line was to be known as the South Manchurian Branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It was also agreed that the Company might at its pleasure open a line of seagoing vessels for the purposes of securing, during the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the timely transportation of the necessary freight, materials, and workmen, and, during the exploitation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, of joining, by means of steamship service, the terminal points of the Far East, thus securing the regular and speedy transfer of passengers and freight, going from Russia and Western Europe to Eastern Asia and back.

The Company was also authorized to construct a branch line to Newchwang and other ports of the neutral zone in order to facilitate the conveying of the necessary materials and provisions for the construction

<sup>1</sup> MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 127 ff.



of the South Manchurian line. These branch lines to the neutral zone might be destroyed, after the completion of the South Manchurian line, if the Chinese Government should formulate a demand to this effect to the Russian Government.

It was provided in Article V that China might establish a customhouse at Talienwan and that the Chinese Eastern Railway might be appointed as agent of the Chinese Imperial Board of Revenue to open and manage the customs and in its behalf to levy and collect taxes. This customhouse was to be under the sole control of the Chinese Government, to which the said agent should from time to time make reports of its administration.<sup>1</sup>

Having secured these railway concessions from the Chinese Government, Russia set about with feverish activity to bring to a completion the construction of these lines, work on the main line having been started in the spring of 1897. After the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan, work began immediately on the Harbin-Port Arthur Line, the small branch line connecting with Newchwang having been finished. The work on the South Manchurian line was done so rapidly that at the time of the Boxer Rebellion the whole line was almost through, with the exception of a few bridges. The progress of the construction of the Manchurian Railway was greatly interrupted in 1900, but, when peace was restored, construction was pushed forward with the utmost dispatch, and the last rail was laid on November 3, 1901, exactly ten years after the commencement of this gigantic undertaking, when Nicholas II, then Czarevitch, with great ceremony turned the first sod. Thus was brought to a successful consummation an enterprise which for its sheer magnitude and boldness of conception was without a parallel,

<sup>1</sup> MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 154 ff.

and Russia was truly on the eve of realizing one of her most cherished dreams.

#### RUSSO-FRENCH-BELGIAN INTRIGUES

Russia was by no means satisfied with this preponderant position which she had already acquired in Manchuria. Her greatest ambition was to join hands with her French ally in South China by a trunk line bisecting China from the north to the south. With this in view her eyes were ever kept on the Peking-Shanhaikwan Line beyond the Great Wall.

When the Sino-Japanese War broke out, the North China Imperial Railway had already been extended to Chunghouso, forty miles southeast of Shanhaikwan. Its further extension north of the Great Wall was delayed partly by the war and partly by the shortage of funds. In 1897, the question of its prolongation was revived and seriously considered by the Chinese Government. Russia, knowing China's intention, attacked Mr. Kinder's position as Engineer-in-Chief of the Chinese Imperial Railway, and through her representative, M. Pavlov, made known to the Tsungli Yamen that Russia would desire the resignation of Mr. Kinder from the employ of the Chinese Imperial Railway.

The Russian motive was of course actuated by the desire to exclude any foreign influence in Manchuria other than their own. In his representation to the Chinese Government, M. Pavlov alleged that China had promised to employ Russian capital and Russian engineers on the extension of the line north of the Great Wall, and therefore the employment of a British engineer would violate the spirit as well as the letter of the understanding with Russia. Sir Claude M. MacDonald, British Minister at Peking, presented the opposite view to the Tsungli Yamen and pointed out to M. Pavlov that the latter's desire to get rid of Mr. Kinder looked as if it were because



of the fact that Mr. Kinder was an Englishman. M. Pavlov's reply was exceedingly illuminating in that it for the first time revealed officially the real motive of the Russian Government in Manchuria. M. Pavlov said to Sir Claude MacDonald that there was no wish on Russia's part to get rid of Mr. Kinder because he was an Englishman but because he was not a Russian, for he said he must frankly tell the British Minister that the Russian Government intended that the province of China bordering on the Russian frontier must not come under the influence of any nation except Russia.<sup>1</sup> This opposition to Mr. Kinder was later withdrawn, however, through Count Lamsdorf, the new Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

By this time the Imperial Chinese Railway Administration had definitely decided to continue the extramural extension, and negotiations had already begun between Hu Yen-mei, Director General of the Imperial Chinese Railway Administration, and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation for the construction of a railway line between Chunghouso and Hsinmintin and a branch line to Yinkow, and an agreement was duly reached between them.

The second clause of this instrument defined the security of the line in the following:

The security for the loan shall be the permanent way, rolling stock, and entire property, together with the freight and earnings of the existing lines between Peking, Tanku, and Chunghouso and also of the proposed new lines when constructed, in addition to the rights of mining coal and iron, which will hereafter be determined. In the event of default or arrears in payment of interest or repayments of capital, the said railway lines and mines shall be handed over to the representatives deputed by the syndicate, to manage them on their behalf, until principal and interest of the loan are redeemed in full, when the management will revert to the Railway Administration.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "China," No. I (1898), p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 179.

This provision was greatly objected to by M. Pavlov on the ground that the security as stipulated above was a mortgage on the existing and future railways which would come into the possession of the mortgagers in the event of default by the mortgagees.<sup>1</sup> In plain language, the Russian contention was apprehensive of a British controlled railway in Manchuria which Russia had marked solely for her own.

M. Pavlov, furthermore, claimed for Russia the priority of this line on the strength of the stipulation contained in the supplementary agreement for the lease of Liaotung, in which China and Russia agreed in common that railway privileges in districts traversed by the South Manchurian Railway should not be given to subjects of other powers, and Hsinmintin, being only a few miles from Mukden, would naturally seem to come under the regulation of this provision. However, in spite of this Russian protest, the agreement was signed with the British corporation by the Chinese Government.

In the meantime, the Russian contention was transferred to Hu Yen-mei, who argued in return that the next clause of this same article withdrew precisely this particular railroad from the purview of the Russian Government, in as much as Russia agreed to have nothing to do with a line that China might herself build. M. Pavlov was nevertheless not to be convinced with this argument, and the matter was then transferred from Peking to London and St. Petersburg, causing a long delay in the signature of a definitive agreement between the two contracting parties.

At St. Petersburg, a long discussion ensued between Sir Charles Scott and Count Muravev without having any concrete results. At London, Mr. Balfour reminded M. Lessar of the Treaty of Tientsin, which guaranteed equal rights to all nations; and that, in objecting to

<sup>1</sup> Morse, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 85.



China's railway development, Russia was not living up to the provisions of the treaty. M. Lessar suggested to Mr. Balfour, however, that if Great Britain wanted she might claim similar privileges in the Yangtze Valley as Russia was now claiming in Manchuria.

Meanwhile, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation had manifested its willingness to undertake the business on the mortgage of the Peking-Shanhaikwan section only and on a charge on the profits of the extramural section, if China would agree to give the assurance that none of the lines mentioned in the agreement would be alienated to the nationals of another foreign power, and if the British Foreign Office would uphold such an assurance given by China. These conditions were duly met by the Chinese and the British Government, and a definitive contract was executed by Hu Tu-jen and Mr. Miller on October 10, 1898, and on November 27 it was sanctioned by imperial decree.

When the prospectus of the agreement was issued in February, 1899, Count Muravev made the discovery that the extension was to Hsinmintin, of which he declared he had not previously heard, having understood that Yinkow was the objective of the extension. This objection was conceded to by Great Britain in formally recognizing the right of the Russian Government to support the application of Russian subjects for concessions in southwest Manchuria and also on the understanding that China should build the Hsinmintin line herself and that she might allow European, not necessarily British, engineers to make periodical inspections of the work of construction and to see to its being properly executed.<sup>1</sup>

On April 28, 1899, a final understanding, delimiting the Russian and British spheres of railway interests in China, was reached between Sir Charles Scott and

<sup>1</sup> MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 207.

Count Muravev, and identic notes were exchanged on the same day to the following effect:

1. Great Britain engages not to seek for her own account or on behalf of British subjects or others any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region by the Russian Government.

2. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of Russian subjects or of others, any railway concessions in the basin of the Yangtze, and not to obstruct directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in the region supported by the British Government.<sup>1</sup>

Whether either contracting party would abide in good faith by the agreement just entered into *mutatis mutandis* was a question to be answered by the future. The sincerity of the Russian Government may be doubted, however, from the facts that a Franco-Belgian syndicate, strongly supported by M. Pavlov, was granted a railway concession for a trunk line from Peking to Hankow by the Chinese Government almost at the very same time that the Scott-Muravev notes were exchanged, and that, two days after this agreement was signed, the Russo-Chinese Bank was making an application for a concession to build a line from Mukden to Peking. That the demarcation of the British and Russian railway interests in China was not so advantageous to the British may be seen from the fact that before the conclusion of this agreement the British and Chinese Corporation had already secured a concession for lines leading from Shanghai to the Yangtze. From these facts it would seem, therefore, that the agreement came too late to be of any great use to Great Britain, and that, in concluding this understanding with Russia, Great Britain was really tying her hands in Manchuria without receiving adequate returns in the form of compensating advantages in other parts of China.

<sup>1</sup> MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 204.



For a time, after the conclusion of this agreement, Russian ambition to dominate other parts of China than Manchuria seemed to have retired to the background, but a moment's study of the situation will show that Russia's political interests below the Great Wall were by no means forsaken but were duly and craftily intrusted to France, her political ally, and Belgium, her financial agent.

When the Belgians entered into the competition for railroad concessions in China the Chinese were lulled by the thought that "Belgium was but an iron and steel manufactory and acknowledged to be a small country without any wish for aggrandizement and that borrowing money from them would be most advantageous and attended with little risk."<sup>1</sup> With these innocent arguments in mind Chinese statesmen turned down British and American bids for the Peking and Hankow trunk line which was awarded to the Belgian group.

It is interesting to note that, during the negotiations for this line, the most powerful supporters of the Belgian financial interests were the Russian Chargé d'Affaires and the French Minister at Peking. The British entertained no illusions with regard to the Belgian syndicate, and duly warned the Tsungli Yamen that any Russian and French participation in the loan would be strongly opposed by the British Government. Sir Claude MacDonald, British Minister to China, was solemnly assured, however, that the money engaged in this concession was *bona fide* Belgian and that no Russian or French interests were involved.<sup>2</sup> Three days after this the agreement was signed ostensibly with a Belgian syndicate. The ratification of the agreement was rushed through despite British efforts to retard its consummation.

<sup>1</sup>Contained in Chang Chi-tung's memorandum to the throne, quoted from P. H. B. Kent, "Railway Enterprise in China," p. 97.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. *North-China Herald*, July 30, 1897.

But when the agreement was made public it was found that the Russo-Chinese Bank was made the agent for the bonds, the bank of deposit, and the medium for monthly payments.<sup>1</sup> This was a distinct departure from the assurance given to the British Minister by the Tsungli Yamen. Thereupon, the British Government demanded as compensation for this breach of faith the concession of the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo, the Shanghai-Nanking, the Canton-Kowloon, and the Pukow-Sinyang Line, which were duly granted to Great Britain by the Chinese Government.

That the Peking-Hankow concession was Franco-Belgian was acknowledged by the French Yellow Book in its issue of June, 1900, in which it is specifically stated that this line was built and operated for the benefit and mutual advantage of the French and Belgian parties. It was also stated that the French supplied sixty per cent of the loan and the Belgians forty per cent. It is plain, therefore, that the French interests were predominant. Then the question arises, if the syndicate were more French than Belgian, why was a Russian bank chosen as its agent in China when the Banque Indo-Chine would serve the purpose just as well, if not better? Certainly the Russo-Chinese Bank did not undertake this business just for petty banking profits. The only plausible explanation would therefore seem to be that Russian financial interests were deeply involved, and that the Société Belge d'Études de Chemins de Fer en Chine was really nothing more than a financial agent of the Russian Government.

Having secured the Peking-Hankow Line, the tripartite combination now set about to undermine the Hankow-Canton concession granted to American banking interests by secretly purchasing the shares of the American China Development Company in the

<sup>1</sup> Articles 18, 20, MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 135.



New York stock market. After they had secured the control of the majority of the shares of the company they began to assume the control and direction of the company, and subsequently replaced all the American engineers with Belgians. This greatly alarmed the Chinese Government, which was accordingly compelled to cancel the American concession<sup>1</sup> and redeem it with British capital.<sup>2</sup> Thus the Russian grandiose scheme of a trunk line running from the north to the south of China and linking the two allies in one unbroken sphere of mutual interest was frustrated.

But Russia was not to be disappointed, however. Blocked by the Japanese in the north and the British in the south, she now tried her hand from the flank of China. A trunk line from China's western borders and through the heart of China to the Pacific coast had long been cherished by Russian statesmen. For the realization of this object the line between Chengtungfu and Taiyüanfu was secured in 1898 by the Russo-Chinese Bank.<sup>3</sup> A few days after the Chinese Government gave away this concession, the Belgian banking interests obtained a short and insignificant line from Kaifengfu to Honanfu and also the right to extend it to Sianfu.<sup>4</sup> It is to be noted that these lines granted to the Russian and Belgian interests both ran in the same direction, and that the construction and operation of the Taiyüanfu line was granted again by the Belgians to the French group in the Russo-Chinese Bank. All this indicates a harmony of interests among the three powers.

Furthermore, when M. de Vos secured for the Société Générale de Chemins de Fer et de Tramways en Chine, a Franco-Belgian concern, the extension of the

<sup>1</sup> "United States Foreign Relations," 1905, p. 124.

<sup>2</sup> Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

<sup>3</sup> W. W. Rockhill, "Treaties and Conventions with or Concerning China and Korea," 1895-1904, p. 309 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 389 ff.

Kaifengfu line eastward to the sea at Haichow and westward not only to Sianfu, as originally conceded by China, but actually as far westward as Lanchowfu, and a further extension to Suchowfu on the extreme western border of China, Russia did not protest that such an extension constituted a menace to the security of her territory as she did in the Chingchow-Aigun project a few years later. The only reasonable explanation for such a conspicuous absence of Russian complaint may be attributed to the belief that such an extension was part of the project of the Russian Central Asian system, and that the Franco-Belgian interests were really helping to consummate the realization of this stupendous scheme.

The interlocking of Russian, French, and Belgian financial interests may further be evidenced from a comparison of the banking houses constituting the Independent Belgian Group of 1911 and those constituting the Russian Group in the Sextuple Group of the Consortium. This Independent Group, headed by M. de Vos, who had just been promoted from the Belgian consular service with practically no banking experience behind him, was composed of the Russo-Asiatic Bank, the Sino-Belgian Bank, Banque d'Outremer, Société Générale de Belgique, Société Belge d'Études de Chemins de Fer en Chine, Eastern Bank Limited, J. Henry Schroeder and Company, and A. Spitzer and Company.<sup>1</sup>

It appears strange that the Russo-Asiatic Bank with its own agent in Peking was willing to trust the leadership to an inexperienced Belgian consul in the person of M. de Vos. But it was a fact, and the only justifiable reason for it would seem to be that the Russo-Asiatic Bank was really coöperating with M. de Vos for concessions which the Bank itself was prohibited from undertaking. When Russia joined the Consortium,

<sup>1</sup> MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 947. A different version of the text of this loan is printed in the *Far Eastern Review*, Vol. VIII, p. 428 ff.



the Russo-Asiatic Bank signed for the Russian Group which was composed of the following banking houses: Banque Russo-Asiatic, A. Spitzer and Company, J. Henry Schroeder and Company, Eastern Bank Limited, Banque Sino-Belge, Société Belge d'Études de Chemins de Fer en Chine, Société Générale de Belgique, Banque d'Outremer (Belgian).<sup>1</sup> It will be seen that most of the names contained in the two groups are identical, and it is hard to believe that their identity is a matter of mere coincidence. The safe conclusion for us to take, therefore, would be that the Société Belge d'Études de Chemins de Fer en Chine was unblushingly a component part of the Russian Group, that the Belgians were in reality acting in China on behalf of Russia, and that M. de Vos, though professionally engaged as a Belgian financier, was really an agent in the employ of the Russian Government to further the latter's political and financial interests in other parts of China than Manchuria, from which the Scott-Muravev Agreement debarred them from active participation.

<sup>1</sup> MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1023.

## CHAPTER III

### RUSSIA'S FURTHER POLITICAL AMBITIONS IN MANCHURIA

#### RUSSIA DURING THE BOXER TROUBLE AND AFTER

WITH the lease of Kiaochow the dismemberment of China had begun. The German lead was followed by Russia with the lease of Liaotung. Great Britain was then compelled to secure the lease of Weihaiwei to maintain the balance of power in North China. France obtained her share in the lease of Kwangchow-wan. There remained, therefore, only the United States of America as one of the great powers which was outside the game of spoliation then going on in China.

Although the United States had no territorial ambitions in China, nevertheless she had great commercial interests to safeguard. With this in view, therefore, Secretary Hay, half selfishly and half altruistically, dispatched his famous note of September 6, 1899, in which he asked the great powers individually to give formal assurances that each within its respective sphere of influence would in no way interfere with the interests of other nationals found within its so-called "sphere of interest" or leased territory which it might have in China; that the same Chinese treaty tariff should apply to all merchandise landed within such territory, irrespective of the nationality to which it might belong; that no higher harbor dues on vessels or higher railroad charges should be levied than those levied on vessels or goods of its own nationals; and that no discrimination whatsoever should exist commercially between



them and other peoples who had equal treaty rights with China.<sup>1</sup>

Great Britain was naturally the first power willing to accede to such a policy, which she had originated and tried to uphold for a long time herself. But it was no surprise that the other nations should feel a little reluctant to indorse a principle which was directly opposed to their desire to exploit as fully as possible what they had already secured, and to scramble for more if they could. However, by one of the most clever strokes of modern diplomacy, Secretary Hay succeeded in extracting from these powers written assurances to at least uphold a policy which, in spite of its many violations, has since become the keystone in the politics of the Far Eastern world.

Japan adhered to the proposed principle unequivocally. France and Germany gave their due assent. But Russia, one of the most important factors in the Far Eastern situation, would sign no paper, and would only give her adherence to the understanding on the condition that France should agree to join. "Still," Hay wrote to Henry White on April 2, 1900, in reference to Muravev's verbal statement just cited "he did say it, he did promise, and he did enter into just that agreement. It is possible that he did so thinking that France would not come in and other powers would not. If now they choose to take a stand in opposition to the civilized world, we shall then make up our mind what to do about it. At present, I am not bothering much."<sup>2</sup> Hay had thus scored a great victory. Russia was not yet in a position to defy the world, and she was made to declare that she had for a long time indicated her intention of upholding the policy of the Open Door, as

<sup>1</sup> MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 221 ff.

<sup>2</sup> W. R. Thayer, "Life of John Hay," Vol. II, p. 243.

might be seen from the creation of Talienwan as a free port. But the sincerity of a declaration so unwillingly extracted from a government whose sole intention was focused on converting the whole of Manchuria into a second Bokhara remains to be seen.

Early in March, 1900, before the outbreak of the Boxer storm, Li Hung-chang was reported to have negotiated on his own responsibility at Canton, with a Russian embassy, the alleged Canton Convention to the effect that Russia would guarantee the existence of the Dynasty and oppose any further territorial concession by the powers, whether solicited by peaceful negotiations or demanded after an armed conflict; that Russia would support the Dynasty against Western intervention and against the Boxers; and that in compensation for these services, Russia would have at her disposal the external provinces of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet.<sup>1</sup>

With this understanding as a background for Russia's position in the Boxer Rebellion, it is interesting to note Russia's apparent equipoise in underestimating the seriousness of the situation when the trouble was brewing. According to Count Muravev, the trouble would be over in two weeks, and he at the same time emphasized the gravity of the crisis in southern and middle China where British interests were paramount.<sup>2</sup> The only explanation for such an optimism would seem to be that it was the real intention of Russian statesmen to divert British attention from northern China, thus leaving Russia to help China put down the insurrection alone, and to intervene before the other maritime powers could take a hand in the matter, so that from the very beginning she would be in a position to play the part of an honest broker between the Chinese Court and wrathful Europe.

<sup>1</sup> Alexander Ular, "A Russo-Chinese Empire," pp. 232-234.

<sup>2</sup> "China," No. 3 (1900), No. 149.



With this object in view, as early as March, 1900, Russia had partially mobilized her Siberian troops on the pretext of staying Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. But unfortunately for Russia, her calculation of the time of the pending outbreak of the Boxers proved erroneous. It came two months sooner than she had expected. This miscalculation was irremediable, as the other powers had already stepped in before Russia could lay her hand on the situation, and it was said that, on being violently rebuked by the Czar for this failure, Muravev committed suicide by taking poison on June 19. His place was then filled by Count Lamsdorf.<sup>1</sup>

Having failed to carry out her original intention of becoming China's sole arbitrator, Russia now began to play the part of a moderator and a traditional friend, trying to win the confidence of the Chinese Government as the other Western invaders would bring upon themselves China's hatred. It was no secret that during the occupation of Peking, where the other Europeans made themselves hated with their plunder, loot, and murders, the Russian Government was distributing almost under the eyes of its blind rivals twenty thousand rations of rice a day to the needy population at Peking. Large quantities of sheepskin cloaks and other clothes were generously distributed.<sup>2</sup>

The point which Muravev emphasized, that war was not extant in China, is worthy of note. Russia stood for the Manchu Court, and contended that the Boxer movement was purely an insurrectionist movement in which the Chinese Government was not implicated. The international expedition, according to Russia, therefore, should be only to safeguard the legations at Peking and foreign nationals resident

<sup>1</sup> Ular, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 257.

there against the criminal intentions of the Chinese insurgents, and to help the Government to restore, as soon as possible, the legal order of things in the Empire. With these ends in view, Russia endeavored to lay down, as a guide for the action of the powers, these fundamental principles; namely, that there should be harmony among the powers, that the integrity of the former rule of government in the Chinese Empire should be respected, that all that might lead to a dismemberment should be set aside, and that there should be restored at Peking, through common efforts, the legally instituted central government which would be competent to insure itself order and the tranquillity of the Empire.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, as a manifestation of her friendship towards the Manchu Dynasty and with the sole object of facilitating the return of the Court to Peking, Russia announced that she would withdraw her legation and troops to Tientsin, and requested accordingly that the other powers do the same. This was made public in the following declaration of Russian purposes:

That Russia has no designs of territorial acquisitions in China; that, equally with other Powers now operating there, Russia has sought safety of legation at Peking and to help the Chinese Government to repress the trouble; that incident to the necessary defensive measures on Russian borders, Russia has occupied Niu-chwang for military purposes, and as soon as order is reëstablished, will retire troops therefrom, if action of other Powers be no obstacle thereto; that the purpose for which the various governments have coöperated for relief of legations in Peking has been accomplished; that, taking the position that, as the Chinese Government has left Peking, there is no need for her representative to remain, Russia has directed the Russian Minister to retire with his official personnel from China; that the Russian troops will likewise be withdrawn, and that when the Government of China shall regain the reins of government and afford an authority with which the other Powers can deal, and will express desire to

<sup>1</sup> "U. S. For. Rel.," 1900, p. 380.



enter into negotiations, the Russian Government will also name its representative.<sup>1</sup>

This proposal of the withdrawal of legations and troops from Peking to Tientsin was made first to the United States. It was no doubt the intention of Russian diplomacy to win over the United States so as to prevent an understanding from being reached between America and Great Britain. This proposal put the powers in a quandary. If they should withdraw it would mean a loss of face and prestige in the eyes of the Chinese, who could not but regard themselves as morally the victor. If they remained, the Court would not return, and it would be beyond their patience to chase a will-o'-the-wisp sovereign all over the Empire. The powers seized the bull by the horns, however, and rejected the Russian proposal, pending the resumption of negotiations with the Dynasty.

The Russian proposal was not, as it at first seemed, a sign of timidity, but a clever stroke of diplomacy, for it was to the interest of Russia that the Manchu Dynasty should be preserved and that the Court return to Peking, which, because of its proximity to the Russian sphere of interest in Manchuria, was naturally more responsive to Russian influences than to those of other powers, whose spheres of interest were more remote from the Chinese Capital. The overthrow of the Dynasty would necessarily result in an international protectorate of China which was the last thing to be desired from the Russian point of view, for it would then rob Russia of all the fruits of her achievement. It was, therefore, manifest to the Russian mind that if China was helpless, Russia could not suffer to be built up by the other powers a controlling influence upon the ruins of the Celestial Empire. If China was not helpless, then, for the sake of her national security, Russia must be China's best friend. Hence the Russian declaration.

1 "U. S. For. Rel.," 1901, p. 19.

However, in spite of the clever game which Russia played during and after the Boxer trouble in Peking, Russian diplomacy failed to conceal the evil intentions which it had harbored for a long time. In contrast with her policy in North China, that of proposing the withdrawal of Allied troops and legations from Peking to Tientsin, Russia was vigorously prosecuting her campaign in Manchuria. Simultaneous with the announcement of her withdrawal proposal, Niguta, Kirin, and Tsitsihar were taken by Russian troops; Newchwang fell in September; Liaoyang, Mukden, and Tiehling were occupied by them in October; Fenghwangcheng and Antung were stormed in December. Thus, true to the prediction of Muravev, the cross was now raised on the Amur, which yesterday was Chinese.

Having brought the whole of Manchuria under Russian military control, Russia then began to consolidate her position there. A convention was alleged to have been signed on November 11, 1901, at Port Arthur, between Alexiev and Tseng, according to which Russia agreed to return the civil administration of Fengtien to the Chinese, on condition that the Tartar general undertake to pacify the said province and assist in the construction of the railroad; that he treat the Russian forces of occupation with kindness and provide them with lodging and provisions; that the Chinese soldiers be disarmed and disbanded; that the forts and defenses, not occupied by the Russians, be dismantled; that law and order be maintained; that a Russian political resident be stationed at Mukden, to whom all important measures should be referred; that Russian reënforcements be invited in case of emergency, if the local police proved insufficient for this purpose; and that only when the Russian Government was satisfied that the pacification of the provinces was complete would Newchwang and other places now under Russian military occupation be restored to



Chinese civil administration.<sup>1</sup> This convention was signed by the Tartar general without the authorization of Peking, so pressure was brought to bear upon the Chinese Government by M. Lessar for its ratification. But, following the vigorous protests of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, and Germany, Count Lamsdorf was obliged, on February 6, to declare that the arrangements now being negotiated in St. Petersburg were purely of a *modus vivendi*, and that no intention existed to depart from the assurance as already given to restore Manchuria to the Chinese Government "as soon as circumstances admitted of it."<sup>2</sup>

But the Russian Government refused to publish the alleged Lamsdorf-Yang Yu Convention and pressed the Chinese Government to ratify it. M. Lessar was said to have penetrated the sick chamber of Li Hung-chang, persuading him to sign it, but Li died before he could place his signature on the protocol. The negotiations were then taken over by Prince Ching, and Russia threatened to break off negotiations if the Yang Yu protocol was not ratified in two weeks. China appealed to Great Britain for an extension of the period.<sup>3</sup>

To the British inquiry of the alleged draft of the agreement, Count Lamsdorf conceded that there had only been a "program" and that since no draft agreement, as published by the press, had ever existed it was therefore impossible for him to discuss the details of it with a third power.<sup>4</sup> To the Japanese representation regarding this, he said that the agreement in question concerned chiefly two independent states and must, therefore, be concluded without the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. London *Times*, Jan. 3, 1901. First disclosed by Dr. Morrison, Peking correspondent of the *Times*.

<sup>2</sup> "China," No. 2 (1901).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* (1904), No. 35.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 39.

interference of any third power or powers. However, he could give this assurance, that any agreement of such a kind would only be temporary, and that neither the sovereignty of the Chinese Empire nor the treaty rights of the powers would be jeopardized.<sup>1</sup>

On April 5, an official statement was issued to the effect that, owing to the misrepresentations of the press and the various obstacles put in her way, Russia had been prevented from beginning a "starting point" towards the evacuation of Manchuria; and that only when a central government, strong enough to prevent a repetition of the deplorable circumstances of the last year, was formed, could Russia be ready to restore to China the territory of Manchuria then under Russian military occupation; and that, while awaiting the future progress of events Russia would, meanwhile, adhere to her original program.<sup>2</sup>

In the meantime, the powers had come to an understanding with regard to the final settlement of the Boxer insurrection. This left Russia a free hand to deal with the Manchurian question. M. Lessar immediately seized the opportunity and brought forward a new convention, regarding the evacuation of Manchuria, by Russian troops. The contents of this convention were first disclosed by Prince Ching to Mr. Conger. According to this agreement, it was provided that the Russian evacuation of Manchuria was to be completed in three years, that China should undertake to protect the railways and Russian subjects in this territory, that no troops of other nationalities should be employed for this protection, that no railway concessions in South Manchuria should be granted to any other power, and that the railways between Shanhaikwan, Newchwang, and Hsinmintin would be returned to China after the

<sup>1</sup> "China," No. 2 (1904), No. 34.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 37.



payment of the expenses incurred during the period of temporary occupation by Russia.<sup>1</sup>

Prince Ching counter-proposed, however, that the evacuation should be completed in one year instead of three years. Russia compromised by cutting it down to two years.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, in addition to this convention, a separate agreement proposed by the Russo-Chinese Bank was presented to the Chinese Government. In this proposed agreement it was demanded that besides guaranteeing all the previous concessions accorded to the Bank, China should undertake the industrial development of Manchuria herself and that, in case outside help should be needed, Russian capital should be approached first.<sup>3</sup>

Prince Ching thought that he had got as much as he could from Russia and that Russia would yield no further. This can be seen from what he said to Mr. Conger, that he was convinced that if China held out longer she would never again secure terms as lenient, and that the only terms that Russia would consent to were the signing of both the Convention and the Russo-Chinese Bank Agreement.<sup>4</sup>

The view of the American Government on this proposed railway monopoly, which the Russo-Chinese Bank sought to get from the Chinese Government, was clearly expressed by Secretary Hay in his memorandum to the Russian Government dated February 1, 1902. It was a lucid exposition of his doctrine of the Open Door, which he enunciated shortly before the Boxer outbreak, as may be seen from the following passage:

An agreement by which China cedes to any corporation or company the exclusive right and privilege of opening mines,

<sup>1</sup> 57th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Doc., Vol. I, p. 271.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 272.

<sup>3</sup> "U. S. For. Rel.," 1902, p. 272 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1902, p. 173.

establishing railroads, or in any other way industrially developing Manchuria, cannot but be viewed with the gravest concern by the Government of the United States. It constitutes a monopoly which is a distinct breach of the stipulations of treaties concluded between China and foreign powers and thereby seriously affects the rights of American citizens. . . . Furthermore, such concession on the part of China will undoubtedly be followed by demands from other powers for similar and equal exclusive advantages in other parts of the Chinese Empire, and the inevitable result must be the complete wreck of the policy of absolute equality of treatment of all nations in regard to trade, navigation, and commerce within the confines of the Empire.<sup>1</sup>

To this memorandum, Count Lamsdorf made the following inconsistent but forcible reply:

The Russian Government feels itself bound to declare that negotiations carried on between two entirely independent states are not subject to be submitted to the approval of other powers. There is no thought of attacking the principle of the Open Door as that principle is understood by the Imperial Government of Russia, and Russia has no intentions whatsoever to change the policy followed by her in that respect up to the present time. If the Russo-Chinese Bank should obtain concessions in China, the agreements of a private character relating to them would not differ from those heretofore concluded by so many other foreign corporations. But would it not be very strange if the door that is open to certain nations should be closed to Russia, whose frontier adjoins that of Manchuria, and who has been forced by recent events to send her troops into that province to reestablish order in the plain and common interest of all nations? It is impossible to deny to an independent state the right to grant to others such concessions as it is free to dispose of, and I have every reason to believe that the demands of the Russo-Chinese Bank do not in the least exceed those that have been so often formulated by other foreign companies, and I feel that under the circumstances it would not be easy for the Imperial Government to deny to the Russian companies that support which is given by other Governments to companies and syndicates of their own nationalities. At all events, I beg Your Excellency to believe that there is not, nor can there be, any question of the contradiction of the assurances which, under the orders of His Majesty the Emperor, I

<sup>1</sup> "U. S. For. Rel.," 1902, p. 276.



have had occasion to give heretofore in regard to the principle which invariably directs the policy of Russia.<sup>1</sup>

However, upon further remonstrances of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, China was encouraged to stand up against Russia and persistently refused to sign the convention and the agreement. Meanwhile, there was consummated a momentous agreement between Great Britain and Japan in the form of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was signed on January 30, 1902. By virtue of this instrument Great Britain and Japan, in view of their special interests in China and actuated by the desire to preserve the peace of the Far East, agreed to take such measures as might be indispensable to safeguard those interests, if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea. The contracting parties also agreed to maintain a strict neutrality and to use their efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against their ally, in case either of the contracting parties should become involved in a war with another power in the defense of their interests, and to conduct the war in common if other power or powers should join in hostility against that ally.<sup>2</sup>

Evidently this agreement was directed against Russia. However, the magnanimity of the Russian Government was not to be disturbed. It was said to have received the Anglo-Japanese understanding with the "utmost calm" as a diplomatic act which did not at all change the general situation of the political horizon in the Far East.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, Russia and her ally, France, "being obliged themselves also to take into consideration the case in which either the aggressive action of third powers, or the recurrence of

<sup>1</sup> 57th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Doc., Vol. I, p. 929.

<sup>2</sup> Text given in MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 324 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 324 ff.

disturbances in China, jeopardizing the integrity and free development of that power which might become a menace to their interests," declared that they had to "reserve themselves the right to consult in that emergency as to the means to be adopted for protecting those interests."<sup>1</sup> This declaration found expression in the Russo-French Agreement entered into in the same year as an answer to the Anglo-Japanese Protocol.

One of the immediate results of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, as far as China was concerned, was to hasten the conclusion of the protracted Manchurian Convention with Russia. Russia no longer thought it wise now to drag the negotiations, Prince Ching's position meanwhile having been strengthened and reassured in a way by the understanding just reached between Great Britain and Japan. Finally, therefore, Russia acceded to China's new counter-proposals of March, and concluded with Prince Ching on April 8, 1902, the agreement with regard to the evacuation by Russian troops of Manchuria.

By virtue of this instrument Russia agreed, "provided that no disturbances arise, and that the action of other powers should not prevent it," to withdraw its forces at three different times: that within the first six months after the signature of the agreement she would clear the southwestern position of the province of Mukden up to the river Liao of Russian troops, and hand the railways over to China; that within another six months her troops should be withdrawn from the provinces of Mukden and Kirin and that within the following six months the province of Heilungkiang should be evacuated.<sup>2</sup>

These terms apparently were mild and China had cause to rejoice over a diplomatic victory. But a

<sup>1</sup> MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 325 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* Vol. I, p. 326 ff.



careful scrutiny of the agreement will reveal at once that there was ample room for contention. For example, by Article II of the Agreement China was obliged not only to protect the Manchurian Railway and the persons employed by it, but also the whole of Manchuria, in which, save in the railway zone and the treaty ports, the Russians had not the right to reside. Besides, by virtue of this stipulation, the Chinese Government was no longer bound to a private company but to the Russian Government. Furthermore, the execution of this agreement was contingent upon the fulfillment of certain conditions that "the surrender of the civil government of Newchwang into the hands of the Chinese administration will take place only upon the withdrawal from that part of foreign forces and landing parties and the restoration to the Chinese of the town of Tientsin, at present under international administration," and that "if the Chinese Government, in spite of these positive assurances, should, on any pretext, violate the above conditions, the Imperial Government would no longer consider itself bound by the provisions of the Manchurian Agreement, nor by its declarations on this subject, and would have to decline to take the responsibility for all consequences which might ensue."<sup>1</sup> Again, nothing was said about the so-called railway guards—a silence that rendered, as will be seen shortly, the promised evacuation only nominal.

The first stage of the evacuation, ending October 8, was carried out exactly in conformity with the letter of the Convention, because there could be no limit to the number of railway guards to be stationed along the line, and what Russia meant by evacuation was changing the color of the shoulder straps and collar patches from white to green—a simple process of evolution which turned a regular soldier into a

<sup>1</sup> "China," No. 2 (1904), No. 51.

railroad or frontier guard. In other words, the evacuation of Russian troops meant their withdrawal from the cities to the railway zone.<sup>1</sup>

During the second stage of the evacuation, ending April 8, 1903, Russian troops not only did not leave that part of the province of Shengking, east of the Liao River and the entire province of Kirin, but they reoccupied Mukden and Newchwang and a limited force was sent to Fenghungcheng.<sup>2</sup> In the words of one of their own soldiers: "Thus, far from completing the evacuation of Southern Manchuria we actually moved into parts of it that we had never before occupied."<sup>3</sup>

Hardly twenty days had elapsed after the second part of the evacuation was supposed to have been completed, when the contents of a series of seven demands, lodged at the Tsungli Yamen early in April, had leaked out and were confirmed by Prince Ching.<sup>4</sup> These demands were to the effect that further evacuation would be contingent upon the acceptance of the new demands which embraced the following points: first, no territory restored to China, especially at Newchwang, and in the valley of the river Liao should be leased or sold to another power under any circumstances; second, the existing system of government in Mongolia should not be altered; third, no new ports or towns in Manchuria should be opened and foreign consuls should not be permitted to have residence there without having first given notice to the Russian Government; fourth, no authority of foreigners, who might be engaged by China for the administration of any affairs, should be permitted to extend to wherever Russian interests

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *London Times*, March 17, 1904.

<sup>2</sup> Kuropatkin, "The Russian Army and the Russo-Japanese War," Vol. I, p. 169.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>4</sup> "China," No. 2 (1904), No. 81.



predominated, including Chihli; fifth, the Newchwang-Peking telegraph line should be maintained under Russian control; sixth, after the restoration of Newchwang to Chinese control, the customs receipts should be deposited with the Russo-Chinese Bank; seventh, after the evacuation of Manchuria a permanent sanitary board should be established to insure the health of the people residing in all the regions traversed by the Chinese Eastern Railway.<sup>1</sup>

It may thus be seen that it was clearly the intention of the Russian Government to close the economic door of Manchuria against all nations and to maintain the *status quo* in Mongolia. China had the moral support of the powers and resisted these objectionable demands. Thereby, upon the inquiries of Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, Count Lamsdorf, on April 28, denied again the authenticity of these reported demands in the most positive manner. Nevertheless, Count Cassini, Russian Ambassador to the United States, intimated, in his remarks on April 29 in Washington, that some sort of negotiation was being carried on in Peking between China and Russia, practically confirming the truth of one of the demands that no ports should be opened in Manchuria, as may be seen from the following statement:

Of the opening of new treaty ports in Manchuria, it is impossible for me to speak at present, but it is the earnest conviction of those best acquainted with the state of affairs there, that such a move will not be to the best advantage of the territory, — were the question solely a commercial one, it would be different. But to open a treaty port in Manchuria, and close upon the heels of commerce will follow political complications of all kinds which will increase the threats to peace.<sup>2</sup>

To test the strength of these latest of the Russian demands upon China, the United States, basing her

<sup>1</sup> "China," No. 2 (1904), No. 94.

<sup>2</sup> New York *Tribune*, May 1, 1903.

case on Count Lamsdorf's disclaimer, instructed her commissioners in Shanghai to insist on the opening of the ports of Manchuria by the Chinese Foreign Office. Thereupon, M. Lessar, the Russian representative in Peking, tried to hasten the conclusion of the new demands, during which he constantly brought pressure to bear upon the Tsungli Yamen, threatening that, should war break out between Russia and Japan because of China's hesitancy in complying with his demands and her perversity in opening Manchuria to the encroachments of the other powers, China would have cause to repent of her obstinacy, for then, he alleged, Manchuria would no longer be Chinese.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of this pressure, however, China concluded, on October 8, a commercial treaty with America opening Mukden and Antung to international residence and trade,<sup>2</sup> and another supplementary treaty with Japan on the same day, opening, in addition to the above ports, Tatungkow, to international commerce and navigation.<sup>3</sup>

#### THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Meanwhile, Japan had come to the realization that Russian advance in Manchuria should continue no further and that nothing save a direct understanding would be of any avail. Thereupon, Count Kurino, Japanese Ambassador to St. Petersburg, according to instructions from Tokyo, sought to open negotiations with Count Lamsdorf for a peaceful settlement of the Manchurian and the Korean question. This was assented to by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, but, unfortunately, the war party in St. Petersburg was dominating the councils of that country, resulting

<sup>1</sup> "China," No. 2 (1904), Nos. 114, 117.

<sup>2</sup> Text given in MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 430 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 414.



in the transfer of the central authority in regard to the Far Eastern affairs from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, to Port Arthur, in the creation, on August 13, of a Vice Regency of the Far East in the person of Admiral Alexiev, to whom all matters concerning Eastern Asia should now be referred.

On July 28, 1904, Japan, through her Minister, Count Kurino, presented to Count Lamsdorf the following conditions as a basis for negotiations: first, Russian recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and Japanese recognition of Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria; second, neutral respect for the independence and the territorial integrity of the Chinese and the Korean Empire and for the principle of equal opportunity in commerce and industry; third, a reciprocal understanding not to obstruct the development of each other's industrial and commercial activities in their respective spheres; fourth, a reciprocal engagement not to send more troops to Korea than actually needed in case it should be found necessary to take such an action for the protection of their respective interests therein; fifth, recognition on the part of Russia that Japan have the exclusive right of advising and assisting in the reforms of the Korean Government, administratively and militarily.<sup>1</sup>

Count Lamsdorf refused to discuss these proposals and demanded that the negotiations be transferred to Tokyo, which was accordingly done. After a delay of eight weeks, Russia addressed a note to Japan, on October 3, embodying a series of eight counter-proposals, the most important of which excluded Japan's right to advise and assist the Korean Government in its military affairs, and discarded the Manchurian question as outside the competency of Japan's sphere of interest.

<sup>1</sup> Asakawa, *op. cit.*, pp. 303, 304.

On October 30, Count Komura presented to Viscount Rosen, Russian Ambassador to Tokyo, the "irreducible minimum" of the Japanese position after making the following concessions: that Manchuria was outside the Japanese sphere of interest; that Russia had the right to take such measures as might be necessary for the protection of her interests; that Japan would undertake no military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the straits, or on the coast of Korea; that both Russia and Japan should engage to establish a neutral zone extending fifty kilometers on the east side of the Korean-Manchurian frontier, into which neither power should introduce troops without the consent of the other.<sup>1</sup>

The second Russian counter-note gave no concessions to Japan whatsoever, and the views of the two powers, instead of coming nearer to conciliation, drifted wider apart. However, the Japanese Government, in spite of its having reached the "irreducible minimum," was still willing to further modify its position. In regard to its relations with Korea, Japan now only asked that Russia recognize that Japan have the right "to give Korea advice and assistance tending to improve the administration of the Korean Empire," thus striking out that provision for military assistance which Russia refused to concede to Japan. But at the same time, Japan insisted that Manchuria should be brought within the purview of the proposed arrangement in order that no misunderstanding might arise from those regions where the interests of the two empires met. The Russian counter-reply to this note still evinced Russia's exclusive policy in Manchuria, and made no mention of the territorial integrity of China in that territory.<sup>2</sup>

As a last resort, Japan urged Russia, in a final note, to reconsider the situation with a view to arriving at

<sup>1</sup> Asakawa, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 329.



an amiable solution of the problem, but was met with the same dilatory reply. Russia did not give way in the least. Meanwhile, Admiral Alexiev had increased his Russian activity along the Korean frontier, and a large contingent of troops was sent there. Japan had reached the end of her tether. Negotiations were broken off on February 6, and on the tenth war was declared by the two governments.

Before we take up China's position in the war and the results of the war, perhaps it will not be out of place here to mention the fact that the war was brought about in a way by the influence of the Kaiser. There is reason to believe that the forward policy of the Czar in the Far East was, to a great extent, affected by German diplomacy, which sought to divert Russian forces to the East so as to leave the Germans a free hand in Europe. The customary farewell signaling between the two imperial yachts after the maneuvers at Reval, when the Kaiser flashed the tempting message that "the Admiral of the Atlantic sends his greetings to the Admiral of the Pacific" to Nicholas II, his cousin, could not help stirring in the mind of the latter a thirst for more conquests and glories in Eastern Asia.

The Kaiser's letters to his cousin speak even more to the point. Early in 1895 he wrote the following to the Czar:

I shall certainly do all in my power to keep Europe quiet and also guard the rear of Russia so that nobody shall hamper your action towards the Far East. For that's already the great task of the future for Russia to cultivate the Asian continent and to defend Europe from the inroads of the Great Yellow Race. In this, you will always find me on your side ready to help you. . . . I shall with interest await the further development of your action and hope that, just as I will gladly help you to settle the question of eventual annexations of portions of territory for Russia, you will kindly see that Germany may also be able to acquire a port somewhere where it does not "gene" you.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> J. D. Levine, "Letters from the Kaiser to the Tsar," p. 10.

Again, on the Czar's successful acquisition of Port Arthur and Dalny, the Kaiser wrote to him thus:

I must congratulate you most heartily at the successful issue of your action at Port Arthur. We two will make a good pair of sentinels at the entrance of the Gulf of Pechili who will be duly respected especially by the Yellow ones. I think the way you managed to soothe the feelings of the "fretful Japs" by the masterly arrangement at Korea, was a remarkably fine piece of diplomacy and a great show of foresight, which is apt to show what a boon it was that by your great journey, you were able to study the question of the Far East locally and are now, morally speaking, the master of Peking.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, shortly before the conflict with Japan, the Kaiser virtually urged his cousin on to the inevitable combat. He wrote:

Everybody here understands perfectly that Russia, following the laws of expansion, must try to get at the sea for an iceless outlet for its commerce. By this law, it is entitled to a strip of coast where such harbors are situated. Vladivostok and Port Arthur, their "hinter land," must be in your power so as to allow your building the railways which are to carry the foods to the ports [Manchuria]. Between the two ports is a tongue of land which may in one adversary's hand become a new sort of Dardanelles. That is impossible for you to allow. These "Dardanelles" [Korea] must not threaten your communications thereby hampering your commerce. That is already on the "Black Sea" and that is not what you went to the Far East for! Therefore it is evident to every unbiased mind that Korea must and will be Russian. When or how, that's nobody's affair and concerns only you and your country. That is the opinion of our people here at home and therefore there is no excitement or "*embellement*" or war rumors or anything of that sort here. The sure end that Korea will once be yours is a foregone conclusion here like the occupation of Manchuria, hence nobody troubles themselves about it here.<sup>2</sup>

Now to return to the Russo-Japanese War after this long digression. The war put China in an extremely

<sup>1</sup> Levine, *op. cit.*, pp. 44, 45.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.



difficult position, because of the fact that the Russian interests were inseparately interwoven with the Chinese interests in Manchuria, arising out of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the leased areas in the Liaotung Peninsula. Moreover, the war had to be waged on Chinese territory and China was not a party to the conflict. However, upon the representations of the powers to the two principals, it was agreed by Russia and Japan that the neutrality of China would be respected and that the administrative entity of the Chinese Government would be upheld. Russia and Japan also agreed to localize and limit the area of hostilities to Manchuria so that undue excitement and disturbance of the Chinese people would be prevented and the least loss to the commerce of the world would be occasioned.

Accordingly, on February 12, 1904, China declared her neutrality in the following imperial decree:

Now Russia and Japan having severed their peaceful relations and appealed to arms and the Court reflecting that both are friendly powers, China ought to observe the laws of neutrality. Let the Tartar generals, viceroys, and governors of the various provinces issue general instructions to the civil and military officials under them and notify troops and people that all must uniformly and reverently comply so as to strengthen international relations and promote the general welfare. There must be no carelessness. Let this be circulated for general information. Respect this.<sup>1</sup>

As to Manchuria, where the battles were fought, China declared that as certain places there were still in the charge of a foreign power from which its troops had not yet been withdrawn, China's strength was insufficient to observe the laws of neutrality there. But Prince Ching, in his memorandum to Mr. Conger, reminded the powers that "throughout the province and along the frontiers, including Inner and Outer

<sup>1</sup> "U. S. For. Rel.," 1904, p. 121.

Mongolia, the two powers must avoid any invasion of Chinese territory.... No matter what the consequences, the frontier territory of Manchuria will still revert to China as an independent government."<sup>1</sup>

On May 14, 1904, the Waiwupu reaffirmed China's neutrality to the effect that it was the fixed purpose of the Imperial Government to maintain the strictest neutrality to the last without the least intention of revoking the decree previously given.<sup>2</sup>

It is, of course, beyond the scope of this study to enter into the technicality of international law involved in the rôle played by China as a neutral power. Suffice it to say, however, that China, due to her ignorance of international law and the inexperience of her officials, could not help making blunders in her endeavor to maintain a strict neutrality. Consequently, she was accused by both belligerents as having favored one party against the other while the war was going on. Nevertheless, her sincerity was unquestioned and it led the United States Government to say that it was "satisfied that the Chinese Government, so far as its knowledge of international law and precedents and its ability to execute and enforce it are concerned, is doing its best to preserve a strict neutrality, and if it fails, it will be on account of unauthorized acts of its provincial or military officials or of unjustifiable proceedings of one or both of the belligerents."<sup>3</sup>

The military and naval operations of the great war have no interest for us here except that they resulted in dire consequences for the Russian forces on land and sea. Both sides were practically at the end of their resources after a year and a half's struggle, when President Roosevelt successfully brought about the termination of the war and the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace signed on September 5, 1905, at Portsmouth.

<sup>1</sup> "U. S. For. Rel. " 1904, p. 122.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 133.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138.



It is hard to surmise what would have been the ultimate consequences of the war if Russia had lived up to the secret treaty of alliance concluded in 1896 between Li Hung-chang and Prince Lobanov. Given a haven of safety in some port in South China, preferably Foochow, the Russian fleet which had been dispatched all the way from European Russia to the scene of trouble in the Far East would have been saved from its subsequent annihilation at the hands of the Japanese naval forces off the Yellow Sea. It is doubtful whether the tide of war would not have turned against Japan if the war had been prolonged. But there could be no doubt that, if China had given Russia her moral and physical support, which seemed to be with Japan, victory would have been in the side of Russia. But Russia had not acted on good faith with China and had grossly violated both the spirit and the letter of the secret agreement, first, in making use of the Chinese Eastern Railway as a weapon for the realization of her political ambitions in Manchuria; and, second, in forcing an extension southward to Port Arthur—a line which Russia, through her spokesman Count Witte, definitely promised not to seek. Russia, therefore, if she had kept her plighted word with China, would undoubtedly have been spared the greatest humiliation that has been inflicted on her in all her history.

The Treaty of Portsmouth was a great triumph for President Roosevelt and the American policy of the Open Door. By virtue of this treaty Russia was made to declare that she had no territorial, preferential, nor exclusive concessions in Manchuria in impairment of the sovereignty of China or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity for all nations. Again, by this treaty Japan and Russia both promised not to obstruct the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria. Whether they would abide by this last declaration is another question, as future events will show.

The transference of Liaotung and part of the Russian railway interests in South Manchuria was stipulated as follows:

The Imperial Government of Russia transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talienwan, and adjacent territory and territorial waters and all rights, privileges, and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease, and they also transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and properties in the territory affected by the above-mentioned lease.<sup>1</sup>

It is important to note that the Liaotung ports were now leased again by Russia to Japan, while in the Sino-Japanese Treaty signed at Shimonoseki it was stipulated that these ports were to be ceded in perpetuity to Japan. Historians cannot understand why China was willing to pay an extra indemnity of three hundred million taels in lieu of Port Arthur and Dalny. Evidently they have overlooked the difference between the cession and the lease of a territory.

#### RUSSIA AND AMERICA IN MANCHURIA

Manchuria after the Treaty of Portsmouth witnessed the arrival of another power, whose ambition it was to obtain an economic foothold there and to see that the integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of the Open Door which the Treaty of Portsmouth once more confirmed were upheld. This power was the United States of America.

Shortly after the signature of the Portsmouth protocol Mr. E. H. Harriman, at the suggestion of the Japanese Government, journeyed to the Orient with the view to reach an understanding with Tokyo with regard to the sale of the South Manchurian Railway

<sup>1</sup> Text given in MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 522 ff.



which Japan had just obtained from Russia. The Japanese Government was very favorable to his proposals. Prince Ito had no objections to the sale; Premier Katsura said that he would give the matter serious consideration; Count Inouye was of the opinion that it would be very foolish to let such a great chance slip.<sup>1</sup>

On October 12, 1906, Mr. Harriman signed, with Count Katsura, a memorandum of a preliminary understanding regarding the sale to this effect:

A syndicate to be formed to provide capital for the South Manchurian Railway, acquired by the Japanese Government, and its appurtenances; the rehabilitation, equipment, reconstruction, and extension of the same and the completion and improvement of the terminals at Tairen [Dalny]; and it is understood that the two parties are to have joint and equal ownership in the properties acquired. Permission to work coal mines (in connection with the railroad) to be given to a corporation by special agreement in which there shall be joint interest and representation.<sup>2</sup>

This agreement was only provisional. It could be completed only after the ratification of the Portsmouth Treaty and with the consent of the Chinese Government. The Treaty of Portsmouth was ratified on November 5, 1905, and on December 22, Count Komura concluded with China the Peking Agreement. Whereupon, Mr. Harriman was notified in Tokyo, by telegram from Peking, that the Chinese Government refused to consent to the admission of American capital to the rehabilitation of the South Manchurian Railway system and that, in due course of time, China herself would desire the participation of Japan in the work of repair, construction, and exploitation. But the true fact was that China had never been approached with Mr. Harriman's proposals and that she

<sup>1</sup> George Kennan, "E. H. Harriman: A Biography," p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

had never declined them.<sup>1</sup> It was, therefore, a real fiction invented to baffle Mr. Harriman, and to keep South Manchuria from American entanglements. Mr. Harriman's scheme remained, therefore, in abeyance for some time. Japan, meanwhile, had no difficulty in floating a loan in London sufficient to restore, to a running condition, the South Manchurian Railways.

American efforts to obtain an economic foothold in Manchuria were continued in the summer of 1907 when Willard Straight, American Consul General in Mukden, succeeded in coming to an understanding with Tang Shao-yi, then Governor of Mukden, for a loan of \$20,000,000 to found a Manchurian bank, which was to be the agent of the Manchurian Government for the construction, in coöperation with Messrs. Pauline and Company (British railway contractors), of a line from Hsinmintin to Aigun and for the development of Manchurian commerce and industry, which Russia and Japan agreed not to obstruct.

This project was delayed, however, by the financial panic in America in 1907. But a year later Straight was recalled to Washington by the Taft administration. Before he left Mukden, Straight signed a memorandum with Governor Tang for the twenty-million-dollar loan originated a year before for a bank which was to undertake the construction of the extension of the line from Hsinmintin to Aigun. "I carried the agreement," Straight writes in his diary, "for nearly six weeks in a small wallet about my neck in a silk case. That memorandum was the groundwork upon which the American group was based."<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, through Yuan Shih-kai's influence, Tang Shao-yi was appointed by imperial decree on a special mission to America to study the financial administration of other countries, and especially to

<sup>1</sup> According to Tang Shao-yi's declaration in Washington, 1908; cf. Bland, "Recent Events and Policies in China," p. 310.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Far Eastern Review*, March, 1921, p. 153.



return thanks to America for the rendition of part of the Boxer Indemnity due America, as also, while in Japan, to discuss Manchurian questions with Japanese statesmen.

Early in November Mr. Harriman's bankers had signified to the Department of State that they were willing to finance the Manchurian Bank and notes were accordingly exchanged. But fate would not have it so. On November 14, the enlightened monarch, Emperor Kuang Hsü, died, and on the next day the powerful Empress Dowager followed him to the grave. With the ascension of the regent, under the influence of Tieh Liang, a conservative, Yuan Shih-kai and his policies were doomed. Yuan was driven from power in January, 1909, and Tang was recalled.

But before Tang's departure, negotiations between Straight and Mr. Harriman's associates had already been under way in New York, as to the basis upon which the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway might be acquired. The matter was taken up with Tang Shao-yi, who was of the opinion that China would welcome such a proposition, if an international syndicate could be organized to purchase both lines on behalf of China, thus anticipating the provision for repurchase of the lines as stipulated in the original agreement of 1896 between China and Russia. This was the germ of Secretary Knox's scheme of the neutralization of the Manchurian railways.

While in Paris in June, 1909, Mr. Harriman met Mr. Noetzlin, who supported the scheme of purchasing the Manchurian railways by an international syndicate. He was accordingly requested to go to St. Petersburg to discuss the matter with M. Kokovtsov, the Russian Minister of Finances, and Straight was to secure from the Chinese Government the right to build a line from the Gulf of Chihli to run northward to a station in the Trans-Siberian Railway and possibly to the Amur. Straight wrote:

Once an agreement with the Russians and the right of the construction of a north and south line secured from China, we would have been in position to negotiate with the Japanese. If they had been willing to make some arrangement regarding joint operation of the South Manchurian Railway, it would have been unnecessary to construct another north and south line. If they were unwilling to make such an agreement, the construction of another north and south line, operating in conjunction with the Russian railway, would have placed them in a very embarrassing position in Manchuria.<sup>1</sup>

M. Kokovtsov was well disposed to the scheme and said that, after his return from the trip he contemplated making to the Far East, he would recommend to his government the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. While in the Far East, M. Kokovtsov met Prince Ito, who a few years before favored the joint ownership with America of the South Manchurian Railway system. These two statesmen seemed to have reached an understanding supporting the American proposition of international control of the Manchurian railways. M. Kokovtsov, on his return, in accordance with the promise he made before he started on his Eastern trip, did make the recommendation to his government. But destiny again would not have it so. Mr. Harriman died, and Prince Ito was assassinated in Korea. If they had lived and the same conditions had been maintained between them, and with Russia's favorable disposition, the course of history as far as Manchuria was concerned would have taken a different turn. But it was not to be. With their untimely deaths, the plan fell through, for none of Mr. Harriman's associates understood the Manchurian scheme or the real motive behind this enterprise.

However, having learned through Mr. Noetzkine of the favorable attitude of the Russian Government towards the scheme and of the signature of the preliminary agreement of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Far Eastern Review*, March, 1921, p. 154.



with China, which was confirmed on October 2, by a secret imperial decree only, the Department of State at Washington launched the neutralization proposals separately to the British, the French, the German, the Russian, and the Japanese Government.

The substance of Secretary Knox's scheme consists of two alternatives, which in his exact wording are as follows :

First, perhaps the most effective way to preserve the undisturbed enjoyment by China of all political rights in Manchuria and to promote the development of those provinces under a practical application of the policy of the Open Door and equal commercial opportunity would be to bring the Manchurian highways, the railroads, under an economic, scientific, and impartial administration by some plan vesting in China the ownership of the railroads, through funds furnished for the purpose by the interested powers willing to participate. . . . The plan should provide that the nationals of the participating powers should supervise the railroad system during the term of the loan and the governments concerned should enjoy for such period the usual preferences for their nationals and materials upon an equitable basis *inter se*. . . .

Second, should this suggestion not be found feasible in its entirety, then the desired end would be approximated, if not attained, by Great Britain and the United States, diplomatically supporting the Chinchow-Aigun arrangement and inviting the interested powers friendly to complete commercial neutralization of Manchuria to participate in the financing and construction of that line and of such additional lines as future commercial development may demand, and at the same time to supply funds for the purchase by China of such of the existing lines as might be offered for inclusion in the system.<sup>1</sup>

The legal basis of Secretary Knox's neutralization proposals was the vested right of China to recover before the stated termination of the period, in 1937, then twenty-eight years distant, the Manchurian railways at a fair valuation. Thus it was merely suggested by Secretary Knox that this redemption be anticipated.

1 "U. S. For. Rel.," 1910, p. 234 ff.

Theoretically, the idea was unassailable. It was simply to apply Hay's policy of the Open Door to preserve the territorial and jurisdictional integrity of the Chinese Empire and equal commercial opportunity in China for all nations, by taking the railroads in Manchuria out of Far Eastern politics and placing them under an economic and impartial administration. But, diplomatically speaking, Mr. Knox made a mistake in not sounding out Russia and Japan first, evidently assuming that they had already been acquainted with the principle of the scheme. Politically, Russia's approval should have been obtained first, which probably would have obliged Japan to acquiesce, for a proposal which necessitated identical aims and harmonious relations of six nations, whose interests were diametrically opposed to each other, required the delicate handling of a Metternich. Everything should have been done to separate Russia from Japan, but, instead of that, Russia and Japan were made to stand together in defense of their rights. Bland writes:

The scheme, as presented, was a diplomatic gaffe, and the blunder was aggravated by the suggestion that, if the powers were unwilling to join the general neutralization scheme, they should at least unite in the financing and construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway. In other words, if Russia and Japan were unwilling to abandon their special interests in this region, they and the other powers were invited to create new interests to compete with those of the existing railways. The presentment of this second proposition overlooked the vital fact that by the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, China was strictly entitled to use her own discretion in the development of her commerce and industry in Manchuria, which Russia and Japan were pledged not to obstruct. To place the construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Line in the same category as the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway, the neutralization scheme was equivalent to denying the validity of the Portsmouth Treaty and to prejudicing China's sovereign rights throughout Manchuria. It was imperative to China's interests that the two questions should be treated separately.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bland, *op. cit.*, p. 138.



Mr. W. W. Rockhill, United States Ambassador to St. Petersburg, who was thoroughly versed in the intricacies of diplomacy, realized at once this fundamental fact, and on account of lack of instructions from his government, presented to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs only the first part of the scheme, leaving out the Chinchow-Aigun project, while his colleagues in Paris, Berlin, and Tokyo submitted the memorandum *in toto*. Naturally, when the Russian Government was informed by its agents abroad of the second proposition it could not help coming to the conclusion that the United States of America was playing a double game, a suspicion which spelled the doom of the neutralization scheme and drove the erstwhile enemies into each other's arms in a common effort to apportion for themselves the coveted grounds of Manchuria and Mongolia to the exclusion of all other comers.

A firm but polite rejection was given by Russia and Japan to Mr. Knox's proposals, evidently after much communication between Tokyo and St. Petersburg, and it is interesting to note that almost identical replies were presented to the American Government by Russia and Japan, as may be seen from the following extracts. The Russian *aide-memoire* says:

It is with a feeling of deep satisfaction that the Imperial Government notes the just testimony by the United States Government to the sincere desire with which Russia is animated to support in Manchuria the policy of the Open Door and of equal opportunity, as well as to guarantee to China her full sovereignty there. However, nothing appears at the present time to threaten either this sovereignty or the Open-Door policy in Manchuria. Consequently, the Imperial Government cannot discover in the present situation of Manchuria any reason necessitating the placing on the order of the day of the questions raised by the United States Government.

At the same time, the Imperial Government believes that it must declare with absolute frankness that the establishment of an international administration and control of the Manchurian

railroads as proposed by the Federal Government would seriously injure Russian interests, both public and private, to which the Imperial Government attaches capital importance. This proposition cannot therefore be met with a favorable reception on its part.

The Imperial Government is of the opinion that the proposition of the United States does not sufficiently guarantee that the new order of things will have a satisfactory result from the financial standpoint. At all events, the organized proposal for Manchuria is of a tentative character, which has not only never been tried in China but is unusual in itself. To decide in favor of it on so vast a scale as proposed by the Federal Government, relinquishing for this purpose a system that has been tested, would only be possible with a certainty of obtaining favorable results. The Imperial Government regrets that it does not have this certainty.<sup>1</sup>

The Japanese reply to the American proposals, after raising the most serious objection that they contemplated a very important departure from the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, says:

Nor can the Imperial Government see in the present condition of things in Manchuria anything so exceptional as to make it necessary or desirable to set up there an exceptional system not required in other parts of China. There is nothing in the actual situation in that region, so far as the Imperial Government are aware, which so exceptionally interferes with the undisturbed enjoyment of China of her political rights. So far as the question of the Open Door is concerned the principle of equal opportunity possesses in its application to Manchuria a more comprehensive signification than it has elsewhere in China, since the Japanese and Russian railways in those provinces are dedicated exclusively to commercial and industrial uses. Finally, in the matter of railway administration, it is impossible for the Imperial Government to believe that the substitution of an international in place of a national régime would prove advantageous or beneficial. On the contrary, it seems to them that in the presence of such a system, economy and efficiency would, in the nature of things, be obliged to political exigencies and that the divided responsibility of the system would inevitably mean an absence of due responsibility to the serious disadvantage of the public and the detriment of the service.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "U. S. For. Rel.," 1910, p. 249 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 251.



As regards the second proposition of the American Government, Russia and Japan, although willing to take this question under consideration in principle, maintained that they must reserve for themselves the privilege of examining into the details of the matter from the double standpoint of its political and strategical interests and of the interests of the existing railways in Manchuria, before they would be able to arrive at any definite conclusion as to the feasibility of their financial participation.<sup>1</sup>

While these notes to the American Government were couched in the most polite terms, the Russian and Japanese memoranda to the Chinese Government were worded in an entirely different tone. Aside from its dictatorialness, the Russian note sought to discredit the American Government and to make the latter seem foolish to Chinese statesmen. This may be seen from the following note, communicating to the Waiwupu the "general sense" of the Russian reply to the United States Government:

Since America has invited Russia to participate in the construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway and has consented to Russia's desire to take careful consideration of the matter before making a reply, the opinion of Russia is that, in not notifying Russia and in not considering that in case Russia did not take a share, she would oppose the undertaking. America is conscious of having made a mistake and has therefore stopped the loan negotiations. Russia expects that this matter must not be recklessly settled without first having obtained the consent of Russia.<sup>2</sup>

The Japanese note to the Chinese Government was equally dictatorial, if not more so. It says:

The Government is now considering the proposal and cannot hastily formulate its demands, but as I formerly stated in my verbal interview, this is a matter which vitally affects Japan's

<sup>1</sup> "U. S. For. Rel.," 1910, p. 252.

<sup>2</sup> T. F. Millard, "America in China," in the *Forum*, Vol. XLIV, p. 75.

interests. Before the Chinese Government determines anything, the consent of my government must first be obtained. If the position of my country is ignored and a decision is made without referring the matter to my government, it will be hard to intimate the seriousness of the trouble that may be caused in the relations of the two countries. I am, therefore, instructed to warn the Chinese Government that it must realize the necessity of caution.<sup>1</sup>

In his note of February 8, 1910, to Prince Ching with regard to the construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway, the Russian Minister dropped the pretended objection of injury to the Chinese Eastern Railway and unveiled Russia's real motives that, for political and strategic reasons, America must be excluded from the development of Manchuria, as may be seen from the following passage:

In respect to the expressed intention of the American Government, to build a railway from Chinchow to Aigun, the Russian Government must declare clearly that this road would seriously affect the interests of Russia. This railway when completed would not only connect from the south with the Northern Manchurian Railway, but at Aigun would reach the actual territories of Russia. Thus, it would affect both military and political arrangements and would materially change the relations of the Manchurian railways to eastern Mongolia and northern Manchuria.<sup>2</sup>

Although the Japanese Government did not officially oppose the construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Line, they nevertheless insisted that she must be permitted to participate in the loan and in the selection of engineers and that, in order to connect the Chinchow-Aigun Line with the South Manchurian Railway, China must construct a branch line from some station on the Chinchow-Aigun Railway southeast to some station on the South Manchurian Railway, the location of which and the point at which it would

<sup>1</sup> "U. S. For. Rel.," 1910, p. 74.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.



connect with the South Manchurian Railway to be settled by amicable discussion with the Japanese Government.<sup>1</sup> This was equivalent to obstruction, of course, for such terms would be stultifying to China, if she were to accept them. As to the Japanese insistence of financing the line, it is interesting to note that Japan herself had to borrow capital from foreign markets to rehabilitate the South Manchurian Railway, and yet she desired to share in floating the loan for the Chinchow-Aigun Railway. The reason for her demand to construct a branch line to the South Manchurian Railway from a station on the Chinchow-Aigun Railway is not far to seek. It was purely for strategic reasons. She wanted to be sure that in case of another breach of peace with Russia, she would then be able to dominate Northern Manchuria and move her troops into the heart of the Russian sphere of interest.

Having rejected both of America's proposals, Russia counter-proposed, through her ambassador at Washington, the construction of a line from Kalgan to Urga and Kiakhta. This counter-proposal, which was delivered to the American Government on February 24, 1910, raised the interesting point that, in the event of China's building this Kalgan-Kiakhta Railway, Russian capitalists should be allowed to be responsible for the construction of the section between Urga and Kiakhta.<sup>2</sup> This provision was an important one. According to Russia, China must be prevented from constructing railways to or along her own borders to make them safe from invasion, although a girdle of lines might be constructed, penetrating into the heart of Chinese territory and running parallel to her boundaries as close as a stone's throw. Here was indicated one of Russia's most cherished dreams of a Russo-Chinese empire. Checked on the north through the

<sup>1</sup> "U. S. For. Rel.," 1910, p. 80.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 262.

loss of the South Manchurian Railway to Japan, Russia endeavored now to reach China through Mongolia, in spite of the fact that a branch railway from a station on the Siberian Railway in the province of Transbaikalia to Kiakhta and from thence to Kalgan and Peking would divert all traffic from the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Without going further into the diplomatic side of Secretary Knox's neutralization scheme and the Chinchow-Aigun Railway proposal, we see that as far as China was concerned she had been denied the right to decide for herself when and what railways to build and who were to build them, and that, in building any railways in her own territory, the strategical and political interests of her neighbors must be considered to the detriment of her own. As far as America was concerned, she had been prevented from legitimately engaging in business transactions of two friendly nations; and, as she was still a negligible factor on the Pacific, she had to stand alone in defeat. All these undesirable results would have been avoided if Great Britain had backed up the claims of her own citizens. But her good memory of the Scott-Muravev Agreement as still binding, when Russia regarded it more or less as a dead letter, caused her to weaken. Japan would have been chastened at once if Great Britain had intimated that her financial market would have tightened against Tokyo. Had Downing Street been aware of Russian insincerity and been bold enough to tell St. Petersburg not to block the commercial and industrial development of Manchuria, the Chinchow-Aigun Railway would have been pulled through and the doctrine of the Open Door and equal opportunity tested and confirmed. But Great Britain did neither of these things, and the principle which Hay propounded, in so far as Manchuria was concerned, remained a shibboleth of fiction good only on paper.



In order to strengthen the diminished American influence in China, as a result of the failure of the Knox proposals, American banking interests sought to enhance their prestige in China by securing the participation in financing the twenty-million-dollar loan for Manchurian Development, originally mooted out by Tang Shao-yi in 1908. This gave rise to the Quadruple Group, with Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States as the principals, to handle Chinese loans in general and Manchurian development in particular, and an agreement was reached with the Chinese Government on April 15, 1911. But when the agreement was made public, Russia and Japan protested against the provision that, should the Chinese Government decide to invite foreign capitalists to participate with Chinese interests in Manchurian business, contemplated under this loan and to be undertaken in connection therewith, the contracting banks should first be invited to participate, as a financial monopoly which would be, therefore, prejudicial to Russo-Japanese interests there. To get over this difficulty with Russia and Japan, the two latter powers were invited to join the quadruple combination, thus making it sextuple. Russia at first refused to come in and sought to destroy the Consortium, if possible, as may be seen from the following memorandum by Sazonov to the Russian Ambassador in Paris:

I saw little use in our joining the syndicate as we would probably only be in solidarity with the French group, whilst the Japanese and the English would frequently act quite independently and the Germans and the Americans, above all, take up an attitude inimical to us. I also believe, although I did not tell the French Minister so, the French group is chiefly actuated by a desire to achieve financial advantages and would not help us to counteract projects that might be disagreeable to us but which might promise them advantages. I, furthermore, expressed my doubts to the Minister whether we and the Americans could participate in one and the same financial action in China, as the

American banking houses pursue political aims in the Far East which are distinctly hostile to us.

The previous correspondence has acquainted you with the negative attitude of the Russian Government towards the Anglo-French-German-American syndicate. We desire to break up the syndicate by urging the French group to withdraw and we should only be willing to enter the syndicate were this latter so transformed that a privileged position would be granted us in the enterprises north of the Great Wall of China. The proposals made by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs would by no means fulfill these aims, as we would not be able to protect our sphere of influence in China from the penetration of financial interests inimical to ourselves and even our vote would have no decisive influence on the decisions of the syndicate.<sup>1</sup>

But finally the Russian and the Japanese Government accepted the invitation of the Four-Nation Group to finance China on the basis of equality, and also on the condition that the loans should not be expended in such a manner as to prejudice their respective special rights and interests in Mongolia and Manchuria. These conditions were acceptable to the British and American governments so long as they referred to no special rights and interests, other than those defined by treaties and conventions concluded between them and China. This interpretation of their conditions was not satisfactory to the Russians and the Japanese. A second conference was convened, therefore, to smoothe over these differences, but it failed in coming to any definite agreement. Finally, the deadlock was terminated in another conference, held in Paris on June 18, 1902, when it was agreed by all the participating groups that each group was to consult its government before the conclusion of any loan to China and that no business was to be entertained if such a business should be objected to by the government of any of the groups concerned.

<sup>1</sup> B. von Siebert, "Entente Diplomacy and the World," p. 36.



What this Six-Nation Consortium amounted to with these understandings is evident. In Bland's language we have these interesting reflections:

Firstly, that the powers, without capital to dispose of but with an aggressive policy backed by material force, are able completely to dominate the counsels of that international finance which ostensibly represents the interests of the commercial powers. Secondly, that the attitude frankly adopted by the representatives of the Russian and Japanese governments, and tacitly accepted by the governments at the back of the "Four Nations" Banks amounts to a complete and categorical denial of the sovereign rights of China in Manchuria and Mongolia; that is to say, that the powers concerned, under this cloak of financial operations, have deliberately acquiesced in annulling the Portsmouth Treaty, the avowed objects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity. Finally, as matters stand, the banking agreement sanctioned by the capitalistic powers gives to the two powers, who have no capital to lend, a virtual right to veto any and every attempt to assist China in the development of her economic and material resources.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE RUSSO-JAPANESE ENTENTE

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, two courses were open to Russia in shaping her Far Eastern policy. On the one hand, she might align herself with China against Japan; and on the other, she might ally with Japan for the division of the Chinese spoils. A small body of public opinion, originally led by Stolypin, was in favor of a rapprochement with China, but in view of the defenseless condition in which China was situated at that time, Russian statesmen finally came to the conclusion that it was far more profitable for Russia to join forces with Japan against China than to support China against Japan. They were fully aware that the only factor which determined the course of international politics, as then

<sup>1</sup> Bland, *op. cit.*, p. 406.

understood, was material force; and force was all on the side of Japan at that time. Therefore it would be suicidal if, instead of casting in their lot with the strong, they should strive to make friends with the weak. Such was the current of public opinion both in Russia and out of Russia, where Russian interests were predominant.

Japan after the war naturally viewed the outlook of the future with gravity and was seriously preparing herself for the ultimate revanche which must inevitably come one day. But when she found that Russia was willing to bury hatchets with her, the ground was indeed latent for a Russo-Japanese understanding which would further the respective interests of the two countries in the Far East.

The first step towards a reconciliation of the two old rivals was made in the public convention of July 30, 1907, which clearly indicated the inauguration of better relations between Russia and Japan. In this agreement the two contracting parties declared that, in order to consolidate the relations of peace and good relations and to remove all future causes of misunderstanding, they agreed first to "respect the actual territorial integrity of the other, all the rights accruing to one and the other party from the treaties, conventions, and contracts in force between them and China . . . as well as from the special conventions concluded between Japan and Russia," and, second, to, "recognize the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the principle of equal opportunity in whatever concerns the commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire and engage to sustain and defend the maintenance of the *status quo* and respect for this principle by all the pacific means within their reach."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Text given in MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 657 ff.



But more important than this open convention, we now have reason to believe, from subsequent references, that a secret agreement must have been signed on the same day to the effect that, first, Russia should recognize that Japan have special interests in Korea; second, Japan should promise not to seek telegraph or railway concessions north of the Nonni River, which seemed to have been taken as the line of demarcation, and that Russia likewise should promise not to seek those concessions south of the mentioned line; and third, Japan should recognize that Russia have special interests in Mongolia.<sup>1</sup>

The second step forward towards a Russo-Japanese entente was precipitated by the well-intended proposals of the American Secretary of State, Knox, and was marked in the Russo-Japanese Convention of 1910 with regard to Manchuria. Since 1907, a strong party, headed by Izwolsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs, had desired a close understanding with Japan. Izwolsky was thoroughly anti-American and a bitter enemy of Kokovtsov, who was favorable to Mr. Harriman's project and the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway to American interests. But, as we have seen, through an unskillful manipulation of the proposition, the negotiations were placed in the hands of Izwolsky, who did not fail to make use of this "notorious American project," as he called it, to build up the myth of an American-incited anti-Russian China and to convince his colleagues that this was "a clear proof of the necessity of bringing about an understanding between Russia and Japan in the Manchurian question as a protection against American intrigue."<sup>2</sup> In this, as we have noted at length, he was successful, and the American proposals which resulted in a rebuff to the United States directly and indirectly, hastened a

<sup>1</sup> Cf. A. L. P. Dennis, "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance," p. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

further consolidation of the Russo-Japanese understanding, reached in 1907, in the signature of the July 4, 1910, Convention, in which the two countries agreed, first, to lend to each other their friendly coöperation, to improve their respective lines of railroads in Manchuria, to perfect their connecting service, and to refrain from all competition unfavorable to the attainment of this result; second, to maintain and respect the *status quo* in Manchuria; and third, in case the above-mentioned *status quo* should be menaced, to enter into communication with each other, for the purpose of agreeing upon the measures that they might judge necessary to take for the maintenance of the said *status quo*.<sup>1</sup>

It is now established that this document, confirming the mutual maintenance of the *status quo* in Manchuria, was nothing but a cover for a second secret treaty, in which Russia and Japan guaranteed to each other the exercise of their respective interests and the mutual protection of these interests against the action of a third power or powers inimical to those interests. It was, therefore, a direct reply to the neutralization scheme advanced by Secretary Knox. The text of this treaty is now available from the documents in the possession of Count B. von Siebert, formerly of the Russian diplomatic service. It was first published by the New York *American* in its issue of April 17, 1921, as follows:

To conform and further develop the provisions of the Secret Treaty of June 17-30, 1907, the Russian and Japanese governments agree to the following provisions:

Article 1. Russia and Japan recognize, as the boundary of their specific spheres of interest in Manchuria, the line of demarcation as defined in the supplementary article to the Secret Treaty of 1907.

Article 2. The two contracting parties agree mutually to recognize their special interests in the areas set forth above.

<sup>1</sup> Text given in MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 803.



Each of them may also, each within its own sphere of interest, take such measures as shall be deemed necessary for the maintenance and protection of these interests.

Article 3. Each party undertakes to place no obstacle of any kind in the way of confirmation and future development of the special interests of the other party within the boundary lines of such spheres of interest.

Article 4. Each of the contracting parties undertakes to refrain from all political action within the sphere of interest of the other party in Manchuria. Furthermore, it has been decided that Russia shall seek no privileges or concessions in the Japanese zone, and Japan none in the Russian zone, that might be injurious to the special interests of either party, and that both governments are to recognize the rights acquired in their spheres of interest, as defined in Article 2 of the Public Treaty of to-day's date.

Article 5. To insure the working of the mutual stipulations, both parties will enter into an open and friendly exchange of opinion on all matters concerning their special interests in Manchuria. In case these special interests should be threatened, the two governments will agree on the measure that may become necessary for the common action or mutual support in order to protect these interests.

Article 6. The present treaty will be kept strictly secret by both governments.<sup>1</sup>

This agreement was secret as far as the United States and Germany were concerned, for Sir Edward Grey, who not only knew about the negotiations going on between Tokyo and St. Petersburg, but also was very well satisfied with the step taken by Russia and Japan, as may be seen from the following confidential correspondence from the Russian Ambassador in England to Izwolsky, dated June 11/24, 1910:

I have just carried out the instructions given me. Grey is very much satisfied with the step taken by the Russian Government and requests me to forward you his best thanks. He has watched with satisfaction the development of good relations between Russia and Japan within the last three years, and is extremely satisfied by the confirmation of his observations as furnished by me. England's political interests in the Far East

<sup>1</sup> Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

consist in the maintenance of peace, just as her trade interests are based on the principle of the Open Door. Grey requests me to couch his statements in the friendliest and heartiest terms.<sup>1</sup>

The third step forward toward a Russo-Japanese entente was occasioned by the Chinese Revolution in 1911, which was too good an opportunity not to be taken advantage of by Russia and Japan in the furtherance of their special interests in Manchuria.

The memorandum of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated January 10-23, 1912, says:

Russia and Japan must use the present favorable moment to fortify their position in China and in this way to prevent the Chinese Government from continually opposing the political interests of Russia and Japan as has been the case during the past few years. It was the resistance on China's part, which at the time evoked in the Russian Government the idea of strengthening Russia's position in the Far East by force of arms and by the annexation of diverse Chinese territories, so that Russia no longer fears complications in Eastern Asia, should she be compelled to try her strength elsewhere. The separation and annexation of further territory was, however, always looked upon by us as extreme measures. The present moment would appear the given one for the attainment of the desired result by diplomatic means without forcible annexation of Chinese territories.<sup>2</sup>

Hence, the Mongolian demands, which we shall discuss in a later chapter. Suffice it to say here that the third secret treaty with Japan confirmed the existence of the two previous secret conventions. It lengthened the line of demarcation set by the Secret Treaty of 1907 to Mongolia which was accordingly divided into two parts: that to the east of the Peking Meridian to be the Russian sphere of interest and that to the west of the said Meridian to be the Japanese sphere of interest.

To further consolidate the entente, Prince Katsura was sent on a special mission to St. Petersburg in

<sup>1</sup> Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.



July, 1912, the object of the mission being to unite Japan, Great Britain, and Russia in one agreement with regard to their Far Eastern policy. Japan and England were already combined for the purpose, and it remained to bring Russia within the same orbit, and thus to create a great political confederation which would exert a controlling influence over the destinies of Eastern Asia.

The conversations between Prince Katsura and Baron Goto on the one part and M. Kokovtsov and M. Sazonov on the other were carefully reported by the special correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* and it is worth while quoting at length as follows:

Prince Katsura told Mr. Kokovtsoff and Mr. Sazonoff that in his opinion Russia and Japan have everything to lose by neglecting to understand one another and everything to gain by cultivating intimacy based on thorough knowledge of each other's political and commercial plans and strivings. "Had we done this in time," he added, "history would have had no sanguinary Manchurian campaign to record."

The outlook of the Chinese Republic and the relations between the Central Government of Peking and the border provinces of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet were well canvassed . . . without revealing the slightest divergency of opinion between the Japanese and Russian statesmen. On the matter of lending money to China, as long as she remains in her present pitiable plight, the unanimity was absolute. It was laid down as desirable that no loan should be floated and no advance made without providing for adequate control, which should answer for it that the proceeds are not applied to undertakings calculated to impair the interests of either of China's powerful neighbors. That means, of course, among other things, that China shall not be permitted to create a formidable army if she recovers her balance sufficiently to turn her attention to the national defenses.

The Japanese statesmen emphatically declare that as long as the two empires remain of one mind, they had in their own hands the key to the Far Eastern problem, the changing aspects of which they could and should regulate congruously with their common interests, which happily coincide with the general interests of the world. This is the pivot of the matter.

The results of those conversations are considered superlatively satisfactory by both sides. The Russian Ministers characterized

their Japanese colleagues as masterful statesmen of power, sincerity, and vision, who are endowed in fullness with the statesman's first quality of seeing the whole of a question and not merely a part. They have completely attained the object of their visit. The destinies of the Far East will now be taken in hand by the governments of Japan and Russia, not indeed for the purpose of narrow, egoistic aims, but with a firm resolve to discharge what they regard as their cultural mission in that part of the globe, unhindered by the impulses of amateur outsiders, whose excellent intentions outrun their sense of political fitness.<sup>1</sup>

The Great War in Europe accelerated the climax of Russo-Japanese intimacy which had now become an almost open secret. The visit of Major General Edward Germonius, of the Russian army, to Tokyo at the outbreak of the hostilities in Europe, with the professed purpose of buying ammunitions from Japan, when Japan had not enough for her own use, and the dispatch of Japanese nurses to Petrograd to attend to the wounded Russian soldiers, were some incidences of their warm friendship. The Russian present of a section of the Manchurian Railway to Japan for the latter's services in the war was a mark of international friendship seldom seen in the dealings between one country and another.

Russia's trust in her Eastern ally was made all the more manifest by the following statement of her Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov, to the correspondent of the *Bourse Gazette*, of Petrograd: "The present war opens up a series of problems for Russia, the solution of which necessitates our confining our attention to the West for many years. Relying on our solidarity with Japan as regards Far Eastern questions, we can devote all our energies to the solution of these problems with the assurance that no power will take unfair advantage of China to carry out its ambitious plans."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bland, *op. cit.*, p. 345.

<sup>2</sup> *Living Age*, Vol. CCXLI, p. 482.



To further consolidate their position in Mongolia and Manchuria, the two powers crowned their mutual interests with a secret treaty of alliance signed on December 8, 1915, which, like the others, was covered by an open treaty. The meager details of the latter could not but betray that which it was meant to conceal. In this public document, the two governments, having resolved to maintain the permanent peace of the Far East, agreed that each would not be a party to any arrangement or political combination directed against the other, and that in the event that the territorial right or the special interests in the Far East of one of the contracting parties should be menaced, Russia and Japan would confer with each other in regard to the measures to be taken with a view to the support or coöperation to be given each other in order to safeguard and defend these rights and interests.<sup>1</sup>

The secret convention which this document sought to cover was "revealed from the files of the Russian Foreign Office at Petrograd by the Trotsky-Lenin Government," shortly after the Russian Revolution in 1917. The preamble of this secret convention confirmed once more the three previous conventions of 1907, 1910, and 1912; and now for the purpose of strengthening their close friendship the two governments agreed to supplement the above-mentioned agreements with the following articles:

Article 1. Both the high contracting parties recognize that the vital interests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of China from the political domination of any third power whatsoever having hostile designs against Russia or Japan; and therefore mutually obligate themselves in the future at all times when circumstances demand to enter into open-hearted dealings, based on complete trust, in order to take necessary measures with the object of preventing the possibility of occurrence of said state of affairs.

<sup>1</sup> Text given in MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1327.

Article 2. In the event, in consequence of measures taken by mutual consent of Russia and Japan, on the basis of the preceding article, a declaration of war is made by any third power, contemplated by Article I of this agreement, against one of the contracting parties, the other party at the first demand of its ally, must come to its aid. Each of the high contracting parties herewith covenants in the event such a condition arises, not to conclude peace with the common enemy without preliminary consent therefor from its ally.

Article 3. The conditions under which each of the high contracting parties will lend armed assistance to the other side by virtue of the preceding article, as well as the means by which such assistance shall be accomplished, must be determined in common by the corresponding authorities of one and the other contracting parties.

Article 4. It is requisite to have in view that neither one nor the other of the high contracting parties must consider itself bound by Article 2 of this agreement to lend armed aid to its ally, unless it be given guarantees by its Allies that the latter will give its assistance corresponding in character to the importance of the approaching conflict.

Article 5. The present agreement shall have force from the time of its execution, and shall continue to be in force until July 1/14 of the year 1921. In the event the other of the high contracting parties does not deem it necessary twelve months prior to the end of said period, to declare its unwillingness to continue the present agreement in force, then the said agreement shall continue in force for a period of one year, after the declaration of one of the contracting parties disclaiming the said agreement.

Article 6. The present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to both of the high contracting parties.<sup>1</sup>

That this treaty was a defensive alliance is evident. It foresaw the eventuality of a third power endeavoring to dominate the Eastern situation and holding inimical aims against Russia and Japan. It visualized the possibility of an armed conflict imminent in the near future and was, therefore, concluded for a period of five years. The third power alluded to could only be either Germany or the United States. It was unlikely that the treaty could have been directed against

<sup>1</sup> Text given in MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1328.



the former, because, first, Germany was then engaged in the heat of battle in Europe and could scarcely be expected to threaten Russo-Japanese interests in the Orient; and second, Germany could only be a menace, if she should come out victorious in the war, but then both Russia and Japan would be at her mercy and such an engagement between them would be useless. There is reason to believe, then, that such an agreement had its aim against the United States of America, which was then still a neutral power, and which was interested particularly in the strict application of the doctrine of the Open Door and equal opportunity. It is also interesting to note that the following significant title was given by the Bolsheviki to this statement: "SECRET AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN, with reference to the Possibility of their Armed Conflict together against America and Great Britain in the Far East before the summer of 1921."

Sazonov's explanation of the real purpose of this agreement should also be noted. He was reported to have said that the Russian Government did have Germany in mind and that their real intention in this agreement was to bind Japan to the Allies by another contract. Nevertheless, by this instrument Japan was given the trump card which enabled her to play the game of Far Eastern politics in a manner most beneficial to her interests. This may be seen in her interpretation of the "special interests" and "special position" which the United States recognized Japan as having in China in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917. Motono was reported to have said to the Russian Minister at Tokyo that he realized the possibility of misunderstandings arising out of these phrases in the future with the United States, but he considered that "in such a case, Japan would have at her disposal better means of applying in practice her interpretation

than would the United States.”<sup>1</sup> Although he did not specify exactly what these “better means” were, we have reason to believe that it was this understanding with Russia that made him give out such an utterance.

Such were the diplomatic intrigues that went on after 1907 between Russia and Japan, which scarcely twenty-two months before were engaged in one of the bloodiest struggles ever recorded in history. But hardly had the ink of the Portsmouth Treaty dried up when they, in the face of common interests, thought it best to forget their old enmities and to become fast friends, working hand and glove for their share in the division of the Chinese spoils. Destiny, however, frustrated their malicious schemings, and the 1917 Revolution in Russia tore the secret treaties to pieces and nullified a decade's work of secret diplomacy.

<sup>1</sup> Leo Pasvolsky, “Russia in the Far East,” Appendix, p. 170.



## CHAPTER IV

### RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA, RUSSIA, AND MONGOLIA

THE historical relations between China, Russia, and Mongolia began when Temuchin succeeded in completing a cohesion of his native forces and proclaimed himself Emperor, with his title known as Genghis Khan, a name which has since become synonymous with a paragon of evil. It was this Mongol conquest, as we have noted at the beginning of this study, that brought China and Russia together, and for some time under one sovereignty, from the shores of the Pacific in Eastern Asia to the banks of the Adriatic in southeastern Europe.

Temuchin's conquest of China was followed up by his second son, Ogdai, who, shortly after his ascension to the throne, marched southward with a large army to hasten the ruins of the Kin Dynasty in China, which fell in 1234. In 1264, the last of the great Khans, Kublai, made Peking his capital and proclaimed himself Emperor of China with his dynasty known as the Yuan Dynasty. The Mongol reign in China was short-lived, however, lasting scarcely a hundred years when it was overthrown in 1368 by an ex-Buddhist priest, Chu Yuen-chang, who afterwards ascended the Chinese throne with his dynasty known as the Ming Dynasty, under the title of Hung Wu. Not contented with the recovery of China from the Mongols, Chu sent an army of four hundred thousand strong into Inner Mongolia and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Khan's forces on the Mongolian steppes, thus bringing Inner Mongolia into the orbit of Chinese sovereignty for the first time.

In 1470, Dayan Khan once more united all Mongolia under one rule, but he made a great mistake in apportioning his dominion among his eleven sons, a division which marked the beginning of the dissolution

of Mongolia into a group of loosely connected principalities, ruled by his successive descendants all claiming their lineage directly through one connection or another from Genghis Khan.

Inner Mongolia fell to the lot of Dayan Khan's elder sons. Because of its geographical proximity, Inner Mongolia naturally gravitated toward Manchuria. Alliances were duly formed between the Inner Mongols and the Manchus, and it was with the help of the Inner Mongols that the Manchus conquered China in 1644. But the Manchus, having overthrown the Mings, turned their hands to their allies of yesterday, and after a short campaign brought the southern Mongols under their protection. In order to break up their tribal organizations and traditions, a number of tribes, sometimes as many as eight, were grouped together to form a league. The Manchus exercised a strict control over their government, and Inner Mongolia has since become more of a province than a territory of China.

Outer Mongolia, or Khalkha, was inherited by Dayan Khan's younger sons. In 1689, a war broke out between them and their powerful neighbors, the Oleuths. Finally, the Khalkhas were badly beaten by the Oleuths and a considerable part of their territory was lost to them. In their hour of stress, the Khalkha chieftains planned to surrender the remaining portion of their land to Russia in return for protection against the Oleuths. This proposal was, however, turned down by the Hutukhtu on the ground that Russia was not a Buddhist country. Consequently, they decided to ask for Chinese aid. Emperor K'ang Hsi was then on the throne. He answered the Khalkha's call for help and without difficulty succeeded in subjugating the Oleuths. In 1691, he called a great congress of the Khalkhas at Dolon Nor in southeastern Mongolia, and there the princes of Outer Mongolia gave their submission to China and accepted vassalage in return for protection. Since this time, the Outer Mongols had testified their



allegiance by the annual tribute of eight white horses and one white camel, known as the "Nine White Tribute" in China, to the Chinese Emperor. The imperial authority of the Manchus had since been represented by a resident known as the "Amban" at Urga, the capital of Outer Mongolia, and by military governors at Kobdo and Uliassutai.

The Mongolian conquest of Europe was intrusted to Batu, son of Ogdai's deceased eldest brother, Juji. The European campaign was pushed forward with such irresistible vigor and amazing rapidity that by 1241 the Mongols had conquered as far as the coast of the Adriatic. Europe trembled at their approach, and its abhorrence of this Golden Horde may be imagined from the following description by a contemporary historian:

That the joys of men be not enduring, nor worldly happiness long lasting without lamentations in this same year, i. e. 1240, a detestable native of Satan, to wit, the countless army of Tartars, broke loose from its mountain-environed home. . . . Swarming like locusts over the face of the earth, they have wrought terrible devastation to the eastern parts of Europe, laying it waste with fire and carnage. They are human and beastly, rather monstrous than men, thirsting for and drinking blood, tearing and devouring the flesh of dogs and men, dressed in oxhides, armed with plates of iron, short and stout, thickset, strong, invincible, indefatigable, their backs unprotected, their breasts covered with armor; drinking with delight the pure blood of their flocks, with big, strong horses, which eat branches and even trees, and which they have to mount by the help of three steps on account of the shortness of their thighs. They are without human laws. They spare neither age, sex, nor conditions. They wander about with their flocks and their wives, who are taught to fight like men. And so they came with the swiftness of lightning, to the confines of Christendom, ravaging and slaughtering, striking every one with terror and incomparable horror.<sup>1</sup>

Such is the description by contemporaries of the Mongolian people at the zenith of their power. But,

<sup>1</sup> A. D. M. Carruthers, "Unknown Mongolia," p. 209.

if these same historians were to visit the land of Genghis Khan of to-day, they would be surprised that, instead of those rough and hardy people whom they were accustomed to see in their day, they would find a numerous body of young men, garbed in long robes, lounging idly in yurts of monasteries which did not exist in their time. Instead of that active and healthy mien which was worn on every Mongol face of the thirteenth century, they would find a passive and peaceful look which every Mongol countenance of to-day possesses.

The immediate cause which brought about this transformation and tamed these shepherd warriors into a morbid mass of inactivity and negativeness may be traced to the introduction of the Lamaist religion into Mongolia during the sixteenth century. Lamaism is a religion more pacific than any other religion in the world. Through its doctrine of reincarnation, it has, on the one hand, restrained predatory and savage instincts, and made them contented and peace-loving, open-minded and hospitable; on the other hand, it has sucked their vitality, ruined their manhood, cramped their outlook of life, and strangled progress. Consequently, the Mongols have made no advancement since the days of their great Khans. Most of them even to-day live in tents exactly as those described by travelers who visited them in the Middle Ages.

During all this time when the Mongols were sinking in degeneracy, the Russians were ever on the ascendancy, and in due process of time, the position of the master and the servant of the thirteenth century was exactly reversed. Historically, the domination of the Golden Horde in Russia came to an end on the seizure, and the death, of Ahmed Khan at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and, thereafter, the relations of the two peoples took a new aspect.

With the introduction of Lamaism into Mongolia the Mongolians have come to regard certain personalities



as incarnations of the Buddha, some of which are the Hutukhtu and all the Kubligans. Besides male deities, the worship of Tsagan-Dara-Ekhe, a sort of female deity, has also been in vogue. This goddess has been adored under two names and two aspects, namely as Tsagan-Dara-Ekhe, or the White-Dara-Ekhe; and as Nogon-Dara-Ekhe, or the Green-Dara-Ekhe. Now at the close of the seventeenth century, when Empress Catherine II was on the throne, these ignorant Mongolians had heard of her wonderful dominion pushing southward, eastward, and westward, so the denizens of the Lamaist order proclaimed her as the incarnation of the Tsagan-Dara-Ekhe, or the White-Dara-Ekhe. After the death of Empress Catherine and the ascension of a male heir to the Russian throne the epithet "White" came into use, and each successive heir of all the Russias became hence known as Tsagan Khan, or White Khan. "The White Tsar," says Dillon, "is a household word in Mongolia. Few Westerners can realize the magic of his name. To the Mongolian ear it has a religious, rather than political sound, and is listened to with the awe due to the name of a god by a devout worshiper, rather than the consideration accorded to a mighty sovereign by a humble subject."<sup>1</sup>

From the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1911 to 1915, Mongolia had been the subject of five important international agreements, namely, the Russo-Mongolian Agreement, November 3, 1912; the Mongolian-Tibetan Treaty of Alliance, December 24, 1912; the Russo-Chinese Declaration, November 5, 1913; the Russo-Mongolian Railway Agreement, September 30, 1914; and lastly, the Chinese-Russo-Mongolian Agreement, signed in June, 1915.

The causes that led to these negotiations may be attributed to two sources: the insistence of the

<sup>1</sup> Kusheleff, "Mongolia," p. 62, quoted by E. J. Dillon, "The Chinese Pale of Settlement," in *English Review*, Vol. XIII, p. 289.

Russians over the renewal of the Commercial Treaty of 1881, signed at St. Petersburg, between China and Russia, and the persistence of the Chinese Government to retain its sovereignty over Mongolia, or at least to extend its suzerainty over the land of the Khanites, an overlordship which they have claimed since time immemorial and which has seldom been questioned.

In order to have a better understanding of the difficulty in the renewal of the 1881 St. Petersburg Treaty, it may not be out of place here to consider briefly the occasion which gave rise to the negotiations and signature of this compact. In 1864, when China was engaged in quelling the Taiping Rebellion, Turkestan saw that her chance had come, and succeeded, in 1866, in throwing off the Chinese yoke and in proclaiming an independent Mohammedan government there. During this period of unrest, Russia, in order to protect her overland trade route through which considerable trade had passed, moved her troops into Kuldja and occupied Ili in 1871, at the same time assuring the Chinese Government that as soon as order was restored Russian troops would be withdrawn immediately.

Meanwhile, General Tso Tsung-tang was charged with the arduous task of putting down this Mohammedan revolt. With consummate generalship and by wholesale massacres he succeeded in bringing into the range of actuality what was then thought impossible. In 1875, the Dungari forces were eliminated, and two years later he put an end to Yakub Beg's usurpation and pretensions in western Turkestan.

Having reconquered Ili, China made representations to the Russian Minister at Peking, demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from the occupied territories. The Russian Minister suggested, however, that the matter be negotiated with the Czar himself. Accordingly, a Chinese embassy, headed by Chunghow, was dispatched to Russia to resume negotiation at St. Petersburg. Chunghow, knowing little of the frontiers



and military precautions thereof, was completely outwitted by the clever Russian diplomats, and concluded with them the Treaty of Livadia, by virtue of which the western part of Ili with the Mussart Pass, commanding the Tien Shan ranges leading into Kashgar, was ceded to Russia. In addition to these territorial concessions, great commercial privileges were accorded the Russians and an indemnity of five million silver rubles was to be paid by China to defray the costs of the temporary occupation by Russia.

Chunghow returned to Peking on June 3, 1880, without waiting for the imperial edict authorizing his return. For this offense he was suspended from all public offices. When the terms of the Treaty of Livadia became known, great consternation was aroused among the Chinese people, and a commission of princes and other high officials was appointed by the Emperor to consider the treaty. As a result of these deliberations the conclusion was reached that "Chunghow had disobeyed his instructions and exceeded his powers." On March 3, an imperial edict was issued condemning Chunghow to "decapitation after incarceration."<sup>1</sup>

China refused to ratify the treaty, and feelings of hostility against Russia ran high throughout the length and the breadth of the land. War seemed inevitable with Russia. Tso Tsung-tang, who had put down the Mohammedan revolt, believed that his Hunnanese troops were the best fighters in the world and "was most anxious to use them in trying conclusions with the Russians, boasting that with two hundred thousand of them he would easily march to St. Petersburg and there dictate a peace which would wipe out the humiliating concessions negotiated by Chunghow in the Treaty of Livadia."<sup>2</sup> But war with

<sup>1</sup> Cf. D. C. de K. Boulger, "The History of China," Vol. II, p. 490.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Bland and Backhouse, "China Under the Empress Dowager," p. 509.

Russia would mean the end of the Dynasty, so it was abandoned, and Marquis Tseng was dispatched to St. Petersburg with the object of modifying the terms of the Livadia Treaty. Meanwhile, Chunghow was reprieved as a manifestation to Russia that China did not wish to hurt Russia's dignity but desired the continuance of friendly relations.<sup>1</sup> This paved the way for negotiations. Finally, after six months of protracted discussions, during which China stood firm for the rendition by Russia of the ceded territories, "His Majesty of all the Russias consents to the reëstablishment of Chinese authority in the country of Ili temporarily occupied, since 1871, by the Russian army."<sup>2</sup> In return for this concession the indemnity compensation was increased to nine million metallic rubles and many commercial and other privileges in Turkestan and Mongolia, such as the establishment of Russian consulates in towns not hitherto open to trade and the creation of a free trade zone extending for fifty versts on either side of the Russo-Chinese frontier, were accorded to Russia.

The renewal of this agreement was provided in the following words:

The commercial stipulations of the present treaty, as well as the regulations which serve as its complement, may be revised after the lapse of ten years, to date from the day of the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty; but if, within the course of six months before the term expires, neither of the Contracting Parties should manifest a desire to proceed to its revision, the Commercial Stipulations, as well as the Regulations, will remain in force for a further term of ten years.<sup>3</sup>

The treaty had been renewed twice, first in 1891, and second in 1901, and its third renewal was due in

<sup>1</sup> Cordier, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 218.

<sup>2</sup> Hertslet, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 483.

<sup>3</sup> Full text of treaty given in "Outer Mongolia, Treaties and Agreements," p. 1 ff.



August, 1911. With this date fast approaching, Russia repeatedly reminded the Chinese Foreign Office of the desirability and necessity of its reassertion and continuance. But the Chinese Government manifested no great desire to renew this protocol, and the attention of the Russian Minister at Peking was brought to the fact that the treaty only provided for the renewal of the commercial regulations in case both parties so desired, and that no provision was made for the renewal of the treaty as a whole, as requested by Russia.

August 1, the time set for the revision of the treaty, came and went without any declaration of its renewal by the Chinese Government. Discussions still went on, but nothing definite was reached until September 6, 1912, when Russia addressed a note to the Chinese Government to the effect that, desirous of establishing a sound system of Russo-Chinese overland trade, the Imperial Government of Russia was compelled to consider the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1881 as remaining in force for another period of ten years, that is, until August, 1921; and that, recognizing the inconvenience of leaving the question of the fifty-verst privileged zone without decision for ten years, the Imperial Russian Government hereby informed the Chinese Government that the privileged zone on the Russian side of the land frontier between Russia and China would be abolished from January 14, 1913, and hoped that China would simultaneously abolish the privileged zone on the Chinese side of the frontier.<sup>1</sup> China did not readily respond to this note, and it was not until May 6, 1914, that the Chinese Maritime Customs issued a note to the effect that the privileged free-trade zone on the Chinese side of the frontier would be abolished from June 1 of the same year.

<sup>1</sup> Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

While the negotiations for the renewal of the 1881 treaty were being carried on, trouble was brewing in Mongolia. The Manchus, during the closing years of their dynasty, realizing the danger of Russian encroachments along the Mongolian frontier, had begun to adopt drastic measures to reduce Mongolia to a status more in line with that of one of the Chinese provinces. The laws forbidding Chinese colonization and intermarriages between the Chinese and the Mongols had already been abolished for some time. A Mongolian Bureau of Colonization had been established in 1906 in Peking to encourage Chinese emigration to Mongolia. Since then, a steady stream of Chinese settlers had flowed into Mongolia at the rate of about four miles a year, making "the wilderness blossom as the rose."<sup>1</sup> In short, a policy of systematic assimilation of the Mongolians had been under way.

China did not fear the Mongols so much as she feared the Russians who were behind the Mongolians. China was greatly concerned with the large Russian army distributed at Irkutsk, Verkne-Udinsk, Kiakhta, and Chita, and with the feverish energy with which the Russians engaged themselves in duplicating the tracks of the Siberian Railway. With the view, therefore, of checking this Russian advance toward Mongolia, the Manchu Dynasty wanted to create a powerful military force in the Capital of Mongolia at Urga. Accordingly, a cadre was sent there with some sixty-five officers, detailed to build barracks and recruit Mongol soldiers. The intention was to garrison two thousand men at Urga by the end of 1911, and later to increase the number to ten thousand with garrisons in other important cities like Kobdo and Tarabogtsi. Before the Revolution broke out, over four hundred barracks sufficient to accommodate two thousand troops had already been built.

<sup>1</sup> Bland, "Japan, Korea and China," p. 150.



At the same time other reforms were introduced into Mongolia. Government bureaus of all kinds and schools of all grades sprang up almost overnight. Consequently, heavy taxes were imposed upon the Mongolian populace and were grudgingly borne, driving the Mongols to great resentment and hostility against the Chinese and their administration.

When the lamas became cognizant of this precarious situation in which they were, they began to preach friendship for Russia. In May, 1911, a delegation, headed by Hanto Chin-wan, a powerful prince, was sent to Russia to solicit the good offices of the Czar to intervene on their behalf against the Chinese intrusion. The delegation was received by the Russian Government with open arms and laden with honors and decorations.

In compliance with this request, the Russian Minister at Peking was instructed by his Government to address a note to the Chinese Foreign Office to the effect that upon their failure to appeal to the Chinese Amban to ameliorate the situation in Mongolia caused by the confiscation of their lands, the curtailment of their range, and the infringement of their rights of self-government, which were violations of the agreement under which they came into Chinese sovereignty, the Mongolian people had, as a last recourse, appealed to Russia for assistance; and that Russia, bordering on the Mongolian frontier, could not be indifferent to any violent change in the *status quo* of that territory, a change which would necessarily affect the peace of the border and ultimately endanger the cordial relations of the two governments. The Russian note concluded with the timely warning that should China fail to take heed of the Russian advice, Russia would reserve to herself the liberty to take whatever measure she might see fit to insure the safety of the Mongolian frontier.

To this note the Chinese Foreign Office made the statement that the Amban at Urga had already been

instructed to consider the feelings of the native population of Mongolia, and that should any reform be adopted it would be for the good of the Mongolian people.<sup>1</sup>

Santo, the last Manchu Amban at Urga, upon receipt of the contents of the Russian note from Peking, promised the Hutukhtu to rescind all the reform measures undertaken by his administration, and persuaded him to telegraph to Russia to stop the dispatch of Russian troops to Mongolia and to recall the Hanta mission. These the Hutukhtu agreed to do, but it was too late. The Russians were already on their way to Urga and the opportunity was too good not to be taken advantage of. Meanwhile, China's position was weakened by the outbreak of the Revolution at Wuchang, and for the time being the Mongolian question was laid aside altogether and Russia was given a free hand to do what she liked with Mongolia.

The loyalty or treachery, as the case may be, of the Mongolians towards the Manchu House at this moment was not without interest. Shortly after the news of the Wuchang outbreak reached Urga, the Hutukhtu addressed a note to the Chinese Amban, Santo, to the effect that, since the Four Leagues of Mongolia had for the last two hundred years been under the protecting wings of the Manchu Dynasty, they could not remain indifferent to seeing the rebel forces march against Peking without coming to the rescue, and that they had, therefore, called to the colors four thousand select horsemen to go to Peking to protect the person of the Emperor. But to do this effectively, the note went on to say, sufficient arms and provisions should be distributed to this contingent of cavalry—a demand which Santo was asked to comply with before three o'clock of that day when the note was presented.

<sup>1</sup> Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 6.



But before this hour had arrived another communication, or ultimatum, was dispatched to Santo asking him to make his departure from Mongolia in three days with all his officers, soldiers, and retinue, and that, failing to do this, force would be applied on him. Santo, who had only about two hundred bodyguards with him, had to comply with this demand. Meanwhile, the Russian Consul at Urga had come out to persuade the Hutukhtu not to go to extremes. Santo was then sent off, heavily guarded from Mongolian territory. But all the Chinese merchants in Urga were robbed of all their personal belongings by the Mongolian and the Russian soldiers.

A conference of all the princes of the Mongols was then called in the Palace of the Hutukhtu. The following decisions were reached: the declaration of independence, the nonrecognition of the Chinese Republic, utmost resistance to the latter's claim of sovereignty over Mongolia, the refusal to pay taxes, the expulsion of all Chinese officials, and the strict prohibition of Chinese colonization in Mongolia.<sup>1</sup> A curiously worded proclamation was shortly afterwards made public as follows:

For some time past, Chinamen and Manchus have been fighting in the interior and soon the name of the dynasty Dai-Tsing [Ta Ch'ing] will have vanished. Of yore our Mongolia was an independent land. For that reason we are decided to govern our free people congruously with our former customs. Henceforth foreigners are disqualified from taking any part in our political affairs. From this day forward we dismiss all Chinamen and Manchus from the posts which they fill, whether great or small, military or civil, and we hereby order them to quit our land without delay.<sup>2</sup>

Some time later another edict was issued, from which we readily see that a different hand was behind its making. The edict says:

<sup>1</sup> Cf. C. L. Chu, "The Last Ten Years of Russo-Chinese Relations" (in Chinese), p. 134.

<sup>2</sup> Dillon, "Chinese Pale of Settlement," in *English Review*, Vol. XIII, p. 291.

Henceforth in Mongolia religion will be systematically welded with state government. Chinamen shall be compelled to embrace Lamaism, provincial officials shall be nominated from among the adherents of Lamaism. The highest state officials shall in future wear uniforms of Russian cut and design; subordinate public servants shall dress in Mongolian fashion, not like the Chinese. The taxes and imposts which are at present in vigor are repealed, and fresh taxation will be levied in accordance with laws which will be framed in concert with Russia.<sup>1</sup>

On December 28, 1911, the Hutukhtu was proclaimed Great Khan of the Mongols with great pomp and ceremony which was thoroughly Russian. Only Russian costumes appeared in court and, to show Russia's deep interest for the occasion, the Czar's Government presented at the coronation a number of Russian guns which were to serve as models for the new Mongolian army shortly to be mobilized.

To prepare themselves against the threatened invasion of the Chinese, forty-five Russian officers were employed by the Mongolian Government at Urga to train the Mongols in the Western style. Large quantities of secondhand ammunitions were purchased from Russia to make up the paraphernalia of a soldier's outfit. Two thousand Hunghutse bandits were enlisted and stationed at various strategic points along the Chinese-Mongolian border. The Four Leagues of Outer Mongolia were each required to furnish ten thousand men by conscription to be trained by the Russian officers. Consequently, the whole of Outer Mongolia was under virtual Russian domination.

In financial and economic affairs, Independent Mongolia was even more at the mercy of Russia. One of the first acts of sympathy of the Russian Government to Mongolia after the latter's declaration of independence was a loan of two million rubles mortgaged on the mines of Mongolia. As an illustration of its blissful ignorance of the use of money, the

<sup>1</sup> Dillon, *op. cit.*



Mongolian Government spent this huge sum of money to erect an imposing temple in which was placed a colossal image of the Buddha Maitri of gilt copper together with ten thousand other images on the walls around it. Expensive insignias for the order of the Vadjir were ordered in large quantities from Russia and freely distributed to Russian officials, a decoration which was hitherto unknown to the Mongols.<sup>1</sup>

To supervise the expenditures of the Mongolian Government, Russian advisers were employed without whose permission no outlays could be made. The Russian financial advisers also had the right to exploit all the industries in Mongolia. A government bank for Mongolia was opened by Russian capitalists on the mortgage of all the mineral resources of the country. The old system of trade by barter was abolished and the use of Russian bank notes forced upon the people by order of the Hutukhtu.

The Mongolian theory of independence was based upon the fact that with the establishment of the Chinese Republic their allegiance to China had come to an end, because it was to the Manchu Dynasty that they pledged their loyalty. Now with the overthrow of the Manchus the tie was, according to them, automatically severed. It is incredible, however, that the Mongols, hitherto capable of dealing only with ewes and rams, should now so suddenly ascend the airy stilts of political abstractions and found a system of government purely based upon a theoretical hypothesis. There is every reason to believe, therefore, that the independence of Mongolia was initiated by the Russians and engineered by a few influential persons at Urga without considering the wishes of the more remote and scattered tribes throughout the land.

<sup>1</sup> W. W. Rockhill, "The Question of Outer Mongolia," in *Far Eastern Review*, June, 1915, p. 1.

Mongolia had been coveted by Russia since the middle of the eighteenth century, when Muravev, after his successful campaign on the Amur, turned to Mongolia as the next scene of his ambition. For this purpose, he sent a clever diplomat in the person of Despot Zenovitch to induce the Mongolians to rebel against the Chinese authorities. This was in 1852 when China was tampering with the Taipings and warring with England and France. Despot Zenovitch, in an interview with some of the Mongolian princes, predicted the downfall of the Manchu Empire, and in such an event, he said to them, Mongolia should form four separate principalities with their own rulers, whom Russia would promise to support. Asked by the lama princes whether his views were those of the Governor-General, Zenovitch replied: "Everything I have been charged to tell you I have transmitted, without adding or curtailing anything. . . . The Russian Government will never allow the Ming Dynasty to rule Manchuria and Mongolia. Look to Russia. She is your hope."<sup>1</sup>

For one reason or another Muravev's plan remained *pia desideria*. It was not until 1907 that Russian interest in Mongolia was revived. In this year a "mercantile mission" to investigate the location of all the oases in Kiakhta and Kashgar was sent out by some of the Moscow merchants. On the return of this mission it was reported that Chinese colonization along the districts had progressed by leaps and bounds. In 1909, a "scientific mission" was undertaken with Colonel Popov at its head. On its return, it was recommended that the early construction of a railway from Lake Baikal to Urga be started. In 1911, a government mission for the "economic" study of Mongolia was sent out under M. Bogolievov. Under

<sup>1</sup> St. Petersburg Questions, No. 36, 1909; and Retch, Feb. 14-27, 1912; quoted from Dillon, "The Secession of Mongolia from China," in *Contemporary Review*, April, 1912, pp. 580, 581.



these captions of missions they were in fact nothing more than spying parties to ascertain the economic and industrial resources of Mongolia for their contemplated exploitation.

Speaking of Russian motives in Mongolia, Lieutenant Binstead says:

Firstly, the motives underlying Russian action are a desire to preserve a buffer between her, as yet, thinly peopled empire in Asia and the areas inhabited by the ever-spreading Chinese. This desire is the result of a real fear of the Chinese from the economic point of view, and of the knowledge based on experience, that the Chinese can easily out-trade the Russians, and in an area inhabited in common would eventually have the Russian working for him.

Secondly, Russia has no desire to see a Chinese modern military force trained and quartered in Outer Mongolia. However inferior to her own troops, and however small this force may be, it would nevertheless constitute a menace against her long line of communications with the Far East, and, in the event of another war on the Pacific coast, Russia would have had to set aside a suitable force to watch these Chinese troops in case they attempted a sudden inroad towards the Siberian Railway.

Thirdly, Russia, looking far ahead, wished to maintain free of any strong alien element all that part of Mongolia which lies north of the natural frontier which ought to bind her Siberian possessions on the south, the direction of which is generally roughly described as running from near Vladivostok along the vague line of the Gobi to near Chuguchak. This does not mean that there has even been any serious question of annexing Outer Mongolia or of colonizing it. Russia has far too much to do in Siberia to desire the further burdens which would be represented in the colossal task of developing Outer Mongolia. But Russia would like it kept free from development by any one else, or at any rate by the Chinese, so that it shall remain a potential field for the development of such commercial and industrial energy which is or may become superfluous in Siberia. Finally when Siberia is fully developed, then it will be time to reconsider the political status of Outer Mongolia.<sup>1</sup>

It is also clear from official statements that the annexation of Outer Mongolia was not contemplated by Russian statesmen as may be evidenced from the following passage from the protocol of an extraordinary

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1914, p. 620.

meeting of the Russian Ministerial Council: "The violation or separation of a province from China cannot be justified by legal considerations. We know how expensive such annexations prove to be in the long run, and to what international complications they lead. The purpose of such annexations would not be understood in Russia."<sup>1</sup> The Russo-Japanese War had certainly taught the Russian statesmen a great lesson.

However, Sazonov frankly admitted, to his credit, that the political interests of Russia must be attained at the expense of China's territorial integrity, when he said:

Another question we should attempt to regulate on the occasion of the recognition of the new Chinese Government is the revision of the St. Petersburg Treaty. Should we succeed in retaining the fundamental principles at the renewal, which form the bases of our political activity in Outer China, then we should not only attain the protection of our economic interests but also assist in the future development of the Mongolian question on the line of Mongolia's existence as an autonomic component part of the Chinese realm. The definite settlement of this difficult question which especially affects Russian interests, must be postponed to a future date, for we have to take into account our political interests which, in principle, are directly opposed to the maintenance of China's territorial integrity. In this way the Chinese will be prevented from establishing their authority over these districts.<sup>2</sup>

In concluding his memorandum, Sazonov further expressed his opinion that in conjunction with Japan Russia's ambition would be fulfilled the sooner. "If we proceed," he says, "in agreement with Japan, we shall be able to reckon all the sooner upon the fulfillment of our wishes as we succeed in assuring ourselves of the support of our French ally just as England might also give her support to Japan."<sup>3</sup> The result was the secret alliance between Russia and Japan. It was secret again as far as the United States of America

<sup>1</sup> Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*



and Germany were concerned, for the French and the British Government were not only informed when this agreement was concluded but were actually consulted when the negotiations were in progress.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the demarcation of Mongolia into Russian and Japanese spheres of interest was not only a Russo-Japanese concern but also the operation of the mechanism of the *entente cordiale*.

The objects of this secret Russo-Japanese convention were clearly stated in the preamble as follows:

In order to more exactly determine and to complete the provisions of the secret treaties of July 17/30, 1907, and June 21/July 1, 1910, and to prevent the possibility of any misunderstanding with regard to their special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, the Russian and the Japanese Government have decided to lengthen the line of demarcation defined in the amendment of the treaty of June 17/30, 1907, and to draw up the confines of the spheres of their special interests in Inner Mongolia.

This line of demarcation was fixed in the following words:

Starting from the intersection of the Tola-Ho River and the 122 meridian, east of Greenwich, the demarcation line follows the course of the Oulountehourb and Moushisha rivers to the watershed of the Moushisha and Haldaitai rivers; from there on it follows the border lines of the Hei-loung-chiang [Heilungkiang] Province and Inner Mongolia to the most extreme frontier point of Inner and Outer Mongolia.

The mutual recognition of each other's rights and interests in the said zones were defined in the following article:

Inner Mongolia is divided into two parts: one to the east, the other one to the west of the Peking meridian. The Japanese Government undertakes to recognize and observe the special interests of Russia in Inner Mongolia to the west of the above-mentioned meridian; the Russian Government undertakes the

<sup>1</sup> Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

same obligation to respect the Japanese interests east of the above-mentioned meridian.

Japanese effort to claim a preponderating position in Inner Mongolia was made the more marked by the demands embodied in Group II of the famous "Twenty-One Demands" presented to China in 1915, and by the demands presented to China in 1917 in connection with the settlement of the Chengchiatun affair. It is singularly noticeable that on both of these occasions Japan only asked for privileges in eastern Inner Mongolia, evidently keeping in view the line of demarcation set down in the 1912 secret convention with Russia. It is equally evident that Russia was discretely silent in 1915 and 1917 when Japan presented those obnoxious demands to China — demands which, if totally conceded to, would mean a menace to the Russian frontier and the virtual bondage of China to Japan politically, militarily, and economically.

With regard to Great Britain, during this crisis of China's history, she was by no means to be outdone by Russia and Japan. She had marked Tibet as her share of the Chinese spoils, so in order to secure official recognition of her dominating position there, England had begun to trade territories with Russia — territories to which neither Russia nor England had a sound claim. This practice of international immorality, characteristic of the *entente cordiale* and of secret diplomacy, may be seen from the following communication of the Russian Minister at Peking to his Government at St. Petersburg: "The only compensation," he reported, "on the part of England in return for our recognition of her freedom of action and her privileged position in Tibet, to which I could point, would be her recognition of our exclusive sphere of

<sup>1</sup> Text given in Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 42.



influence in Northern Manchuria, Mongolia, and Western China, with the exception of Kashgar, as well as the understanding not to hinder us in the execution of our plans in these territories, and herself to pursue no aims which we would have to regard as incompatible with our interests.”<sup>1</sup>

To go back to Independent Outer Mongolia, China refused absolutely to recognize its independence. Therefore a mandate, incorporating Mongolia as one of the component parts of the Chinese Republic, was issued to the following effect:

The five races in this country are entitled to equal treatment in the Republic, and the territories of the Mongols, the Tibetans, and the Mohammedans are all its citizens. There is no more distinction between them, as was the case during the imperial rule. Thus no such name as “dependencies” shall be used any more. Hereafter, the Mongols, the Tibetans, and the Mohammedans should live in perfect harmony so as to bring about a real union of the five races into one. The Republican Government will not establish a department for dependencies, in view of the fact that they are to be treated equally as the other parts of the state, namely, the interior provinces. All matters concerning these places will be included in the Administration of Home Affairs, etc.<sup>2</sup>

Yuan Shih-kai, president of the newly founded Republic, made strenuous efforts to persuade the Mongols to rescind their declaration of independence and to come back to the Chinese fold. A lengthy telegram to the Hutukhtu couched in the following exhortation was dispatched to Urga:

For a nation to exist independently, she must have a large population, abundance of wealth, a strong army, and a sound system of government. Although your Mongolia has a large territory, yet your people are too small in numbers, which are not even as large as those of one of the small provinces of the Republic. Moreover, the economic existence of your people is miserable and

<sup>1</sup> Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>2</sup> *Far Eastern Review*, Feb., 1920, p. 106.

they certainly cannot bear the taxes necessary for the maintenance of an army. To resort to foreign loans is to invite interference which would endanger the very existence of your country. With the introduction of Lamaism into Mongolia your people have stifled their ancient fighting instinct and they now know only how to ride on horseback and use the bow and arrow, incapable of being depended upon in times of crises. Moreover, your government is based upon a tribal system of bureaucracy, and compared with that of the civilized nations, it has not the least chance of standing on its own feet. Your power does not extend even to the Four Leagues of Outer Mongolia. Can you recall of a single instance within the last hundred years of a Mongol tribe that has existed without the protection of China?

The relation between Mongolia and the Chinese provinces may be likened to that of the teeth and the lips and to that of the gate and the courtyard. If the lips are severed the teeth will be endangered; if the gate is demolished the courtyard cannot but be exposed. Therefore a continuance of our good relations will be conducive to prosperity and security, and a severance of our existing relations cannot but be injurious and detrimental to our national life. The salvation of Mongolia, therefore, depends upon China. With the immense wealth at her disposal and the great man power at her command, China can easily transform Mongolian weakness into strength, Mongolian poverty into wealth. The Chinese Government has resolved to sweep aside the corrupt government of the old days in Mongolia and to install a new reign of righteousness and justice. Therefore, any suggestions or proposals that you think fit to present will be carefully considered by me. It is earnestly desired that the Mongolian independence will be immediately canceled. Thoughtful and intelligent as you are, I am sure you will make the right choice between good and bad, happiness and misery, and not be deceived by the intrigues of false friends.<sup>1</sup>

President Yuan received no reply for some time, but finally the following came from the Hutukhtu:

It is not to be denied that our population is small and our people poor and lack the militaristic spirit, hardly able to stand on a basis of independent existence. We are grateful to Your Excellency's farsighted policy and desire to help us out. But as to Mongolia's future all I can say is that it largely depends upon Your Excellency's attitude and actions. If China will reform her

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Chinese original (Chu, *op. cit.*, p. 137).



own government in earnest, pay attention to her foreign affairs, strengthen her frontiers and put her own house on a firm foundation, not only will the existence of Mongolia be secured, China herself will have no cause to apprehend an invasion from the north.

The position of Mongolia, hemmed in between powerful neighbors, may be likened to that of an egg surrounded by stones, and the slightest mishap may reduce her to the same state in which Korea and Formosa are now situated. China is too far away and her whip, however long, can scarcely reach out to Mongolia and help her to drive off her enemies. Independence is, therefore, her only hope. Personally, it is as easy for me to cancel our independence as to discard a pair of old shoes. But this declaration was proclaimed before the abdication of the Manchu Dynasty and has already been promulgated to the outside world. Consequently, my hand is tied from taking an independent course of action. However, if Your Excellency should insist on this step being taken, it is desirable that our neighbor [Russia] be consulted and an understanding reached between China and Russia. Therefore, the very existence of Mongolia is in Your Excellency's hand. I beg Your Excellency not to take too severe a measure lest it drive the Mongols to desperation, and I also hope that Your Excellency's generous heart will hear the supplications of the Mongolian people and open for them a way through which they may save themselves from destruction.<sup>1</sup>

Thereupon, President Yuan sent a second telegram to the Hutukhtu advising him of the undesirability of soliciting outside mediation and informing him that a Chinese envoy would be dispatched to Urga to see if an agreement could not be reached. Yuan said:

I beg to bring to your attention the fact that it was not Mongolia alone that has suffered from the maladministration of the late dynasty, but the same condition prevailed in the provinces as well. But now a new republican government has been formed and the five races of the Chinese people are united into one great family. Mongolia is now a full member of the Chinese house and any dire consequences that befall her will be equally felt by all the other members of the family. Consequently, I do not see the feasibility of inviting foreign intervention in the adjustment of our internal affairs, thus throwing away our inalienable right of sovereignty.

<sup>1</sup> Chu, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

China's only desire is to see Mongolia safe from external encroachment which can only be prevented by her joining the Republic in an inseparable bond of the five races. In this connection, I beg to make the assurance that in the event of Mongolia's canceling her independence, all the Mongol princes and the Mongol people will be most favorably treated and accorded every opportunity for self-government and development. As there are so many things that cannot be said in a telegram, I am therefore despatching a special envoy to Urga to discuss matters with you in detail, and I hope when he arrives you will give him every courtesy and consideration.<sup>1</sup>

This time a prompt reply came from the Hutukhtu, rejecting President Yuan's idea of sending a special envoy to Mongolia. It said:

The inauguration of the five races into one Great Republic of China deserves the utmost admiration of all at home and abroad. But considering, however, the diverse customs and habits of the Mongols from those of the other races composing the Republic, it is thought best by us that we live apart from them. I am also fully aware that foreign intervention infringes on our sovereign rights, but such a recourse is necessitated by considerations beyond my control, and after careful deliberation with my ministers, we have come to the final conclusion that the best thing for us to do at the present time is to solicit the good offices of our neighbor for the settlement of our differences.<sup>2</sup>

The Chinese people as a whole did not at first take the Mongolian situation seriously. They regarded the Mongolian declaration of independence as a mere child's play which could be frustrated as easily as turning the palm of the hand. The very thought of two million Mongols against four hundred million Chinese was enough to dissipate any fear of dispossessing Mongolia. But they soon became aware that behind the Mongolian stage a strange hand was directing the show.

On November 3, 1912, the Russians had discarded their cloak of intrigue and come out into the open to

<sup>1</sup> Chu, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 139.



recognize the Mongolian independence as a *fait accompli*. "In accordance with the desire unanimously expressed by the Mongolians to maintain the national and historic constitution of their country," so said the Urga Protocol, "the Chinese troops and authorities were obliged to evacuate Mongolian territory, and Djebzoun-Khutukhtu was proclaimed ruler of the Mongolian people. The old relations between Mongolia and China thus came to an end." Following this declaration it was then agreed that "the Imperial Russian Government shall assist Mongolia to maintain the autonomous régime which she has established, as also the right to have her national army, and to admit neither the presence of Chinese troops on her territory, nor the colonization of her land by the Chinese." It was further agreed that "the ruler of Mongolia and the Mongolian Government shall grant, as in the past, to Russian subjects and trade the enjoyment in their possessions of the rights and privileges enumerated in the protocol annexed thereto. It is well understood that there shall not be granted to other foreign subjects in Mongolia rights not enjoyed there by the Russian subjects." Finally it was provided that if the Mongolian Government should find it necessary to conclude a separate treaty with China, the new treaty should in no way infringe upon the clauses of the present agreement and of the protocol annexed thereto or modify them without the consent of the Russian Government.

It is to be noted that throughout the agreement the term "Mongolia" and not "Outer Mongolia" was used. Thus Russia by one stroke of the pen sought to nullify the age-old relations between Mongolia and China and secured for herself all the rights and privileges that even China herself did not enjoy in the days of her overlordship. In other words, China, hitherto the acknowledged suzerain, could not settle the foreign relations of her ex-vassal, could not deal with her

directly, could not own land, could not colonize, could not build railways and have mining concessions. On the other hand, Russian subjects could move, reside freely anywhere in Mongolia, engage in every kind of business, commercial, industrial, or otherwise; Russian subjects could make contracts of every kind; Russian subjects could export and import goods free of duties, taxes, or other dues; Russian credit institutions could have branches in Mongolia and transact all kinds of businesses; Russians could have allotments on lease, acquire them as private property or for cultivation; Russians could obtain concessions of any kind. All these rights and privileges Mongolia granted Russia in the protocol annexed to the principal agreement. In short, Russia could have everything and China nothing. One must indeed be purblind to fail to grasp the significance of these restrictions and concessions.<sup>1</sup>

Shortly after the conclusion of this agreement another was entered into between Russia and Mongolia, the latter agreeing to concede to the former the right to construct a telegraph line between Kosh-Ayatch and Kobdo and the right to exploit, and have control of, this line, which would rest absolutely upon the Russian Administration of Post and Telegraphs.<sup>2</sup>

On December 24, 1912, Mongolia found another ally in Tibet. Since the conclusion of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, the Chinese had retained but a nominal suzerainty over this territory. When the Republic came into being, Tibet, together with the other Chinese dependencies, was made one of the provinces of China. Now animated by the success achieved by their Mongolian brethren, the Tibetans thought that the moment had also arrived for them to assert their independence. With this in view, they took the initiative and proposed an alliance with Outer

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<sup>1</sup> Text of the treaty and the protocol given in MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 992 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Text given in *ibid.*, p. 1038.



Mongolia. The Hutukhtu, being of a lower spiritual hierarchy, naturally felt flattered when a superior condescended to propose a treaty on equal terms with him. Furthermore, according to the religious mind of these peoples, the benediction and approbation of the Supreme Head of the Lamaist church was essential to their national existence. Thus, imbued with the same religion and prompted by the same desire, the Tibetans and the Mongolians readily came to terms and allied themselves to resist the Chinese claim of sovereignty over them.

The objects and purposes of this Mongolian-Tibetan entente were clearly stated in the preamble of the treaty to the effect that, as they had freed themselves from the Manchu Dynasty and separated themselves from China and become independent states, and that, as they had always professed one and the same religion, they, the Tibetans and the Mongolians, decided to strengthen their friendship by mutually agreeing to recognize each other as ruler of their respective domains, to establish Buddhism on a firm footing, to aid each other against internal and external dangers, to afford protection and assistance to each other's subjects traveling in the territories of the other, and to further mutual trade with each other.<sup>1</sup>

These were some of the problems that confronted the Republic of China in its infant days. Mongolia and Tibet had seceded. Manchuria, failing to come to terms with China, would likewise renounce its allegiance to the young democracy. Indeed, it was even feared that China Proper might itself disintegrate if something was not speedily done to harmonize the conflicting interests of the various provinces.

Externally, Russia and Japan were working hand and glove for the destruction of the Young Republic. France was a party to the game. England had

<sup>1</sup> Text given in "China Year Book," 1914, p. 629.

abandoned her rôle as defender of that ancient shibboleth of the integrity of China and had joined the others to weaken China's hold on her dependencies by desiring to create in Tibet a buffer state between India and Turkestan and Mongolia where Russian influence was paramount. Only Germany and the United States of America were, therefore, likely to raise a dim murmur against the clamor of the Entente on China's behalf. Germany had not the courage to champion the cause of China single-handed. The United States of America, maintaining her traditional attitude of aloofness from international entanglements, was out of the question. Besides, her hand was tied by a precedent in Panama of which a Far Eastern monthly had this interesting analogy to make:

When the United States finally withdrew from the protracted and unsuccessful negotiations with the Republic of Colombia for the purchase of the Panama Canal trip, the state of Panama revolted and seceded from Colombia and declared its independence. America immediately recognized the new government and then opened the negotiations resulting in the purchase of the present Canal Zone. America little thought that it had created a precedent that might be invoked by other powers in other parts of the world to justify the acquisition of concessions considered vital to their national expansion. It would seem that Russia, profiting by the lesson taught by America, has gone her one better, and when she found that it was impossible to obtain from the Chinese Government the coveted railway, mining, and commercial rights in Mongolia, she availed herself of the situation caused by the general revolution by indirectly aiding a counter-revolution in Mongolia, and recognizing the independence of the latter dependency. Russia has now served emphatic notice on the new Chinese Republican Government that she will not tolerate the despatch of any armed force into Mongolia to restore the dependency to its old allegiance. In other words, Mongolia is from now on to be considered as an independent state, and whatever concessions are secured from the Mongolian Government at Urga must therefore hold good.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, bereft of all her friends, China had to fight her own battle. In general, great indignation was

<sup>1</sup> *Far Eastern Review*, Vol. IX, p. 176.



shown against the Russians, and public opinion ran along three distinct lines. First, there was a strong party advocating war against Russia and the dispatch of a strong force to Mongolia to expel the Russians there and then bring the Mongols to submission. In other words, they were for prompt and determined action to frustrate the Mongolian revolt which they regarded as a mere product of the machinations of a few Russian adventurers. Second, there were those who favored the settlement of the Mongolian situation through diplomatic negotiations. Third, there were those who were absolutely opposed to the use of force. According to the latter, the fundamental solution lay in bringing the Hutukhtu and the lama princes to a real cognizance of their weak position and their corruptions by moral suasion. They held that what bound Mongolia to China for the last two hundred years was not force but their sense of loyalty and allegiance, and that the cause of the recent manifestation of hostility and hatred against China was due internally to the misgovernment of Mongolia by the Manchus and externally to the intrigues of the Russians. Therefore, China's policy towards Mongolia should be to arouse from within the Mongols themselves a national consciousness which would be strong enough and intelligent enough to make them distinguish the good from the bad intentions of their neighbors. This, they charged, could not be achieved in a day but gradually through peaceful means of persuasion and assimilation.

Public opinion in Russia ran nearly along the same lines. Semiofficial Russia was for war with China. Count Bennigsen said:

War against China is inevitable. If it be waged in the near future, the theater will almost be exclusively Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia: that is to say, our troops will not encounter serious resistance anywhere else. At the extreme West the Chinese are too weak, and they still lack roads to Urga and

Kiakhta. . . . If war does not take place now, China will contrive not merely to strengthen her army, but also to prepare the field for action. A railway line will be built to Urga, or even to Kiakhta, the frontier will be colonized by many thousand military settlers, who will isolate the Mongols from our dangerous influence and then we shall have not only to dispense with their help, but we may even be compelled to wage war on our own territory. To-day we need only a single army in Manchuria and Priamur; in a few years we shall also require one near Lake Baikal.

War with China is inevitable. And as we shall never become China's friend, the sooner we equip ourselves for the tussle the better. Which of the two alternatives is more to our advantage, to consolidate ourselves in the East, to lay our enormous sums on the work and in the end to be forced to begin the contest just when it suits China, or else, with a relatively small outlay, to demolish that nation when it is to our advantage to do so and to cripple it for many years to come? This question I leave to statesmen to answer. After a successful campaign we could assure our safety by forming two separate states out of Mongolia and Sin Dsian [Sinkiang], and deny the Chinese admission by means of various restrictions.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time, more liberal sentiments were not lacking in Russia. The Reich had the following to say regarding the situation in Mongolia:

It is to our best interests not only in our relations to China but also to England and Japan, to maintain the *status quo*. One need not be a prophet to tell what the consequences of its violation would be. The other nations will demand, not the establishment of the *status quo*, but the bringing about of a balance of power by "compensation" to themselves. That means the reopening of the Far Eastern Question in all its complications, and it would shake the very foundations of our entire recent policy in the Far East. It would mean a readjustment, not only of our Eastern-Asiatic politics, but also of our European politics. And that is a very dangerous undertaking. It is difficult for Mongolia to come to an understanding with China, but it is still more difficult for it to come to terms with Russia. It is not in our interest to annex Mongolia. The best solution of the whole question is to let Mongolia alone.<sup>2</sup>

Official Russia, through its spokesman, Sazonov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was for a compromise of

<sup>1</sup> Count Bennigsen, "Some Data About Contemporary Mongolia," pp. 39, 40, quoted from the *English Review*, Jan., 1913, p. 299.

<sup>2</sup> *Literary Digest*, March 9, 1912, p. 475.



these two extreme views. Speaking in the Duma on April 13, 1912, he said:

Independent Mongolia as it is at present lacks political ability to run her own government, money to finance her administration and an army to protect herself from invasion. Should we let her alone she will sooner or later come again under Chinese domination. Therefore, for the sake of our national interests we cannot be indifferent to the present situation. For if we abandon our forward policy in Mongolia we abandon at the same time our whole policy in the Far East which will spell the doom of our Empire. On the other hand, if we take Mongolia into our protection we cannot but incur the suspicion of other powers as bent on the ambition of swallowing up all Asia. This is not a sound policy for us to pursue either. Therefore, according to my opinion, we should steer a middle course between these two extremes in order to protect our interests in the Far East. We should demand three conditions from China as a basis for negotiations. First, China should promise not to colonize Mongolia; second, not to send troops to Mongolia; and third, not to interfere with the internal politics of Mongolia. These three conditions are of the utmost advantage to us. Meanwhile, owing to a misunderstanding of our real intentions, feelings are running high in China against us and a settlement by a recourse to arms seems probable, but we are not to give way at this moment. We should persist in the acquiescence of our demands until full satisfaction of the same is obtained.<sup>1</sup>

War never came. President Yuan Shih-kai, in view of the instability of his own position as executive of the Chinese Republic, could not afford to send an expeditionary force to Mongolia to bring the Mongols to account. Russia, with her hands full in the Balkans and only desiring a weak and pliable state along her Siberian border, was willing to meet the Chinese halfway. As to the Mongols, differences of opinion had arisen among them as to the wisdom of their action. Urga was for full independence: Western Mongolia wanted only autonomy: and southern or Inner Mongolia wished to come back to the Chinese fold, a considerable number of them having come back already when one Prince Wu-tai

<sup>1</sup> Chu, *op. cit.*, p. 145; translated from the Chinese by the author.

returned with eight hundred men. At the same time, the Mongols had begun to have qualms over their relations with Russia. They were beginning to find out that having shaken off an old yoke under which they could move and have their being with comparative freedom, they had accepted a new yoke which proved more burdensome and undesirable. Their enthusiasm for the Russians began to cool off perceptibly, when they found that Russian friendship was not so altruistic as they had at first thought, but really motivated by selfish interests. They also began to realize that after all an autonomy under the ægis of China was to be preferred to an autonomy under the ægis of Russia. With these national feelings as a background the way was paved for a solution of the Mongolian problem.

Early in 1913, Russia presented to the Chinese Foreign Office six conditions in accordance with the principles laid down by Sazonov in his speech to the Duma as a basis upon which Russia was willing to come to terms with China. These conditions were to the effect that, first, recognizing Mongolia as an integral part of the territory of China, Russia promise not to seek to dissolve this bond and promise to respect the historical rights accruing therefrom to China; second, that China agree not to modify the historical autonomy of Outer Mongolia but to give the Mongols of Outer Mongolia the responsibility for the defense and the maintenance of order in their own territory, the exclusive right of maintaining their own military and police organization, as well as the right to prohibit the colonization of their lands by people other than Mongolian subjects; third, that Russia, on her side, promise not to send troops into Outer Mongolia with the exception of consular guards, not to undertake the colonization of the territory of Outer Mongolia, and not to be represented in that country by any other institution than the consulates allowed by the treaties; fourth, that China, desirous of using



peaceful methods in the exercise of her authority over Outer Mongolia, declare herself prepared to accept the good offices of Russia to establish on the basis given above the principle of her relations with Outer Mongolia so that the central authority of this region should recognize its historical character as a local authority of a part of China; fifth, that in consideration of the good offices of the Russian Government the Chinese Government consent to confer on Russian subjects in Outer Mongolia the commercial advantages enumerated in the protocol concluded at Urga; and sixth, that all international acts concerning modifications to be brought about to bear on the system of government in Outer Mongolia, which might later be concluded by the Russian Government with the authorities of that country, be valid in so far as they should have been approved by the Chinese Government as a result of direct negotiations between China and Russia.<sup>1</sup>

These conditions, after a protracted discussion in the House of Representatives at Peking, were finally voted upon by a large majority for ratification. But the Senate, which was at this time dominated by the Kuomintang, thought that too much was given to Russia and so refused to indorse the Russian proposals.

Russia was greatly irritated by this rejection and presented, two days after the action of the Senate to modify the terms of the conditions, four new conditions, which were much harsher than the first, to the effect that China acknowledge the autonomy of Mongolia (with the exception of the district forming Inner Mongolia) and the rights ensuing from such autonomy for the said territory; that Russia acknowledge the suzerainty of China over Mongolia, and the rights involved in such suzerainty; that China express her readiness to accept

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Perry-Ayscough and Otter-Barry, "With the Russians in Mongolia; p. 29.

the good offices of Russia for the establishment of her mutual relations with the Mongolian Government, the basis of which being the principles expressed in the Russo-Mongolian Agreement and the Protocol of 1912; and that questions touching the interests of Russia and China in Mongolia and arising from the new state of affairs in that country be settled by subsequent discussion by the respective governments.<sup>1</sup>

After two months' deliberation, under the leadership of Mr. Sun Pao-chi, China and Russia finally came to an agreement on November 5, which was signed on the same day, with ratifications exchanged on the following day, President Yuan Shih-kai having in the meantime issued a mandate dissolving the Kuomintang and ostracizing its members from the affairs of the state. Consequently, more than three hundred sixty members of Parliament were ousted, and no session had since been convened to discuss further the Russo-Chinese Agreement, as no quorum could be called.

This understanding between Russia and China was embodied in a declaration of five articles and an exchange of notes in four articles. It was agreed in the declaration that Russia would recognize China's suzerainty over Outer Mongolia and that China, on her part, would recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia. Both China and Russia pledged not to intervene in the internal administration of Outer Mongolia, not to send troops there and to abstain from colonizing. China also agreed to accept the good offices of the Russian Government in the settlement of her relations with Outer Mongolia, and in questions pertaining to Russo-Chinese interest in Outer Mongolia, China and Russia agreed to settle them in subsequent conferences.

In the notes exchanged, it was provided that, "as regards questions of a political and territorial nature,

<sup>1</sup> Perry-Ayscough and Otter-Barry, *op. cit.*



the Chinese Government shall come to an agreement with the Russian Government through negotiations in which the authorities of Outer Mongolia shall take part." Thus, nominally, China was the acknowledged suzerain, but, in reality, she had to consult with Russia in matters of a political and territorial nature. In other words, by virtue of this stipulation, Outer Mongolia had come to be under the joint protection of China and Russia.<sup>1</sup>

However, from the Chinese point of view, the agreement could not help being considered as a great diplomatic victory for China. The Chinese were satisfied that Outer Mongolia had been retained as an integral part of the Chinese Republic and that their sovereignty over this territory, which had not until lately been disputed for over two hundred years, was now sanctioned by the law of nations. The Russians had reason to be equally satisfied because they had at last compelled the Chinese to concede to them the commercial privileges stipulated in the 1881 St. Petersburg Treaty, which they had for the last three years tried in vain to renew. But with the Mongols it was anything but satisfactory. They received it with open displeasure and frankly declared that it was negotiated over their heads. However, they were flattered in a way when they were assured that, in the negotiations soon to be started as provided in the declaration and the notes exchanged in Peking, they would take a share on a footing of perfect equality with China and Russia and that their best interests would be given due consideration.

Prior to the assembly of the three parties for their final settlement of their mutual relations, Russia entered into another agreement with Outer Mongolia with regard to the exploitation and concession of the latter's railroads. By this understanding it was agreed that Russia and Mongolia would jointly deliberate

<sup>1</sup> Text given in MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1066.



and decide upon the most advantageous lines to be laid for the benefit of both contracting parties. Russia recognized the right of Mongolia to build her own railroads with her own funds, but, "as regards the granting of railroad concessions to any one, the Mongolian Government shall, by virtue of the relations of close friendship with the neighboring Great Russian nation, previous to granting the concession, enter into conference with the Imperial Russian Government and consult with it as to whether the projected railroad is not injurious to Russia from an economic and strategic standpoint."<sup>1</sup> Thus, it is evident that by this instrument China was prevented from building railroads which would endanger the security of the Russian frontier, and should lines be built it was unlikely that they would connect with the Chinese lines, for the Russian five-foot gauge would be used instead of the Chinese standard gauge.

However, having cleared all the misunderstandings and having reached the main points of agreement, the representatives of the three interested parties, namely, China, Russia, and Mongolia, came together on September 8, 1914, at Kiakhta, for a last settlement of their relations with each other. The Mongols showed from the very beginning of the negotiations an obstinate and uncompromising attitude, which was evidently caused by the resentment for their not being a party to the Peking Convention, and it was at first feared that the conference would terminate without any concrete results being reached, the Chinese delegation, tired of the constant deadlocks occasioned by the ignorance and obduracy of the Mongols, having twice telegraphed to Peking for authority to discontinue the negotiations. But Peking was simultaneously fighting a harder diplomatic battle with the Japanese and their

<sup>1</sup> Text given in MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1178.



“Twenty-One Demands.” Consequently, the Chinese representatives at Kiakhta were advised to accommodate the other parties as much as possible in order that something definite might be accomplished. Difficulties were finally overcome, and, after nearly nine months of patient labor, an agreement was at last reached and signed on June 7, 1915, at Kiakhta, hereafter better known as the “Tripartite Agreement in Regard to Outer Mongolia.”

By this treaty, Outer Mongolia recognized the validity of the Sino-Russian Declaration of November 5, 1913, and the notes exchanged in connection therewith. She also recognized China's suzerainty over her. China and Russia on their part recognized “the autonomy of Outer Mongolia forming part of Chinese territory.” Autonomous Mongolia by virtue of this agreement had no right to conclude treaties of a political or territorial character with foreign powers, but she might enter into agreements concerning questions of a commercial and industrial nature. The ruler of Outer Mongolia might retain the title of “Bogdo Cheptsun Damba Hutukhtu Khan,” meaning Great Venerable Sacred Reincarnated Ruler, which would be conferred upon him by the President of the Chinese Republic.

In conforming with the Sino-Russian agreement, Russia and China agreed not to interfere with the internal administration of Autonomous Mongolia, nor to station troops there, with the exception of consular or military guards, as the case might be. The place of honor was to be given to the Chinese dignitary on all ceremonial and official occasions. He and the Russian representative should have the right of seeing the ruler of Autonomous Mongolia in private audiences. The Chinese dignitary at Urga and his assistants in various localities of Outer Mongolia were to exercise general control of Autonomous Mongolia “lest the suzerain rights and interests of China be impaired by the acts of the Autonomous Government of Outer

Mongolia and its subordinate authorities." Chinese merchants were to be exempted from customs duties in importing goods of whatever origin they might be into Autonomous Mongolia, but they were to be subject to all taxes on internal trade which had been or might be established, payable by the Mongols of Autonomous Mongolia.

The question which occupied the longest time of the delegates assembled at Kiakhta was jurisdiction, and it was solved in this way: in Chinese-Mongol mixed cases, the Chinese and Mongol authorities were to adjudicate conjointly. In regard to Russo-Mongolian cases, the law, as stipulated in the Russo-Mongolian Protocol of 1912, would be applied. In Russo-Chinese cases, a joint tribunal, composed of Russians and Chinese, would partake in the decisions and the drafting of the judgment. If the Chinese were defendants, the cases would be tried in Chinese courts in the presence of Russian assessors and the judgment signed by both the judges and the assessors. If the Russians were defendants, the cases would be tried in Russian courts and the Chinese authorities could send a representative to watch the proceedings, but it was not definitely stipulated whether he had a voice in the judgment.

The treaty was drawn up in triplicate in the Chinese, Russian, Mongolian, and French languages. In case of dispute in the interpretation of the language of the treaty the French text would be authoritative. It came into force on the date of its signature.<sup>1</sup>

Thus were settled once for all the controversies and disputes which had spun out since the date set for the renewal of the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1881 between China and Russia. The Tripartite Agreement remained the keystone of all the relations between China, Russia,

<sup>1</sup> Text given in MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1239.



and Mongolia until shortly after the Russian Revolution of 1917, when China, taking advantage of the unrest in that country, succeeded in bringing about a "voluntary" cancellation of Mongolian autonomy by the Mongolians.

PART II

CHINA AND SOVIET RUSSIA





## CHAPTER V

### WHITE AND RED RUSSIAN INTRIGUES IN MONGOLIA

THE autonomous régime born of the Tripartite Agreement of 1915 between China, Russia, and Mongolia was a short one. In fact, during the second year of its existence a movement was on foot in Mongolia among the lay princes to reëstablish the administrative system which was in vogue prior to 1912. With this in view, secret negotiations were carried on with the Chinese Resident by the Mongols at Urga, looking to the abrogation of the autonomy of Mongolia and to assigning to the Hutukhtu a nominal position with a large pension for himself and his family and the more important princes of Mongolia. This proposal was turned down by the Chinese Government purely for financial considerations, because it involved an extra outlay of at least five million dollars from its already depleted treasury.<sup>1</sup>

The talk of coming back to Chinese administration was, however, revived in 1919, following the fall of the Omsk Government in Siberia when Ataman Semenov, who claimed Mongolian blood in his veins, was trying to put into execution his preposterous plan of a Pan-Mongolian state, in which he was to play a leading rôle. The territory involved in this ambitious scheme was bigger than China Proper itself, as it included, besides Inner and Outer Mongolia, the trans-Baikal districts, Hulunbuir, and Tibet, as well as other districts where the Mongolian dialects are spoken.

Early in February, 1919, a conference was called by Semenov in China to put this project into action.

<sup>1</sup> Pasvolsky, "Present Status of Mongolia," in the *Baltimore Sun*, Nov. 28, 1921.



Such a novel scheme did not lack sponsors. A few adventurers, from the above-named districts, immediately answered the call of the ataman (hetman) and came to the conference styling themselves official representatives of their respective localities. It was reported that an understanding was reached to the effect that an independent nation should be formed, consisting of the Inner and Outer Mongols, the Buriats, and the Tibetans. On March 2, 1919, another conference was called at Verkhne-Udinsk and the following agreements were reported to have been reached: that a unified government should be organized for the districts above-named; that a delegate should be sent to the Paris Peace Conference to seek official recognition; that Hailar should be the seat of the government; that a provincial government consisting of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of War, and the Ministry of the Interior should be established; that Semenov should be made a prince; that the two thousand soldiers recruited by him should be employed for the protection of the newly formed government, and that a military school should be established to train Mongols for the army. It was further decided to send an expedition of four thousand Buriat soldiers to compel Mongolia to declare her independence from China.<sup>1</sup>

After the conferences a delegate was accordingly sent to seek recognition from the Allied Powers. At the same time Captain Barrow, an American under Semenov's command, was dispatched to appeal to President Wilson on the basis of the latter's principle of self-determination. But the Allied statesmen naturally would not tamper with so ambitious a scheme, involving the interrelations of four great nations, namely, China, Russia, Great Britain, and Japan.

<sup>1</sup> Chu, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

Meanwhile, Japanese agents were sent to Urga to interview the Hutukhtu in an attempt to persuade him to indorse the seven articles which had just been formulated at the conference held at Verkne-Udinsk. But the Outer Mongolians were more or less opposed to such a movement. If possible, they did not want to create a novel situation which would deprive them of their autonomy so generously accorded them by the Chinese. Consequently, these overtures were not favorably entertained by the Living Buddha. Then the Japanese and the Russian string pullers lost no time in taking advantage of the internal dissension going on between the priests and the princes who were anticipating an early demise of the aged and sickly Hutukhtu. As it took six months, according to Mongolian belief, for the soul of the Living Buddha to transmigrate to its new abode in his successor, civil disorders were bound to take place during this interval of uncertainty, if the religious bodies were not strong enough to keep the lay princes under their control. Semenov and his Japanese intriguers were not blind to this anomalous situation, so they caused as much dissatisfaction as possible between the spiritual and the temporal powers and threatened to stir up a revolt if the Living Buddha would still persist in having nothing to do with the movement. Finally the Hutukhtu gave in and in Semenov's next conference he was represented by the prince of the Tashitu clan.

But Semenov's Pan-Mongolian plan fell through when the Red forces succeeded in advancing steadily after him and at last in ousting him from Siberia and Mongolia. Thus was frustrated a scheme which if carried out to a full realization would have meant a virtual Japanese protectorate over Mongolia and a long step forward towards a Tokyo-controlled political hegemony over all the Mongolians of Asia.

In the meantime, following the declaration of peace in Europe in 1919, the so-called War Participation



Bureau in China was converted into the Northwestern Frontier Defense Force and General Hsü Shu-tseng, better known as "Little Hsü," was appointed its commander-in-chief. Immediately after he had received this portfolio, he sent a memorandum to the President asking for power to deal with China's foreign relations along the Mongolian frontier and for a free hand in the performance of this duty. It was his determination, therefore, to bring about the cancellation of Mongolian autonomy on his account. Political opponents sent him to Mongolia with the intention of getting rid of him, but in doing so they really made him the uncrowned king of the land of the semi-nomads.

In Mongolia, at this time, the Chinese Resident, Cheng-yi, was trying to induce the Mongols to cancel their autonomy, which was receiving the favorable consideration of the leading princes and lamas, who were by no means satisfied with the existing state of affairs in their own country. Prior to the autonomous régime, the princes and the people of Mongolia were only required to contribute a fixed amount of money to the revenue of the Hutukhtu, but with the new system of administration they were taxed without limit, and the word of the Living Buddha was law, which they had to obey. Hence, the old-time freedom of action to which they had been so accustomed was taken away from them, and thus naturally they could not help longing for a return to the good old times when they were under the ægis of the Chinese. Cheng-yi, the Resident, knowing these conditions, had for some time worked among the Mongols, persuading them to cancel their autonomy and to come back to the Chinese fold. Finally, the Mongols were won over to his point of view, and an agreement consisting of sixty-three articles, giving the Mongols freedom of action and good treatment, was arrived at and indorsed by the

Hutukhtu. This agreement was accordingly sent to Peking for consideration and sanction.<sup>1</sup>

While this was going on, General Hsü caused it to be known that his duty demanded him to inspect the Chinese garrisons at Urga which had been sent there some time before in defiance of the Kiakhta Treaty, which had already become a dead letter, and at the request of the Mongols for assistance to combat the Pan-Mongolian intrigues and the threatened invasion of the Buriats and the Russian bandits. Towards the end of October, General Hsü proceeded in person to Urga. Cheng-yi, who was ordered by Presidential mandate to take charge of the negotiations with the Mongols with a view to canceling their autonomy, decided not to disclose to General Hsü, who was sent to Mongolia by Peking merely on a military capacity, the agreement which he had already reached with the Mongolians. But the gist of the thing was that General Hsü, before his departure from Peking, had already got hold of a copy of this document, and he also decided not to exchange views with the Resident. Besides, on his arrival at Urga, he telegraphed to Peking to the effect that, according to his opinion, in order to obtain the best results with the Mongols the conditions upon which they were to cancel their autonomy should be simple and brief and free from international entanglements. This view was indorsed by Peking with the instruction that whatever modifications he deemed necessary might be made in consultation with Cheng-yi, the Resident.<sup>2</sup>

But General Hsü was too arrogant to condescend to interchange views with his colleague, who was proceeding too slowly with the negotiations to suit his taste. Therefore, shortly after his arrival at Urga, he demanded an independent interview with the Hutukhtu

<sup>1</sup> Chu, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*



who delayed and delayed in granting it, probably due to the encouragement and the procrastination of the Resident, who was naturally reluctant to see the fruits of his labor slip out of his hands. General Hsü utilized this delay to his advantage, however, by making personal calls upon the leading princes of Mongolia and giving them costly presents, and he succeeded in the end in persuading them to send in a voluntary petition asking for a cancellation of their autonomy. The petition was handed for ratification to the Hutukhtu, who, playing to gain time, referred the matter to the two Houses for consideration. An uncompromising attitude was shown by a majority of the members of the two Houses, with the exception of those who had received presents from General Hsü. As a result of this deliberation, the Hutukhtu received both General Hsü and the Resident and informed them on this occasion of the decision lately reached by members of the two Houses who could see no reason for this step being taken at this time. While the interview was going on, General Hsü purposely had his troops lined up in front of the Hutukhtu's palace to display his superior forces. But the Hutukhtu was not to be cowed and he refused persistently to acquiesce in the Chinese demand.<sup>1</sup>

Then the two Chinese representatives retired to consult with each other as to the best measure to be adopted to bring about the desired result. Infuriated by the determined opposition of the Living Buddha, General Hsü struck out those clauses in the proposed agreement promising good treatment to the Mongols and substituted for them eight conditions that were much harder than those originally presented. On the next morning, an ultimatum was addressed to the Hutukhtu, demanding compliance with the new terms within forty-eight hours, and, at the expiration of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the *Sun* (N. Y.), April 11, 1920, p. 4.

this period, if the document was still unsigned, both the Hutukhtu and all his ministers would be arrested and transported to Kalgan.<sup>1</sup> This threat was immediately referred to the two Houses for action. Great indignation was aroused when the new terms were made known, and hot debates ensued which, it was reported, kept the neighbors awake for three consecutive nights. A large faction which was for armed resistance finally gave way to moderation, when it was brought home to them that it was absolutely impossible for the Mongol soldiers to oppose the better-equipped troops of Little Hsü's army. Thus the Chinese won the day, but they had to be contented with the signatures of the Ministerial Council only, for the Hutukhtu could not be persuaded to attach his name to the document.

Having got the petition signed, a contention arose as to who should receive it. Both Cheng-yi and General Hsü claimed the honor. The document was at last handed to the latter on November 17, 1919. Thereupon, General Hsü immediately returned with it to his headquarters at Kalgan and from thence to Peking, leaving orders that the Resident and his staff be arrested, as he feared that intrigues might be engineered against him behind his back. Cheng-yi was afterwards removed to Peking and all the important posts in Mongolia were filled by General Hsü's men.

The petition extolled the benevolent rule of the Manchus for over two hundred years, which, the petition said, could not but make the Mongols sigh for the old days when they thought of the present condition of their country. The petition acknowledged also that the declaration of independence in 1912 was the work of foreign machinations and that, although several years had elapsed, yet no good results had

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the *Sun* (N. Y.), *op. cit.*



been obtained from this change. On the other hand, it complained that the conditions of the Mongolians had been aggravated by the invasion of Russian bandits who sought to establish a Pan-Mongolian state to rob China completely of her control over Mongolia and to take away its autonomy, and that as a result of these foreign disturbances the economic condition of Mongolia had been thrown into a deplorable condition. Therefore, in order to save their country from this misery, the petition said, the officials of Mongolia had recently called several conferences of princes and lamas and had now unanimously passed a resolution to the following effect:

Whereas the friendly feelings between China and Outer Mongolia have been gradually restored and the old-time prejudices have disappeared, and whereas both sides are anxious to promote the welfare of the people and to secure for their permanent peace and tranquillity, we, officials, princes, and lamas, hereby declare the abolition of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, and the restoration of the relations subsisting under the late Ch'ing Dynasty. All Djazaks shall hereafter be subject to the control of the Central Government, which shall define uniformly all their rights and shall reform our internal administration and resist external invasions for us. The above has been submitted to and approved by the Living Buddha. It is our hope that the Central Government will fix the system of government of Outer Mongolia in accordance with the circumstances of various banners and leagues. We are sure of a permanent peace, if the Central Government will so draw up regulations governing the promotion of industry, etc., that they do not interfere with the central authority and the custom of the Mongolians. It is our only desire that the Republic of Five Races should thrive and its people enjoy peace and prosperity. In connection with our foreign intercourse, we beg further to state that it was on account of the declaration of autonomy that in former days the Sino-Russo-Mongolian Treaty and the Russo-Mongolian Commercial Treaty were concluded and notes between China and Russia were exchanged. Since we are willing to renounce autonomy, all these instruments were null and void automatically. As to the commercial enterprises started by Russians in Outer Mongolia the Central Government must undertake the responsibility of making arrangements with the Russians when their new government is established, so as to

promote the friendship between China and Russia and to protect our interests, etc.<sup>1</sup>

This petition was duly transmitted to the Chinese Government, and the President graciously consented to allow the prodigal son to return, and had the fatted calf killed by conferring high honors and titles upon the Hutukhtu. A mandate was accordingly issued approving the petition, saying that it was "most sincerely expressed and displays the patriotism of the Living Buddha, princes, and lamas, who have as their ideal a Republic of Five Races of the same origin." "Their petition is hereby granted," the mandate goes on to say, "and the desires of the people of Outer Mongolia are hereby complied with. The dignity of the Living Buddha shall, hereafter, be preserved and the rights and privileges of the Chiefs of the Four Leagues respected. The old system obtaining under the late Manchu Dynasty is hereby restored, and specially favorable treatment shall be given to Outer Mongolia. I, the President, hope that peace and good relations will forever be maintained between the Central Government and Outer Mongolia."<sup>2</sup>

Thus with one clever stroke of diplomacy, backed up by a little display of force, China had brought about the voluntary cancellation of Mongolian autonomy, together with the abrogation of all the international agreements entered into during the last decade between China, Russia, and Mongolia. But such a momentous step taken by the Chinese Government was naturally protested by Russia, whose interests were greatly concerned in the future of Mongolia. Through her official spokesman, M. Koudachev, Russia reminded the Chinese Government that such an action was a direct breach of international obligations. The Chinese Foreign Office contended, however, that as the Mongols

<sup>1</sup> *Millard's Review*, Vol. II, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*



on their own accord broke away from the Chinese fold in 1912, so they had the same option to return to their old master if they should so desire; and furthermore, in view of the fact that the cancellation was voluntary and unanimously consented to by the people of Mongolia, China could not but recognize this petition as indicative of the popular will of the Mongol people and grant their desire accordingly. The Chinese Foreign Office also reminded the Russian Minister that, in as much as Russia was unable to maintain peace and order, China was obliged to take this step to protect her own interests against the Russian bandits who threatened to disturb the tranquillity of Mongolia. M. Koudachev was assured, however, that all the commercial privileges which the Russians had enjoyed in Mongolia by virtue of treaty stipulations would be fully guaranteed in so far as they did not jeopardize the sovereign rights of China in that territory.<sup>1</sup> In view of the chaos and the uncertainties of his own country the Russian Minister did not see fit to push his demands further, and the protest was thus dropped.

Having successfully brought about the cancellation of Mongolian autonomy, General Hsü was officially given the task of pacifying Mongolia by order of the Peking Government on December 1, 1919. The Mongol forces were disarmed without resistance and the Chinese military forces took possession of the former Mongolian ministries. Then General Hsü settled down on what he called a "peaceful basis" and issued an imposing proclamation in the Mongolian language to the Mongolian people; admonishing them to propagate their religion faithfully, to increase their population, to develop their industries and commerce, and to educate themselves and their children as the only means of strengthening their country.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Chen, *op. cit.*, Part 3, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Part of General Hsü's proclamation is as follows: "(1) The only thing which can bind together the interests of Mongols, who are separated by vast

But exactly contrary to his program of pacification and industrial development of Mongolia, General Hsü extracted from the Mongolian toilers as much as he could lay his hands on. Not contented with this trivial income, he negotiated with the Sino-Japanese Exchange Bank a loan of fifteen million dollars on the mortgage of the mining and agricultural resources of Mongolia as security. It was reported later that he floated another loan of twenty million dollars with Japanese assistance to construct a railway connecting Kalgan

deserts and plains, is the Yellow Religion. What the Central Government did soon after the independence of Outer Mongolia was canceled, was, therefore, the conferring of additional religious titles upon the Living Buddha, who shall hereafter do his best to propagate this religion. (2) Means should be devised to increase the population. In the Yuan Dynasty, when the Mongolian Empire was at the zenith of its glory, the population was exceedingly great, but it dwindled in the beginning of the Ch'ing Dynasty. It has since been decreasing all along. Consequently, the laborers to develop the vast natural resources have become very scarce. If the decrease of the population should continue at this rate, the Mongolian territory will be depopulated within the next hundred years. In former days Hsü Fu took five hundred boys and girls to the sea and founded the great empire in the East. Why should not we, several hundred thousand inhabitants of the land, strive to increase our numbers? (3) Commerce should at once be improved. Only very few Mongolian merchants in this vast land are trading with the people of other nationalities. Hereafter they should commence to deal in their native products and sell their superfluous animals to the outside world. (4) Numerous industrial institutes should be established and agriculture encouraged. The Mongolians are fond of meat and milk. Perhaps this is the cause of the decrease of population in Mongolia. Man is not purely a carnivorous animal. He needs vegetables and other food. I am glad to notice that the Mongols have begun to like brick tea. Therefore the agricultural industry should be greatly improved, and the Mongols should begin to supply their own rice, wheat, and other cereals. They should try to make their own cloth, furs, and other daily necessities. (5) The natural resources should be developed. Most of the Mongolian territory is covered with forests, and minerals of all descriptions can be found in almost every banner and league. The Mongols can become rich if they will only wake up from their slumber. If they do not there is no doubt that foreign adventurers will step in to rob them of their rights and privileges. (6) Education should be introduced to enlighten the people. I have met with very few people here who can read and write. There are few Mongolian books which are within the reach of the general public. Ignorance and darkness have always brought unnecessary panics upon the people. The government's policy is to educate the people in all branches of knowledge. (7) The teachings of Confucius and other sages of ancient times should be enforced. The people should have proper marriages which are not prohibited by the Yellow Religion. It is hoped that no celibacy will be enforced. The Living Buddha is the acknowledged chief of the Religion and yet he has a wife who has proved to be a great help to him. His example should therefore be copied."—*Millard's Review*, "Jan. 31, 1920, Vol. II, pp. 412, 413.



and Urga.<sup>1</sup> Public opinion in China was, therefore, skeptical as to who was really going to profit from Mongolia's cancellation of autonomy. Japan was subjugating China not with her armies but with the Anfu tools at Peking. Moreover, Japan had reason to think that it was really child's play to wrench Mongolia from China—a thing which would be impossible to do if Mongolia was lined up with her great rival Russia. Hence Japan welcomed Mongolia's coming back to Chinese administration, which played exactly into her hands.

But the events in China and Mongolia in 1920 defeated the malicious intrigues of the Anfuites. Public opinion, fermented by the student movement, overthrew the Anfu Club in Peking, and Wu Pei-fu seized the reins of government. The Northwestern Frontier Defense Force was abolished and General Hsü was replaced first by Li Yuan and later by Cheng-yi, whom he had ousted a short time before. But the hearts of the Mongolians were lost to the Chinese people as a result of the disgraceful and inhuman practices of General Hsü's unpaid soldiers, who set about killing the innocent Mongols, plundering them and robbing them of all their belongings.

Urga was attacked in October, 1920, by Baron Ungern, a former aid of Semenov. Peking sent Cheng-yi with the remnants of General Hsü's army to counter-attack the Russian bandit forces, which were repulsed, and the Living Buddha was kept in captivity by the Chinese soldiers, an unprecedented sacrilege in the eyes of the Mongols. Malcontents were growing daily, and revolt was imminent. The reënforcements, which were intrusted to generals Chang Tso-lin and Ts'ao Kun, were never dispatched, and Urga easily fell after Baron Ungern's second attack at the beginning of February, resulting in the complete annihilation of the Chinese

<sup>1</sup> Chen, *op. cit.*, Part 3, p. 16.

forces. Ungern's soldiers were composed of Mongols, Buriats, Tartars, a few Tibetans, and a few Chinese and Japanese. Prior to his attack, the Living Buddha had been carried away to a place of safety in the mountains by a band of faithful Tibetans, who slew ninety-six of the hundred Chinese guards. After Urga was taken by Ungern, the Hutukhtu returned, and an independent Mongol Government was proclaimed under his sovereignty, with Ungern, who had since become a Mongolian subject, as his supreme military adviser.

Ungern's régime was a reign of terror. He carried out a series of wholesale executions, purging his troops of all doubtful elements, and doing away with all the Russian Jews whom he blamed for all the trouble in Russia. On February 16, 1921, he wrote thus: "It is not without commiseration that I think of the Chinese blood that has been shed and which no doubt would be attributed to my cruelty; on the other hand, I am positive that every soldier should consider it his duty to root out every revolutionist, irrespective of his nationality, for they are no less evil spirits in human shape who destroy sovereigns, instigate brother against brother, son against father, and bring forth great trouble in life."<sup>1</sup>

The next item in Baron Ungern's program was to continue the policy of his chief, Semenov, in the formation of a Pan-Mongolian state. Writing to his agents in Peking on May 20, 1921, he said:

An earnest campaign for the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia and the bringing into fold of Greater Mongolia of the tribes of western and eastern Mongolia is being carried on with great success and I am convinced of the Boghdikhan and of my endeavors. Just now the main attention is being paid to eastern Mongolian provinces, which must serve us as a secure barrier against the aggression of revolutionary China, and afterwards

<sup>1</sup> "Letters Captured from Baron Ungern," published in pamphlet form by the Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the United States of America during the Washington Conference, 1921-1922.



measures will be taken for annexation of western Mongolia. According to the approved plan the annexed provinces will not be subject to the control of the Council of Ministers at Urga, but they will retain violable rights of independence of "aimaks," their own courts and laws, their own administrative structure and social customs, forming only military and financial-economic unity in the defensive alliance under the blessing of the Boghdi-khan. The aim of the alliance is twofold: On the one hand, to enable all the tribes of Mongolian origin to unite round one center, and on the other hand, military and moral defense against the rotten West which is under the influence of mad revolution and the decline of morality in all its manifestations, both physical and spiritual. As regards Kobdo and Urianhaisk I am easy on the score. The inhabitants of these districts, the ancient Toobs and Scottes, are readily joining us, having experienced upon themselves the yoke of the Chinese Republic and the heavy hand of Chinese Revolutionary Communists and Bolsheviks.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, in Tientsin the military triumvirate, consisting of Chang Tso-lin of Manchuria, Ts'ao Kun of Paotingfu, and Wang Chung-yuan of Wuchang, had met in May to decide as to who should have the honor of bringing an action to chastise Mongolia for this independent step which it had taken. Chang Tso-lin was finally given the task of bringing back Mongolia to Chinese sovereignty. Peking promised him ten million dollars for this job. But he, after receiving more than half of the proffered sum, set about slowly making preparations for his Mongolian expedition. A story was circulated to the effect that he offered Ungern six hundred thousand dollars to retreat before his troops, but as the latter wanted one million dollars the bargain was thus dragged along.<sup>2</sup>

We now have reason to believe that Chang's Mongolian campaign was a real farce. If Chang was really serious about it and had made a move of his troops, Ungern's men would have been caught as in a vise between Urga and Akasha by the Chita soldiers

<sup>1</sup> Ungern, *op. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Henry K. Norton, "The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia."

and his own, and yet Chang, boasting a prowess of three hundred thousand strong with all the facilities of modern transportation to Mongolia at his disposal, requested a leave of two months to get ready for this punitive expedition against a couple of hundred unorganized bandits. When he did begin to dispatch his troops he sent them only as far as Kalgan. The current explanation was that he did not wish to move his troops too far away from Peking, on which he had set his eyes for a long time; but the documents now revealed to the world show that not only did Chang make light of the task assigned to him, but that in reality he was a party to the Ungern episode in the Mongolian game.

In an intercepted letter to Baron Ungern, written by his lieutenant, Andrew Pogodalen, from Peking, we find the following passage:

It is necessary to state that the Chinese are very agitated by your success. Peking has ordered the movement of troops upon Urga. Notwithstanding the fact that Peking, supported by generals Ts'ao Kun and Chang Hsün, has entered with the Reds into an agreement for joint action against you, Chang Tso-lin has declared that he would not tolerate any intervention of said parties into Mongolian affairs, having rejected all propositions of Peking and the Reds.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, it cannot but be considered as extraordinary that all the preparations made by Ungern to carry out his campaign were done without any intervention by the Manchurian authorities. In 1919 General Birukov was appointed quartermaster at the station at Hailar, ostensibly to promote trade between Mongolia and Russia. His activities, however, were not only connected with trade, but also with a series of supply stations and ammunition depots between Hailar and Urga. This was done no doubt with the knowledge of Chang Tso-lin's lieutenants, a fact which

<sup>1</sup> Ungern, *op. cit.*



may be authenticated by the following correspondence: "Right after the carriers," Andrew Pogodalen wrote to Ungern,

"I am dispatching you three machine guns and a large quantity of cartridges. All this is being sent to you with the assistance of Colonel Lam Pan and his lieutenant, known to the Russians as Gvozdfff. At Manchouli the Bolsheviks are selling not only wagons, rifles, ammunitions, and machine guns, but also three-inch field guns may be bought of the Bolsheviks, who already have had their fill or who are about to desert the Reds. If you need weapons or ammunition then send on money and I will gradually forward you anything you want. Also let me know if you are in need of men, officers, or Cossacks, or both."<sup>1</sup>

These words show unmistakably that the Semenov-Ungern schemes were carried on with the knowledge, if not the actual connivance, of the Manchurian authorities. Thus Chang and the Russian bandits were not only not enemies but fast friends engaged in one common enterprise, and their intimacy towards each other may further be seen from the following passage in a letter, which Ungern wrote to General Chang, Military Governor of Tsitsihar:

"I beg respectfully to state that I extremely rejoice in the knowledge of your continued favor and good will to myself. It is still more gratifying to me because of the heartfelt affection which animates me towards you, and because I appreciate the gracious partiality and the ample trust which Your Excellency is placing with me."<sup>2</sup>

The reason for Chang Tso-lin's inactivity and his motive for not interfering with Ungern's Mongolian designs may be explained when we remember that his ambition was at this time bent upon the restoration of the Manchus and the defeat of the revolutionary forces in China. To attain this end he found an ardent supporter in none other than Ungern, whose admiration

<sup>1</sup> Ungern, *op. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

for him may be seen from these glowing epithets of "Manchurian Khan," "the highly revered Chang Tso-lin," and so forth.

Ungern's zealous support for Chang Tso-lin may be seen from the following passage in a letter which he wrote to his agent in Peking:

It is necessary in all communications to stress the necessity of saving China from the revolutionary death through the restoration of the Manchu Dynasty which has accomplished so much for the Mongolians and which has covered itself with undying glory. . . . I am beginning the movement towards the north and in the near future will open activities against the Bolsheviks. As soon as I will succeed in giving a strong and decided impetus to all detachments and persons cherishing the struggle with the Communists and after I have seen an organized uprising in Russia headed by devoted and honest people, I shall direct my activities to Mongolia and provinces allied with it for the restoration of the Ch'ing Dynasty which I consider the only means of struggling with the world's revolution.<sup>1</sup>

Again, in his letter to General Lu Chang-kun, speaking of the disorder spreading in Mongolia, Sinkiang, and the Altai Mountains, Ungern wrote:

It is imperative to take advantage of the turmoil, i. e., to interrupt the unprofitable struggle with the Chinese forces and exploit them for the reestablishment of the Manchurian Khan, for, in the opinion of the population, he personates a great and impartial judge — a patron and defender of all tribes of the Central Empire. It is indispensable to act under the guidance of one person who would stand at the head of the whole enterprise. Until such a person be found no success could be expected. A leader is wanted. This office may be filled only by a person who commands popular support, and there could be no more suitable person to discharge those functions than General Chang Tso-lin. No particular difficulties would be encountered to assert his supremacy and secure him the general recognition. . . . Your Excellency is well aware of the hatred and animosity I feel towards the Revolution; hence comes my readiness to do anything that would advance the cause of monarchy under the supervision of Chang Tso-lin. I am writing you this openly and unreservedly,

<sup>1</sup> Ungern, *op. cit.*



being confident of hearty sympathy and feeling sure that you are sincerely devoted to our common object of restoring the Monarchy, which is the only way for the welfare and salvation of every nation. I beg to affirm my readiness to submit myself to the guidance of highly revered Chang Tso-lin.<sup>1</sup>

The Semenov-Ungern schemes for a campaign in Mongolia, aside from furthering Chang Tso-lin's ambition of extending his sway south of the Great Wall and of restoring the Manchu House, coincided with the Japanese desire to create a buffer state in Manchuria and Mongolia. That Semenov and Ungern were encouraged by the Japanese and were supplied with Japanese arms and Japanese money was a fact officially acknowledged by the Japanese themselves.<sup>2</sup> The whole deal was again exposed in the secret treaty entered into between Semenov and the Japanese Siberian Command. By virtue of this agreement a three-front attack was to be staged against the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic. Semenov was to attack Khabarovsk; a revolt of the Cossack population was to be brought about in the Amur region; and Ungern was to attack from his Mongolian base on the western flank of the Far Eastern Republic, thus cutting off the latter's communication with the Soviets.<sup>3</sup>

But unfortunately for Ungern, he was the only party faithful to the agreement, the others failing to carry out what was assigned to them. In May, 1921, Ungern made a fantastic appeal at the coronation of the Living Buddha for a northern punitive expedition against the Red forces. He marched with his men to the Russian frontier at Kiakhta, where he was defeated by the combined forces of the Far Eastern Republic and Soviet Russia and was driven back into the Orkon Valley. The Red and the Siberian troops then crossed

<sup>1</sup> Ungern, *op. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> For official Japanese statement, see "Conference on the Limitation of Armament," p. 1398.

<sup>3</sup> Norton, *op. cit.*, "A Short History of the Far Eastern Republic," p. 32.

the frontier and pushed their way toward Urga. Ungern succeeded in gathering another five thousand of his scattered men and entered Transbaikalia and occupied Selinginsk, but had to withdraw shortly afterwards into the valley of Etsin-gol. Here his soldiers revolted, and he barely escaped with his life, but only to fall into the hands of the Mongols who, after a few months of his inhuman and cruel rule, had nothing but hatred left for him. He was taken by them to the steppes and left there to perish alone in the desert. Shortly afterwards, he was hunted up and captured by the Red troops, who took him to Novonikolaevsk, where he was tried in open court and subsequently executed by order of the Soviet authorities. Thus ended nearly a year's White intrigues in Mongolia, but these were only to be followed by those of the Reds equally detrimental to the interests of the Mongolian people.

The Semenov-Ungern operations in Mongolia gave the Soviets a good excuse to ask for intervention. Chita had repeatedly requested of Peking permission to coöperate with the Chinese forces to crush the White reactionaries in Siberia and Mongolia. These offers were persistently declined by the Chinese Government. Already in November, 1920, when Ungern launched his first unsuccessful attack upon Urga, Chita had received orders from Moscow to march down with an army to exterminate the White troops there, but the order was rescinded upon the failure of Ungern to capture the Mongolian Capital. This was the first attempt at intervention by the Reds, which, according to Moscow, was based upon the request of the Chinese authorities at Urga, asking them to suppress the White bandits. Peking, however, immediately set out to disavow the truth of this statement and protested against this intended transgression of Chinese sovereignty, which may be seen from the following note of the Chinese Government to the Soviets:



In his telegram of November 10, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the Soviet Government, upon the request of the Chinese authorities in Urga, ordered the Siberian Command to dispatch troops to Mongolia in order to assist in the liquidation of the Semenov bands, whereupon these troops were to return to the Russian territory. On November 27, another telegram stated that, since the Chinese troops had already driven out the Semenov bands, the Soviet government did not intend any longer to send troops there; however, should the followers of Semenov be found again within the boundaries of Mongolia and should the Chinese authorities apply to Russia for assistance, such assistance will be given. We consider it necessary to state that the crossing of the frontiers of one country by the troops of another violates the sovereignty of that country, and that the statement in the first telegram to the effect that we asked for assistance is not true. Though the despatching of troops did not actually take place, there still remains the offer of military assistance which we should not accept.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, the Soviet technic of promoting revolutions in territories adjacent to Russian boundaries was used in Mongolia in the creation of a revolutionary party which was to proclaim itself the provisional revolutionary government of the territory in question, and to request the assistance of Soviet Russia. In the summer of 1921 the party declared itself the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia and appealed for assistance to annihilate the Ungern forces, which had by this time succeeded in taking Urga and had installed a reign of terror and cruelty in Mongolia. The assistance was immediately given in the form of a combined punitive expedition of Soviet and Siberian troops which swept down upon Urga and put an end to the White Russian intrigues in Mongolia. A Red system of administration was then instituted, and an edict, in which the old Mongolian Government announced its abdication in favor of the Provisional People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia, was published at Chita on September 1 to the following effect:

<sup>1</sup> Moscow *Izvestia*, quoted from Pasvolsky, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

To the Provisional People's Revolutionary Government from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the old government of Mongolia. In the third year, we Mongolians, under the pressure of the circumstances of the times, have lost our rights of autonomous government to the benefit of the Chinese, the autocratic reactionaries. Last year an officer of the Russian White party, Baron Ungern, with his forces, invaded Mongolian territory, mobilized Mongolian soldiers, and, thus reënforsing himself, gave battle and drove out from Urga the Chinese "hamins"—officers and soldiers. In accordance with the declaration of Baron Ungern of the need of reëstablishing the autonomous government by all princes and influential people, the latter, after a discussion of this question, put the Boghdikhan on the precious throne and created the Yamen of Internal Affairs and all the other five yamens.

In view of the fact that Baron Ungern with his forces left for the north, and in view of the weakness of our forces and the lack of armament, and also in view of the possibility of an assault by the Chinese reactionaries, as early as last year, an appeal for assistance was made to foreign powers by the Boghdikhan and many wangs and khans who, obtaining such assistance, established at Kiakhta a people's government which mobilized model forces, and having driven out the "ghamens," laid the foundation of the state of Mongolia, fortifying the nation and improving the conditions of the masses. Urga, the capital, was occupied on the first of the second moon.

After the occupation of Urga, the People's Government, together with the officials of our five (old) ministries, opened free discussions, which resulted in resolving to establish immediately a new people's government in accord with the requirements of the times and the progress of the people, leaving the Boghdikhan on the precious throne and handing all seals and documents of all ministries to the new People's Government. The resolution was reported to the Boghdikhan, who sanctioned it, and on the fifth day of the sixth moon, at a joint conference, the handing over of the seals and documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the rest of the ministries to the chairman and officials of the People's Government, took place. The Provisional People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia is hereby informed of the aforesaid for its consideration in accepting the power, and at the same time the public in all localities is being informed to this effect.<sup>1</sup>

Having brought about the existence of a people's revolutionary government in Mongolia, the Soviets

<sup>1</sup> *Nation*, October 26, 1921, Vol. CCXIII, p. 486.



then staged one of the most farcical features of the Mongolian drama in extracting from this revolutionary government an appeal to Moscow, requesting that the Soviet troops should not be withdrawn from Mongolia at the present time. The appeal was couched in clever arguments in the following words:

The People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia addresses to the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics a request not to withdraw the Soviet troops from the territory of Mongolia until the complete removal of the menace from the common enemy, who is now seeking reënforcements in the Eastern Steppes. The People's Revolutionary Government finds it necessary to address this request to the government of the R. S. F. S. R., because the Mongolian Government has not as yet completed the organization of the apparatus of the new authority. The presence of the Soviet troops is dictated by circumstances, its purpose being to preserve the security of the territory of Mongolia and of the frontiers of the R. S. F. S. R. The People's Provisional Revolutionary Government of Mongolia is confident that the Government of the R. S. F. S. R. will realize the seriousness of the situation and the common interest in the defeat of the common enemy, and will accede to this request.<sup>1</sup>

Needless to say, this appeal was graciously acceded to, and the following pompous note was dispatched to the Mongolian Government by the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Chicherin:

Welcoming the first steps of the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia on the road toward creating a new order in its country, now freed from the enemy by common effort, the Russian Government notes with great satisfaction the appeal addressed to it by the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia, which appeal expresses the wish that the Soviet troops should not be removed from the territory of Mongolia until the complete destruction of the common enemy shall have been encompassed. Considering this proposal a manifestation of the steadfast, close and friendly bonds which united the liberated people of Mongolia with the workmen and peasants of Russia who have thrown off the yoke of the exploiters, the Russian Government declares that

<sup>1</sup> Pasvolsky, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

it recognizes fully the seriousness of the situation and the common interest of Russia and Mongolia in the destruction of the common enemy. Having firmly decided to withdraw its troops from the territory of autonomous Mongolia, which is bound to Soviet Russia only by the ties of mutual friendship and common interests, just as soon as the menace to the free development of the Mongolian people and to the security of the Russian Republic and of the Far Eastern Republic shall have been removed, the Russian Government, in complete harmony with the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia, notes that this moment has not yet arrived. In response to the request addressed to it by the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia, the Russian Government announces its decision to give this request complete satisfaction.

The Russian Government is convinced that, in the near future, by the united efforts of the two peoples who are struggling against the violence of the Tsarist generals and against foreign aggression and exploitation, the free development of the Mongolian people will be secured on the basis of its autonomy, and that, as a result of the organization of the apparatus of popular revolutionary authority in Mongolia, such authority will be definitely established and firmly secured there.<sup>1</sup>

The next step which the Soviets undertook to further consolidate their position in Mongolia was to enter into a secret treaty with the Mongolian Government to the following effect :

1. The Russian Soviet and the Revolutionary Mongol Governments recognize each other as the only governments in the territory of Russia and Mongolia.

2. They agree mutually to respect each other, and not allow on their territory the formation of groups, or the recruiting of troops hostile to one of the Contracting Parties, as also not to allow the transportation of arms and the transit of troops hostile to one of the Contracting Parties through their territory.

3. Both governments will establish, at their discretion, consulates in necessary places.

4. The question of frontier delimitation must be decided immediately by a mixed Russo-Mongol commission.

5. The citizens of Russia and Mongolia, residing on the territory of the other Contracting Party, must be judged, both in civil and in criminal cases, according to the laws of their own country.

<sup>1</sup> *Living Age*, Aug. 27, 1921, Vol. V, No. 130.



6. Taxes on imports and exports will also be fixed by a mixed commission.

7. The Soviet Government undertakes to establish in Mongolia, free of charge, postal and telegraphic communications and will supply the necessary materials for this purpose, whereupon a special postal and telegraphic convention will be signed.

8. The Mongolian Government recognizes the right of property on land within the territory of Mongolia, and agrees to give the ground space necessary for buildings of diverse kinds and for railways, built with Russian capital.

9. The present treaty comes into force from the day of the signature by the representatives of the Contracting Parties.<sup>1</sup>

The Red régime in Mongolia is interesting in many respects. Politically, one of the most conspicuous features of the so-called People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia was that it was a government, of the least fit, as may be seen from the following personages who constituted its personnel when it first came into existence. Comrade Bodo, a *ci-devant* lama and formerly teacher in a Russian school, was made Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Suhobatyr, a local butcher, was made Minister of War; the Ministry of Finance was filled, however, by Danson, a comparatively enlightened Mongol. All the Mongols of influence and ability were excluded from the administration of the affairs of the state, their places being assigned to the puppet Buriats, who advised upon measures consonant with Bolshevik practice. Consequently, in every office there were three administrative officers—a Mongol who was the nominal chief, a Buriat, and a communist Russian. The Russian was actually the chief in every instance, while the Buriat was his assistant and go-between, and the local Mongol was nothing but a figurehead. Furthermore, agents from the riffraff class were used everywhere to keep up the Red régime, for it was really the policy of the Soviets to augment this

1 "China Year Book," 1924, p. 578 ff.

outcast element, officially known as the nomad proletariat, and to deprive the propertied Mongols of their herds through heavy taxation. But this *déclassé* element constituted only seven per cent of the whole Mongol population, consequently, the Red régime in Mongolia was opposed by the majority of the people.

The basis of the Mongolian Government was the Great Khuruldan or Constituent Assembly. It determined the political structure of the Mongolian Republic, approximating it to the Soviet Government as much as possible. It also selected a Small Khuruldan of thirty members in which the herdsmen and nomads were prevailing. This Small Khuruldan in turn selected a Presidium which was the Mongolian Government, functioning during the intervals between sessions which were convened only two or three times in a year.

Opponents of the Soviet régime were mysteriously done away with, either by murder or by other foul means of extirpation. The ninety-ninth Living Buddha and his wife were well known for their opposition to Soviet proclivities. They both died mysteriously in 1922, alleged to have been poisoned by order of the Secret Division of the Third International. The Living Buddha was succeeded by a prince who was exceedingly well disposed to the Soviets and who delegated nearly all his temporal powers to Moscow. Danson was murdered because he attempted to introduce a more moderate orientation in Mongolian politics and to do away with the worst sides of Bolshevism. When his execution was made known in the Assembly, Vessiliev, the Soviet representative at Urga, expressed the hope that the blood which had been spilled would make for the "consolidation of friendly relations between Mongolia and the Soviet Union."<sup>1</sup>

As regards military matters, a national Mongol army, drilled and officered by the Soviets, was installed. All

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Trans-Pacific*, Oct. 3, 1925.



males between the ages of fourteen and forty were liable to be mobilized. The recruiting was conducted on primitive but drastic lines. Red detachments visited all family encampments, and those who were unfortunately caught were compelled to saddle their horses and accompany the detachment. To prevent desertions the new recruits were quartered far from their own villages.

Economically a stringent policy was inaugurated, aiming at the increase of government revenues and the control of private trade. Maximum sales, heavy customs duties, onerous income taxes, and heavy fines and summary confiscation of private property were some aspects of the new economic system. Exports to Russia were encouraged. Money was strictly prohibited to be taken out of Mongolia except to Russia. Those who went into Mongolia to increase production there were tolerated, and those who attempted to escape the Red rule by moving into Inner Mongolia were pursued and taken back. This paternal system of trade administration naturally would not work with the Mongols and the inevitable result was the impoverishment of the Mongolian people as a whole. Hence complaints poured into Peking for relief measures to ameliorate their miserable condition.

The sentiments of the Mongolian people for a better understanding with China were distinctly expressed through the declaration of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bodo, as reported from Novonikolaevsk, dated October 6, 1921. In this declaration, Bodo announced that "the People's Government of Mongolia cherishes no unfriendly feelings to the Middle State and contemplates no hostile acts whatever against the latter on condition of complete nonintervention on the part of China in the internal affairs of Mongolia in general and noninterference with the exercise of the principles of national independence and the democratic system of government proclaimed by the People's Government

in particular. Firmly convinced that it is an urgent necessity for China and Mongolia to take steps towards the speediest restoration of diplomatic and commercial relations, the People's Government is certain that this question will be solved in a manner favorable to Mongolia and for the welfare and peace of both nations."<sup>1</sup>

China, however, was bent upon chastising Mongolia for her precipitate action, and no resumption of relations was possible save an unconditional return to Chinese sovereignty. Thus failing to reach an understanding with China, Mongolia once again appealed to Russia to bring about a reconciliation with China. The Russian Government complied with the Mongolian request, as may be seen from the following passage contained in a note sent by the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, to the President of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia:

The Russian Government shares the conviction of the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia as to the need of establishing peaceful and businesslike relations between Mongolia and China. It hopes that the steps it is taking in this direction will lead to favorable results in the near future, provided the Mongolian people at the same time applies its right to self-determination.

More than once has the Russian Government approached the Government of China, both directly and through the representatives of the Far Eastern Republic, who were in communication with the latter, with offers to begin negotiations on this question. In the near future the Russian Government expects to enter into permanent relations with the Government of China by means of a trade delegation which is being sent to Peking.

The Russian Government notices with joy the readiness of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government to enter into negotiations with China on this question, as expressed in Citizen Bodo's note of September 10. It hopes that the Chinese Government will receive favorably this offer, which it will present in the

<sup>1</sup> *Nation*, Nov. 23, 1921, Vol. CCXIII, p. 605.



spirit of good offices, in order to remove the possibility of a conflict between the peoples and the governments of Mongolia and China.<sup>1</sup>

But Moscow naturally was not going to exert its good offices on behalf of Mongolia disinterestedly. In spite of its overtures in 1919 and 1920, which we shall discuss in a later chapter, the Soviet Government was simply making use of the Mongolian question to bargain for official recognition on which it was to base its whole case in its relations with China. The sincerity of the Soviet Government had yet to be supported by facts before Peking would condescend to recognize a government which was outlawed by the society of nations. The good faith of the Soviets was further questioned by the publication in the spring of 1922 of the Soviet-Mongolian Agreement, which had since been kept in secret. Therefore, when M. Paikes, who was sent to Peking by Chita to continue the negotiations which his predecessor, Yourin, had tried in vain for a year and half to conclude, made known his mission to the Chinese Government, he was given the following abrupt note:

According to the recent report of General Li Yuan on the subject of the Russo-Mongolian Treaty, we asked you about this matter when you first arrived in Peking and you replied that it was entirely untrue. However, during a recent conversation with you, I again put the question to you, owing to the recent publication by the papers of the text of this treaty, and you admitted the truth of this report.

The Soviet Government has repeatedly declared to the Chinese Government that "all previous treaties made between the Russian Government and China shall be null and void, that the Soviet Government renounces all encroachments on Chinese territory and all concessions within China, and that the Soviet Government will unconditionally and forever return what has been forcibly seized from China by the former Imperial Russian Government and the bourgeoisie." Now the Soviet government has suddenly gone

<sup>1</sup> Pasvolsky, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

back on its own words and secretly and without any right concluded a treaty with Mongolia. Such action on the part of the Soviet Government is similar to the policy which the former Imperial Russian Government assumed toward China.

It must be observed that Mongolia is part of Chinese territory and as such has long been recognized by all countries. In secretly concluding a treaty with Mongolia, the Soviet Government has not only broken faith with its previous declarations, but also violates all principles of justice. The Chinese Government finds it difficult to tolerate such action, and therefore we solemnly lodge a protest with you to the effect that any treaty secretly concluded between the Soviet Government and Mongolia will not be recognized by the Chinese Government. You are respectfully requested to transmit this note to the Soviet Government at Moscow.<sup>1</sup>

From the foregoing notes and utterances, we see that there is really little difference between the rôle played by Czarist Russia in engineering the Mongolian independence in 1912 and the rôle played by Soviet Russia in bringing about the independence of Mongolia for the second time in 1920. Both lent their military assistance to the Mongolians liberally. But in tactics, Soviet Russia had gone one better on Czarist Russia in the creation of a provisional people's revolutionary party in Mongolia which was to appeal to Moscow for armed assistance. This, as we have seen, was readily given, and since then, until shortly after the conclusion of the Treaty on General Principles on May 31, 1924, the Soviets, in spite of Chinese protests and the complete liquidation of White Russians in Mongolia, had insisted on the postulate that the moment for the evacuation by the Soviet troops had not yet arrived. And, finally, when the moment did arrive it was only because Mongolia had so gravitated towards Russia that the presence of Soviet troops was deemed no longer necessary,—a fact which was made clear by Comrade Chicherin in his report on the international situation to the third session of the Central

<sup>1</sup> *Peking Daily News*, May 6, 1922.



Executive Committee at Tiflis on March 3, 1925, when he said: "Our contact with the Mongolian Republic is much closer. We recognize the Republic as part of the Chinese Republic, but we also recognize its autonomy, which is so broad that not only does Mongolia not permit any interference in its internal life on the part of China, but also pursues its own independent foreign policy."<sup>1</sup> The Mongolian question, thus, as we shall see presently, constituted one of the main stumblingblocks to an early rapprochement between China and Soviet Russia.

<sup>1</sup> *Izvestia*, March 6, 1925; taken from the *Russian Review*, April 15, 1925.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY AND ITS ZONE<sup>1</sup>

THE Russian Revolution of March, 1917, which spelled the doom of the Romanovs and put an end to Czardom in Russia, changed the whole aspect of Russo-Chinese relations in the Far East. As far as China was concerned, it was a God-sent opportunity for her to recover what she had been obliged to give away during the last few decades and to assert her sovereign rights in those regions where she had a legal claim.

<sup>1</sup>For the origin of the Chinese Eastern Railway, see Chap. II. Geographically the Chinese Eastern Railway as it is to-day may be divided into the eastern section from Harbin to Pogranichinaya, 512 versts; the western section from Harbin to Manchouli, 876 versts; the southern section from Harbin to Changchun, 225 versts; a total of 1,613 versts. It therefore taps the Three Eastern Provinces from the west to the east, joining the Ussuri Railway at Vladivostok.

Financially, it cost the Chinese Eastern Railway 350,000,000 gold rubles to be built, nearly as much as the cost of all the Chinese government railways. The only plausible reason for such a high cost of construction seems to be that it was the intention of the Russian authorities to make the expenditures as high as possible so that it would be impossible or unprofitable for China to recover it. With this in view enormous sums of money were spent in the erection of magnificent public buildings and palatial residences and numerous barracks. These items were all entered in the books of the company. As to their exact figures, no one seems to know, for a convenient fire had destroyed the building containing all the records when the time came for auditing these accounts. Since its inauguration up to 1914, the railway had not been a paying concern. During this period debts amounting to 182,000,000 rubles had been incurred which were subsidized, however, by the funds from the Russian Treasury. The Chinese Eastern Railway was run irrespective of economy, employing as many as twenty thousand railway employees, mainly Russian, the Central Administration in Harbin alone having no less than two thousand employees in one building and in round figures costing two million dollars to run. From 1914 to 1918 a substantial annual profit had been made, but the debit after eighteen years' operation still amounted to approximately 100,000,000 gold rubles. After the reorganization in 1920 and the adoption of the Chinese silver dollar as the official currency of the railway area the road has gradually been made a profitable enterprise. For further details of the



One of the first things affected by the Russian Revolution was the Chinese Eastern Railway. Prior to the Revolution, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, the whole zone traversed by this road was alienated from China and converted into Russian territory. The manager of this line was the virtual monarch of all he surveyed, and there was none to dispute his authority. When the Revolution broke out, this important post was held by General Hovarth, a distant relative of the Czar and a strong reactionary. The news of the Petrograd outbreak was at first suppressed by the railway authorities, until it leaked out in the middle of March, 1917. Then a few representative men at Harbin got together and appointed themselves members of a Republican Executive Committee under the authority of the First Provisional Government and assumed the administration of the municipality. Hovarth's power was therefore greatly reduced. He could now exert authority only upon the previous authorization of the Executive Committee. But he was allowed to retain his position under the title of Commissioner, which was approved by the Russian population.

Meanwhile, the Council of the Soldiers' and Workmen's Delegates at Petrograd had its replica here under the leadership of Rutin and his comrades, Slavin and Lutsku. In due course of time, collisions between the Executive Committee and the Delegates took place, followed by summary arrests of officers by their soldiers. The Delegates lost no time in stirring up dissatisfaction, and busied themselves with persecuting every one whom they could label as "Bourgeois." All the civil and military authorities for whom they had no liking, were ousted. General Hovarth was suffered

business standing of the Railway, see "China Year Book," 1923, p. 626 ff. The figures with reference to the construction cost of the railway were given by the Russian railway authorities to Dr. C. C. Wang. (Cited from *Millard's Review*, Oct. 23, 1920, p. 400.)

to remain at his post only because the Delegates could not agree among themselves as to how to dispose of him at this time. In view of this confusion and disorder, the Tuchun and Governor of Kirin saw it expedient to send a regiment of Chinese troops into the railway zone to help preserve peace and order there. This marked the beginning of Chinese intervention.

When the second revolution broke out in Petrograd in November, the Workmens' and Soldiers' Delegates were emboldened to usurp more powers. Wherever three or four soldiers gathered together they arrogated to themselves the function of a *de facto* government. Idlers increased in numbers and more confusion was added to the existing anarchistic state of things. Murders, robberies, and violation of women became an hourly occurrence. And it was apparent that the Railway authorities were impotent to enforce law and to cope with the situation. The Consular Body tried in vain to induce General Hovarth, the nominal authority, to restrain the acts of the soldiers, the railway administration being paralyzed. The Delegates were next approached, but they could not even control themselves, much less the affairs of the whole transportation system.

In December, after the Bolsheviks had succeeded in overthrowing the Kerensky Government, the Workmens' and Soldiers' Delegates, under instructions from their home government, suddenly issued an order to the effect that from this day forth the Workmens' and Soldiers' Delegates would become the official representatives of the Russian Government, that their policy would be the policy of the Government, and that all the public officers would come under their supervision and control. This the Chinese Taoyin and the Consular Body declined to countenance and protested accordingly, threatening to invite Chinese intervention or the intervention of international



troops.<sup>1</sup> This warning was defied by the Delegates, who in the meantime had received a telegram from Lenin instructing them to demand by force the transfer of the Railway administration into their hands.<sup>2</sup> Hovarth had weakened and had conceded to joint administration. The measure was opposed by the Consular Body, in view of the fact that the Bolsheviki were negotiating a separate peace with Germany. Three weeks of temporizing and jockeying followed without any definite results having been reached. While the *pourparlers* were going on, the Chinese troops had been numerically reënforced from Kirin and were barracked within call.

On December 12, the Delegates physically assumed control of the Railway administration and issued their first order on the eighteenth, dismissing General Hovarth and various other important officials from their posts. The Russian Consul at Harbin escaped with his documents and other matters into the headquarters of the Chinese Bureau for Foreign Affairs.<sup>3</sup>

The Chinese Commandant could not but view the situation with great concern, but before he took the matter into his own hands he consulted Hovarth, who was still the recognized head of the Railway Administration, as to the best solution. General Hovarth replied that he had told the new party that as the right of way of the Chinese Eastern Railway lay in Chinese territory, and that as the Russians were guests of another nation, they should try to live peacefully, and that China would not permit them to form here an institution to further their political activities. As to the transfer of the administration to the Delegates, Hovarth said that as the authority emanated from the

<sup>1</sup> Chu, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

Chinese Eastern Railway Company it could only be rescinded by order of the same power without which he would never give up. As regards the maintenance of order and the enforcement of law, General Hovarth admitted that it was beyond his ability.<sup>1</sup>

The Chinese military authority was desirous to solve this anomalous situation peacefully, if possible. Slavin, head of the Delegates, was therefore asked to appear in the Bureau of Foreign Affairs and was persuaded, in view of the international gravity of the situation, to disarm voluntarily all his men and to leave the railway zone. This he not only refused to comply with, but he also threatened to seize the magazine depot and arrest the person of General Hovarth.

The Chinese were driven to the end of their patience. Upon the request of the Consular Body on the forenoon of December 25 they delivered an ultimatum to Slavin demanding the withdrawal of his party's claim to the railway and the disarmament of his men by seven o'clock on the following morning. The Bolsheviks, learning that the Chinese had ten thousand at their command, accepted the ultimatum. Shortly after dawn they were called upon to disarm, which procedure started with a little resistance, resulting in one casualty on each side, but by nine o'clock the surrender of the Bolshevist recruits, numbering four thousand strong, had been completed.<sup>2</sup>

Having disarmed the Reds, the Chinese military authorities, upon consultation with General Hovarth, adopted the following arrangements: first, the Chinese military authorities and the Russian railway officials were jointly to maintain peace and order in the railway zone; second, the chief of the railway guards was to issue receipts for the arms surrendered; third, the

<sup>1</sup> Chu, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.



Chinese troops were to be quartered at different stations along the railway line; fourth, the disarmed Bolsheviks were to be deported to Siberia; fifth, the Chinese were to audit the accounts of the telegraph office of the railway company and to set up a customs station at Harbin.<sup>1</sup> Thus for the first time since the inception of the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1896 China exercised her own sovereign rights in her own territory.

Mr. Kuo Tsang-hsi, Governor of Kirin, was then appointed President of the Railway, a post left vacant after a lapse of seventeen years, when the last and only Director, Mr. Pi Kwei-fang, was executed because of his anti-Boxer convictions. China was thus simply reasserting her right as stipulated in Article I of the September 8, 1896, agreement providing for a Chinese Directorship. This right had never been repudiated by the Russians. China refrained from making an appointment after the execution of Mr. Pi in 1900, as a passive protest against the encroachments of Chinese sovereignty by the railroad company.

Shortly after the Revolution, the Board of Directors in Petrograd were scattered and the operation of the Railway fell on General Hovarth. In the meantime, the Russian Delegation at Peking called a meeting of the shareholders, under authority of the Russo-Asiatic Bank, whose headquarters had now been transferred to Paris. The meeting was held on April 29, 1918, in which China was represented by its newly appointed President of the Railway. A certificate, issued under the authority of the Russian Minister of Finance, stating that all the Chinese Eastern Railway Company's shares had been deposited by the Russo-Asiatic Bank in Petrograd with the local office of the Russian State Bank where they had since remained, was read. Only two members of the Board of Directors were

<sup>1</sup> Chu, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

present. It was, therefore, short of a quorum, as five Directors were required by the Statutes. Wherefore, the shareholders, comprising a qualified representative of the Russo-Asiatic Bank and seven other members who possessed certificates of the Bank as holders of three shares of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, elected a new board of directors with a membership of seven and General Hovarth as Managing Director.<sup>1</sup>

On August 14, 1917, China declared that a state of war existed between China and Germany and Austria-Hungary. This brought about the conclusion of the Military Agreement of May 16, 1918, and the Naval Agreement of May 19, 1918, with Japan, in which the two contracting parties agreed that in view of the speedy penetration of hostile influence into Russian territory, threatening the general peace and security of the Far East, they would "promptly consider in common the measures to be taken in order to meet the exigencies of the situation, and to do their share in the Allied cause for the prosecution of the present war."<sup>2</sup> It was specifically provided in a supplementary agreement that the duty of the joint military forces of China and Japan, operating in the two Siberian provinces of Transbaikalia and Amur was "to assist the Czecho-Slovakian forces to drive out German and Austrian forces and such as may be rendering assistance to them."<sup>3</sup> The use of the Chinese Eastern Railway was stipulated when military transportation necessitated such a use. In resorting to this recourse, the matter was to be invested in the hands of the organization having charge of the railway. But a joint bureau for the purpose of making proper arrangements was to be established by China and Japan with the railway organization for the transportation of Chinese, Japanese, and Czecho-Slovakian forces over the railway.

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1923, p. 618.

<sup>2</sup> MacMurray, *op. cit.*, p. 1048.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1413.



It was also provided that "should other allied countries later desire to carry on military operations in this region, they shall be permitted to participate in the bureau."<sup>1</sup> The period within which these agreements were to remain in force would be determined by the competent military and naval authorities of the two powers. But it was declared by Japan that "Japanese troops stationed within Chinese territory for the purpose of such defensive movements against the enemy shall be completely withdrawn from such territory upon the termination of the war."<sup>2</sup> The details of these agreements were at first kept secret as military secrets, but later, owing to the intense agitation in China against such an understanding, the two governments were obliged to publish them to appease the hostile sentiments of the public.

Meanwhile, conditions in Siberia had continued to grow worse every day. The Bolsheviks had concluded a disgraceful treaty with the Germans at Brest Litovsk, by virtue of which the great number of Austro-German prisoners in Siberia captured by the armies of the Czar were freed, and fraternalization on a large scale went on between them and the Bolsheviks. Their activity was increasing, and it began to spread through the East. At Vladivostok at this time there were in storage unlimited supplies of ammunition shipped by the Allies for the continuation of the war, but held up there, owing to the collapse of Russia. In view of these circumstances, naturally, the Allies could not but view the situation with great concern, and finally, in August, 1918, they had agreed on intervention in Siberia.

In fact, early in the summer of 1917, in view of the disintegration of the Russian Far East, which had already begun since the Petrograd Revolution in March,

<sup>1</sup> MacMurray, *op. cit.*, p. 1414.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1409.

the Japanese had advanced the idea of exclusive intervention by Japan in Siberia. The first publicity of such a conception was cleverly manipulated by the Japanese, through the dispatch of a telegram from London to the American and Japanese press to the effect that the British and French Governments were becoming uneasy at the developments in Siberia and that "they might ask Japan to intervene there."<sup>1</sup> In December, 1917, this thought received its official inception when the Japanese Government addressed a note to several of the Allied nations suggesting that Japan be permitted to send troops to Siberia to "preserve order" and "to protect the Allied interests in Siberia." In return for these services Japan asked that her paramount position with regard to China and that her exclusive right to exploit the mining, timber, and fishery concessions there be recognized.<sup>2</sup>

China was alarmed by this proposition, and she did not fail to make her uneasiness known. China's interest in the Siberian question was fundamental. Owing to her territorial propinquity with Siberia, her reversionary ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the large holdings of her people in Siberia, China could not but have a deep concern in the proposed Japanese occupation of the country east of Lake Baikal, which would envelop her northern provinces in an elbow. Besides, as a result of Russia's collapse in the Great War, China was just beginning to assert her control over northern Manchuria and effect the recovery of Mongolia—a legitimate aspiration which could not but be retarded by Japan's proposition of exclusive intervention.

France, whose one and only aim was vengeance on Germany, was naturally favorable to the Japanese conception, which was further strengthened by the

<sup>1</sup> T. F. Millard, "Democracy and the Eastern Question," p. 285.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*



prospect of the stabilizing effect it would have on the Russian money market in which she had invested such enormous interests.

Great Britain's attitude was made favorable by the fear of a combined German and Turkish invasion of India—an apprehension which was aggravated by the rumor that had been current for some time of a possible German-Japanese rapprochement. A secret agreement was probably reached early in 1918, by which Great Britain and France pledged to support Japan's exclusive intervention in Siberia, which they could hardly refuse in view of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, recognizing Japan's special position in China. But Great Britain and France could not afford to disregard the view of Washington, on whose support the Allies were then depending for the winning of the war. The Foreign Offices of Great Britain and France thought it expedient, therefore, to put the Siberian issue up to America. But Washington refused to give its consent to such a scheme, and that killed the Japanese proposal of a one-nation intervention.

In the summer of 1918, the question of intervention was revived, however, this time on the initiative of the United States. It was proposed by the United States that the four leading powers, Great Britain, Japan, France, and the United States, should each send a limited number of men to Siberia with expressed limitations as to extent and objects. The British and the French Government left the whole thing to the discretion of the United States Government. Negotiations were then commenced between the representatives of the latter two governments and an agreement was duly reached for joint intervention. It was decided that the four leading powers were to furnish a maximum of seven thousand troops each. On August 5, the United States Government made a formal declaration to the world, to the effect that the Government of the United States had proposed to the

Government of Japan that each of the two governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok with the purpose of coöperating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding, so far as it might, the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks, and that the Japanese Government had consented to the American proposal. On the following day the Japanese Government made a similar declaration, to the effect that the Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the desire of the American Government, and also to act in harmony with their Allies in the expedition, had decided to proceed at once to the disposition of suitable forces for the proposed mission, and a certain number of troops would be sent forthwith to Vladivostok. The Japanese statement further declared that, upon the realization of the objects mentioned, it would immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from the occupied territory.

Owing to their geographical proximity to Siberia, the Japanese easily forestalled their Allies in celerity in the transportation of troops. It was stated from trustworthy information that Japan had mobilized three divisions for occupation of Siberia as early as August, 1917.<sup>1</sup> She soon had troops in Harbin and her military officers attempted to assume superior command over the Chinese troops within the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, basing her contention on the clause as provided in the Military Agreement that "with the purposes of obtaining a unification of military direction and a maximum of harmony, the operation of the Chinese military forces in these Provinces shall be directed by Japanese commanders."<sup>2</sup> Japanese guards were placed at all bridges, culverts, and stations, and at other places the Chinese guards

<sup>1</sup> Millard, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

<sup>2</sup> MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1413.



were driven from their posts. The Chinese authorities refused to be thrust aside, and contended that they were masters within their own territory and that the aforesaid "Provinces" alluded to Transbaikalia and the Amur Province in eastern Siberia and not to northern Manchuria. The Japanese declined to meet the wishes of the Chinese authorities, and this gave rise to various collisions between the Chinese and the Japanese troops in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, the most serious of which was the Manchouli incident.<sup>1</sup> Shortly after this incident the Japanese Government suddenly notified the Chinese Government of their intention to act according to the terms of the "Military Agreement" without previously intimating to the Chinese Foreign Office, and consulting with it, as to the measures to be adopted, a procedure specifically provided by the agreement on military coöperation. This notification was given on September 20, and on September 28 there were twenty-two thousand Japanese troops north of Changchun, three thousand at Changchun, and fifteen thousand at Mukden. By the end of October, there were sixty thousand in northern Manchuria outside of the sphere tapped by the South Manchurian Railway.<sup>2</sup>

Japan's quota in the intervention was fixed at seven thousand, but she sent ten thousand to Vladivostok, which together with the sixty thousand in North Manchuria and five thousand in South Manchuria, gave Japan a force of seventy-five thousand for the intervention. When joint intervention was agreed upon, China was also invited to participate. But her quota was not fixed, her part being to do what was necessary in regions contiguous to Siberia and to facilitate operation where needed. But it was Japan's idea that China should have no

<sup>1</sup> For details of this incident, see Millard, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 318.

part in the intervention, just as she was prevented by Japan from doing her share in the prosecution of the Great War. In contravention to the 1918 Military Agreement, Japan simply took it upon herself to decide upon when and how the agreement would be applied.

In the meantime, with the signing of the armistice in Europe, the military situation in Siberia had changed its character. In view of the disorganization of the Siberian transportation system and, for the purpose of more efficient technical management, and without prejudice to any claims of financial or political interest, the American Government offered the suggestion that the Siberian Railway system, including the Chinese Eastern Railway should be intrusted to a commission directed by Mr. Stevens.<sup>1</sup> Negotiations then began between the American and Japanese Governments, the other powers having indicated their willingness to accept any agreement that might be made between America and Japan.

A final agreement was made on March 14, 1919, providing for the creation of a special Interallied Committee composed of representatives from each Allied Power having military forces in Siberia, including Russia. The Chairman of the Committee should be a Russian. General supervision of these railways was to be exercised by the Committee. Two Boards, namely, a Technical Board, which was to be constituted by railway experts of the nations having military forces in Siberia for the purpose of administering technical and economic management of the railways, and an Allied Military Transportation Board for the purpose of coördinating military transportation under instructions of the proper military authorities, were to be

<sup>1</sup>Mr. Stevens was sent to Russia at the request of the Kerensky Government in the spring of 1917. He was made official adviser to the Minister of Ways and Communications at Petrograd under the provincial government to help rehabilitate the Russian railway system. But owing to the Bolshevik uprising, the Russian railway service could not start to work.



placed under the control of the Interallied Committee. The protection of the railways was intrusted to the Allied Military Authority. A Russian Manager or Director, with powers conferred by existing Russian law, should remain as head of each railway. The technical operation of the railways was to be intrusted to the President of the Technical Board, who could make appointments of the members of the Board and make assignments, if necessary, of the corps of railway experts to the more important stations. The President of the Technical Board should be Mr. Stevens. The period in which this agreement was to remain in force was stipulated that "the present arrangement shall cease to be operative upon withdrawal of the foreign military forces from Siberia, when all the foreign railway experts appointed under this arrangement shall be recalled forthwith." It was also stipulated that, when the actual state of the railways had been investigated and their needs known, a plan would be submitted to the governments signatory to this agreement to provide for the necessary funds, materials, and rolling stock, so that the railways might be efficiently run.

In the notes exchanged between the American and Japanese Governments the objects of this plan were specifically emphasized; and it was stated that "this plan should be interpreted as a sincere effort temporarily to operate the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways to the interest of the Russian people with a view to their ultimate return to those in interest, without impairing any existing rights; that in intrusting to Mr. Stevens as President the technical operation of these railways it is understood the Governments of Japan and the United States are both prepared to give him the authority and support which will be necessary to make his efforts effective." In the same notes, the United States Government gave its approval to the agreement on the explicit understanding that the word "interest" used in Article 4 of the agreement should

be construed as "implying only military convenience as distinguished from any political or territorial rights or spheres of interest."

This agreement was presented to the Chinese Government for indorsement. Peking at first refused to give its assent to such a proposal on the ground that the status of the Chinese Eastern Railway was not the same as that of the Siberian system, as the former was within the territory of China and under its sovereignty. However, finally, through the good offices of the American Government, a compromise was reached whereby the protection of the Chinese Eastern Railway was to be undertaken by the Chinese military authority, and on March 10, 1919, the system of technical control was put into effect.

At a meeting of the commanders of the Allied Forces at Vladivostok in April, 1919, the following allocation of sections of the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern Railway for military protection was made: The United States was given the Ussuri Railway, from Vladivostok, inclusive, to Nikolsk, inclusive, the branch to Suchan mines, the section from Spasskoe to Ussuri, the Trans-Baikal Railway, from Verkhne-Udinsk, inclusive, to Baikal city, inclusive; China was given the Chinese Eastern Railway from Nibulsk, inclusive, to Manchouli, exclusive, and from Harbin to Changchun, inclusive; Japan was allocated the Ussuri Railway from Nikolsk to Spasskoe, from Guberoovo to Harbarovsk, the entire Amur Railway, and the Trans-Baikal Railway from Manchouli, inclusive, to Verkhne-Udinsk, exclusive.

The Technical Board was represented by railway experts of the following countries: China, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, Russia, Italy, and Czecho-Slovakia. Italy and Czecho-Slovakia later withdrew from the Board. Colonel John A. Stevens, according to the agreement, was made President. China was represented by her best railway experts in



the persons of Dr. Jeme Tien Yu, builder of the Peking-Kalgan Railway; Dr. C. C. Wang, then President of the Chinese Eastern Railway; Dr. C. S. Liu, formerly director of the Railway Department of the Ministry of Communications, and Mr. T. C. Yen, Chief Technical Expert of the Ministry of Communications.

The first thing the Board did was to negotiate a loan of five million dollars gold for the rehabilitation of the railway. No effort was spared by the engineers to improve the technical operation of the system to meet the heavy demands of the Allied Expedition and the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovakian forces.

Aside from these financial and technical services, the Interallied Technical Board served a very useful purpose as a watchdog of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and greatly helped to preserve the integrity of the Chinese Eastern Railway from being undermined by the Japanese, who treated the Board at first with contempt. Their deliberate attempts to convert the Changchun-Harbin section of the Chinese Eastern Railway from the Russian gauge to the South Manchurian gauge, and their efforts to take over the telegraphic line of the Chinese Eastern Railway and to adopt the Japanese yen as the official currency of the railway area after the depreciation of the ruble, would have been carried out if it had not been resisted by the agents of the Allied Powers.

By the end of spring, 1920, Japanese encroachments along the Chinese Eastern Railway zone in the summary arrest of Russian railway employees, in refusing civilians passage over the Sungari bridge by the Japanese soldiers, and other violent acts in direct contravention of the Interallied agreement, covering the guarding of the Chinese Eastern Railway which was assigned to the Chinese army, became too serious to be endured. The Technical Board was compelled to protest in the strongest possible manner against these interferences and high-handed actions of the Japanese troops to the

diplomatic agents at Peking, and they asked for an assurance from the Japanese authorities that such acts would not be repeated.<sup>1</sup>

The Japanese intention to dominate northern Manchuria was made unmistakably manifest from her attempt to modify the composition of the Interallied Committee by the exclusion of the representatives of those countries whose troops had been withdrawn, so that the revised commission would be composed of representatives of only Japan, Russia, and China, in which commission the Japanese would take the leading rôle. But the agreement, under which the Allies constituted the commission, stated that the Technical Board was to function until foreign troops were withdrawn from Siberia. And, by this clause, the Allied Powers construed that the commission would continue to operate until the Japanese troops were withdrawn, since they were foreign. Thus was frustrated one of the most cherished ambitions of the Japanese—the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

But the trouble of the Chinese Eastern Railway did not end with the expulsion of the Bolsheviks nor with Allied control. The cause was not yet removed. So long as Hovarth stayed and tried to use the expropriated zone as a base for his operations against the Reds, so long was there going to be disorder and confusion.

After the restoration of the railway administration into its old hands, Hovarth began his campaign against the revolutionists. For this purpose, he recruited over four thousand civilians on the pretext of giving the railway adequate protection. In reply to the protest of the Chinese authorities, that the number of Chinese troops was sufficient to meet any emergency, Hovarth said that in view of the difficulty which the Chinese soldiers had in making themselves understood by the

<sup>1</sup> *Far Eastern Review*, May, 1920, p. 262.



Russian population, and in view of certain measures regarding the administration of the railway which the Chinese troops could not undertake, he was obliged to increase his force—an action which he assured the Chinese authorities was taken primarily for the protection of the railroad as a commercial enterprise. But the Chinese were not so easily convinced, and the newly recruited soldiers were completely disarmed.<sup>1</sup>

Shortly after this, General Hovarth went to Peking to consult the Russian representative there. When he returned to Harbin, the reactionaries had already constituted an anti-Bolshevist Government in Siberia. To give his support, Hovarth secretly enlisted over a thousand ex-Russian troops and sent them to Siberia under the command of Ataman Semenov to fight against the Reds there. Furthermore, a society for the national salvation of Russia was instituted consisting of four departments, namely, the Military Department, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Subscription Department, and the Department of Civil Affairs. Hovarth was made President of the society and he undertook to execute all its affairs. Martial law was then proclaimed within the Eastern Railway zone, and a headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief was established.

With the formation of the Omsk Government, in July, 1918, Hovarth left Harbin to take an important part in the functioning of the Zemstvo. He was relieved, however, of his duty in this assembly, owing to his weak tendencies, but he was reappointed to his old job of Managing Director of the Chinese Eastern Railway, of which he had been the head for such a long time. In fact, he had by no means relinquished his authority when he left Harbin, having merely delegated his power to one of his subordinates. On his return, he began immediately to renew his political

<sup>1</sup> Chu, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

ambitions, and issued a proclamation to the effect that "on account of the interruption of all communication with the Supreme Ruler and the Central Government organization I consider myself forced, pending the renewal of the contact with the Supreme Ruler, to assume full government power as regards the Russian population in the Chinese Eastern Railway territory."<sup>1</sup>

Against this proclamation, General Po, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese troops in the railway zone, strongly protested that it was unlawful and contrary to international law for one country to carry out any administrative measures within the domain of another country, that the terms of the agreement had been violated by the present action of General Hovarth, that as Managing Director of the Railway he was exceeding his powers when he attempted to conduct a political movement within the railway zone, and that his activity should be confined to railway matters.<sup>2</sup>

This admonition was not heeded by General Hovarth. On the contrary, he disbursed the railway funds to further his political ambitions, and, consequently, the railway employees were due two months' pay. He had already alienated the hearts of the majority of the Russian population since the inauguration of his terrible régime of extirpating the revolutionary elements through sweeping methods of assassination. Now, with the misappropriation of the railway funds, the Russian population found a good excuse to stir up action against Hovarth. A general strike was proclaimed by the Railway employees, who demanded the immediate dismissal of Hovarth as a condition to their return to work.

The situation was tense, as it involved the public safety of thousands of people living in the railway zone. Naturally, the Chinese authorities could not

<sup>1</sup> *Millard's Review*, Feb. 14, 1920, Vol. XI, p. 524.

<sup>2</sup> *Chu, op. cit.*, p. 37.



remain indifferent to such an acute crisis. Accordingly, the following notification was sent by the Governor of Kirin as Director General of the Chinese Eastern Railway to General Hovarth for his immediate compliance :

I have frequently pointed out that the Chinese Eastern Railway is situated in Chinese territory in which the existence of other government power is inadmissible, as there is strife between Russian political parties, which creates disorders and intrigues with the work of the railroad. Owing to the fact that General Hovarth, Assistant President of the above board, has assumed the functions of government and proceeded to adopt a policy of military force for political aims, the Russian working population has declared a strike and begun a revolutionary movement. In order to defend China's sovereign rights and to maintain normal conditions on the railway, I have suggested that General Hovarth shall renounce full political power in the railroad territory so as to enable China to fulfill her obligations. All arms are to be handed over to and guarded by specially appointed agents. At the same time I consider it my duty to declare that I cannot allow in future any Russian party or individual to interfere with the work of the railway for political purposes. I therefore request the population on the railway territory to proceed with their peaceful work.<sup>1</sup>

General Hovarth, forced by the exigencies of the situation, was compelled to acquiesce. The Chinese Government compensated him with an advisorship of the Ministry of Communications, and also made him Honorary President of the Chinese Eastern Railway with a salary of three thousand dollars Mexican a month. Hovarth graciously accepted this offer and soon left Harbin for Peking. Mr. Pimenov was ordered by the Chinese Government to take his place. Three new Chinese directors were appointed to take the places vacated by the resignation of Admiral Kolchak and the demise of Mr. Slauta. The strike was thus broken and the railway restored to normal conditions. The arrears due the workmen were paid by the Chinese Government from a loan of two million dollars Mexican

<sup>1</sup> *Far Eastern Review*, April, 1920, p. 214.

from the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications, to the great satisfaction of all concerned. The policing of the railway, which had been greatly augmented by the Chinese guards, was now completely turned over to the Chinese military authorities. China had at last come back to be master of her own territory.

In connection with this peaceful coup d'état, the following Presidential mandate was issued:

Since the political crisis in Russia, the Chinese Eastern Railway has been seriously affected; whenever political changes happened a state of chaos and disorder prevailed in the administration of the railway. Consequently, the financial relations of both countries and international communications have suffered. At the very beginning our Government has decided upon the policy of keeping the railway free from all political entanglements, therefore, since the sixth year of the Republic, China has from time to time dispatched military and police forces to preserve order and prevent disturbances. In order to insure the safety of the railway, the Chinese Government shall temporarily assume the responsibilities and exercise the rights of control regarding the administration of the railway, which formerly belonged to the Russian Government as provided in the original agreement made between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Asiatic Bank.<sup>1</sup>

In adopting this policy, the Chinese Government, aside from attempting to keep Russian politics out of the railway and to maintain as strict a neutral attitude as possible, had as its objects the employment of Chinese in the higher posts in the company, the recovery of her sovereign rights, the elimination of any third power from participation in the operation of the line, and the exercise of the highest functions on behalf of the Russian Government, so that when a stable Russian government was formed the way would be prepared for a revision of the original contracts. These measures constituted a new departure from her old

<sup>1</sup> *Far Eastern Review*, Nov., 1920, p. 605.



policy of indifference, and naturally brought forth vehement protests from the shareholders of the Russo-Asiatic Bank, which was strongly supported by the French Government. Protracted negotiations ensued for several months between the Bank and the Chinese Government, based upon the foregoing contemplated measures. Controversy centered upon the point of the number of Directors to be appointed. China insisted on having four Chinese Directors, while the Bank, under instructions from Paris, could agree to only three. Finally, the Chinese contention prevailed, and an agreement, known as the "Supplement to the Agreement for the Construction and Exploitation of the Chinese Eastern Railway," was signed on October 2, 1920, at Peking, between China and the Russo-Asiatic Bank.

The preamble of the agreement declared that the Chinese Government, in consideration of its share of five million taels in the construction and exploitation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, of the sum due by the Railway Company to the Chinese Government, of the internal disorganization in Russia, which interrupted its regularity and efficiency, and of the sovereign rights in the railway zone, "finds itself obliged to take measures which are indispensable not only for ensuring the security of the regions served by the aforesaid railway and for maintaining communications of universal interest, but also for the efficient protection of the property of the said railway."

The contract, which followed, provided in substance that the Chinese Eastern Railway Company should recognize its obligation to pay in bonds of the railway, guaranteed by a mortgage on all the property of the railway, landed or movable, a sum of five million Ku-ping taels, due the Chinese Government from the day of the opening of the traffic on the said railway, plus six per cent compound interest to be computed from the opening of the traffic up to the year 1920. It was also agreed that the Chinese Government should have the

right to appoint to the Board of Directors or "Pravlenie," besides the President, four members of Chinese nationality who need not necessarily be shareholders of the Company. The Russian members were to be freely appointed by the stockholders. In the event of tie votes, the President was to have a casting vote in addition to his vote as a member. The quorum of the Board of Directors should consist of seven members. No decision would be binding unless it was approved by at least seven members. The Chinese Government was to have the right to appoint two members of Chinese nationality to the Audit Committee, which was to consist of five members. The Chairman of the Committee to be appointed out of the five members should be of Chinese nationality. Posts of the railway should be equitably distributed among Chinese and Russians. The rights and obligations of the Company should be strictly of a commercial nature; every political activity and attribute would be absolutely forbidden to the railway. The Chinese Government would reserve itself the right to restrict at any moment such political activities and attributions. The provisions of the 1896 Contract and of the Statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company not in conflict with the clauses of the present agreement should remain in force.<sup>1</sup>

The agreement was unquestionably a long step forward towards the vindication of China's sovereign rights, but, from the legal point of view, it was a great blunder on the part of the Chinese Government. Prior to the conclusion of this agreement the Bolsheviks had already made their overtures returning the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Chinese people "without any compensation whatsoever." What China should have done was to recognize the Soviet declaration as sincere and take over the whole Chinese

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1923, p. 660.



Eastern Railway. But this was not what she did. She permitted the enterprise in which she alone had a paramount interest to fall into the hands of an international body of control. To aggravate the situation, she entered into an agreement with a third party, the Russo-Asiatic Bank, an *ultra vires* institution, as was pointed out in a foregoing chapter. This technicality was not only overlooked by the Chinese statesmen but it was made the more ridiculous by the fact that they should consent to be bracketed into the stipulation to negotiate with the Russo-Asiatic Bank, "whatever its name might subsequently be."

It is true that four Chinese Directors were provided for in the Board of Directors. But they could do no more than make their voices heard. In other words, the shareholders could elect five Russian directors against the Chinese four, exclusive of the President, who was to be Chinese. Numerically, it was five against five, but the Chinese President could have a casting vote, which made it six against five. But it was also provided that no decision was to be effective unless approved by seven members of the board. This was tantamount to saying that in spite of a Chinese majority, they could not push through any measure without the consent of the Russians. Again there was provided the equitable distribution of posts. But against this provision it was declared that only certain posts of a subordinate rank might be filled by the Chinese. Therefore, after all, China did not gain as much from this agreement as it appeared on the surface.

#### THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY AT THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

One of the questions which the Disarmament Conference held at Washington, 1921-1922, considered in

relation to China, was the "Development of Railways, including plans relative to the Chinese Eastern Railway," which in the words of the Chairman of the Conference, Secretary of State Hughes, should be maintained as "an artery of commerce with free opportunity to all and unfair discrimination against none." The Chinese Eastern Railway question was first referred to a subcommittee of experts chosen from the technical advisers of the various delegations. The Report of the Technical Committee, after citing the legal instruments of the railway's concern and the occasion giving rise to the Interallied agreement of January, 1919, brought forward three principal problems: first, that a Finance Committee, consisting of a representative of each of the powers represented at the Conference, so far as they might care to participate, be established at Harbin to replace the so-called Interallied Committee then established at Vladivostok and the so-called Technical Board at Harbin, which should exercise general financial control and be intrusted with the exercise of the trusteeship until the general recognition by the powers of a Russian government; second, that the operation be left in the hands of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company; and third, that in order to assure the protection of the railway property and the maintenance of public order within the railway zone, a dependable and effective police force, or gendarmerie, consisting of Chinese, if China so desired, but paid and controlled by the Finance Committee, be provided.<sup>1</sup> The first proposal was objected to by the Chinese delegates, in view of the existing administrative organization and operation of the railway. With respect to the third measure of establishing a gendarmerie, China "doubted the propriety, not to say advisability, of putting Chinese police, or gendarme, under a mixed committee, as was proposed, as the

<sup>1</sup> "Conference on the Limitation of Armament," p. 1378.



police, or gendarme, is a State force." In this connection the Chinese delegation also pointed out that "the precedent of a Russian guard has no legal ground, as it was expressly stipulated in the Agreement of 1896 that it was the Chinese Government which was to take measures to assure the safety of the railway and of the persons in its service." Under these circumstances, the Chinese Delegation was obliged to make reservations with respect to these two measures.<sup>1</sup>

In view of this disagreement and at the suggestion of Secretary Hughes, a new subcommittee was created from the Committee of the Whole to see if an agreement could not be reached. In the discussions of this new committee, Mr. Hanihara, the Japanese representative, "while admitting that the Chinese Eastern Railway was a Chinese chartered corporation, denied that the railway was Chinese property, and said that his Delegation could not discuss the question upon that basis. Furthermore, he questioned the right of the Conference to discuss and determine the treaty and other contractual rights involved, and contended that the whole situation could be considered only upon a *de facto* basis of expediency." No agreement was reached, therefore, at this meeting. Dr. Koo and Mr. Kammerer were, however, deputed to prepare a report with the view to compromise the diverse objections of the different delegations. Their attempt to reconcile the Japanese views likewise proved futile. Finally, the subcommittee was obliged to content itself with reporting the following resolution which was adopted at the sixth plenary session by all powers on February 4, 1922.

Resolved, that the preservation of the Chinese Eastern Railway for those in interest required that better protection be given to the railway and the persons engaged in its operation and use; a more careful selection of personnel to secure efficiency of service,

<sup>1</sup> "Conference on the Limitation of Armament," p. 1380.

and a more economical use of funds to prevent waste of the property. That the subject should immediately be dealt with through the proper diplomatic channels.<sup>1</sup>

Simultaneously, the following reservation was adopted by all the powers, other than China:

The powers, other than China, in agreeing to the resolution regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, reserve the right to insist hereafter upon the responsibility of China for the performance or nonperformance of the obligations towards the foreign stockholders, bondholders, and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, which the powers deem to result from the contracts under which the railroad was built and the action of China thereunder and the obligations which they deem to be in the nature of a trust resulting from the exercise of power by the Chinese Government over the possession and administration of the railroad.<sup>2</sup>

A casual comparison of these two resolutions indicates at once that the first was definite and clear, while the second was vague and pretentious. To quote Dr. C. C. Wang, then President of the Chinese Eastern Railway:

It is not definitely known by whom is meant the foreign stockholders and bondholders. As Russia was not represented in the conference, it may be inferred that these stockholders and bondholders had reference to foreigners other than Russians. But the very contract referred to in the resolution clearly stated that only Russians and Chinese could be stockholders and bondholders of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company. So far as is known, the Chinese Eastern Railway Company never issued any stocks or bonds in its name to any parties other than Chinese and Russians. So far as the foreign creditors of the railway are concerned, there are but few and the amounts due too insignificant to deserve the attention of such an important body as the Conference on Disarmament. Therefore, it may be presumed that the real motive back of the Chinese Eastern Railway question at Washington was not stated in the resolutions, but was to be found in the fact that the railway had been, and was at that time an important factor affecting the peace of the Far East.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "Conference on the Limitation of Armaments," p. 316.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 318.

<sup>3</sup> "The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science," Nov., 1925, p. 67.



China's recognition of Soviet Russia and the understanding reached with regard to the restoration of the Chinese Eastern Railway to its original status caused a strong protest from Mr. Hughes, American Secretary of State, accusing China of having repudiated her obligations. Mr. Hughes's protest was based, first, upon the claim for \$4,250,000 which America had put into the railway in the form of equipments, supplies, etc., furnished during the Allied expedition in Siberia and, second, upon the Chinese Eastern Railway resolution adopted at the Washington Conference in 1921-1922. In regard to the American financial claim, it should be remembered that the money spent on the railroad was the result of the Technical Board's own volition. It was loaned to the railway as an extraordinary measure to safeguard the Allied troops operating in Siberia and to facilitate the transportation of the Czechs who were then on their way home to Europe. In other words, the extra expenditure was incurred primarily for the benefit of the powers themselves and not for the railroad alone. It was not a loan in the proper sense of the term made by mutual consent. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government had never repudiated it. Therefore, Mr. Hughes's charge that China had repudiated her debt was presumably the result of misleading information.

To answer the second charge, that China had broken an agreement reached at the Washington Conference, it is worth while to repeat the fact that China was not a party to the second resolution passed at Washington, and that Russia was not represented at the Conference. Therefore, China could not be accused of having broken a plighted word. Moreover, there was nothing in the Russo-Chinese agreement that was anything like a repudiation of any obligation on the Chinese Eastern Railway. In view of these considerations, to say that China had affronted Mr. Hughes and that she had

returned base ingratitude for kindness in her dealings with the United States was hardly justified.

#### THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY ZONE

So far we have considered the Chinese Eastern Railway in its legal and historical aspects. We shall now discuss some of the important international issues arising out of the existence of this railway. For the sake of convenience, the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway zone may be divided into its three chief spheres, namely, the Judicial Administration, the Police Administration, and the Municipal Administration.

The Judicial Administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, prior to the Russian Revolution, was entirely in the hands of the Railway Company and was thoroughly Russian in character. After the suspension of the recognition of the Russian Minister and Consuls in China, the Chinese Government succeeded in asserting its jurisdiction in the railway zone, and on October 31, 1920, a Presidential mandate was issued, promulgating the "Regulations for the Organization of the Judiciary of the Special Manchurian Region," which had the object of facilitating the process of law suits in this special area. These provided for the establishment of a High Court and a District Court in Harbin and six subdistrict courts at places to be designated by the Minister of Justice. Offices of public prosecutors were to be attached to these courts. Special courts were attached to the District Courts to try cases of the first degree. The last appeal remained to the Supreme Court at Peking. Foreign barristers might appear in suits brought by and against foreigners. Foreign advisers and investigators might be engaged by the Chinese judges. Persons, formerly employed in the judiciary of foreign states and those who were or had been barristers at law, were eligible for these positions. They were to be controlled and guided by the Presidents



of the Courts. They must give their conclusions when required by the Court on the Public Prosecution; they might acquaint themselves with the files of the different cases; they might attend public sessions of the courts, and be permitted to question the parties in the case, and the witnesses and experts; they might express their opinion when they should observe any breach in the law in case of arrest or imprisonment of a foreigner; they might personally inspect the prisons in which foreigners were detained; in criminal cases they had the right to report to the Public Prosecutor circumstances which had come to their knowledge; they might be suspended or dismissed by the Minister of Justice in case of activities incompatible with their official status.<sup>1</sup>

The Chinese authorities experienced some difficulty when they took over the extant Russian courts. The Russians demanded, as a condition of surrender, the retention of the whole Russian staff and the exclusion of criminal cases from the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts. These demands the Chinese were unable to consider. Consequently, they were obliged to seal several of the Russian courts and place Chinese guards around them, resulting in a stagnation of the judicial system for five months. The deadlock was broken upon the mediation of the foreign consuls in the retention of a majority of the Russian staff.

To liquidate all the cases that had been left over by the Russian courts and those which had accumulated during the period of transition, a Presidential mandate, dated March 2, 1921, was promulgated, embodying "Regulations of the Section for the Liquidation of Old Russian Legal Cases in the Manchurian Region." These regulations provided for two tribunals, the first consisting of a single judge and the second of three judges. The decisions of the latter were final. They were to liquidate all the Russian legal cases, begun before September

<sup>1</sup> Chu, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-97.

23, 1920. The President of this section should be the President of the High Court of the Special Manchurian Region. The judges were to be appointed by the President. A Public Prosecutor's Office was to be attached to these tribunals. All these courts were to be abolished when all the cases mentioned had been liquidated.

Three kinds of cases were within the competence of these tribunals: first, cases which had already been passed by the Russian courts against whose decisions appeals had now been brought; second, similar cases in which, under Russian law, appeal could still be brought against decisions already passed; third, cases left undecided by the Russian courts. Criminal cases upon appeal were to be decided by the second tribunal; those undecided were to be investigated by the Public Prosecutor and liquidated according to law. A time limit might be set for civil cases to be continued at a later date. Decisions of the former Russian courts might be valid, and might be put into execution. Political cases, upon consideration, might, however, be discontinued. The laws used in the adjudication of these cases, which were of a civil nature, should be the existing Chinese law and regulation, in addition to those promulgated for the application of foreign laws. In criminal cases, the Provisional Criminal Code would be applied; but in those cases which, according to Russian law, called for lighter penalties, correspondingly less severe punishment would be inflicted.<sup>1</sup>

It was estimated that about five thousand cases, comprising about one hundred eighty thousand sheets written in Russian, were waiting for liquidation when the Chinese took over the Russian courts.<sup>2</sup> Naturally great difficulty was experienced due to the volume of the business, and the necessity of interpretation from

<sup>1</sup> Chu, *op. cit.*, pp. 97, 98.

<sup>2</sup> "China Year Book," 1921-1922, p. 639.



Russian into Chinese. But the Chinese authorities were to be congratulated for successfully meeting a novel situation with comparatively little trouble.

On October 30, 1920, the following Rules for the administration of Russians residing in China were promulgated by the Chinese Government:

1. Russian citizens in China may continue to reside in ports opened for trade (*Shan-wu*) or those places in which they have been allowed to reside heretofore; they may, moreover, occupy themselves with suitable peaceful professions and also receive protection of their persons and property. They are, however, bound to obey Chinese laws and regulations, both in force at present and those which will be promulgated in good time in future:

In those cases, where it will be necessary to rent premises in the places mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, they will be bound to observe the regulations in force in these places with regard to renting premises and to apply to the local governmental institution for permission.

2. Russian citizens, residing in China, suspected of carrying contraband, will be bound to submit to examination on the part of the local governmental institutions.

3. Should Russian citizens, residing in China, commit offenses infringing the laws and disturbing public order, or should they be suspected and also in cases in which it will be considered absolutely necessary, they may, apart from legal consequences, be summoned to leave the territory of the country, or adequate observation and restrictions may be enforced with regard to them.

4. Russian citizens residing in China, when they leave for a journey inside the country, are bound to apply, either through the local governmental institution or directly to the office of the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, requesting permission and the issuing of a passport (*hu-chao*), mentioning in their request the object and locality of the journey and defining in advance its duration; they are, however, not allowed to make topographical surveys in the localities of their journeys.

The passports mentioned in the foregoing paragraph are to be issued in the capital by the administrator or the metropolitan police.

5. In the present regulations the term "local governmental institution" is to be taken to mean the Police Offices in those localities where police have been established, and the district office and offices preparatory to the establishment of districts in those localities where police have not yet been established.

6. The present regulations come into force from the day of their publication.<sup>1</sup>

The Police Administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway, according to the railway contract of 1896, was specifically invested in the Chinese Government, which should take means to assume the safety of the railway and of the persons in its service against any attack. But the Russian Government disregarded entirely this provision, and went on to provide in the Statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company for police agents to be appointed by the Company. As remarked elsewhere in this study, the Statutes were approved by the Russian Government, China's consent not being obtained. They, therefore, could not but be considered as null and void.

The first dispatch of Russian troops in the railway zone was in May, 1897, when the Board of Directors of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, in view of the fact that the workmen on the railway needed adequate protection against extraneous attacks, decided to send into the railway zone a cavalry force of five hundred from Vladivostok. This marked the beginning of Russian encroachment upon the sovereign rights of China in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone. After the Boxer trouble, as we have noted in a foregoing chapter, Russia had practically brought the whole of Manchuria under military occupation and did not evacuate in compliance with the terms of the Manchurian Convention, which was one of the causes of the Russo-Japanese War. As a reward of this victory, the Japanese obtained the South Manchurian line. Then the two erstwhile enemies, Russia and Japan, finding they had interests in common, became fast friends and agreed to station twenty guards on every kilometer of the line, Russia alone having about

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1921-1922, p. 644.



seventy thousand of these guards in the railway zone prior to the Chinese Revolution and thirty thousand in Harbin, inclusive.<sup>1</sup> These were gradually withdrawn after the outbreak of the European War, but Russia still had seven to eight thousand in Manchuria when the Revolution took place in Petrograd in 1917. These latter were partially replaced by Chinese guards after the Bolshevist coup at Harbin, and with the expulsion of General Hovarth, the police administration of the railway zone was completely recovered by the Chinese military authorities.

The Chinese Eastern Railway zone was then demarcated as a Special Area of Police Administration by the Chinese Government with its head office at Harbin. The old Russian paraphernalia of the gendarmarie was entirely abolished. The Commander-in-Chief of this special police force was appointed by the Chinese Government. His duty was to take charge of all matters appertaining to the police administration within this special area. In other matters he was to be under the instructions of the Governors of Kirin, and Heilungkiang, and the President of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company. The whole zone was divided into five subareas under five assistants appointed by the commander. The whole force was divided into patrol guards and property guards. The former were to maintain order and peace, while the latter were to protect the movable and unmovable property of the Railway Company. Their number was to be fixed by regulation and discretion. The police force was to be paid from the appropriation by the President of the Railway Company.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, the conflict of the Bolsheviks and the reactionaries had reached its fiercest stage in the Russian Far East. Manchuria, being contiguous to

<sup>1</sup> Chu, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 85-89.

Siberia, offered just that sanctuary for the defeated troops which began to pour in after every decisive battle. China wanted to preserve a strict neutral attitude towards the internal struggle in Russia. Accordingly, it was regulated that no Russian troops from Eastern Siberia would be allowed to enter Manchuria. In the event of any getting over the border without being seen, they would be disarmed and expelled. In the event of either side being defeated and the troops of the conquered force desiring to seek concealment in Manchuria, they might be interned in localities set apart for that purpose. In such circumstances the victorious army would be notified. In the event of an armistice, disarmed men of the rank and file might be permitted to return to their homes, but officers would be kept in custody for the time being. Russians, bearing passports signed by the Chinese authorities in Vladivostok or Kuangchengsze, might be permitted to enter Chinese territory, but in the event of such persons being in possession of valuables they would be retained by the Chinese authorities temporarily. Trains entering Manchuria from the West would be stopped at the border and passengers searched before being allowed to proceed. Traffic through Suifen was to be temporarily suspended.

That there should be a municipal question in connection with the exploitation and operation of the Chinese Southern Railway is the outcome of a series of Russian encroachments on Chinese sovereignty, dating back to the beginning of the history of the railway. By virtue of the original railway contract of 1896, it was stipulated that China would appropriate, either gratis or on the payment of an annual rental by the Company to the proprietors, lands "actually necessary for the construction, operation and protection of the line." This stipulation was interpreted by the Russians to its fullest extent possible. Beside the grant



of the strip of territory one hundred feet wide on either side of the line, amounting approximately to three hundred thousand acres within the whole zone, the Railway Company had bought large areas surrounding the various stations, thus giving rise to towns and cities, the most important of which is Harbin, covering an area of over fifty square miles.<sup>1</sup>

Until the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, Harbin had to all intents and purposes become a part of the Russian Empire through the arbitrary interpretation of the clause in the railway contract of 1896, that "the company will have the absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands," in the sense that China had abandoned all rights of jurisdiction in her own territory, and, therefore, all people, whether they be Chinese or Russians or foreign residents within the railway area, had to be under Russian laws. To prevent foreign interests other than Russian from gaining a foothold in the railway zone, all the lands for miles around, suitable for foreign settlement, was bought and included in the railway area, in which foreigners were excluded from residing and permitted to remain only on sufferance.

Harbin was opened as a treaty port by the treaty of Portsmouth and since then foreigners have the right of residence and engagement in trade under extra-territorial privileges as in other cities in China. China appointed a Taotai to be stationed in Harbin to take charge of Chinese interests. The United States of America and Japan sent consular officials there.

<sup>1</sup> Harbin was founded in 1897 and made the administrative and working headquarters of the Company. Located on the banks of the Sungari, it was an ideal location and a strategic center of Manchuria. There was no native settlement here in 1909, the old town being three miles away, but ten years later it had become a Moscow of Asia. In 1901, the Russian population in Harbin was 12,000, in 1902 there were 60,000 exclusive of soldiers, railway employees alone numbering 11,000. Living in the original town was a Chinese population of 40,000. Out of 400 Japanese inhabitants in Harbin, 350 were women; of the 60,000 Russian population only 40 per cent, or 24,000, were females. (*Far Eastern Review*, May, 1909, p. 424.)

France sent a consular agent. Great Britain and Germany refrained from creating new consulates, leaving their nearest consuls to make occasional visits. A Russian Consul General was appointed by Russia to represent her national interests in the person of Luba. A dispute soon arose between Luba, the Consul General, and General Hovarth, the Managing Director of the Railway, as to who was supreme. The railway administration finally won, and Luba was shortly recalled and Hovarth appointed Acting Consul General.

The Russian authorities at Harbin still insisted on the contention of absolute administration, arguing that prior to the war Harbin did not exist and that the treaty port referred to in the Portsmouth Treaty meant the Chinese town, Fu-tu-tin, four miles away. The matter was complicated by the great number of Japanese business men doing business in Fu-tu-tin, from which the Chinese Taotai attempted first to expel the Japanese because Fu-tu-tin was not a treaty port. The Japanese refused to go, so the Chinese authorities attempted to levy the customary likin dues on their business. This the Japanese refused to pay, being supported by the British Consul.

The matter was further complicated by the question of jurisdiction. The Chinese authorities had never given their sanction to the Russian claims that Harbin was within the exclusive and absolute administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company. A very interesting case arose in the raping of a fourteen-year-old boy by an Armenian, subject of a non-extraterritorial nation with China, in the railway zone. The Armenian was arrested by the railway authorities and handed over to the Chinese Taotai. But shortly afterwards the Russians demanded that he be turned over to them for trial and punishment. This the Taotai refused to do, and insisted that in turning over the prisoner to him the railway authorities had done the right thing, maintaining that the crime was



committed within Chinese territory. Not satisfied with this explanation the railway authorities intimated that they would use force to effect his recovery. The Taotai was, however, not to be cowed. On the other hand, he threatened that he had given orders to shoot whoever should be found trespassing on his yamen. At the same time he assured the Russians that, if the prisoner was left alone with him, he would see that due justice be meted out. The railway authorities, not desiring to carry the case further, dropped the matter, and the prisoner was tried and punished according to Chinese law.<sup>1</sup>

The Railway Company's pretension to regulate the affairs of Harbin was strongly opposed by the Americans, the British, and the Germans, but not by the Japanese, who supported the Russian stand, being assured by the Russians that they would reciprocally recognize their similar rights in the Japanese zones of the South Manchurian Railway, which was operated under the same convention as the Chinese Eastern Railway. The American, British, and German protest was primarily based on principle, as may be seen from the fact that there was not a single American, or German, or British merchant in Harbin at that time. Nevertheless, in 1909, General Hovarth put his plans of a Russian municipality in Harbin into execution with himself as mayor. A code of obligatory regulations, providing for taxation in various schedules as well as obnoxious domiciliary obligations on residents, such as existed in Russia, were imposed. This was greatly resented by the Chinese merchants, who, in protest, refused to pay any levies imposed upon them arbitrarily by the Railway Company. The matter reached such an acute tension that Taotai Sze and

<sup>1</sup> The then Chinese Taotai was H. E. Sao-ke Sze, now Chinese minister to the United States, to whom the author is indebted for the citation of this case.

General Hovarth were both ordered to Peking to make explanations and to see if an agreement could not be drawn. On May 10, 1909, an understanding was reached with regard to the administration of the municipality in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone.

By this agreement the fundamental principle of China's sovereign rights was confirmed, and not to be prejudiced in any way, and measures introduced by China in the exercise of these rights were not to be opposed on any pretext by the railway administration or the municipality. Municipalities were to be established in important commercial centers in which the right to vote and be voted for should belong to inhabitants irrespective of nationality, who owned an estate of a fixed value or who paid a fixed annual rental and taxes. The management of the municipal affairs should be intrusted to an executive committee, constituting an assembly of three individuals elected by the delegates. In addition, the President of the Chiao-She-Chu and the Director of the Railway Company should each nominate one delegate and the President. The decisions of the Executive Committee should be binding upon the residents of the municipality. Important questions relating to public interest should be referred to the President of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, who should have the right of control and personal revision. Detailed arrangements regarding the municipalities and police, the scale of taxation, lands and buildings, should be discussed within a month, reckoning from the date of signature of the present agreement.<sup>1</sup> The discussions never took place, however, so these basic principles remained only dead letters. In the meantime, the Russians unilaterally promulgated the regulations, which consisted of fifty-five articles, subordinating the municipality to

<sup>1</sup> "U. S. Foreign Relations," 1910, p. 209.



the strict surveillance of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company and were soon put into effect.<sup>1</sup>

On December 3, 1914, an agreement was reached between the Russian and British Governments, in which the latter agreed to include British subjects within the Russian scheme of municipal administration and taxation, established within the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway, upon the following conditions: That the Russian Government declare that the taxes and dues collected in the Railway settlement at Harbin and elsewhere within the railway zone be exclusively devoted to municipal and public purposes; that British subjects should have the active and passive rights of election to the local municipal administrations and that a representative of the non-Russian community be introduced into the Municipal Council at Harbin, constituting six members in all, whose terms were to be three years; that British subjects should enjoy the same rights and privileges as the Russian subjects in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, as regards all matters of an economic character, especially those relating to industry and leases of land; and that, finally, British subjects should be accorded the most-favored-nation treatment which the Imperial Government of Russia might grant to residents of other Foreign Powers within the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway.<sup>2</sup> To this agreement the governments of France, Italy, Japan, Denmark, Spain, and later Belgium, all gave their adherence with the conspicuous exception of the Government of the United States.

Things went on smoothly until February, 1920, with the establishment of the Chinese Police Administration in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, when the Chinese Government, through the Ministry of the Interior, after

<sup>1</sup> Chu, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-113.

<sup>2</sup> Text in Manchuria, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

seven months' deliberation, finally divulged the following scheme for the government of municipalities within the zone lately demarcated as the Special Area of Chinese Police Administration. In this scheme, the Chinese Government sought to obtain a uniform system of municipal administration within the Chinese Eastern Railway zone with the establishment of a municipal administration office, which was to be headed by a President and a Vice President, appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. A certain number of councilors and advisers might be employed by the office, subject to the approval of the Ministry of the Interior. Important matters regarding the municipality should be referred to the Ministry of the Interior. The various departments and the various institutions of public utility existing under the old system should be continued. Provisions now in force, which were in conflict with this new arrangement, should be recommended by the President to the Ministry of the Interior for modification or cancellation. New regulations might be proposed to the Ministry of the Interior for consideration and adoption. It may be readily seen that instead of being subordinated to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, the Municipality was now made directly responsible to the Ministry of the Interior.

No interruption took place until the middle of 1923, when, upon the authority of Chang Tso-lin, as Commander-in-Chief of the Three Eastern Provinces, the Chinese Eastern Railway Land Office was seized and sealed by the Chinese and a new office established. The Chinese based their case on the argument that, in subleasing land for other purposes than the strict maintenance of the railway service, the Chinese Eastern Railway had violated the original agreements reached in 1896 and had infringed upon China's administrative rights. The Russians refused to yield and both offices continued to function for some time, causing great inconvenience. Finally, the following regulations



were reached by the two sides and enforced as a temporary measure pending the existence of a legally constituted Russian Government recognized by China :

1. The properties of the said company [the Chinese Eastern Railway] originally acquired shall be maintained.

2. Except the lands directly required for use by the company and the buildings thereon, the drawing up of plans for the establishment of markets, ports, towns, or villages and their construction work, connected therewith as well as all other administrative affairs shall be undertaken by the Chinese authorities; the said company shall not be allowed at their own will to take up such matters.

3. In case of letting land of the said company or transfer of other unmovable properties or privileges, the Chinese official departments concerned shall be petitioned for sanction and registration before they can be considered valid. Regarding the land leased or let in the past such applications for sanction or registration shall be made to complete the procedure now required.

4. For the purpose of working for the prosperity and maintenance of the local market, the property owners shall have the obligation to obey the orders or prohibitions concerning administrative establishment and to pay taxes imposed by the Chinese authorities in connection therewith, or imposed for the purpose of promoting public welfare.

5. All the above provisions concern purely China's administrative rights and should be carried out forthwith.<sup>1</sup>

This high-handed action on the part of Chang Tso-lin happened at a time when Karakhan, the Soviet plenipotentiary, was on his way to Peking to negotiate a treaty with China. We shall see later that it was the intention of this clever diplomat to reach an understanding first with the satrap of Monchuria with regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway. But in this he failed, and one of the obstacles that prevented the consummation of this understanding was presumably the seizure of the Land Office of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The final settlement of this question will be dealt with in the following chapter.

<sup>1</sup> *North-China Herald*, Feb. 23, 1924.

## CHAPTER VII

### CHINESE-RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY, 1917-1924

#### THE SUSPENSION OF RECOGNITION OF THE RUSSIAN MINISTER AND CONSULS IN CHINA

THE disintegration of Russia created a new situation in regard to the legal status of Russians in China. Under treaty stipulations, Russian citizens, like the nationals of other treaty powers in China, had hitherto been enjoying the privileges of extraterritoriality. But with the overthrow of the government of the Czar by the Revolution of 1917, until the conclusion of the Sino-Russian Treaty in 1924, there was in Russia no legally constituted government which the Chinese Government could hold responsible. Consequently, China had to adopt a novel scheme of administration of the Russian population in China at large and principally in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone. In point of fact, however, the Chinese Government continued to recognize, for some time after the Bolshevist Revolution, the imperial Russian representative at Peking. Prince Koudachev, whose attitude towards the new Government in Russia was defined by his refusal to comply with the two telegrams sent by Trotsky, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, for his recall. So he continued to function on behalf of Russian interests in China. He signed, for instance, on November 20, 1917, with the representatives of the other Allied governments, the agreement deferring the payment by China of the Boxer Indemnity for five years, the specific understanding with Russia being that only the payment of a portion of the Russian share was to be postponed, the balance to be deposited



with the Russo-Chinese Bank and to be later transferred to a future Russian Government recognized by China. He also signed, on December 19, 1918, with the other powers, the agreement with China as regards the revision of the import tariff. He protested against the application of the revised tariff to the Russo-Chinese land frontier trade. He took a prominent part in the Armistice celebration at Peking, and was awarded, by the president of China, the highest decoration in commemoration of this event. His assistance was also requested by the Chinese Government to suppress the activities of the Bolsheviks in China.

But with the ascendancy of the Bolsheviks in Russia and in Siberia, China's attitude towards the old Russian order underwent a marked change. Meanwhile, the Soviets had made their overtures to China, agreeing to cancel the extraterritorial privileges and abrogate all the unequal treaties made by China with Czarist Russia. A trade mission headed by Yourin had already been permitted to come to Peking, and on its arrival the delegates did not fail to discredit their political opponents to the best of their ability. In view of these circumstances, China realized that her chance had come to reassert her sovereign rights. The Mongolian treaty had already been abrogated which echoed only in a dim murmur of protest from the Russian Minister. On August 1, 1920, the payment of the Russian share of the Boxer Indemnity to the Russo-Asiatic Bank, as agreed upon in 1917, was suspended. The 1881 treaty of St. Petersburg was violated by the establishment of customhouses and the collection of taxes along the western frontier, and a new agreement was reached between the Tuchun of Sinkiang and the plenipotentiaries of the Tashkent Soviets. All these acts served as an augury to the suspension of the recognition of the Russian Legation and Consulates in China.

The position of the Russian Legation and Consulates was brought into question early in September, 1920, when, under instructions of the Waichiaopu, a Russian Legation telegram in code was returned by the Chinese telegraph authorities with a notification to the effect that hereafter no Russian Legation telegrams would be accepted. Against this stoppage of telegrams Prince Koudachev protested to Dr. W. W. Yen, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, who gave out the reason that this action was taken in view of the fact that code telegrams from the Russian Legation might be connected with political activities and cause difficulty with local Chinese authorities. During the latter part of the conversation, Dr. Yen suggested that to simplify matters Prince Koudachev voluntarily retire. Prince Koudachev told Dr. Yen, however, of his obligation to the three hundred thousand Russians in China, and added that a termination of his position would only be brought about by his recall from a future Russian Government or by the severance of diplomatic relations by China. In a subsequent note to the minister of foreign affairs, Prince Koudachev presumed that Dr. Yen's conversation was an official intimation from the Chinese Government, withholding his recognition, and he also expressed his willingness to retire but refused to give up his position voluntarily.<sup>1</sup>

On September 23, 1920, a Presidential mandate embodying the following petition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was issued:

In the course of the last years many organizations have appeared in Russia which are at war with each other; party strifes took place and no united government, expressing the will of the people, has been constituted until now. It is therefore difficult for the time being to restore regular diplomatic relations between China and Russia. With regard to the diplomatic and consular officers primarily appointed by Russia to China, they have long

<sup>1</sup> *North-China Herald*, Oct. 2, 1919.



ago lost their representative character and have indeed no ground to continue discharging the responsible duties devolving upon them. Declarations in this sense have been made personally to the Russian Minister in Peking; the Ministry therefore requests the immediate promulgation of a mandate, announcing the suspension of the recognition of the Russian Minister and Consuls in China.<sup>1</sup>

The mandate then proceeds to speak of China's friendship for the Russians and her desire to preserve neutrality towards the internal strife now raging in Russia, and, in granting the Waichiaopu's request says:

The contents of the report quoted above certainly correspond to the true condition of affairs. Considering the geographical proximity of China and Russia and their ancient friendship, China, while now ceasing to recognize the Russian Minister and Consuls, nevertheless preserves, with regard to Russian citizens, the same friendly feelings as before.

Therefore efficient measures towards the safeguarding of the persons and property of peaceful Russian citizens residing in China must be taken as before. As for the civil war, which is taking place in Russia, China has hitherto observed neutrality and directed herself by the attitude of the powers of the Entente. The corresponding departments and chief provincial authorities are being instructed to devise adequate measures with regard to questions concerning Russian concessions, and land territory of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Russian citizens residing everywhere in China."<sup>2</sup>

On receipt of this mandate, Prince Koudachev addressed a note to the Waichiaopu on September 24, 1920, to the effect that he would inform by wire all the Russian consuls in China of this decree for the

<sup>1</sup> *North-China Herald*, Oct. 2, 1919; "China Year Book," 1921-1922, p. 626.

<sup>2</sup> "China Year Book," 1921-1922, p. 626.

information of the Russian citizens sojourning within their consular districts. The note went on with the protest, however, that as Russian citizens in China would henceforth be deprived of any official Russian protection, it was hoped that the Chinese Government would be careful to have the order of the president, embodied in the decree above-mentioned, thoroughly executed in regard to efficient measures towards the safeguarding of the persons and property of peaceful Russian citizens. The note also begged to affirm that this safeguarding must be based on the exact application of the *status quo* of the Russo-Chinese treaties, and warned the Chinese Government that all infringements which had been made in the last few years upon the Russo-Chinese treaties could only become lawful when they should have been agreed to by a regular all-Russian Government, recognized as such by the Chinese Government. The note then concluded with an enumeration of the treaties alleged to have been violated by China. A copy of this note was also communicated to the dean of the Diplomatic Corps, together with a notification that his mission in China had been terminated.<sup>1</sup>

This unprecedented departure from customary diplomatic practice on the part of China called forth a hurricane of protests, especially from the Legation Quarter and the foreign communities. The *North-China Daily News* took the lead in championing the Russian cause. One of its editorials said :

No protestations of the Waichiaopu, no honey-phrasing of Presidential mandates, can alter the fact that it is not the same for foreigners to be "protected" by a Chinese official as by their own nationals; that such protection is not only not in harmony with extraterritorial rights but is a flat violation of them; and if the blow thus aimed at Russians in China be not quickly countered and their extraterritorial status fully secured, the other powers

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1921-1922, pp. 626, 627.



will very soon have cause to regret their shortsightedness. What treaty is safe if this breach of faith on China's part passes unchallenged?<sup>1</sup>

The challenge was taken up by the heads of missions at Peking, in compliance with the request of Prince Koudachev that they should assert their influence in devising an arrangement satisfactory to the Russian citizens in China. The American Legation unofficially proposed, shortly after the breach of relations, the internationalizing of the Russian Concession. This was objected to by the Waichiaopu on the ground that it would complicate matters, for China as sole trustee could with the greatest facility restore the Concession when the proper moment arrived, whereas if the control were centered in an international body international negotiations would be necessary with all the formality and delay associated with international procedure.<sup>2</sup>

In its note of October 11, 1920, the Diplomatic Corps communicated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they would be glad to receive an official confirmation of the verbal assurances given to them by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the measures taken by the Chinese Government in compliance with the aforesaid Presidential mandate, might in no case constitute a permanent amendment of the legal status of Russians, recognized by treaty, but must be considered purely provisional and subject to the agreement of the future officially recognized Russian Government. They further suggested that the provisional *modus vivendi* for the administration of Russian interests should be elaborated by agreement between the Chinese Government and the Diplomatic Body.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *North-China Herald*, Sept. 30, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> "China Year Book," 1921-1922, p. 629.

In reply to this memorandum, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his note of October 22, 1920, stated that this action taken by the Chinese Government was nothing new. They were simply following the precedent of other countries so as to avoid practical difficulties. And it was argued that the Presidential mandate of September 23 produced no rupture of China's treaty relations with Russia. It constituted but merely an interregnum and did not contemplate to abrogate the Russian treaties. Hence Russian citizens might continue to enjoy the rights derived from these treaties. However, the Chinese Government would take over the management of all the administrative affairs within their limits temporarily without introducing any changes, reserving to itself, in the meantime, the right to modify and improve existing conditions according to circumstances. Russian Government property would also be held in trust by the Chinese Government until such time as a recognized government should exist. Russian consular jurisdiction should naturally cease. In cases when the plaintiffs were foreigners and the defendants Russians, Russian laws would be applied, provided that these laws were not in conflict with Chinese legal rights. The Chinese law courts might engage special persons well versed in Russian laws to assist in the adjudication of these cases. The Chinese Government manifested its readiness to negotiate in good time with every Minister should the interests of his nationals be affected by this suspension of the official recognition of the Russian Minister and Consuls. In view of these measures, the Minister of Foreign Affairs concluded that they could see no need for negotiating with the Diplomatic Body a provisional method for governing Russians.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1921-1922, p. 629.



This reply was not very satisfactory to the foreign Ministers. They pointed out to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the measures already adopted by the Chinese Government contradicted these assurances. They mentioned, for instance, the fact that the Russians had now been deprived of right secured by treaties to trial both in civil and criminal cases by Russian law courts and according to Russian laws. They mentioned also the newly organized judiciary in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone by which Russian citizens were deprived of their own law courts and subjected to the jurisdiction of Chinese courts, and the taking over of the municipal administration of the Russian Concession at Tientsin. Furthermore, they brought forth the difficulties with regard to documents relating to personal estates, notaries public in the Concessions, documents of personal identification, passports, contracts, and other official papers which the contemplated *modus vivendi* did not cover. Therefore, the Diplomatic Body suggested that the following amendments to the measures already taken by the Chinese Government be considered: First, with regard to the Concessions, they proposed that the Chinese Government recognize the competence of Russian police in their own concessions, who were to be responsible to the municipal courts only, and that the latter were to function on the basis of existing rules and regulations; second, with regard to jurisdiction, they proposed that China retain, as far as possible, the former law courts both as to institutions and as to staff, to act henceforth in the name of China, but to apply Russian law, and to deal with cases between Russians and eventually between Russians and foreigners, disputes arising between Russians and Chinese to be examined by mixed courts, composed locally of Chinese and Russian judges; third, with regard to the functions of notaries public, and administrative functions, it was proposed by the Diplomatic

Body that posts of Russian advisers attached to the Chinese Commissioners of Foreign Affairs be instituted in places where there was a considerable Russian population. These advisers were to discharge administrative functions and to act as notaries public for Russian citizens. Finally, the note went on to suggest that, in order to coördinate and control the activities of these different institutions, a special bureau for Russian affairs composed of Russian advisers and presided over by a high Chinese official be created in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>1</sup>

In answer to this memorandum of the Diplomatic Body the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs made a lengthy reply politely rejecting every proposal brought up by them in the foregoing note. In this memorandum the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs maintained that, situated as China was at the present time and in the absence of a responsible Russian authority, the Chinese Government could not do otherwise than to assume jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases in which Russian nationals were involved.

As to Russian courts in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs made an important point, that

the Russian law courts in the leased territory of the Chinese Eastern Railway are based neither on the contract for the construction of this railway, nor on the treaty provisions relating to consular jurisdiction. They were established by the Russians in an arbitrary way, and the consent of the Chinese Government has never been obtained to them. Such an encroachment on treaty stipulations was, properly speaking, an infringement of the sovereign rights of China. Both the President of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company and the local authorities had, even before the withdrawal of the official recognition of the Russian Minister and Consuls, repeatedly raised the question of the closing of these law courts with the [local] Russian Consul. Thus, a decision with regard to this question had been arrived at long ago

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1921-1922, p. 631.



and the corresponding measures are in no wise a result of the withdrawal of recognition. These measures and the withdrawal of recognition are two entirely separate questions and their motives are quite clear.<sup>1</sup>

As regards the municipal administration of the Russian Concession at Tientsin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the existing rules and regulations had already been allowed to remain temporarily in force, but maintained that the representative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had replaced the Russian Consul, should certainly have the right to control all matters. He should also have charge of all the passports and other personal documents; measures regulating these would be in conformity with the fundamental Russian consular regulations so that there would be no inconvenience to the Russian residents in China and no impairment of the interests of foreigners who had business dealings with the Russians.<sup>2</sup> Although interfering as little as possible in the competence of the municipality, the Chinese Government, nevertheless, felt that it must assume the policing of the districts in the Concessions in accordance with the spirit of the laws. As to the establishment of Chinese courts to replace the Russian courts in the special Manchurian region, the note said that care had already been taken to model them on the former Russian law courts, respecting their organization and location. Furthermore, Russian advisers and investigators of all grades and Russian interpreters and clerks had been engaged with a view to increasing the efficiency of the judiciary. The Russian notaries public had been allowed to function as before. A special commission had been appointed to study the Russian questions. In view of these measures already taken, the Minister of Foreign Affairs

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1921-1922, p. 632.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 652.

said that he could not see the feasibility of calling a mixed conference which would not only complicate matters, but also question the sovereign rights of China. The appointment of legal advisers and investigators fell within the province of the judiciary which must be allowed to act independently. The power of appointment of Russian advisers to assist the Commissioners of Foreign Affairs belonged to the executive authority; it must, therefore, be under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In general, the Chinese Government assured the representatives of the powers that in all matters touching their interests utmost caution would be taken and requested that they put themselves in China's position and consider carefully the foregoing declarations.<sup>1</sup>

The Diplomatic Body, in a third memorandum, dated December 14, 1920, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that these "benevolent" assurances of the Chinese Government had been received with great satisfaction and hoped that they would be put into practice. In addition, they asked the Chinese government for details concerning the question of the application of laws.<sup>2</sup>

To this question, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that the "Rules for the Application of Foreign Laws,"<sup>3</sup> promulgated on August 15, 1918, had reference to cases involving private international law, and were, therefore, to be applied in all cases where questions of private international law were at issue. These laws, in six chapters, aim at obviating conflicts between Chinese and foreign legislations in the domain of private international law. They are intended for nationalities who do not enjoy extraterritorial rights. It is noticeable that these provisions

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1921-1922, p. 633.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 635.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*



deal only with civil law. In criminal cases involving citizens of nonextraterritorial nations, the Chinese Government has practically adopted the existing Chinese Provisional Criminal Code, which came into use since 1915; provision has been made by Presidential mandate of December 30, 1920, to this effect, "that, hereafter, if a citizen of a nonextraterritorial nation is convicted of a crime that carries with it the death penalty, according to Chinese law, the death penalty shall be imposed upon the offender, if the laws of his own country provide for the death penalty; and if they do not that a sentence of life imprisonment be imposed in lieu thereof."<sup>1</sup> This modification was adopted by the Chinese Government with the view to bringing about as near as possible a state of similarity between Chinese and foreign criminal procedures, thus preparing the way for the withdrawal of extraterritoriality in China.

From these notes we gather that theoretically, as a result of the suspension of the official recognition of the Russian Minister and Consuls, the extraterritorial rights of Russians secured under treaties with China would be in abeyance, that Russian jurisdiction cease, and that the administration of Russian property and Concessions would be undertaken by China acting as trustee for the Russian Government. The supervision of these properties and Concessions was to be intrusted to the Chinese Foreign Commissioner, sympathetically inclined and suited to the task, who would succeed to the duties and functions of the former Russian Consul, but the machinery of local self-government, the imposition and determination of the degree of taxation, the election of local officers by the taxpayers, under the existing suffrage provision, would not be affected and would remain in force, but should circumstances warrant, the Chinese Government might

<sup>1</sup> *Official Gazette*, Publications, Eng., No. 7, Jan. 9, 1921.

adopt proposals for the improvement and smooth working of the administration. The policing of the Concession in accordance with the spirit of the law and the sovereign rights of China would be exercised, however, by the Chinese authority. In suits brought by subjects of foreign powers against Russians, which would be tried in the Russian courts, Russian law might be applied in so far as they were in consonance with the exercise of Chinese authority and within the provision of the rules for the application of foreign laws promulgated by the Chinese Government on August 15, 1918.

#### SOVIET-CHINESE NEGOTIATIONS

While China was trying to sever her relations with old Russia, new Russia had been flirting with the Chinese Government and the bases of the Soviet-Chinese negotiations, leading up to the conclusion of the Agreement on General Principles on May 31, 1924, between China and Soviet Russia, were the Soviet declarations of 1919 and 1920. They came at a time when public opinion in China was aroused to the highest pitch of righteous indignation against the predatoriness of Western secret diplomacy as seen in the decisions of the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded Shantung, China's cradle of civilization, to Japan, in spite of President Wilson's Fourteen Points of self-determination and of racial and national equality. In other words, the same old story of Occidental imperialism was told there in the settlement of Far Eastern problems, resulting from the war, the great powers having in the meantime forgotten their sweet promises which induced China to cast in her lot with the Allies. Now in tantalizing contrast to these violations of good faith and international morality came the unprecedented overtures of the Soviets, which sounded to the Chinese ear, as remarked by



Dr. Dennis, like "a new diplomatic Magna Carta."<sup>1</sup>

The first declaration announced that

all people, whether they are great or small, whether they have lived until now a free life, or whether they form against their own will a part of another country, shall be free in their inner life and no power shall interfere with them within this limit. The Government of Workers and Peasants has then declared null and void all the secret treaties concluded with Japan, China and the ex-allies, the treaties which were to enable the Russian Government of the Tsar and his allies to enslave the people of the East and principally the people of China by intimidating or buying them for the sole interests of the capitalists, financiers, and the Russian generals. The Soviet Government invites, henceforth, the Chinese Government to enter into negotiations with the object of canceling the treaty of 1896, the protocol of Peking of 1901, and all the agreements concluded with Japan from 1907 to 1916. That is to say, to give back to the Chinese people all the power and authority which were obtained by the government of the Tsar by tricks or by entering into understandings with Japan and the allies. . . .

We herewith address the Chinese people with the object of making them thoroughly understand that the Soviet Government has given up all the conquests made by the government of the Tsar which took away from China Manchuria and other territories. . . .

The Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people, without demanding any kind of compensation, the Chinese Eastern Railway as well as all the mining concessions, forestry, gold mines, and all other things which were seized from them by the government of the Tsar, that of Kerensky, and the brigands, Horvath, Semenov, Koltchak, the Russian Ex-generals, merchants, and capitalists.

The Soviet Government gives up the indemnities payable by China for the insurrection of Boxers in 1900. . . .

The Soviet Government has abolished all the special privileges and all the factories owned by the Russian merchants in the Chinese territory; no Russian official, priest, or missionary should be allowed to interfere with Chinese affairs; and if they should commit any crime, they must be judged according to the local laws in local law courts. No authority or law court should be allowed to exist in China except the authority of the Chinese people.

<sup>1</sup> A. L. P. Dennis, "Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia," p. 316.

Besides these principal points, the Soviet Government represented by its plenipotentiaries, is ready to negotiate with the Chinese people all the other questions and to settle once for all, all the cases of acts of violence and injustice which were committed towards China by the former government of Russia, acting together with Japan and the Allies.<sup>1</sup>

The second declaration began with a long digression, regretting that an early rapprochement between China and Soviet Russia had been delayed; and now, with the object of hastening the establishment of friendship between the two Republics the Soviet Government declared more specifically the following main points of agreement abiding by those principles laid down in the first declaration of 1919:

Article 1. The government of the Socialist Federated Soviet Republics declares null and void all the treaties concluded with China by the former governments of Russia, renounces all seizure of Chinese territory and all Russian concessions in China and restores to China without any compensation and forever, all that had been predatorily seized from her by the Czar's government and the Russian bourgeoisie.

Article 2. The governments of both republics shall take necessary measures for immediately establishing regular trade and economic relations. A special treaty to this effect shall be subsequently concluded on the principle of the clause of the most-favored nation, applying to both contracting parties.

Article 3. The Chinese Government pledges itself: (1) not to proffer any aid to Russian counter-revolutionary individuals, groups or organizations, not to allow their activities in Chinese territory; (2) to disarm, intern and hand over to the government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics all the detachments and organizations to be found in Chinese territory at the time of the signing of this treaty which are fighting against the R. S. F. S. R. or states allied with her, and to give over to the Government of the R. S. F. S. R. all their arms, munitions and property.<sup>2</sup>

Article 4. All the Russian citizens residing in China shall be subject to all the laws and regulations acting in the territory of

<sup>1</sup> For text, see "China Year Book," 1924, p. 868.

<sup>2</sup> This clause is reciprocal, a sub-paragraph to this effect having admittedly been omitted.



the Chinese Republic, and shall not enjoy any rights of extraterritoriality. The Chinese citizens residing in Russia shall be subject to all the laws and regulations acting in the territory of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics.

Article 5. The government of the Chinese Republic pledges itself: (1) immediately upon the signing of the present treaty to sever connections with persons styling themselves as diplomatic and consular representatives of the R. S. F. S. R. and to deport such persons from China; (2) to hand over to the Russian state, in the person of the R. S. F. S. R., the buildings of the Embassy and consulates and other property and archives of the same situated in Chinese territory and belonging to Russia.

Article 6. The government of the R. S. F. S. R. renounces any compensation paid out by China as indemnity for the Boxer rising, provided that under no circumstances shall the government of the Chinese Republic pay any money to the former Russian consuls or to any other persons or Russian organizations putting up illegal claims thereto.

Article 7. Following immediately upon the signing of the present treaty, there shall be mutually established diplomatic and consular representatives of the Republic of China and the R. S. F. S. R. The Russian and the Chinese Government agree to sign a special treaty on the way of working of the Chinese Eastern Railway with due regard to the needs of the R. S. F. S. R., and, in the conclusion of the treaty there shall take part, besides China and Russia, also the Far Eastern Republic.<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately, the Chinese Government did not take these declarations very seriously, otherwise much future controversy would have been avoided. But China's position was a difficult one. On the one hand, there was the representative of the old Russian régime still claiming *de jure* recognition with the strong support of his colleagues at Peking. On the other hand, there was the representative of the new order demanding the recognition of a government *de facto* with valuable presents which China had not expected. The Chinese Government was therefore in a difficult position. A breach with the old government would not only mean the displeasure of the powers but also an

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1924, p. 870.

exceedingly hazardous thing to do, for the new government was still an unknown quantity. A *liaison* with the new government was likewise hazardous; for the life of the old government was not yet extinct and it might eventually come back again, in which event China would have to pay a heavy penalty for such a precipitate action. China got out of the quandary, however, by pursuing a middle course. As we have seen, she suspended the recognition of the Russian Minister and Consuls in China, and took over all the Russian interests under her own care pending the establishment of a legally constituted Russian government recognized by China. But as the Soviets were gradually gaining ascendancy and the imperialists and reactionaries were daily losing ground, China's attitude became correspondingly favorable to the former and unfavorable to the latter.

Meanwhile, when the Soviets had found out that their efforts to Bolshevize Europe must needs end in failure, they at once doubled their attention to the revolutionary East, especially China. Through their vassal, the Far Eastern Republic, M. Yourin was dispatched to China on a trade mission. The Japanese and French Ministers at Peking at first succeeded in preventing the Chinese Government from resuming friendly relations with this satellite of Moscow. Upon their protests passports to proceed to Peking from Kiakhta were denied members of the Yourin mission. This unfriendly action was resented by the Far Eastern Republic, which protested strongly on the ground that, as Russia allowed Chinese subjects to go to her territory, reciprocity demanded a like courtesy to Russians proceeding to Chinese territory. To get over this difficulty, China decided to send a Chinese envoy to Kiakhta to confer with the Yourin mission there on business matters. The trip of the Chinese envoy was postponed, however, on the outbreak of hostilities between the Chihli and Anfu parties. But, with the



cessation of military operations and the reorganization of the Cabinet, the question of a trade agreement with the Far Eastern Republic came up again. This time the Chinese Government had decided to receive the mission at Peking, the Japanese and the French representatives having withdrawn their objections on condition that no political questions be discussed.

As a preliminary to a commercial agreement, China outlined four points as a basis for negotiations: first, no Bolshevist propaganda was to be undertaken by the mission; second, payment of an indemnity by the Far Eastern Republic for losses and damages suffered by Chinese merchants in Siberia; third, the protection of Chinese in Siberia and the removal of certain restrictions against Chinese in Russia; fourth, the settlement of certain specified incidents and the measures to be taken to prevent their recurrence.<sup>1</sup> M. Yourin signified his willingness to negotiate along these lines, but the Chinese Government wanted, in addition to verbal assurances, proofs of his government's sincerity which M. Yourin could not readily furnish and the matter dragged on for months without any concrete results.

In Turkestan, at this time, it was urgent that some sort of agreement had to be reached. Owing to its proximity to the Russian border Turkestan had become a natural retreating ground for the Russian defeated soldiers and due to the disturbances caused by the intense internal struggle then going on between the Whites and the Reds, Sino-Russia land trade had suffered enormously. In order to ameliorate these conditions, the tuchun of Chinese Turkestan found it necessary to enter into an agreement with the Tashkent Soviets to the effect that reciprocal bureaus of trade and foreign affairs should be established both in

<sup>1</sup> Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

Chinese and Russian Turkestan; that Russians transporting goods from Russia to Ili and vice versa should abide by the general tax regulations of Sinkiang and the Maritime Customs Tariff of China; that trade should pass through the barrier Nikau, those taking a circuitous route to be confiscated; that all the civil and criminal cases should be tried by the law courts of the locality concerned; that passports should be provided for citizens of both countries crossing the frontier of the other; and that defeated soldiers and refugees returning to Russia should not be molested.<sup>1</sup> This provisional agreement was approved by the Chinese Government which took care at the same time to deny that it was in any way connected with the Yourin mission or the recognition of the Soviet Government.

Encouraged by this stride forward towards a possible rapprochement with China, the Soviets replaced the Far Eastern Republic trade mission with one of their own, headed by M. Joffe, who was formerly a professor of international law in Russia, and who had since the Revolution made a name for himself in the negotiation of the Soviet-German Trade Agreement and sundry others of importance. Before his arrival in Peking, he made a series of speeches denouncing Western imperialism and preaching the Russian gospel of the liberation of mankind. He was greeted with vociferous welcome by the Chinese intellectuals on his arrival at Peking.

In a memorandum to the Waichiaopu, dated September 2, M. Joffe proposed to commence negotiations on the basis of the Karakhan declarations of 1919 and 1920. The Chinese Foreign Office raised at once the question of the presence of Red troops in Mongolia and demanded their immediate evacuation as a condition to the negotiations. M. Joffe retorted

<sup>1</sup> *North-China Herald*, Sept. 25, 1920.



that no separate question should be picked out of the complexus of questions, and also pointed out to the Chinese Government that "the stationing of Russian troops in Mongolia concerns Chinese interests no less than the Russian interests, and while in the name of my Government, I reject energetically the demand of their withdrawal from Urga, the only reason is that I am totally convinced that not only would this be impossible at the present moment, from the viewpoint of Russian interests, but that it would be impossible also from the viewpoint of real Chinese national interests rightly understood—to let alone the interests of the people of Mongolia still energetically demanding that Russian forces be left in Outer Mongolia. It is clear to every one who would take the trouble of carefully and substantially studying this question that the demand to withdraw these troops serves but the interests of only our enemies both of Russia and China and of Mongolia herself." The weakness of this argument is obvious from the fact that the Whites no longer had either men or money to carry on an assault on Russia, and if they had, Mongolia would be the last place from which to make such an experiment.

Another obstacle, which stood in the way of an understanding between China and Soviet Russia, lay in the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In spite of the fact that, according to an unofficial investigation by Mr. Stevens, the railway was as efficiently run as ever, M. Joffe, in a note to the Chinese Government, accused M. Oustroumov, the Engineer-in-Chief, of being guilty of the most corrupt practices, and he declared that if he and his more intimate colleagues were left any longer in charge they would compromise the finances of the railway so deeply as to bring about a catastrophe. In view of this situation, he urged the adoption of the following measures: first, the present management should be immediately ended and M. Oustroumov arrested

and tried; second, a Chinese commission should be dispatched to Harbin to carry out a searching inquiry before it was too late; and third, a new management should be provisionally established pending the settlement of this question at the coming Russo-Chinese Conference.<sup>1</sup>

The Chinese Government in reply to this note stated that all necessary reforms towards an efficient administration and working of the Chinese Eastern Railway had been introduced within the last two years and that, in view of the present complaint, the Chinese Government would see to the alleged corruption of the administration accordingly. And, in concluding this memorandum, the Chinese Government asked M. Joffe to declare that the Soviet Government would return the railway without compensation as enunciated in the 1919 and 1920 declarations which, according to the Chinese Government, was the only solution of the Chinese Eastern Railway problem.<sup>2</sup>

After the dispatch of this note there ensued for the first time the controversy over the Karakhan declarations. "By these declarations," he wrote in his memorandum to the Chinese Government on November 10, 1922:

Russia has denounced the predatory and violent policy of the Czar's Government and promised to renounce those rights which had accrued to Russia from this policy. But, first, until all these questions shall have been settled on a free accord between Russia and China, Russia's rights in China will not have lost their strength; and secondly, these declarations do not annul Russia's legal and just rights in China. In particular, for instance, even if Russia vests in the Chinese people her title to the Chinese Eastern Railway, this will not annul Russia's interests in this line, which is a portion of the Great Siberian Railway and unites one part of the Russian territory with another.

<sup>1</sup> *North-China Herald*, Nov. 7, 1922.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*



And in conclusion he said that he deemed it necessary to emphasize that

The promises stipulated in the Declarations of 1919 and 1920, which the Workers' and Peasants' Government still recognizes as binding to-day, cannot after all be valid forever and that, therefore, unless the Chinese Government discontinues its ignoring of Russian interests, Russia will perhaps after all be obliged to consider herself free from these promises which she voluntarily gave.<sup>1</sup>

With regard to the rendition of the Chinese Eastern Railway to China, M. Joffe categorically disavowed the most important clause of the first declaration, stipulating the restoration of the railway without compensation. He said that in the declaration the Soviet Government had merely laid down a fundamental program as to her foreign policy towards China and that it had made no concrete nor detailed conditions whatsoever. The Chinese Government pointed out, however, that Article I of the 1920 Declaration specifically announced that the Soviet Government would declare null and void all the treaties concluded between China and Czarist Russia, and renounce all the seizures of Chinese territory and concessions, and restore to China, without compensation, all whatsoever that had been predatorily seized by the old Russian Government. M. Joffe retorted that such was made conditional by Article III of the same declaration in which China declared its intention to disarm, intern, and hand over all the White Russian forces against Soviet Russia and its allies, and these he alleged not to have been fulfilled by China in good faith. He also pointed out the stipulation that provided for a special treaty in regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway question—a settlement which should give due consideration of the needs of the Soviet

<sup>1</sup> *North-China Herald*, Nov. 14, 1922.

Republic. In concluding his memorandum to the Waichiaopu, he denied the rumor that Soviet troops had been concentrated along the border with the intention of seizing the Chinese Eastern Railway, adding, however ominously, that "for one reason, if for no others in its actual state, the Red Army needs no preparation to occupy the Chinese Eastern Railway."<sup>1</sup>

It is clear from these notes that Joffe had given up wheedling and coaxing and was frankly bullying and browbeating China in a way that no imperialistic government, with the exception of Japan, had bullied China for the last twenty years. But by sound political intuition, the Chinese Government and the Chinese people knew that Joffe was bluffing, and bluffing awkwardly and badly, which lost him all dignity in their eyes. His few months' stay in Peking had created in the minds of the Chinese people such a strong suspicion of him that his every word and move was interpreted by the native press as prompted by ulterior and malign motives.

Finding that he could make no headway with the existing government at Peking in forwarding his imperialistic schemes, he quietly departed from Peking for Shanghai on January 16, 1924, en route to Japan, ostensibly to recuperate his health, but in reality to reach an understanding with Japan on the Chinese question. While in Shanghai, he had several conferences with Dr. Sun Yat-sen and an agreement of policy was reached between them, and the following statement was authorized for publication on January 26, 1924:

During his stay in Shanghai, Mr. Joffe has had several conversations with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which have revealed the identity of their views on matters relating to Chinese-Russian relations, more especially on the following points:

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1924, p. 862.



(1) Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding this great task, he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia.

(2) In order to clarify the situation, Dr. Sun Yat-sen has requested of Mr. Joffe a reaffirmation of the principles defined in the Russian Note to the Chinese Government, dated September 27, 1920. Mr. Joffe has accordingly reaffirmed these principles and categorically declared to Dr. Sun Yat-sen that the Russian government is ready and willing to enter into negotiations with China on the basis of the renunciation by Russia of all the treaties and exactions which the Tsardom imposed on China, including the treaty or treaties and agreements relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway [the management of which was the subject of a specific reference in Article VII of the said Note].

(3) Recognizing that the Chinese Eastern Railway question in its entirety can be settled only at a competent Russo-Chinese Conference, Dr. Sun Yat-sen is of opinion that the realities of the situation point to the desirability of a *modus vivendi* in the matter of the present management of the Railway. And he agrees with Mr. Joffe that the existing railway management should be temporarily reorganized by agreement between the Chinese and the Russian Government without prejudice, however, to the true rights and special interests of either party. At the same time Dr. Sun Yat-sen considers that General Chang Tso-lin should be consulted on the point.

(4) Mr. Joffe has categorically declared to Dr. Sun Yat-sen (who has fully satisfied himself as to this) that it is not and has never been the intention and purpose of the present Russian Government to pursue an imperialistic policy in Outer Mongolia or to cause it to secede from China. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, therefore, does not view an immediate evacuation of Russian troops from Outer Mongolia as either imperative or in the real interest of China, the more so on account of the inability of the present Government at Peking to prevent such an evacuation being followed by a recrudescence of intrigues and hostile activities by White Guardists against Russia and the creation of a grave situation than that which now exists.

Mr. Joffe has parted from Dr. Sun Yat-sen on the most cordial and friendly terms. On leaving Japan, to which he is now

proceeding, he will again visit the south of China before finally returning to Peking.<sup>1</sup>

The Chinese were apprehensive of Joffe's visit to Japan, fearing that he might conclude an agreement with Japan inimical to the interests of China. This fear was aggravated by the rumor which had been circulated that Joffe was negotiating a transfer of the Harbin-Changchun section of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan. Accordingly, Joffe was warned by some members of the Chinese Parliament that any agreement which he might reach with Japan would not be recognized by China. Joffe maintained, however, that his Japanese visit was purely for reasons of health and was in no way connected with politics. The Soviet mission also informed the Waichiaopu that negotiations would be resumed immediately upon the return of Joffe.

But the Chinese were not to be so easily deceived. They knew that Goto was the moving spirit of Joffe's visit to Japan and that he was strongly in favor of a rapprochement between Tokyo and Moscow. Chinese diplomacy was equal to the occasion, when the Waichiaopu sent, on March 10, a note to the Japanese Government formally demanding the abrogation of the Twenty-One Demands of 1915. This was met, as predicted, with a categorical refusal by the Japanese Government. Thereupon, a country-wide agitation was staged against Japan as a protest, and May 7, the National Day of Humiliation, was taken advantage of to bring the anti-Japanese movement into renewed vigor.

In Japan, unofficial negotiations were started between Mayor Goto and M. Joffe, but the time was not ripe for an agreement to be reached. This might be evidenced that Japanese anti-Bolsheviks stoned

<sup>1</sup>*North-China Herald*, Feb. 3, 1923; "China Year Book," 1924, p. 863.



Mayor Goto's house and wrecked his furniture for bringing Joffe there to transform Japan as they alleged into a communistic state. Joffe was in the meantime running the gauntlet in Japan. In Atani the morning following his arrival, he woke up to see the main street and every available billboard, etc., placarded with diatribes against the "Soviet Devil who is here to organize a communistic movement and ruin Japan and the bone-head of mayor that Fate has inflicted upon us."

Meanwhile, during Joffe's absence in Japan, it was proposed by the Soviet Government that the negotiations be transferred to Moscow. This was rejected by the Chinese Government, which had in the meantime named Dr. C. T. Wang as head of the Russo-Chinese Negotiations Commission. Joffe was accordingly notified of this appointment, and he replied that the negotiations would be opened as soon as he was able to get out of bed. But Moscow knew that Joffe had made a mess out of the Chinese situation, which was the last thing the Soviet Government desired. Rumors had it for some time that M. Karakhan had been appointed to take Joffe's place. This was confirmed during the latter part of July, and on September 2, Karakhan arrived at Peking accompanied by a large retinue.

Before Karakhan came to Peking, he stopped at Mukden, where he had an interview with Chang Tso-lin. It was generally believed that it was his intention to reach a favorable understanding with the Manchurian war lord first on all questions concerning Manchuria, including the Chinese Eastern Railway, and then with this agreement he would advance upon Peking and coerce the latter to indorse it, or he would support the autonomy of Manchuria, which would leave China out of the bargain altogether. But evidently having found the Manchurian atmosphere not very congenial to his secret aspirations, he stopped at Mukden only for a short time. However, a timely illness which came

upon Madame Karakhan gave him good reason to postpone his departure from Mukden for another twenty-four hours to give Chang another day to think over his proposals; but Chang did not change his mind, and presumably the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company's Land Office was the main stumblingblock.

In his first official visit to the Waichiaopu on September 7, 1923, Karakhan intimated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that his government required formal recognition before negotiations. This put the Chinese Government in a nervous position. A trade agreement was one thing and the resumption of diplomatic relations was an entirely different thing. China had been watching with great care the negotiations of the British Labor Cabinet with the Soviet Government, and the furthest she could go was to follow Great Britain's example. Certain preliminary negotiations must be first entered into before she would grant *de jure* recognition. Chinese diplomats were fully aware that if they recognized the Soviet Government unconditionally they would be recognizing the Soviets as the heir to Imperialist Russia and their legal claim to all rights and properties enjoyed by the Russians in the old régime. Once this was done, China would have nothing to bargain with. The only way to deal with the Soviets was, therefore, to pin them down to sealed contracts before they were to be recognized as successor to the old government of Russia. In other words, *de jure* recognition was the peg upon which Chinese diplomats hung China's case, and they did it with consummate skill.

M. Karakhan's demand for recognition first and business afterwards showed that the old imperialist ambition was still latent in new Russia. This was made the more manifest by the distinct change of tone of the Soviet envoy. The question of a Russo-Chinese alliance, which M. Karakhan preached on his



arrival, had already dropped into the background, and notes of protest had now begun to pour into the Waichiaopu accusing the Chinese Government for not abiding by the 1919 and 1920 declarations in the refusal to hand over to the Soviet authorities certain vessels of the Russian Volunteer Fleet, which had escaped into Chinese waters after the ejection of the Whites from Vladivostok; for permitting "intolerable and barbarous" outrages to be committed against the Russians on the Chinese border, and in appropriating the indemnity funds for the payment of Czarist Russia's consular and diplomatic agents abroad. To these allegations the Chinese Government replied that as soon as it was found expedient and safe to disarm the Russian vessels without disturbing the peace and public safety of the neighboring localities, near which the above-mentioned men-of-war had taken refuge, measures would be taken to turn them over to the Soviet authorities. As regards the alleged outrages committed by the Chinese against the Russians, the Waichiaopu, after stating that orders had been issued to stop these irresponsible acts of its nationals, reminded the Soviet envoy of the fact that since the Russian Revolution many thousands of Chinese citizens, residing in Russian territory, had been subject to untold hardships and maltreatment of diverse character, to which the Chinese Government could not turn a deaf ear, and requested, therefore, that due protection and proper treatment be given to them within Russian jurisdiction. With regard to the third allegation, the Chinese Government replied that in view of the 1919 Declaration, in which Russia renounced the indemnity, it had therefore taken the liberty to assign the funds to a purpose of its own choosing.

Before a settlement of these disputes was reached, the publication of an authorized version of the 1919 and 1920 Declarations by the Soviet mission in

Peking complicated the situation, and reopened the controversy started by M. Joffe a few weeks previous as to the authenticity of these statements. According to these newly published texts the clause providing for the restoration without compensation of the Chinese Eastern Railway to China was omitted in the 1919 Declarations, and likewise the sub-paragraph of Article III of the 1920 Declaration, making the obligations regarding the suppression of activities and organizations hostile to both Governments mutual, was omitted.

The Waichiaopu contended that the 1919 Declaration was issued from Moscow on July 25, 1919, by Karakhan and received in Peking on March 26, 1920, by cable from Irkutsk by M. Yanson on behalf of the Council of Commissars of the People of Siberia and the Far East. The Chinese text of the Declaration as published by the Chinese newspapers was identical with those published by the Russian press in Harbin and elsewhere in the Russian Far East. Other things being specific, it was only natural that if it was to appeal to the public sentiment in China at all the Chinese Eastern Railway question should be included as well. Besides, the second declaration confirmed the existence of this clause. It bore the date of September 27, 1920, four days after the withdrawal of China's official recognition of Prince Koudachev. It was handed to Major General Chang Shih-lin in Moscow and brought back by him to Peking, when its receipt was formally acknowledged by the Chinese Government. It is a fact not to be overlooked that the second declaration followed so closely China's severance of official relations with the representative of the old régime. Moscow was evidently alarmed that China should work out a literal construction of the first declaration in the treatment of Russian subjects and interests in China. Hence it was found necessary to insert in the second



declaration the provision of a special treaty in the adjustment of the Chinese Eastern Railway question "with due regard for the needs of Russia."

Doubt of the Soviet Government's good faith had already been aroused when Karakhan demanded *de jure* recognition. It was now intensified by Karakhan's endeavor to reach an understanding with Japan and by the rumor of his contemplated departure from Peking. In order to hasten the commencement of negotiations, Dr. C. T. Wang was appointed head of a special commission to Japan, ostensibly to convey the condolence of the Chinese Government for the recent earthquake in Japan, but really to try to reach an understanding with Tokyo regarding Russian affairs in the Far East. But Tokyo was not in a mood to talk over matters with Wang for fear that the publication by Wang of the massacres of Chinese subjects in Japan after the earthquake would increase the anti-Japanese movement already started in China.

After Wang's return from Japan, conversations were continued with the Soviet Envoy. The latter's position was stated in a lengthy memorandum to Dr. Wang, dated November 30, in which M. Karakhan blamed the Chinese Government for delaying an early resumption of friendly relations between the two countries, and for taking part in the intervention of the Imperialist Powers, aiming at the overthrow of the Soviet Government. He still insisted that the establishment of normal relations precede the convening of the conference as "a preliminary evidence of sincerity and friendliness on the part of the Chinese Government." This he said he was bound to require in view of the many hostile acts committed, whether in concert with the other powers or on China's own account against Soviet Russia. "We made the first step in 1919 and 1920," he wrote to Dr. Wang, "it is for you now to make the second; you must restore

normal relations and the Conference will then be started immediately; and all the questions will be settled at this Conference with regard to the legitimate interests of the peoples of China and of the Union." Rejecting Dr. Wang's proposal that the question of recognition be settled, among other things, in the Conference, he said:

The difference in our views consisted not in that we proposed different ways of settling such question or others, but in that you proposed to solve all the questions immediately by way of a preliminary agreement, making this a payment for the recognition of the Soviet Republics by China, but, on the other hand, we demand that the normal relations between both the countries be established without any special pay for it. As for the essentials, I am willing to settle all the questions at the Conference just as you propose and as is necessary in the national interests of China.<sup>1</sup>

In regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway question the sincerity of the Soviet Envoy was more questionable. He wrote in this same memorandum:

Never and nowhere could I have said that all the rights on the Chinese Eastern Railway belong to China. Neither do you say this yourself, nor for that matter has it been said by any one else in China. What you wish and will strive for, is that the rights on the Chinese Eastern Railway should pass over to China, and this is exactly the reason why, for my part, considering on the assumption that rights of property on the railway as a commercial enterprise belong to the Union, I am willing to discuss at the Conference any proposition of yours, including the proposition that all the rights of the line should pass over to China, on conditions to be discussed and decided at the Conference. But even now I can confirm what was said four years ago, namely that the sovereignty of China in the territory of the Railway is fully recognized by us, and that we shall not insist on any one of these privileges which the Tsarist Government had, and which the other foreign Powers still have to-day, in the Railway zone.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1924, p. 873 ff.



Dr. Wang, in reply to this letter, first brought to the attention of M. Karakhan that discrepancies existed between the texts which the Chinese Government had previously received from Mr. Yanson and Major General Chang Shih-lin and those which he had just received from him, and that, in view of this difference, the former texts should be regarded as authoritative. Dr. Wang also mentioned that in spite of Soviet Russia's "complete friendliness," in the opinion of the Chinese people there "still leaves something to be desired, since the troops of your Government are still stationed in Chinese territory, namely in Outer Mongolia." In summing up his position Dr. Wang said:

When two nations desire to maintain friendly relations with each other it is essential that a formal agreement shall first be signed by them which may be capable of mutual observance. If, on the other hand, only the normal relations are resumed, while outstanding questions are to be left for settlement at a future date, how can the Chinese people be expected to be satisfied therewith! In my opinion, if the formal Conference could be opened at an early date, normal relations could be resumed at an early date. This would dispense with argumentation through an exchange of letters and memoranda which hardly accomplish any good to our object in view.<sup>1</sup>

Matters still dragged on for some time and the much-talked-of Conference failed to meet. Meanwhile, public opinion led by the Peking intellectuals was favorable to an understanding with Russia. Furthermore, in view of the recognition of the Soviet Government by Great Britain and Italy, China was emboldened to go a step forward toward a rapprochement with Soviet Russia. Informal conversations were then conducted by Dr. Wang and the Soviet Envoy M. Karakhan along the lines of the 1919 and 1920 Declarations. Finally, on the morning of March 16, 1924, an initialed agreement was signed by them

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1924, p. 877.

to this effect: that diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries should be immediately reëstablished upon the signing of this agreement; that one month after the signing of this agreement there should be held a Conference in which detailed arrangements with regard to the following questions should be concluded—the nullification of all the agreements, treaties, etc., entered into between China and Tsarist Russia and the replacement of new ones thereof, on the basis of equality, reciprocity, and justice, as well as the spirit of the two declarations; the conditions for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia; the redemarcation of the national boundaries of the two countries; the regulation of the navigation of rivers, lakes, and other bodies of water which were common to the respective frontiers of the two countries; the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty and a Customs Tariff for the two Contracting Parties; and the settlement of claims for losses. It was provided that the settlement of these outstanding questions were to be completed in any case not later than six months from the date of the opening of the Conference.

By this Agreement the Soviet Government agreed to renounce the Russian portion of the Boxer Indemnity and to relinquish the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction for Russian subjects in China. Both Contracting Parties also mutually declared that all the treaties, agreements, etc., concluded by each other with any third party or parties affecting the sovereign rights and interests of the two countries were null and void and that, in future, neither Contracting Party should enter into any treaty or agreement with any third party or parties prejudicial to the sovereign rights and interests of either Contracting Party. The two Governments also mutually pledged themselves not to permit the existence of activities or organizations inimical to the interests of either Contracting Party within its territory, not to engage



themselves in propaganda directed against the social or political systems of either Contracting Party.

Article V had to do with Mongolia, which was recognized by the Soviet Government as an integral part of the Republic of China. But as regards the withdrawal of Red troops from Outer Mongolia, it was stipulated that

as soon as the conditions for the withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Socialist Republics from Outer Mongolia — namely, as to the time limit of the withdrawal of such troops and the measures to be adopted in the interests of the safety of the frontiers and agreed upon at the Conference as provided in Article II of the Present Agreement, it will effect the complete withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Outer Mongolia.

Article IX, consisting of nine sub-articles, was entirely devoted to the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway which was put on a completely new basis by these stipulations. The whole article reads as follows:

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to settle at the aforementioned Conference the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway in conformity with the principles as hereinafter provided:

(1) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties declare that the Chinese Eastern Railway is a purely commercial enterprise.

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually declare that with the exception of matters pertaining to the business operations which are under the direct control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, all other matters affecting the rights of the National and Local Governments of the Republic of China — such as judicial matters, matters relating to civil administration, military administration, police, municipal government, taxation, and landed property (with the exception of lands required by the said company) — shall be administered by the Chinese authorities.

(2) The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to the redemption by the Government of the Republic of China, with Chinese capital, of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all appurtenant properties, and to the transfer to China of all shares and bonds of the said railway.

(3) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties shall settle at the Conference, as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, the amount and conditions governing the redemption as well as the procedure for the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

(4) The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to be responsible for the entire claims of the shareholders, bondholders, and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway incurred prior to the Revolution of March 9, 1917.

(5) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be determined by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China, to the exclusion of any third party or parties.

(6) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to draw up an arrangement for the provisional management of the Chinese Eastern Railway pending the settlement of the questions as provided under Section 3 of the present Article.

(7) Until the various questions, relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway are settled at the Conference as provided in Article II of the Present Agreement, the rights of the two Governments arising out of the Contract of August 27, 1896, for the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which do not conflict with the present Agreement and the Agreement for the provisional management of the said railway and which do not prejudice China's right of sovereignty, shall be maintained.<sup>1</sup>

An agreement for the provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway was also drawn up and signed by Dr. Wang and M. Karakhan. It resembled very much the Supplementary Agreement reached in 1920, with the Soviet Government, taking the place of the Russo-Asiatic Bank. But the time limit for the restoration of the railway to China, free of charge, was reduced from eighty to sixty years; all the positions of the railway should be equally divided among the Chinese and the Russians; pending the final settlement of the Chinese Eastern Railway question all the net profits of the Railway should be held by the Board of Directors; and all the questions which the Board could not decide should be referred to the two

<sup>1</sup> For text, see "China Year Book," 1924, p. 1192.



Governments for settlement; these being the main differences between this Provisional Agreement and the Supplementary Agreement of 1920.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>For text, see "China Year Book," 1924, p. 1194.

On September 20, 1924, Marshal Chang Tso-lin entered on his own responsibility another agreement with the Soviet Government. This agreement is interesting in that it was styled "An Agreement between the Autonomous Government of the Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." The main differences between this agreement and the Peking Agreement regarding the C. E. R. are summarized by Dr. Willoughby in the following:

"(1) The Mukden-Soviet Agreement implies recognition of Chang Tso-lin, ruler of Manchuria and at that time in revolt against the Chinese Central Government.

"(2) In regard to the redemption of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Mukden Agreement provides that The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics agrees, upon the signing of this Agreement, to the redemption by China of the said Railway with Chinese capital, the actual and fair cost of which to be fixed by the two Contracting Parties." (Cf. Article IX, items 2, 3 and 4, of the Peking Agreement.)

"(3) The Mukden Agreement reduces to sixty years the concession period of eighty years provided for in the contract of September 8, 1896, upon the expiration of which the line with all its appurtenances will pass free of charge to the Chinese Government. The question of further reducing this period of sixty years may be taken up for the approval of the two Contracting Parties. The Peking Agreement contained no such provisions.

"(4) The Mukden Agreement provides that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 'agrees to the settlement of the question of the indebtedness of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, by a commission to be appointed by the two Contracting Parties, in accordance with Item 4 of Article IX of the Sino-Russian Agreement on General Principles signed at Peking on May 31, 1924.' (Cf. Item 4, of Article IX, of the Peking Agreement.)

"(5) The Mukden Agreement provides that 'all the net profits of the Railway shall be held by the Board of Directors and shall not be used before the question as to how to divide these profits between the two Contracting Parties is settled by a Commission to be appointed by the two Governments.'

"The Peking Agreement for the Provisional Management of the C. E. R. provides that 'all the net profits of the Railway shall be held by the Board of Directors and shall not be used pending a final settlement of the question of the present Railway.'

"(6) The Mukden Agreement provides for revision of the Contract of September 8, 1896, within four months of the signing of the Agreement, by a Commission to be appointed by the two Contracting Parties. The Peking Agreement does not explicitly provide for revision of the Contract, but provides for a conference to be opened within one month, to settle various questions, among them the question of the C. E. R. (Cf. Article IX, item 7, of the Peking Agreement.)

"(7) The Mukden Agreement provides for revision of the Statutes of the C. E. R. Company by the Board of Directors within four months from the constitution of the Board, thus reducing the period by the Peking Agreement by two months." — *W. W. Willoughby, "Foreign Rights and Interests in China," second edition, Vol. I, pp. 449, 450.*

Before putting his signature to the final copy Dr. Wang submitted this draft agreement to the Cabinet for discussion and endorsement. The Cabinet for reasons which will be seen later, considered it necessary, however, to make certain modifications and so withheld Dr. Wang from signing it until changes were duly made. When this was communicated to the Soviet Envoy, M. Karakhan burst into rage and fired his three-day ultimatum in his letter to Dr. Wang and his note to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he said that he was instructed to bring to the cognizance of the Chinese Government that

(1) It considers the negotiations with the official delegate of the Chinese Government as concluded;

(2) It rejects resolutely any attempt at reverting to the discussion of agreements as already arrived at and signed;

(3) It warns the Chinese Government against committing an irretrievable mistake which will not be without a bearing on the future mutual relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China.

(4) Upon the expiration of the time limit set in the letter to the Official Delegate (three days) it will not consider itself bound by the conditions of the Agreements signed on the fourteenth of March c.y., and will reserve its full right of freely establishing the conditions of future treaties with China; and

(5) After the expiration of the same time limit the Chinese Government will not be able to resume negotiations until it will have established without any agreements and unconditionally normal relations with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.<sup>1</sup>

It is hard to divine the real motive of this ultimatum. Dr. Wang initialed the completed agreement and he put his personal approval upon it. It was his business to win from M. Karakhan and, in the execution of this duty, he tried to pin M. Karakhan down to as many pointed and detailed concessions as he

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1924, p. 880.



possibly could, and in this he succeeded. On the other hand, it was M. Karakhan's task to adhere to the general principles and keep the terms as vague as possible and to hold the vital questions open for discussion until after the recognition when Soviet Russia should be regarded as heir to the realm of the Czars. But neither could expect such a procedure to be binding until it was indorsed by his respective government. As experienced a diplomat as Dr. Wang naturally would not fix a final signature to a preliminary agreement until he was sure that it would be indorsed by his Government; hence his transmission of it to the Cabinet for action. The ultimatum was the more unwarranted, judging from the fact that from the very beginning of his relations with Dr. Wang, M. Karakhan had maintained that there would be no formal bargaining and that the conversations were informal in character. The only explanation for his precipitate action seemed to be, therefore, that he felt that Dr. Wang had really got much more out of him than Moscow would probably care to grant, and that, through the ultimatum, he sought to put the onus of rejecting the agreement upon China, thus freeing himself from the obligations of an agreement the one-sidedness of which could hardly be found in another document of its kind.

After this unexpected turn in the negotiations between Dr. Wang and M. Karakhan, both China and Russia were now so situated that neither could give way to the other without loss of face. For China to recognize Russia would now mean surrender to a domineering power and for Russia to continue the negotiations would put her in the position of a defeated enemy seeking a renewal of relations. However, at midnight, on March 21, a Presidential Mandate was issued, transferring the negotiations to the Waichiao-pu, Dr. Wang having tendered his resignation. It is interesting to note that the Mandate emphasized that

the initial agreement by Dr. Wang was not binding to the Chinese Government and that, hereafter, the Soviet Government must deal with Dr. Koo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The objections of the Cabinet to Dr. Wang's preliminary agreement with M. Karakhan centered around three points which were embodied in the first circular telegram sent by the Cabinet to the various provincial authorities after the break of the Wang-Karakhan negotiations as follows:

1. In the opinion of the Government the treaties made by Russia and Outer Mongolia should be immediately canceled. The Russian representative, however, only admitted that such treaties as were made with old Russia and those with a third country should be canceled, if harmful to China's sovereignty. He did not recognize cancellation of treaties between Soviet Russia and Outer Mongolia. In view of the fact that these treaties consider Outer Mongolia as an independent country, and that a minister has been sent there by the Russian Government, this is quite contrary to the sentence "respecting the sovereignty of China," and this, of course, is of great importance.

2. The Chinese Government is of opinion that the Russian troops in Mongolia should be withdrawn immediately. The Russian representative, however, insisted that this could not be done until certain conditions (immediate suppression of the Whites) had been settled in the formal conference. Further, the Government intended to change the wording to "the Russian troops shall be fully withdrawn, the time limit for withdrawal and the question of peace between the two countries' borders to be settled at the forthcoming formal conference." The reason for this is that the invasion of Russian troops is an act against China's sovereignty, and the troops should be withdrawn immediately, with no conditions to follow, so that no hindrances might be created.

3. The Russian representative demanded that Russian properties such as churches and immovable property should be handed over to his Government. The Chinese Government, fearing that this might be followed by other countries and thus interfere with the buying and selling of properties owned by foreigners in China, considered it an improper request.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1924, p. 883.



The *impasse* remained unsolved for some time, M. Karakhan holding steadfast to the dictum of recognition. Public opinion in China was, however, favorable to the indorsement of the Wang-Karakhan Agreement, in spite of the excellent reasons advanced by the Cabinet for rejecting it. As the deadlock was caused by Dr. Koo, it was, therefore, up to him now to right matters to appease public sentiment. This Dr. Koo did masterfully in his memorandum of March 24, to M. Karakhan. In this excellent note, he made a strong case for himself by first discrediting Dr. Wang in calling M. Karakhan's attention to the fact that Dr. Wang was ordered by Presidential Mandate to prepare for, and carry on, Sino-Russian negotiations, and not to sign any agreement that might be reached between them, and that the termination of such negotiations by signature on the part of Dr. Wang constituted an act not authorized by the Chinese Government. In view of these considerations, therefore, Dr. Koo said that these preliminary texts could not but be subject to changes as the Chinese Government might see fit, and could in no way be considered as final; and that in refusing to continue discussion, Dr. Koo accused M. Karakhan of being "bent upon taking an advantage of an incident in the course of negotiations rather than trying to avoid a possible *impasse* in the settlement of Sino-Russian relations."

In regard to the Soviet Ultimatum, Dr. Koo said that the Ministry was gratified to learn that the three-day limit was not meant to be an obstacle in reaching a settlement, but it was meant to hasten such a result. "But it is most surprising," he continued, "that the Soviet Envoy, after having set the time limit, should turn around and blame China for not having asked an extension thereof. The view of the Chinese Government is that it was a mistake on the part of the Soviet Envoy to have set a time limit at all, for it appears to be an unprecedented procedure

for one party to set a time limit to the other in the nature of a threat when both are engaged in the common task of establishing friendly relations. The Chinese Government did not ask to prolong it, because they could not recognize that the Soviet Envoy had any right to impose a time limit on the Chinese Government."

Then Dr. Koo brought forward the three essential points in the Wang-Karakhan Agreement which the Chinese Cabinet wanted to have modified, and which the Chinese Government, animated by the spirit of conciliation and friendship for Russia, were prepared to have affected through a supplementary exchange of notes to be signed along with the Agreement, should M. Karakhan see "insurmountable difficulties" in their modification in the preliminary text of the proposed Agreement.<sup>1</sup> The note was thus a great face-saving device, in shifting the whole blame of the deadlock on M. Karakhan, and making him look like a petulant child, blundering in the intricate ways of diplomacy.

The deadlock appeared to have been unbroken throughout the months of April and May, but the whole country was astir on May 31, 1924, by the sudden issue of a communique by the Waichiaopu, to the effect that a Sino-Russian Agreement and seven Declarations had been signed at the Waichiaopu at 2 A.M. by Dr. Koo, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of China, and M. Karakhan, the Soviet Extraordinary Plenipotentiary, on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and that the normal relations of the two countries had accordingly since this day forth been restored.<sup>2</sup>

It was a surprise because not even those most closely associated with the Government knew anything

<sup>1</sup> For text of Dr. Koo's letter, see "China Year Book," 1924, p. 885.

<sup>2</sup> For text of mandate, see *ibid.*, p. 887.



about it until it was signed and published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The public was the more misled by the fact that just a few days previous to the consummation of this treaty M. Karakhan categorically denied through the press that the situation had in any way been changed. All this secrecy is now explained. From the very beginning of the breaking off of the negotiations the Soviet Envoy had alleged to the Chinese Government, in spite of the latter's affirmation to the contrary, that it was due to the influence of a certain mission in Peking, presumably the French, that Russia had been prevented from coming to terms with the Chinese Government. Therefore in order to avoid further obstruction on the part of these same powers, M. Karakhan insisted that these negotiations be continued in secret. This was made officially by Chicherin's statement on the signing of the Sino-Russian Treaty, when he said:

Even now the agreement between Comrade Karakhan and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wellington Koo, had to be prepared with the greatest secrecy. The diplomacy of the Great Powers at first prevented the signing of our agreement with China and even now would not have permitted it, if we had not succeeded in concealing from them the diplomatic documents during the negotiations.<sup>1</sup>

The Sino-Russian Agreements signed by Dr. Koo and M. Karakhan on May 31, 1924, consist of an Agreement on General Principles, an Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and Seven Declarations. The Agreement on General Principles and the Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway are exactly the same as those reached between Dr. Wang and M. Karakhan. The first declaration

<sup>1</sup> *Soviet Russia Pictorial*, Aug., 1924, p. 210.

deals with the reciprocal transfer of real estate and movable property, owned by China and Czarist Russia, found within their respective territories. This provision does not include the Russian Concessions at Hankow and Tientsin and is, therefore, a slight modification of the declaration regarding the same, as embodied in the Wang-Karakhan Agreement. The second declaration states that the restoration of the Russian Church buildings and property shall be determined at the forthcoming conference as provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles, China in the meantime undertaking to guard them and clear them from all the persons now living there. This represents, therefore, an alteration of the understanding reached between Dr. Wang and M. Karakhan. The third declaration stipulates that any treaty, agreement, etc., concluded between Russia since the Czarist régime and any third party or parties, affecting the sovereign rights and interests of China, will not be recognized as valid. In the fourth declaration, the Chinese Government makes the assurance that China will not transfer either partially or wholly any of the rights or privileges renounced by Russia. The fifth declaration refers to the disposition of the Russian share of the Boxer Indemnity, which shall be appropriated to create a fund to promote education in China, after all prior obligations secured thereon shall have been satisfied. The sixth and seventh declarations, dealing with the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights by Russia and the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, remain unaltered as those contained in the Wang-Karakhan Agreement. It will be readily seen that nothing was declared about the withdrawal of Russian troops from Mongolia, which was one of the three essential points brought forward by the Cabinet for modification. However, Dr. Koo was to be congratulated for getting over



the difficulties of a seemingly impossible situation and making a strong case out of it for himself.<sup>1</sup>

The Sino-Russian Treaty as a whole was a great victory for China and it opened a new era in the diplomatic history of China, placing the country for the first time on terms of absolute equality and reciprocity with a Western power and furnishing a foundation upon which China has striven to build a new structure of her international relations.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>For text of the Seven Declarations, see "China Year Book," 1924, pp. 1196-1200, and Appendix C.

<sup>2</sup>The Sino-Russian Conference, as provided in the Agreement of General Principles, signed on May 31, 1924, for the settlement of all detailed questions relating to China and Russia was not convened until August 26, 1925, fourteen months overdue. The delay was caused by M. Karakhan's objection to the alleged employment of White Russians in Chang Tso-lin's army and the latter's refusal to put into effect the new agreement, calling for joint operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway. This conference did not sit very long, however. With the overthrow of the Feng Government at Peking in the spring of 1926 and the dismissal of Dr. C. T. Wang, Director of the Sino-Russian Bureau, the conference was broken up, and since then no effort has been made to resume negotiations.

## CHAPTER VIII

### BOLSHEVISM AND CHINA

**B**EFORE we attempt to discuss the program and policies of the Bolsheviks and their activities in China, perhaps it will not be out of place here to state that, if there is anything of which China has had a surfeit, it is philosophy in general and political philosophy in particular. In point of fact, there is not a single theory of government known to-day that has not already been exploited by Chinese statesmen and philosophers in the so-called "eight-legged" essays and other forms of literature. Bolshevism is, therefore, not a new thing in China. Long before the time of Marx or Lenin the Chinese theorists not only had thought of socialism and communism, but also had actually put them into practice. Therefore, if we find modern Chinese radicals ever turn to the Russians for instruction and guidance in working out a program of national salvation, we know that they go to them not so much for political philosophy as for the practical means of which the Bolsheviks are masters and by which the end may be attained.

Now, in order to understand intelligently what Bolshevism means in China, we must have a clear notion what Bolshevism really is and what it stands for. Of course, a full discussion of this will be beyond the purpose of this chapter. Suffice it to say here that Bolshevism, theoretically speaking, is based on the doctrines of Marx and Engels, which center around the idea of class struggle between capital, labor, and the peasant. Bolshevism premises, therefore, its whole tenet upon a highly developed industrial society, in which the conflict between capital and labor is rife



over the distribution of the fruits of production. The Bolsheviks insist that the workers and the peasants shall control everything in order that the one class of the population, namely, labor, might be protected. With this end in view, their whole energy is bent upon the overthrow of the capitalists, and the ascendancy of the proletariat. These principles may be seen from the Bolshevik creed, embodied in the proclamation calling the First Congress of the Communist International in February, 1919.

1. The present is the period of destruction and crushing of the capitalistic system of the whole world.
2. The aim of the proletariat must now be immediately to conquer power. To conquer power means to destroy the governmental apparatus of the bourgeoisie and to organize a new proletarian governmental apparatus.
3. The new apparatus of the Government must express the dictatorship of the working class, that is, to persist in the systematic suppression of the exploiting classes and be the means of exploiting them.
4. The dictatorship of the proletariat must be the occasion for the immediate expropriation of capital and the elimination of the private right of owning the means of production, through making them public property.
5. In order to protect the socialist revolution against external and internal enemies, and to assist the fighting proletariats of other countries, it becomes necessary to disarm the bourgeoisie entirely and its agents and to arm the proletariat.
6. The world situation demands immediate and as perfect as possible relations between the different groups of the revolutionary proletariat and a complete alliance of all the countries in which the revolution has already succeeded.
7. The most important method is the action of the proletariat including armed struggle against the Government power of the capitalists.<sup>1</sup>

Two things have to be noted in this document: first, the destruction of the governmental apparatus of

<sup>1</sup>Rosta News Agency, Feb. 24, 1919, quoted from "Memorandum on Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia," 1919, Gov. Print. Office, Washington, D. C.

the bourgeoisie and the substitution of a proletarian administration. According to the Bolsheviks, the capitalistic state is the organ of class domination and the organ of oppression of one class by another.<sup>1</sup> Its government is one "of the capitalists, by the capitalists, and for the capitalists."<sup>2</sup> Hence, it must be done away with and a proletarian government substituted, which is only possible by a violent revolution.<sup>3</sup> But, before a revolution can be successful, it must be preceded by wide propaganda and agitation which must be based upon the conception that "no lasting betterment of the position of the proletariat is possible under capitalism, and that the overthrow of the bourgeoisie is the prerequisite for the achievement of such betterment and the rebuilding of the social structure destroyed by capitalism."<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, the necessities of life of the masses must be appealed to and be made as issues in the revolutionary struggles,<sup>5</sup> because this is the basis of the will to fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and because, when the economic needs of the masses clash with the needs of capitalist society, the workers will realize that capitalism must die, if they are to live.<sup>6</sup> "To the masses" is, therefore, the slogan of the Bolsheviks in their quest for power and in their attempt to destroy the existing order of things.<sup>7</sup>

Second, it is to be noted that the Bolshevik program is not limited to the formation of a socialist state in Russia, it aims at a socialist unity in all lands. It constitutes part of their activity to foster revolutionary mischief and to conduct a systematic

<sup>1</sup> Lenin, "State vs. Revolution," pp. 11, 85.

<sup>2</sup> "Theses and Resolutions adopted at the Third World Congress of the Communist International, June 22-July 12, 1921," p. 73.

<sup>3</sup> Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>4</sup> "Theses and Resolutions, etc.," p. 49.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 190.



propaganda all over the world, undermining all legally functioned governments and substituting for them a proletarian administration in unison with that which functions at Moscow. In this the Soviets are living up to the instructions left by their teacher Marx, who urged them everywhere to support every revolutionary movement against the social and political order of things.

To carry out this program the Soviet Government in the spring of 1919 took the lead in summoning a gathering of representatives from all parts of the world to meet at Moscow. This gave rise to the Third International, whose purpose it is to "unite the efforts of all revolutionary parties of the world proletariat and thus facilitate and hasten the victory of the communist revolution of the whole world."<sup>1</sup> Moscow is the headquarters of this international organ to which all communist parties must turn for guidance and direction. It is the object of the International to establish soviet workmen's, soldiers', and peasants' deputies wherever the toiling masses live and are conscious. They are to strengthen the Soviets, to increase their authority, and to imitate the governmental apparatus of Russia. With these ends in view, annual meetings are called to formulate plans and tactics for the immediate future: propaganda on a world scale, with its secret lines of communication and the division of the world into various districts with Moscow as the center, is carefully outlined and assigned to the agents of the highly organized bureaucracy of the party.<sup>2</sup>

In speaking of Bolshevism, the Communist International must not be confused, however, with the Soviet Government. Indeed, it is practically impossible to distinguish between the policy of the Soviet

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from W. E. Walling, "Sovietism," p. 168.

<sup>2</sup> A. L. P. Dennis, "The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia," p. 340.

Foreign Office and the policy of the Communist International, as the personnel of the two are interlocked in such a way that "they constitute actually, if not technically, one working organization."<sup>1</sup> This gives the Soviet Government a decided vantage point in not holding itself responsible for certain acts which emanate from the Third International and to which they themselves are a party. However, we may safely say that the program of the one is usually the program of the other, and in the matter of the world revolution the Third International is merely the tool of the Soviet Foreign Office in the execution of orders which they themselves are not permitted to carry out.

The international character of the Russian Communist program may be evidenced from the repeated reiterations of the Bolshevik leaders who, in nearly every speech and every thesis, have as their final goal the liberation of the proletariat of the world. Thus Lenin, speaking at the Second Congress of the Third International to the representatives of the various countries, said:

Now, we have everywhere advance detachments, and everywhere we have proletarian armies, although poorly organized and requiring reorganization. We are able to organize these into a single detachment, into a single force. If you will help us to accomplish this, then no mental exercises or guesses with respect to what cannot be known and what no one can know, will prevent us from accomplishing our task, and this task will be that of leading on to the victory of the world revolution and to the establishment of an international proletarian Soviet Republic.<sup>2</sup>

Again, speaking of the progress made by the communists in all countries at the opening session of the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party held in Moscow, Lenin said:

<sup>1</sup> "The Communist Party of Russia, the Russian Soviet or III International," Gov. Print. Office, Wash., 1919, p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> *Severnaya Kommuna*, March 20, 1919.



We know, we see, that this growth assumes the Soviet forms. Here we have the guarantee that by realizing the Soviet authority we have discovered the international, world-wide form, the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and we are finally convinced that the entire proletariat of the world has started on a similar road of struggle, to create similar forms of proletarian power, the power of workmen and toilers; and that no force in the world will hold back the course of the communist revolution, leading to the World Soviet Republic.<sup>1</sup>

The efforts of the Bolsheviks were at first directed to stir up the proletarian revolution in Europe upon which they counted for the success of the Russian Revolution, and which was to be the first incident in their program. This was made very clear by Lenin in his speech at the opening session of the Petrograd Soviet on March 12, 1919, when he said:

We can understand the activities of the Council of People's Commissars for the last year only if we assess the rôle of the Soviets on the scale of the world revolution. Often the daily routine of administration and details that could not be avoided in the work of construction are pushing us to one side and forcing us to forget the great task of world revolution. But only when we assess the rôle of the Soviets on the world scale will we be able properly to handle the details of our internal life and regulate them properly. The task of construction depends entirely on how soon revolution will triumph in the more important centers of Europe. Only after such a victory shall we be able seriously to undertake the work of construction.<sup>2</sup>

Again in one of his theses he says:

There is no doubt that the Socialist revolution in Europe must come and will come. All our hopes for the definitive triumph of socialism are based on this conviction and on this scientific provision.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "The Second Congress of the Communist International," Gov. Print. Office, Wash., 1920, p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> *Severnaya Kommuna*, March 14, 1919, "Mem. on Certain Aspects, etc.," p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Izvestia*, March 8, 1918, "Mem. on Certain Aspects, etc.," p. 43.

In order that this object might be realized, the Soviet Government was willing to conclude any kind of peace and any kind of agreements simply as a means to an end. This was made clear by Trotsky in his peace program published at Petrograd in February, 1918, in which he says :

If in waiting the imminent proletarian flood in Europe, Russia should be forced to conclude peace with the present-day governments of the Central Powers, it would be a provisional, temporary, and transitory peace, with the revision of which the European Revolution will have to concern itself in the first instance. Our whole policy is based upon this expectation.<sup>1</sup>

Zinoviev, President of the Petrograd Soviet, more strikingly disclosed the real motive of the Soviet concessions when he said in a speech made on February 2, 1919 :

We are willing to sign an unfavorable peace with the Allies. . . . It would only mean that we should put no trust whatsoever in the bit of paper we should sign. We should use the breathing space so obtained in order to gather our strength in order that the mere continued existence of our government would keep up the world-wide propaganda which Soviet Russia has been carrying on for more than a year.<sup>2</sup>

Hence, the disgraceful treaties which were concluded at Brest-Litovsk in March, 1918.

But, contrary to the expectation of the Soviet leaders, the flame of the Russian Revolution did not readily catch fire in the other more or less inflammatory centers of Europe. Realizing that any further efforts along that direction would be futile, they seized at the last straw, — the Orient, — which provided for them an exceedingly favorable place in which to fish. So, hereafter, we can see a distinct change in

<sup>1</sup> *Izvestia*, March 8, 1918, "Mem. on Certain Aspects, etc.," p. 20.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*



the orientation of Soviet diplomacy. This conviction was clearly expressed by Pak Dinshun in an article entitled, "The Revolutionary East and the Immediate Problems of the Communist International," in which he says :<sup>1</sup>

The realization of the necessity of conjoint struggle of the toiling masses of the East and West became stronger and stronger. The great victorious October revolution in Russia first bridged over the chasm between the proletariat of the West and the revolutionary East; Soviet Russia became the connecting link between the two formerly separated worlds. . . . At the present moment, when the spirit of the social revolution hovers all the earth and when the bourgeoisie is straining all its forces in order for a short time to stave off the hour of its perdition . . . the Communist International should give serious attention to the East, where the fate of the revolution may be decided. For whoever shall know how to go to the enslaved peoples of the East and make comrades of them will, in union with them, come victorious out of this last war of labor and capital.

Suffering as the peoples of the Orient have been under the pressure of the foreign capitalists, the Bolsheviks had no difficulty in picking up a text for their sermon which they spared no effort to preach to their comrades in the Far East. Bukharin says, in his program of the Communists :

The International Soviet Republic will liberate from oppression hundreds of millions of inhabitants of colonies. The civilized robber powers tortured the population of colonial countries by a régime of terror. European civilization was maintained by exploitation and by stealing small peoples in distant countries. The latter will be liberated only by the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . Therefore the program of our party, which is the program of international revolution, is at the same time the program of complete liberation of the weak and oppressed.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Izvestia*, March, 8, 1918, "Mem. on Certain Aspects, etc.," pp. 45, 46.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

The interest and zeal which the Soviets showed in propagating their doctrine in the Asiatic continent and the Far East, aside from the propaganda work undertaken by the Third International, may be judged from the establishment and existence of the "Communist University of the Toiling East" for all Oriental students and the "Sun Yat-sen University" recently founded in memory of the great Chinese revolutionary leader especially for educating Chinese students in the tenets of Marx and Lenin. Academically they were unique institutions and undoubtedly no other university in the world either offered such flexibility in determining the requirements for matriculation and graduation or showed such wide variations in the mental background and previous preparation of the students as these institutions at Moscow. There, Chinese, Indian, and Japanese political refugees, holding the highest degrees from English, French, German, and American universities, sat side by side with Mohammedan peasants and Caucasian workmen, who had not even seen a factory or a large city and who had not even the most rudimentary ideas about science and literature. The fundamental purpose of these institutions was, of course, to train communist leaders of those who had come there to study, so that when they should go back to their native lands they might advance the Soviet cause and help to bring about the revolution of the world.<sup>1</sup>

As the social and economic conditions were not the same in the East as in the West, the Bolsheviks must needs modify their program and change their tactics. Hence, we see that instead of directing their activity to the industrial proletariat which was a negligible minority in China, the Soviets concentrated their forces upon the intelligentsia and the nationalist elements, which were the only masses susceptible to

<sup>1</sup> *Soviet Russian Pictorial*, April, 1923.



radical ideas. But what the intelligentsia and the nationalists wanted was not the theories of Marx or Lenin, of which we have seen they had enough of their own. What they aspired to was the vindication of their country's sovereign rights and the abolition of the unequal treaties. Therefore, any country, whether it be red or white, pink or black, or of whatever color it might be, which was willing to side with them and champion their cause would be taken to their bosom and regarded as sincere friends. The astute Muscovites were the first to detect this national psychological phenomenon of the Chinese people, and they knew at once what to do. They declared to the Chinese that they were willing "to renounce all the former Tsarist treaties concluded with China and return to the Chinese people all that had been seized from them by force and grabbed by the Tsar's Government and the Russian bourgeoisie."<sup>1</sup> These overtures of 1919 and 1920 were received with national welcome, and have since been looked upon as an augury to the relinquishment by all the other powers of their special rights and privileges and territories which had been exacted from the Chinese at the point of the bayonet. Thus we see the skillful methods of Russian diplomacy have once more outplayed the unskillful methods of diplomacy on the part of the powers.

Russia's friendship for China was further enhanced by the soft and honeyed words of her spokesmen in contrast with the high tone and predatory demands of the other diplomats at Peking. Joffe, before his arrival at Peking, was heralded by a fanfare of trumpets. In Peking he delivered a series of lectures, centering on the theme that Russia was deeply concerned with the fact that, while Europe was embroiled in national politics, the Far East was accumulating

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1924, p. 870.

strength and becoming a powerful factor in international politics; and, in view of the fact that China constituted a nucleus of this new situation just as Russia was the center of politics in Europe, and in view of the fact that both Russia and China were seeking to overthrow a common enemy in the form of Western imperialism, it was necessary that friendly relations between China and Russia on a basis of equality and strict observance of sovereignty should be established. He said:

Soviet Russia is watching with great attentiveness the national struggle in China, since Soviet Russia is the only country which rejects all Imperialistic policies. With hope we watch the growing national consciousness of the many millions of Chinese people, because, in line with the Russian Revolution, the awakening of the Chinese people is a factor of immense historical significance.<sup>1</sup>

These words were greeted with vociferous welcome by the radical intellectuals, and at a banquet given in honor of the new Soviet Envoy, Dr. Tsai Yuah-peï, Chancellor of the National University at Peking and leader of the "New Thought" movement, in response to the speech by Joffe said:

Since the penetration of European thought into China, a process of social, economic, and political changes has developed in this country. The Chinese Revolution was a political one. Now it is tending towards the direction of a social revolution. Russia furnishes a good example to China, which thinks it advisable to learn the lessons of the Russian Revolution which started also as a political movement but later assumed the nature of a social revolution. Please accept the hearty welcome of the pupil to the teachers.<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet gospel was preached more vehemently by Joffe's successor, M. Karakhan. Being the author

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1924, p. 858.

<sup>2</sup> *North-China Herald*, Sept. 2, 1922.



of the famous declarations of 1919 and 1920, he received on his arrival at Peking an ovation which was seldom accorded to a foreigner. The numerous receptions and dinners gave him ample opportunity to propagate his doctrine, and the atmosphere was moreover exceedingly favorable, China being under the difficulties of the Lincheng outrage, harassed and threatened by the legations for reparations and indemnities. These "unheard-of demands," as he phrased them, gave him a good text to preach his sermon. He declared that all the powers wanted to see China a weak man, without an army, divided and entangled in internal dissensions so that she would be incapable of resisting external encroachments. "Only the Soviet Republics," he said, "only the Russian people desire to see China strong, powerful, possessing a strong army, and capable of defending the interests and the sovereignty of its people. . . . The great Chinese people, with its culture, peacefulness, and exceptional diligence is the best ally of the Russian people. The friendship of Russia and China is a pledge of the peace of the Far East." "I refuse decidedly the honor of treading the path of America's policy in China," he responded to Dr. C. T. Wang at a dinner given in his honor, when the latter invited him to adhere to the principle of the "open door" as advocated by John Hay. "Russia will never follow the example of America nor put her signature under a document such as the last Lincheng Note. Russia will never claim the rights of extraterritoriality, nor establish her courts or administration in Chinese territory. "Nothing," he concluded, "pleased me more, during my recent stay in Harbin, than the fact that I saw there a Chinese administration, Chinese laws, and the realization of Chinese sovereignty."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "China Year Book," 1924, p. 866.

Speaking in the university hall on the occasion of the resumption of normal relations, following the conclusion of the treaty on General Principles, M. Karakhan told the Chinese intellectuals that it was in no small measure due to their efforts that led to the completion of the Russo-Chinese Agreement. Then he went on to tell them of the "unwritten part" of the agreement in the establishment of friendship with the Union of the Soviet Republics. "Did you realize," he said, "that the Union had, for five long years, battled against world imperialism, that it had won this battle and is now stretching out its hand of friendship and succor to the Chinese people, which has many years yet before it of strenuous, and eventually bloody, struggle for national freedom and liberation from imperialism." Speaking of the unequal treaties and urging China to follow the example set by Turkey, and to go one better in repudiating the unequal treaties, he told the Chinese intelligentsia: "The greatest woe and misfortune of the Chinese people, that which makes it suffer and keeps your great nation in a position of almost a semi-colonial country—let me be frank with you—are the treaties which exist between China and the imperialist foreign powers. These treaties have fettered your national liberty, happiness, and welfare. The happiest event for your people will be to throw off these chains and conquer the same national freedom and independence as were achieved by the peoples of the Soviet Republics." He then told them of the way to carry on the struggle by opening the eyes of the great masses of the people to the imperialistic treaties that stifle it and by comparing them with the one just concluded with Soviet Russia, a treaty which the Chinese must strive to complete with all countries. "We have driven imperialism out of our country," he concluded, "but only then shall we be satisfied when there will not be a single oppressed nation in the world. When



you will be strong enough to start the battle against imperialism, which is oppressing your country, you may be assured of the sympathies with your cause of the people of the Union. Long live the brotherhood of the peoples of China and the Union. Long live China, independent and free from imperialism.”<sup>1</sup>

Taking these protestations of friendship and sympathy at their face value and without considering the real intents and purposes behind these utterances, the Chinese nationalists found some one espousing their cause and promising them support in their endeavor to attain these ends. Therefore, is it any wonder that we find a group of people of pro-Soviet proclivities? Theirs was an inclination not based upon the belief that Bolshevism was best suited to the government of China, but that through Bolshevism they might liberate themselves from the encroachments of the Western powers.

As an example of the Chinese nationalists, we cannot find a better one than Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the great revolutionary leader. In spite of his repeated declarations that he and his party did not think the time had come for China to adopt the Bolshevist form of government, that he was not a communist, and that at no time had he or any duly accredited member of his party proposed, much less, demanded, the acceptance of communism as the political faith of the party, anti-Soviet propagandists continued to associate his name and his party with the Bolsheviks.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Rosta News Agency*, June 9; *North-China Herald*, June 14, 1924.

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps his nearest approach to communism, theoretically speaking, is his idea regarding land. According to his opinion, what the economists call the “unarmed increment” of land is the work of the community as a whole and not the work of the individual holder of the land. Therefore, he maintains that that should go to the profit of the state. In his “*The Three Principles of the People*” he advocates an entire revaluation of the land of the whole country and a price fixed for every holding. The way to go about this undertaking is to require every landowner to register with the government as to the number of acres of land he holds and the price which he thinks it is worth. In order to prevent undervaluation by the owners, with the view of paying less taxes, a provision should be made by which the government reserves the right to purchase such a piece of land at

Politically speaking, Dr. Sun's association with the Bolsheviks was out and out opportunistic. There were two things which he felt himself called upon to combat, namely, Chinese militarism and foreign imperialism. To do away with either of these two evils he felt that he had the right to solicit assistance from whatever source where assistance was available, just as he had received aid from abroad in bringing about the great revolution in 1911. He was a revolutionist and he continued to be one so long as the military outlaws and freebooters, who had usurped the power of government in China and overrun the country as legalized bandits, plundering, robbing, and killing the innocent people, remained in power. In this he struggled unto the end of his days without success. His failure was largely due to the fact that his very foreign friends, whose support he had a right to expect, turned against him. He was not recognized by them as a leader of democracy in trying to implant the very principles which he had imported from their countries into China. He was condemned by them as a political adventurer, a firebrand, and an upstart demagogue. They not only failed him in the hour of need, but also strengthened his opponents by arbitrarily maintaining the military oligarchy in power at Peking. Thus forsaken by his friends, he turned

the price submitted by the owner. With this weapon in the hands of the state, no landlord will dare to undervalue his estate to any great extent for fear the government might take it away from him. After this revaluation, should there be any rise in the value of a certain piece of land, that much difference of profit between the revalued price and the present selling price should go to the coffers of the state. As has been said, it is the community that increases the value of the property and not the individual holder of the land. His whole theory aims at preventing the evil of speculation and the development, to any great proportion, of the landed aristocracy which is so prevalent in the West and is yet nonexistent in China at the present time. As far as land is concerned, it may not be an unworkable experiment, but it does not rectify the evils of capitalism, which is not due to land alone but to many other things, a solution of which Dr. Sun is silent. Nevertheless, it may be called a form of communism but so modified that it can hardly be called Bolshevik.



to his Russian friends for help and sought political leadership through the organization of the Chinese students and the workers.

Dr. Sun's second great mission, which he felt he was called upon to perform, was to deliver his people from the political and economic bondage of the foreign imperialists. In his opinion, China was worse than a colony, having to serve thirteen or fourteen masters, all of them claiming privileges, but none of them accepting any responsibility such as Great Britain has had to face in India. The doctrine of the "open door" and "equal opportunity" meant to him the turning of China into a free market for the exploitation of the powers, every one of them wishing not to be left out when any one of them acquired rights and interests in China. The crystallization of this policy was the unequal treaties, which was but a natural outcome of the great game going on in China during the last three quarters of a century in the scramble for concessions and spheres of influence. Therefore, in his immediate campaign for the restoration of China's independence, he confined himself to two things—the abolition of extraterritoriality and the restitution of China's tariff autonomy. To bring this about he looked forward to a rapprochement with Russia and Germany.<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Sun's greatest aim was the liberation of all the enslaved peoples of the Asiatic continent. This great task could be accomplished only in coöperation with Japan. To him the great European War presented a heaven-sent opportunity for the East to

<sup>1</sup>He was charged by his enemies with conspiring to bring about a triple alliance between China, Russia, and Germany on Bolshevist ideals. To strengthen their case, they published an alleged correspondence between him and his agent in Berlin, after his flight from Canton in 1922. It is interesting to note that, while he repudiated the allegation that he was attempting to Sovietize China, he was favorable to a policy looking towards a closer rapprochement with Germany and Russia which China could now treat on terms of equality. Thus he might be called pro-German or pro-Bolshevik, but these epithets of hate and revenge had no terror for him. To him the end justified the means.

strike a crushing blow to the colonial powers in Asia. Therefore, at the commencement of the great conflagration he tried to create in Japan a public opinion favorable to the Teutonic aggregation or, at least, neutral in the great conflict to preserve the world's balance of power and make it possible to translate into action the claim of Asia for the Asiatics. "If in 1914," he was reported to have said, "Japan had preached the holy doctrine of purging Asia of all foreign influence, India would have revolted against Great Britain, Annam against the French, the Chinese would have thrown their full weight into the scales, while even Turkey would have abandoned the Central Powers and consolidated her position in Asia."<sup>1</sup> But Japan not only did not seize the golden opportunity in assuming the leadership of the Orient against the Occident, but also threw in her lot with the Allies, thus indefinitely postponing the consummation of any Pan-Asiatic movement.

Dr. Sun had his faults, but his principles were worthy of the highest consideration, and his sincerity was undoubted. To combat a host of foes, external and internal, he had to have allies; and, if his friends did not come to his aid, he had to seek them elsewhere. Therefore, when we find him going to the Bolsheviks, he went for the sake of expediency in order to triumph over the foreign and native enslavers of his people and not with the conviction of transforming China into an oasis of communism. Any man in his place would do the same thing. Therefore, it is a misnomer to brand a man as Red when he approaches or is approached by the Bolsheviks.

Take, for instance, General Chen Chiung-Ming, who, heralded by the foreign press as the most promising personality to combat the alleged communists at

<sup>1</sup> *North-China Herald*, Dec. 16, 1922.



Canton, was a few years ago thoroughly "Red," as may be judged by the following letter, which he wrote to his "teacher," Lenin:

Great was my joy and happiness to hear from afar of the success of the Revolution in your country. All the disturbances and woes of modern humanity issue from the principles of capitalism and of the state. Only after the abolition of the national boundaries shall we put an end to world wars, and only after the abolition of capitalism may we think of the equality of men.

The Chinese people has five thousand years of civilization behind it. The exalted principle of humanity became the characteristic feature of our people long ago and made it the center of civilization in the Far East. Unfortunately, the Chinese people has been subjected to plunder by invading brigands from without and it is oppressed by despotism from within, wherefore it has been unable to bring to a realization the principles of humanity in the world.

At the present time, for the sake of mankind, the Russian Government and its leaders, with steadfast determination and energy, are striving valiantly and courageously to clear all obstacles from humanity's path. The new Russia that has just been created on the principles of Bolshevism opens a new era of world history. This is indeed a joyful spectacle.

The manifesto of the Workers' and Peasants' Government to the Chinese people has already reached China, and the entire nation is filled with pure gratitude. I have profound faith in the exceptional sympathy displayed by new Russia toward the Chinese people and in its aid to the coming new revolutionary movement in its various phases. Thanks to this, through struggle and sacrifice the Chinese nation will sooner attain to self-determination, cast off the yoke of capitalism and create a new China which will walk hand in hand like two good, loving friends.

Still more confident am I that Bolshevism bears good tidings for humanity. I desire to devote all my strength to spreading these principles throughout the world. It is our mission to reconstruct not only China, but all of Eastern Asia.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> From "Vestnik" (Herald of People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs), Nos. 1-2 (Moscow, March 15, 1921, pp. 12-15). Accessibility to this document and translation from Russian into English was obtained by courtesy of M. Skvirsky, formerly head of the Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic at the Washington Conference, now head of the Russian Bureau at Washington, D. C.

A discussion of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen and his ideals is incomplete without a reference to his party, the Kuomintang. It is true that the party has been attended by many vicissitudes and has undergone many changes in its policy, but to allege that it has been captured by the communists simply on the grounds that a few Russians have been engaged as instructors in the military academy at Whampoa, that a few more, notably Comrade Borodin, have been made advisers, and that the Soviet Committee system has been adopted in some departments of the central government, is to make a false statement, as may be seen from the fact that, so long as the Russians in Canton behaved themselves, their services were greatly appreciated, but, as soon as they began to play too lively a part in stirring up extremism, they were rounded up and deported from Canton. Whether the Kuomintang is Red or not the fact remains that it is the only powerful organization which has a definite program, and that it is a party of principles and not of men. Judging from what it has accomplished up to date, it promises to be the only agency that will ultimately bring China back to herself. Starting from its base at Canton, it has, in less than a few months since it secured unchallenged control, brought the whole province of Kwangtung under a centralized administration and has stretched its military arm over half of China under the able command of General Chiang Kai-shek. That such successes are possible is an indication that public opinion in China is behind the party—a development which may be worth while for the powers to take into serious consideration.

Another national figure, whose star seems to be at present on the wane and who is branded as Red, is Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, the well-known Christian general. Whether or not he is allied to Soviet Russia is still a question; but, taking it for granted that he is and that he does receive support from Moscow in



the form of ammunitions and otherwise, is he not justified in doing so when we consider the fact that a noose is being formed around his neck and tightening daily against him, simply because he wants to stand aloof and refuses to join hands with those who profit in the spoliation of China? Whatever faults Feng may have he is a patriot and a lover of his countrymen. But as patriotism and nationalism have lately become synonymous with Bolshevism, and as Feng is a patriot and a nationalist, to some logical minds, therefore, he cannot but be regarded as a Bolshevik. The following telegram, which he sent throughout the country after the Shameen affair, demanding, *inter alia*, the abolition of the unequal treaties, no doubt gave him in the eyes of the Western world an undisputed claim to this title:

To the list of the Shanghai and Hankow tragedies there is now to be added the Shameen massacre. This really exhausts our patience. Whatever may be the attitude of others I want war. Others may ignore the Shameen affair, but I, Feng Yu-hsiang, Commander in Chief of the People's Army and my troops, who have sworn to die for their country, cannot ignore it. If we go to war and fight with machine guns, it is not because we are vainglorious, but it is out of a distressing desire to serve our country.

We are forced to the wall and have no choice. We must fight out a road of blood for China, otherwise there will be no chance for our country. Since we have to die whether we fight or not, what shall deter us from fighting? What should we fear? We should be determined to shed the blood of our two hundred thousand men in order to deliver China from the yoke of the imperialist powers, and, incidentally to free the oppressed peoples of the world. Let us make the first move, and I am sure the rest will follow. In death there shall be glory for us.

God has a special mission for us when he ordained that we should live at this time instead of fifty years ago or fifty years later. He wants us to fight the forces of evil. If we want justice and humanity we must be prepared to shed blood, and this is the reason why the People's Army is determined to fight out a road of blood so that real justice and humanity may

prevail in the world. I pray for an early coming of war so that I may die early. To die for the salvation of China is far better than to live as slaves of our enemy. Let us prepare for the coming struggle.<sup>1</sup>

Another element in the Chinese population that is most misunderstood is the intelligentsia, nearly all of whom are nationalists, but the rôle they play is more important. They have made and unmade cabinets; they have stayed the inroad of foreign encroachments; they have stirred up a national consciousness of the people. But, as their activities clash with the interests of the parasitical officialdom and the interests of the foreign imperialists they are branded as Bolshevist, antiforeign, and anti-Christian. They are Bolshevist in the sense that they aim at churning the militarists and at ousting the corrupt politicians — two classes of parasites whom they hold responsible for all the troubles which the country has fallen heir to since the founding of the Republic, and for bartering away national rights for personal prerogatives and self-gratification. They are antiforeign in the sense that they regard the unequal treaties as stifling to their national growth and foreign capital as the weapon for enslaving the industrial masses of the people. They are anti-Christian in the sense that they regard the passive doctrines of Christianity as detrimental to their national existence in an era when it is the strongest and the fittest that survive and not the best and the most religious. With the view to chastise the selfish officials, to recover for China her lost rights and to invigorate China's great lethargic masses, they stage demonstrations, engineer boycotts, declare strikes, and agitate against missionary schools. For these activities they are said to have been converted to the Elysian doctrines from Russia and

<sup>1</sup> *North-China Herald*, July 4, 1925.



are called communists, anarchists, and atheists. Be that as it may, thanks to their relentless efforts and unequalled heroism, they have given birth to a new China no longer to be exploited, as would a market for the gains of the capitalist powers, but a nation to be treated on terms of equality and respectability.

Having considered some of the more important aspects of Bolshevism and its relation to China, now let us see what the future holds for China and the world. Undoubtedly one of the foremost questions that is in the minds of those who are interested in Chinese affairs is whether China is going to turn Red. From what has been said, it is clear that what is now called Bolshevism is a misnomer for nationalism. Bolshevism in China does not mean, in the Leninist sense of the term, the dictatorship of the proletariat, for this class of people is still in the negligible minority, only a few large cities being slightly industrialized. The country is still in an agricultural state, which may be seen from the fact that eighty per cent of the population of China is engaged in farming and its kindred industries, with the cultivators themselves holding the land directly. Hence, the aristocracy of the landlords does not exist, and class distinction is theoretically disavowed and practically undiscernible. Moreover, the whole Chinese social structure is founded on a "horizontal plane" and not on a "vertical stratification"<sup>1</sup> as it was in Russia prior to the Revolution. The richest and the poorest have the same right to make a name for themselves, the only element that approaches the aristocratic caste in the Western sense of the term being the educated class. The whole life of the nation centers around the clan and the family system, in which the aged and the elderly are respected and the women

<sup>1</sup> Terms used by Dr. M. T. Z. Tyau, in "China Awakened," p. 236.

and the young protected, as they are respected and protected in no other country in the world. Therefore, to think that Chinese women may be nationalized is to think of an impossible postulate unless a bolt thunders from the azure blue and shatters the whole moral system, which has preserved China intact for over five thousand years.

Bolshevism in China does mean this, however, that the nationalistic and intellectual elements, tired of the political juggling that goes on in the tuchunate draining the sinews of the nation, and indignant over the unequal treaties that bind China hand and foot politically and economically, may, with the help of a rejuvenated Russia, defy the *opera bouffe* of native militarism and the predatoriness of foreign imperialism—a defiance which may or may not involve all manners of disorder and all kinds of atrocities. This is the kind of Bolshevism that appeals to the most sensitized and the most articulate elements of the nation, the nationalists and the intelligentsia.

The Bolsheviks thoroughly understand this situation. They are fully aware of the different social-economic conditions that prevail in China. Therefore, they have adopted a new line of tactics in tackling the Chinese problem. They realize that before they break in with the masses they must needs break into the national revolutionary movement. Herein lies the most interesting part of the Soviet-Chinese relations. On the one hand the Chinese nationalists and intellectuals are trying to make use of the Bolsheviks as a means to an end in their campaign for national liberation. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks are trying to make use of the Chinese nationalists and intellectuals as a means to an end also in bringing about a world revolution. Thus each side tries to outplay the other, for the Chinese nationalists and intellectuals, while believing in national liberation, do not believe in a social revolution in China; while the



Bolsheviks, believing in national revolution, believe also in social revolution. The gist of the whole thing may be made clearer from the following passage from a recent issue of the Petrograd *Pravda*:

Of course there are elements among the revolutionists themselves who will join us Internationalists only for the purpose of national-political liberation. We shall realize their revolutionary spirit in combating world capital and for the triumph of the social revolution in the whole world; but if the revolution demands it afterwards, we will know how to turn the weapons against the "allies" of yesterday, and the victory will be ours, as the native masses of the East, just liberated from foreign political and economic bondage will hardly be reconciled to the strong-hand tactics of new masters. So although we are fighting together with the above-named elements, we cannot regard them as comrades with whom we might go to the end without danger. Without tiring for a minute, we must explain to the wide masses of toilers of the East that national-political enfranchisement alone will not give them that for which they are fighting, and that only social liberation can give them the full guaranty of freedom.<sup>1</sup>

Such being the crux of the present situation in China, what attitude are the powers going to take regarding it? It seems to the author that there are only two alternatives open. On the one hand, the powers can save China from falling into the clutches of the Russian Bear, first, by discountenancing the criminal militarists and discontinuing their support to them, which will mean the strengthening of the nationalists in their righteous endeavor to bring China back to herself; and, second, by returning to China her sovereign prerogatives which she justly demands, and giving her time to put her own house in order politically and economically.

On the other hand, the powers may stick to their policy of supporting a government that is no longer

<sup>1</sup> Pak Dinshun, "The Revolutionary East and the Immediate Problems of the Communist International," Petrograd *Pravda*, July 27, 1920.

the expression of the popular will, and resort to the use of force in compelling China to observe treaties that are unequal, obsolete and incompatible with the circumstances and needs of the times. In pursuance of this policy, the powers are simply backing the wrong horse, driving Young China into the bosom of the Russian Bear, and defeating the very purposes of their being in China, namely, the peaceful pursuit of trade and the unhampered propagation of their religion. Recent events have shown that China does not have to go to war with another nation in order to win, for she is in possession of a most effective and legitimate weapon in the form of an economic boycott which she can call into being at a moment's notice against a country that does not play the game fairly and squarely. As to the use of force, let it be remembered that, granting that the powers can smooth over their own differences as to the anticipated spoils which they are going to get out of China and secure a unity of command in the field of battle there is yet to be considered the million soldiers under arms in China. Schooled in their own internecine warfare, they are not so easily conquerable as popular Western notion would have it. The charging of the bayonets and the bombarding of the gunboats may be capable of doing great things, but to subdue a nation with a population of four hundred million and a territory as large as Europe is not an easy task. Which of the two policies is more to the advantage of the powers to pursue is evident. The one begets good will and harmonious relations, and the other ill-will, hatred, and possibly war. China welcomes foreigners to trade and to preach in her land, but whether they want to come as friends or foes it is for themselves to decide.

In this connection a word in particular as regards China's relations with Japan in the immediate future needs to be said. We have seen earlier in this study



that Japan as a victor in the Russo-Japanese conflict in 1905 has become heir to part of the Chinese Eastern Railway, now incorporated into the South Manchurian Railway system, as well as Port Arthur and Dalny, which Russia had leased from China for twenty-five years, dating from 1898. The lease should have expired in 1923, but by the famous Twenty-One Demands, presented by Japan to China in 1915, China was compelled under duress to extend the former Russian lease to another ninety-nine years. Now the question is: Is China going to wait until A.D. 2022 for the return of these territories to her sovereignty? Impatient as Young China is, we know she is not going to wait such a long time to become possessor of two of the choicest morsels of her land. Such being China's position, the next question is: Is Japan going to return them to China as soon as China would like to have them? As the situation is to-day, we know also that Japan is not going to relinquish these paramount interests in Manchuria on which depends largely her strength as a world power and on which she has made such enormous investments.

The strength of China's case lies on equity alone. She signed the paper under duress and as long as she is weak militarily her protest will not meet with serious consideration on the part of Japan, and all she can do is to appeal to the god of justice for redress and the vindication of her Japanese wrongs. On the other hand, Japan may contend that the 1915 Treaty was not made under duress at all and that, in point of fact, it was at the instance of President Yuan Shih-kai himself that the famous ultimatum was presented. Whether such an alleged assertion had any truth in it no one knows, though it was made by Baron Kato, who negotiated the treaty for Japan shortly before his death, ten years after the conclusion of the treaty. It is an interesting statement from a man on his death-bed, but whether it carries with it the force of

evidence is altogether another question, and personal confessions usually do not count in diplomacy.

To carry the Japanese contention further: granting that the 1915 Treaty was exacted under duress, could not the Japanese base their claim to these interests in South Manchuria on the fact that China was a secret ally of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, and that, as a member of the vanquished party, should China go scot-free and not pay the price in the cessions of Port Arthur, Dalny, and the South Manchurian Railways? This is an intricate question for the international jurists to answer. Suffice it to say here, however, that China was to all intents and purposes not an ally of Russia during the war in 1904-1905, Russia having already broken the terms of the Li-Lobanov Treaty which, *ipso facto*, released China from all obligations as specified by the protocol. Furthermore, the very fact that China, in her rôle as a neutral, was morally on the side of Japan leaves no room for doubt as to her innocence in the conflict.

Such is the Far Eastern dilemma: On the one hand, China is too impatient to wait, and an extension of the reversionary rights of these territories and interests to another ninety-nine years would mean the curtailment of her independence as a sovereign power; and, on the other, Japan is too reluctant to give way, for to do so would mean the end of her power in northern China. Then, what is the solution? The only solution, as in the case of all dilemmas, is to seize the bull by the horn. This will naturally bring into play the multifarious forces in the Orient, resolving the Pacific problem into a sort of triangle with China representing one angle, the powers another, and Japan the third.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Since these lines were written, with the formation of the new administration in Japan headed by Baron Tanaka, an attempt seems to have been made by those at present in power to depart from the conciliatory policy adopted by the Japanese Government with respect to China in the past year



or two and to reassert in a more intensive form the Twenty-One Demands which she presented to China in 1915 and which the world has been led to believe as having been considerably whittled down and definitely curbed. This sudden change of front is a great disappointment to the Chinese people and has constrained Dr. C. C. Wu, the Nationalist Minister of Foreign Affairs, to address the following communication to M. Yoshizawa, the Japanese Minister at Peking, for transmission to the Japanese Government:

“Disquieting reports regarding the so-called ‘Positive Policy’ enunciated by Baron Tanaka, the Premier of the new Japanese Cabinet, would indicate that the Imperial Japanese Government contemplates embarking upon a new policy of economic and political imperialism in China, especially vis-à-vis the Three Eastern Provinces and Mongolia. It would seem that the Japanese Government has presented, — and has been negotiating in an atmosphere of secrecy and mystery with the northern militarists masquerading as a government, — demands which involve extensive railway concessions, freedom of residence in the interior for Japanese, assumption of right of protection over these territories and other demands which would in effect be a revival, in an even more objectionable form, of the now universally discredited Twenty-One Demands of 1915, and would thus deprive the Republic of China of her sovereign rights in these regions and virtually place them under the domination of Japan. . . .

“It will be recalled that in numerous international documents Japan and other friendly powers have given formal undertaking to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. The doctrine of the open door with its corollary, the principle of equal opportunity for the trade and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China, has also been repeatedly affirmed. The new demands which are reported to have been made by your Government would without doubt seriously violate the spirit of this international undertaking.

“In these circumstances, the Nationalist Government cannot refrain from communicating to the Imperial Japanese Government its grave concern at the reports which are now current and to enquire whether there is any foundation for them. The Nationalist Flag now flies in sixteen out of the twenty-two provinces of China. It is obvious that no agreement concluded with a military chieftain who claims control over only six — and actually exercises control over less than six — provinces can ever be recognized by the Chinese people. The new policy of the Imperial Japanese Government regarding Manchuria and Mongolia would create, in effect, an “Alsace-Lorraine” problem in the Far East which would sooner or later jeopardize the peace of the world. It is, therefore, the duty of the Nationalist Government, confidently voicing the unanimous opinion of the people of all China, to protest energetically against the consummation of any such arrangements which, as reported, the Imperial Japanese Government has in contemplation and to solemnly warn the Government and people of Japan of the consequences.”

## APPENDICES





## APPENDIX A

### CONTRACT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1896

Between the undersigned, His Excellency Shu King-chen, Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China, at St. Petersburg, acting by virtue of an Imperial Edict, dated Kuang Hsü, 22d year, 7th month, 20th day (August 16/28, 1896), of the one part, and the Russo-Chinese Bank, of the other part, it has been agreed as follows:

The Chinese Government will pay the sum of five million Kuping taels (Kuping Tls. 5,000,000) to the Russo-Chinese Bank, and will participate in proportion to this payment in the profits and losses of the bank, on conditions set forth in a special contract.

The Chinese Government having decided upon the construction of a railway line, establishing direct communication between the city of Chita and the Russian South Ussuri Railway, intrusts the construction and operation of this railway to the Russo-Chinese Bank upon the following conditions:

I. — The Russo-Chinese Bank will establish for the construction and operation of this railway a company under the name of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company.

The seal which this Company will employ will be given to it by the Chinese Government. The statutes of this Company will be in conformity with the Russian usages in regard to railways. The shares of the Company can be acquired only by Chinese or Russian subjects. The president of this Company will be named by the Chinese Government, but paid by the Company. He may have his residence in Peking.

It will be the duty of the president to see particularly to the scrupulous fulfillment of the obligations of the Bank and of the Railway Company towards the Chinese Government; he will furthermore be responsible for the relations of the Bank and of the Railway Company with the Chinese Government and the central and local authorities.



The president of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company will likewise be responsible for examining all accounts of the Chinese Government with the Russo-Chinese Bank.

To facilitate local negotiations, the Russo-Chinese Bank will maintain an agent in Peking.

2. — The route of the line will be determined by the deputies of the president (named by the Chinese Government) of the Company, in mutual agreement with the engineers of the Company and the local authorities. In laying out this line, cemeteries and tombs, as also towns and villages, should so far as possible be avoided and passed by.

3. — The Company must commence the work within a period of twelve months from the day on which this contract shall be sanctioned by imperial decree, and must so carry it on that the whole line will be finished within a period of six years from the day on which the route of the line is definitely established and the lands necessary therefor are placed at the disposal of the Company. The gauge of the line should be the same as that of the Russian railways (five Russian feet — about four feet, two and one-half inches, Chinese).

4. — The Chinese Government will give orders to the local authorities to assist the Company to the extent of their ability in obtaining, at current prices, the materials necessary for the construction of the railway, as also laborers, means of transport by water and by land, the provisions necessary for the feeding of men and animals, etc.

The Chinese Government should, as needed, take measures to facilitate such transportation.

5. — The Chinese Government will take measures to assure the safety of the railway and of the persons in its service against any attack.

The Company will have the right to employ at will, as many foreigners or natives as it may find necessary for the purpose of administration, etc.

Criminal cases, law suits, etc., upon the territory of the railway, must be settled by the local authorities in accordance with the stipulations of the treaties.

6. — The lands actually necessary for the construction, operation, and protection of the line, as also the lands in the vicinity of the line necessary for procuring sand, stone, lime, etc., will be turned over to the Company freely, if these lands

are the property of the State; if they belong to individuals, they will be turned over to the Company either upon a single payment or upon an annual rental to the proprietors at current prices. The lands belonging to the Company will be exempt from all land taxes (*impôt foncier*).

The Company will have the absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands. (*La Société aura le droit absolu et exclusif de l'administration de ses terrains.*)

The Company will have the right to construct on these lands buildings of all sorts, and likewise to construct and operate the telegraph necessary for all the needs of the line.

The income of the Company, all its receipts and the charges for the transportation of passengers and merchandise, telegraphs, etc., will likewise be exempt from tax or duty. Exception is made, however, as to mines, for which there will be a special arrangement.

7. — All goods and materials for the construction, operation, and repair of the line, will be exempt from any tax or customs duty and from any internal tax or duty.

8. — The Company is responsible that the Russian troops and war material, dispatched in transit over the line, will be carried through directly from one Russian station to another, without for any pretext stopping on the way longer than is strictly necessary.

9. — Passengers who are not Chinese subjects, if they wish to leave the territory of the railway, should be supplied with Chinese passports. The Company is responsible that passengers, who are not Chinese subjects, should not leave the territory of the railway if they do not have Chinese passports.

10. — Passengers' baggage, as well as merchandise dispatched in transit from one Russian station to another, will not be subject to customs duties; they will likewise be exempt from any internal tax or duty. The Company is bound to dispatch such merchandise, except passengers' baggage, in special cars, which, on arrival at the Chinese frontier, will be sealed by the office of the Chinese customs, and cannot leave Chinese territory until after the office of the customs shall have satisfied itself that the seals are intact; should it be established that these cars have been opened on the way



without authorization, the merchandise would be confiscated.

Merchandise imported from Russia into China by the railway, and likewise merchandise exported from China into Russia by the same route, will respectively pay the import and export duty of the Chinese maritime customs, less one third.

If merchandise is transported into the interior it will pay in addition the transit duty — equivalent to a half of the import duty collected — which frees it from any further charge.

Merchandise not paying the transit tax will be subject to all the barrier and likin duties imposed in the interior.

The Chinese Government must install customs offices at the two frontier points on the line.

11. — The charges for the transportation of passengers and of merchandise, as well as for the loading and unloading of merchandise, are to be fixed by the Company, but it is obliged to transport free of charge the Chinese official letter post, and, at half price, Chinese land or sea forces and also Chinese war materials.

12. — The Chinese Government transfers to the Company the complete and exclusive right to operate the line on its own account and risk, so that the Chinese Government will in no case be responsible for any deficit whatsoever of the Company, during the time allotted for the work and thereafter for a further eighty years from the day on which the line is finished and traffic is in operation. This period having elapsed, the line, with all its appurtenances, will pass free of charge to the Chinese Government.

At the expiration of thirty-six years from the day on which the entire line is finished and traffic is in operation, the Chinese Government will have the right to buy back this line upon repaying in full all the capital involved, as well as all the debts contracted for this line, plus accrued interest.

If — in case the profit realized exceeds the dividends allowed to the shareholders — a part of such capital is repaid, the part will be deducted from the price of repurchase. In no case may the Chinese Government enter into possession of this line before the appropriate sum is deposited in the Russian State Bank.

The day when the line is finished and traffic is in operation, the Company will make to the Chinese Government a payment of five million Kuping taels (Kuping Tls. 5,000,000).

*Kuang Hsü, 22d year, 8th month, 2d day.*

(Signed) SHU.

*Berlin, August 27/September 8, 1896.*

RUSSO-CHINESE BANK

(Signed) ROTHSTEIN.

(Signed) PRINCE OUKHTOMSKY.





## APPENDIX B

### STATUTES OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY, DECEMBER 4, 1896

I. — On the strength of the Agreement concluded on the 27th August/8th September, 1896, by the Imperial Chinese Government with the Russo-Chinese Bank, a Company is formed under the name of the “Eastern Chinese Railway Company” for the construction and working of a railway within the confines of China from one of the points on the western borders of the provinces of Hei-Lun-Tsian, to one of the points on the eastern borders of the province of Ghirin and for the connection of this railway with those branches which the Imperial Russian Government will construct to the Chinese frontier from Transbaikalia and the southern Ussuri lines. [*Observation.* The Company is empowered, subject to the sanction of the Chinese Government, to exploit, in connection with the railway or independently of it, coal mines, as also to exploit in China other enterprises — mining, industrial, and commercial. For the working of these enterprises, which may be independent of the railway, the Company shall keep accounts separate from those of the railway.]

The formation of the Company shall be undertaken by the Russo-Chinese Bank.

With the formation of the Company all rights and obligations are transferred to it in regard to the construction and working of the line ceded in virtue of the above-named Agreement of the 27th August/8th September, 1896.

The Company shall be recognized as formed on the presentation to the Minister of Finances of a warrant of the State Bank certifying the payment of the first installment on the shares. In any case such payment must be made not later than two months from the day of confirmation of the present Statutes.

The succeeding installments on the shares shall be paid in such orders of gradation that the shares shall be fully paid up at their nominal value not later than one year from the day of formation of the Company.



Owners of shares of the Company may only be Russian and Chinese subjects.

II. — In virtue of the Agreement with the Chinese Government, the Company shall retain possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway during the course of eighty years from the day of the opening of traffic along the whole line.

III. — In recognition that the enterprise of the Chinese Eastern Railway will be realized only owing to the guarantee given by the Russian Government in regard to the revenue of the line for covering working expenses as well as for effecting the obligatory payments on the bonds (XI, XVI), the Company, on its part, binds itself to the Russian Government during the whole term of the Concession under the following obligations:

(a) The Chinese Eastern Railway with all its appurtenances and rolling stock must be always maintained in full order for satisfying all the requirements of the service of the line, in regard to the safety, comfort, and uninterrupted conveyance of passengers and goods;

(b) The traffic on the Chinese Eastern line must be maintained conformably with the degree of traffic on the Russian railway lines adjoining the Chinese line;

(c) The trains of all descriptions, running between the Russian Transbaikal and Ussuri lines, shall be received by the Chinese Eastern Railway and dispatched to their destination in full complement without delay;

(d) All through trains, both passenger and goods, shall be dispatched by the Eastern Chinese Railway at rates of speed not lower than those which shall be adopted on the Siberian Railway;

(e) The Chinese Eastern Railway is bound to establish and maintain a telegraph along the whole extent of the line and to connect it with the telegraph wire of the Russian adjoining railways, and to receive and dispatch without delay through telegrams sent from one frontier station of the line to another, as also telegrams sent from Russia to China and conversely;

(f) Should, with the development of traffic on the Chinese Eastern Railway, its technical organization prove insufficient for satisfying the requirements of a regular and uninterrupted passenger and goods traffic, the Chinese Eastern Railway

shall immediately, on receipt of a notification on the part of the Russian railways to augment its capacity to a corresponding degree, adopt the necessary measures for further developing its technical organization and the traffic on it. In the event of a difference of opinion arising between the above-mentioned railways, the Chinese Eastern Railway shall submit to the decision of the Russian Minister of Finances. If the means at the command of the Chinese Eastern Railway prove insufficient for carrying out the necessary work of its development, the Board of Management of the railway may at all times apply to the Russian Minister of Finances for pecuniary assistance on the part of the Russian Government;

(g) For all transit conveyance of passengers and goods, as also for the transmission of telegrams, there will be established by agreement of the Company with the Russian Government for the whole term of duration of the Concession (II), maximum tariffs, which cannot be raised without the consent of the Russian Government during the whole term above referred to. Within these limits the tariffs of direct communication both for railway carriage and telegrams will be fixed by the Board of Management of the Company on the strength of a mutual agreement with the Russian Minister of Finances;

(h) The Russian letter and parcels post, as also the officials accompanying the same, shall be carried by the Chinese Eastern Railway free of charge.

For this purpose the company shall set apart in each ordinary passenger train a carriage compartment of three fathoms in length. The Russian postal authorities may, moreover, if they deem it necessary, place on the line postal carriages, constructed by them at their own cost; and the repair, maintenance (interior fittings excepted), as well as the running of such carriages with the trains, shall be free of charge and at the cost of the railway.

The above-mentioned engagements, by which, as already stated, the grant of a guarantee by the Russian Government is conditioned and the consequent realization of the enterprise of the Chinese Eastern Railway, shall be binding on the railway until the same, after the expiration of the eighty years' term of the Concession, shall without payment become



the property of the Chinese Government (XXIX). The redemption of the line from the Company before the above-mentioned term in accordance with Article (XXX) of the present Statutes shall not in any way diminish the effect of the above-specified engagements, and these latter, together with the railway, shall be transferred to its new proprietor.

In the same manner during the course of the whole eighty years' term of the Concession (II) the following privileges granted to the railway by the Imperial Chinese Government shall remain in force:

(a) Passengers' luggage, as also goods, carried in transit from one Russian station shall not be liable to any Chinese customs duties, and shall be exempt from all internal Chinese dues and taxes;

(b) The rates for the carriage of passengers and goods, for telegrams, etc., shall be free from all Chinese taxes and dues;

(c) Goods imported from Russia into China by rail and exported from China to Russia in the same manner shall pay respectively an import or export Chinese duty to the extent of one third less as compared with the duty imposed at Chinese seaport customhouses.

(d) If goods imported by the railway are destined for conveyance inland they shall in such case be subject to payment of transit duty to the extent of one half of the import duty levied on them, and they shall then be exempted from any additional imposts. Goods which shall not have paid transit duty shall be liable to payment of all established internal barrier and likin dues.

IV. — In regard to the place of acquisition of materials for the requirements of the railway, the Company shall not be liable to any limitations.

If materials be obtained beyond the confines of Russia, they shall, on importation through Russian territory, be freed from payment of Russian customs duties.

V. — The breadth of the railway track must be the same as that of the Russian lines (five feet).

The Company must commence the work not later than the 16th August, 1897, and conduct it in such a manner that the whole line shall be completed not later than six years from the time when the direction of the line shall be finally determined and the necessary land assigned to the Company.

When tracing the line of the railway, cemeteries and graves, as also towns and villages, must, as far as possible, be left aside of the railway.

When effecting the connection, in accordance with 1 of these Statutes, of the Chinese Eastern Railway with the Russian Transbaikal and South Ussuri lines the Company shall have the right, with a view of reduction of expenditure, of abstaining from building its own frontier stations, and of utilizing the frontier station of the above-named Russian lines. The conditions on which they shall be utilized shall be determined by agreement of the Board of the Company with the Boards of the respective railways.

VI. — The tariffs for the carriage of passengers and goods, as also for supplementary carriage rates, shall be determined by the Company itself, within the limits indicated in III.

VII. — Offenses, litigation, etc., on the territory of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be dealt with by local authorities, Chinese and Russian, on the basis of existing treaties.

In regard to the carriage of passengers and goods, the responsibility for such conveyance, the lapse of time for claims, the order of recovering money from the railway when adjudged, and the relations of the railway to the public shall be defined in rules drawn up by the Company and established before the opening of the railway traffic; these rules shall be framed in accordance with those existing on Russian railways.

VIII. — The Chinese Government has undertaken to adopt measures for securing the safety of the railway and of all employed on it against any extraneous attacks.

The preservation of law and order on the lands assigned to the railway and its appurtenances shall be confided to police agents appointed by the Company.

The Company shall for this purpose draw up and establish police regulations.

IX. — The whole amount of the capital of the Company shall be determined according to the cost of construction calculated on the basis of estimates framed when the survey of the line was carried out. The foundation capital shall be charged with.

(a) The payment of interest and amortization of the foundation capital during the construction of the railway;



(b) The purchase from the Russian Government of the results of the surveys of the direction of the railway to Manchuria, which were made by Russian engineers, the sum payable for these surveys being determined by agreement of the Russian Minister of Finances with the Company.

The capital of the Company shall be formed by the issue of shares and bonds.

X. — The share capital of the Company shall be fixed at five million nominal credit rubles, and divided into one thousand shares at five thousand nominal credit rubles.

The shares are to be issued at their nominal value.

The guarantee of the Russian Government does not extend to them.

XI. — The remaining portion of the capital of the Company will be formed by the issue of bonds. The bonds will be issued as required, and each time with the special sanction of the Minister of Finances. The nominal amount and value of each separate issue of bonds, the time and condition of the issue, as also the form of these bonds, shall be subject to the sanction of the Minister of Finances.

The Russian Government will guarantee the interest on and amortization of the bonds.

For the realization of these bonds the Company must have recourse to the Russo-Chinese Bank, but the Russian Government reserves to itself the right of appropriating the bond loan at a price which shall be determined between the Company and the Bank, and to pay the Company the agreed amount in ready money.

XII. — As payments are received for bonds guaranteed by the Russian Government, the Company shall be bound to keep such sums, or interest bearing securities purchased with the same by permission of the Russian Minister of Finances, under the special supervision of the Russian Ministry of Finances.

Out of the above receipts the Company shall have the right to make the following payments :

(a) According to actual fulfillment of the work in progress, and execution of orders, and at the time when various expenditures shall become necessary, such payments to be made on the scale and on the conditions specified in the working estimates;

(b) During the construction of the line, of interest, as it becomes due, on the bonds issued by the Company, subject to the conditions of their issue, and the Company shall pay the sums necessary for the above purpose within the limits of the amount realized by it in the issue of its bonds.

XIII. — On the payment of the first allotment on the shares, the founders shall receive temporary certificates on which subsequently, when the Board of Management of the Company shall have been formed, the receipt of the further installments on the shares will be inscribed.

When the shares shall be fully paid up the temporary certificates issued to the founders shall be replaced by shares.

The shares of the Company are issued to bearer, under the signature of not fewer than three members of the Board of Management. To the shares will be attached a coupon sheet for the receipt once yearly under them of any dividend that may be payable.

On the coupon sheets becoming exhausted new sheets will be issued.

A dividend on the shares out of the net profits of any year, supposing such accrue, shall be payable on the adoption by the general meeting of shareholders of the Annual Report for that year, and the dividend shall be payable at the offices of the Company, or at such places which it may indicate.

The Company shall notify for general information in the "Official Gazette" and in the "Finance Messenger," as also in one of the Chinese newspapers, the amount and place of payment of the dividend.

XIV. — The reserve capital is destined —

(a) For the capital repair of the railway, its buildings and appurtenances;

(b) For defraying extraordinary expenditure of the Company in repairing the railway and its appurtenances.

The reserve capital of the Company is formed out of annual sums put aside from the net profits of the working of the railway (XVII).

The reserve capital must be kept in Russian State interest bearing securities, or in railway bonds guaranteed by the Russian Government.

At the expiration of the term of possession of the railway by the Company the reserve capital shall be first of all



employed in the payment of the debts of the Company, including among them sums due to the Russian Government, if such exist; after the debts of the Company shall have been paid, the remainder of the reserve capital shall be divided among the shareholders. In the event of the redemption of the railway by the Chinese Government the reserve capital becomes the property of the shareholders.

XV. — The net revenue of the Company shall be the remainder of the gross receipts, after deduction of working expenses.

Under these expenses are classed —

(a) General outlays, including assignments towards pension and relief funds, if such be established on the land;

(b) Maintenance of the Staff of the Board of Management, and of all the services; as also the maintenance of employees and laborers not on the permanent list;

(c) Outlays for materials and articles used for the railways, as also expenditure in the shape of remuneration for the use of buildings, rolling stock, and other various requisites, for the purposes of the railway.

(d) Outlays for the maintenance, repair, and renewal of the permanent way, works of construction, buildings, rolling stock, and other appurtenances of the railway;

(e) Expenditure connected with the adoption of the measures and instructions of the Board of Management for insuring the safety and regularity of the railway service;

(f) Expenditure for the improvement and development of the railway, as also for creating and developing its resources.

XVI. — Should the gross receipts of the railway prove insufficient for defraying the working expenses and for meeting the yearly payments due on the bonds, the Company will receive the deficient sum from the Russian Government through the Russian Minister of Finances. The payments referred to will be made to the Company as advances, at a rate of interest of six per cent per annum. Sums paid in excess to the Company in consequence of its demands and on account of the guarantee will be deducted from succeeding money payments.

On the presentation to the general meeting of shareholders of the annual report of the working of the railway for a given year the Company shall at the same time submit to the

general meeting, for confirmation, a detailed statement of the sums owing by the Company to the Russian Government, with the interest that has accrued thereon. On the confirmation of this statement by the general meeting, the Board of Management shall deliver to the Russian Government an acknowledgment of the Company's debt, to the full determined amount of the same, and this acknowledgment, until its substitution by another, shall bear annually interest at the rate of six per cent.

The acknowledgment above-mentioned, given by the Board of Management to the Russian Government, shall not be subject to bill or deed stamp tax.

[Subjects of minor importance are dealt with in the following sections:

XVII. — Distribution of net profits of the railway.

XVIII. — Functions of Board of Management, the seals of which will be at Peking and St. Petersburg.

XIX. — Constitution of the Board, which is to consist of nine members elected by the shareholders. The Chairman is to be appointed by the Chinese Government; the Vice Chairman is to be chosen by the members of the Board from among themselves.

XX. — Order of transaction of the business of the Board.

XXI. — General meetings of shareholders and the subjects that shall come under their notice.

XXII. — Order of convening general meetings.

XXIII. — Conditions under which general meetings shall be recognized as legally held.

XXIV. — Participation of shareholders in proceedings of general meetings.

XXV. — Local management of works of construction.

XXVI. — Local management of railway when in working order.

XXVII. — Questions to be submitted for confirmation by Russian Minister of Finances.

XXVIII. — Committee of audit.]

XXIX. — In accordance with the Agreement concluded with the Chinese Government, the latter, after the expiration of eighty years of possession of the railway by the Company, enters into possession of it and its appurtenances.



The reserve and other funds belonging to the Company shall be employed in paying the money due to the Russian Government under the guarantee (XVI) and in satisfaction of other debts of the Company, and the remainder shall be distributed among the shareholders.

Any money that may remain owing by the Company to the Russian Government at the expiration of eighty years in respect of the guarantee shall be written off.

The Russo-Chinese Bank will incur no responsibility in respect of the same.

XXX. — In accordance with the agreement concluded with the Chinese Government, on the expiration of thirty-six years from the time of completion of the whole line and its opening for traffic, the Chinese Government has the right of acquiring the line, on refunding to the Company in full all the outlays made on it, and on payment for everything done for the requirements of the railway, such payments to be made with accrued interest.

It follows as a matter of course that the portion of the share capital which has been amortized by drawing and the part of the debt owing to the Russian Government under the Guarantee and repaid out of the net profits (XVII) will not constitute part of the purchase money.

In no case can the Chinese Government enter into possession of the railway before it has lodged in the Russian State Bank the necessary purchase money.

The purchase money lodged by the Chinese Government shall be employed in paying the debt of the Company under its bonds and all sums, with interest, owing to the Russian Government, the remainder of the money being then at the disposal of the shareholders.

## APPENDIX C

### THE SINO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENTS, MAY 31, 1924

#### AGREEMENT ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to reëstablish normal relations with each other, have agreed to conclude an agreement on general principles for the settlement of the questions between the two countries, and have to that end named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China:

Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Lev Mikhailovitch Karahan.

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

*Article I.* Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the normal diplomatic and consular relations between the two Contracting Parties shall be reëstablished.

The Government of the Republic of China agrees to take the necessary steps to transfer to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the Legation and Consular buildings formerly belonging to the Czarist Government.

*Article II.* The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to hold, within one month after the signing of the present Agreement, a Conference which shall conclude and carry out detailed arrangements relative to the questions in accordance with the principles as provided in the following Articles.

Such detailed arrangements shall be completed as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than six months from the date of the opening of the Conference as provided in the preceding paragraph.



*Article III.* The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to annul at the Conference as provided in the preceding Article, all Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, Protocols, Contracts, et cetera, concluded between the Government of China and the Czarist Government and to replace them with new treaties, agreements, et cetera, on the basis of equality, reciprocity and justice, as well as the spirit of the Declarations of the Soviet Government of 1919 and 1920.

*Article IV.* The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in accordance with its policy and Declarations of 1919 and 1920, declares that all Treaties, Agreements, et cetera, concluded between the former Czarist Government and any third party or parties affecting the sovereign rights of interests of China, are null and void.

The Governments of both Contracting Parties declare that in future neither Government will conclude any treaties or agreements which prejudice the sovereign rights or interests of either Contracting Party.

*Article V.* The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China's sovereignty therein.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that as soon as the questions for the withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Outer Mongolia — namely, as to the time limit of the withdrawal of such troops and the measures to be adopted in the interests of the safety of the frontiers — are agreed upon at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, it will effect the complete withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Outer Mongolia.

*Article VI.* The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually pledge themselves not to permit, within their respective territories, the existence and/or activities of any organizations or groups whose aim is to struggle by acts of violence against the Governments of either Contracting Party.

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties further pledge themselves not to engage in propaganda directed against the political and social systems of either Contracting Party.

*Article VII.* The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to redemarcate their national boundaries at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, and pending such redemarcation, to maintain the present boundaries.

*Article VIII.* The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to regulate at the aforementioned Conference the questions relating to the navigation of rivers, lakes, and other bodies of water which are common to their respective frontiers, on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

*Article IX.* The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to settle at the aforementioned Conference the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway in conformity with the principles as hereinafter provided:

1. — The Governments of the two Contracting Parties declare that the Chinese Eastern Railway is a purely commercial enterprise.

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually declare that with the exception of matters pertaining to the business operations which are under the direct control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, all other matters affecting the rights of the National and the Local Governments of the Republic of China — such as judicial matters, matters relating to civil administration, military administration, police, municipal government, taxation, and landed property (with the exception of lands required by the said Railway) — shall be administered by the Chinese Authorities.

2. — The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to the redemption by the Government of the Republic of China, with Chinese capital, of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all appurtenant properties, and to the transfer to China of all shares and bonds of the Railway.

3. — The Governments of the two Contracting Parties shall settle at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, the amount and conditions governing the redemption as well as the procedure for the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

4. — The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to be responsible for the entire claims of the shareholders, bondholders, and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway incurred prior to the Revolution of March 9, 1917.



5. — The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be determined by the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the exclusion of any third party or parties.

6. — The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to draw up an arrangement for the provisional management of the Chinese Eastern Railway pending the settlement of the questions as provided under Section 3 of the present Article.

7. — Until the various questions relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway are settled at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, the rights of the two Governments arising out of the Contract of August 27/September 8, 1896, for the Construction and Operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which do not conflict with the present Agreement and the Agreement for the Provisional Management of the said Railway and which do not prejudice China's right of sovereignty, shall be maintained.

*Article X.* The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to renounce the special rights and privileges relating to all Concessions in any part of China acquired by the Czarist Government under various Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, et cetera.

*Article XI.* The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to renounce the Russian portion of the Boxer Indemnity.

*Article XII.* The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to relinquish the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction.

*Article XIII.* The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to draw up simultaneously with the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, a Customs Tariff for the two Contracting Parties in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity.

*Article XIV.* The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to discuss at the aforementioned Conference the questions relating to the claims for the compensation of losses.

*Article XV.* The present Agreement shall come into effect from the date of signature.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

(Seal) L. M. KARAHAN.

AGREEMENT FOR THE PROVISIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE  
CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

The Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics mutually recognizing that, inasmuch as the Chinese Eastern Railway was built with capital furnished by the Russian Government and constructed entirely within Chinese territory, the said Railway is a purely commercial enterprise and that, excepting for matters appertaining to its own business operations, all other matters which affect the rights of the Chinese National and Local Governments shall be administered by the Chinese Authorities, have agreed to conclude an Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Railway with a view to carrying on jointly the management of the said Railway until its final settlement at the Conference as provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, and have to that end named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China:

Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Lev Mikhailovitch Karahan.



Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles :

*Article I.* The Railway shall establish, for discussion and decision of all matters relative to the Chinese Eastern Railway, a Board of Directors to be composed of ten persons, of whom five shall be appointed by the Government of the Republic of China and five by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Government of the Republic of China shall appoint one of the Chinese Directors as President of the Board of Directors, who shall also be the Director General.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall appoint one of the Russian Directors as Vice President of the Board of Directors, who shall also be the Assistant Director General.

Seven persons shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions of the Board of Directors shall have the consent of not less than six persons before they can be carried out.

The Director General and the Assistant Director General shall jointly manage the affairs of the Board of Directors and they shall both sign all the documents of the Board.

In the absence of either the Director General or the Assistant Director General, the respective Governments may appoint another Director to officiate as the Director General or the Assistant Director General (in the case of the Director General, by one of the Chinese Directors, and in that of the Assistant Director General, by one of the Russian Directors).

*Article II.* The Railway shall establish a Board of Auditors to be composed of five persons, namely two Chinese Auditors, who shall be appointed by the Government of the Republic of China and three Russian Auditors who shall be appointed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Chairman of the Board of Auditors shall be elected from among the Chinese Auditors.

*Article III.* The Railway shall have a Manager, who shall be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and two Assistant Managers, one to be a national of the Republic of China and the other to be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The said officers shall be appointed by the Board of Directors and such appointments shall be confirmed by their respective Governments.

The rights and duties of the Manager and the Assistant Managers shall be defined by the Board of Directors.

*Article IV.* The Chiefs and the Assistant Chiefs of the various Departments of the Railway shall be appointed by the Board of Directors.

If the Chief of the Department is a national of the Republic of China, the Assistant Chief of the Department shall be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and if the Chief of the Department is a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Assistant Chief of the Department shall be a national of the Republic of China.

*Article V.* The employment of persons in the various departments of the Railway shall be in accordance with the principle of equal representation between the nationals of the Republic of China and those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Article VI.* With the exception of the estimates and budgets, as provided in Article VII of the present Agreement, all other matters on which the Board of Directors cannot reach an agreement shall be referred for settlement to the Governments of the Contracting Parties.

*Article VII.* The Board of Directors shall present the estimates and budgets of the Railway to a joint meeting of the Board of Directors and the Board of Auditors for consideration and approval.

*Article VIII.* All the net profits of the Railway shall be held by the Board of Directors and shall not be used pending a final settlement of the question of the present Railway.

*Article IX.* The Board of Directors shall revise as soon as possible the statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, approved on December 4, 1896, by the Czarist Government, in accordance with the present Agreement and the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, and in any case, not later than six months from the date of the constitution of the Board of Directors.



Pending their revision, the aforesaid statutes, in so far as they do not conflict with the present Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and do not prejudice the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of China, shall continue to be observed.

*Article X.* The present Agreement shall cease to have effect as soon as the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway is finally settled at the Conference as provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924.

*Article XI.* The present Agreement shall come into effect from the date of signature.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is the Thirty-First Day of May, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

(Seal) L. M. KARAHAN.

#### DECLARATION I

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declare that immediately after the signing of the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, they will reciprocally hand over to each other all the real estate and movable property owned by China and the former Czarist Government and found in their respective territories. For this purpose each Government will furnish the other with a list of the property to be transferred.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the Two Contracting Parties have signed

the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is the Thirty-First Day of May, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

(Seal) L. M. KARAHAN.

#### DECLARATION II

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby declare that it is understood that with regard to the buildings and landed property of the Russian Orthodox Mission belonging as it does to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the question of the transfer or other suitable disposal of the same will be jointly determined at the Conference provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, in accordance with the internal laws and regulations existing in China regarding property-holding in the inland. As regards the buildings and property of the Russian Orthodox Mission belonging as it does to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Peking and Patachu, the Chinese Government will take steps to immediately transfer same as soon as the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will designate a Chinese person or organization, in accordance with the laws and regulations existing in China regarding property holding in the inland.

Meanwhile the Government of the Republic of China will at once take measures with a view to guarding all the said buildings and property and clearing them from all persons now living there.

It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles.



In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is the Thirty-First Day of May, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

(Seal) L. M. KARAHAN.

### DECLARATION III

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly declare that it is understood that with reference to Article IV of the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, the Government of the Republic of China will not and does not recognize as valid any treaty, agreement, et cetera, concluded between Russia since the Czarist régime and any third party or parties, affecting the sovereign rights and interests of the Republic of China. It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Government of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is the Thirty-First Day of May, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

(Seal) L. M. KARAHAN.

## DECLARATION IV

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly declare that it is understood that the Government of the Republic of China will not transfer either in part or in whole to any third Power or any foreign organization the special rights and privileges renounced by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Article X of the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924. It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is the Thirty-first Day of May, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

(Seal) L. M. KARAHAN.

## DECLARATION V

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly declare that it is understood that with reference to Article XI of the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924:

1. The Russian share of the Boxer Indemnity which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics renounces, will after the satisfaction of all prior obligations



secured thereon be entirely appropriated to create a fund for the promotion of education among the Chinese people.

2. A special Commission will be established to administer and allocate the said fund. This Commission will consist of three persons, two of whom will be appointed by the Government of the Republic of China and one by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Decisions of the said Commission will be taken by unanimous vote.

3. The said fund will be deposited as it accrues from time to time in a Bank to be designated by the said Commission.

It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is the Thirty-First Day of May, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

(Seal) L. M. KARAHAN.

#### DECLARATION VI

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree that they will establish equitable provisions at the Conference as provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, for the regulation of the situation created for the citizens of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the relinquishment of the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction under Article XII of the aforementioned Agreement, it being

understood, however, that the nationals of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be entirely amenable to Chinese jurisdiction.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is the Thirty-First Day of May, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

(Seal) L. M. KARAHAN.

#### DECLARATION VII

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having signed the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, hereby agree, in explanation of Article V of the Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway of the same date, which provides for the principle of equal representation in the filling of posts by citizens of the Republic of China and those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the application of this principle is not to be understood to mean that the present employees of Russian nationality shall be dismissed for the sole purpose of enforcing the said principle. It is further understood that access to all posts is equally open to citizens of both Contracting Parties, that no special preference shall be shown to either nationality, and that the posts shall be filled in accordance with the ability and technical as well as educational qualifications of the applicants.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declarations in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.



Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is the Thirty-First Day of May, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

(Seal) L. M. KARAHAN.

#### EXCHANGE OF NOTES

PEKING, May 31, 1924.

Mr. L. M. Karahan,

*Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Republic of China, Peking.*

DEAR MR. KARAHAN:

On behalf of my Government, I have the honor to declare that an Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics having been signed between us to-day, the Government of the Republic of China will, in the interests of friendship between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, discontinue the services of all the subjects of the former Russian Empire now employed in the Chinese army and police force, as they constitute by their presence or activities a menace to the safety of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. If you will furnish my Government with a list of such persons, the authorities concerned will be instructed to adopt the necessary action.

I have the honor to remain,

Yours faithfully,

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of China.*

Peking, May 31, 1924.

DEAR DR. KOO:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following Note from you under this date:

"On behalf of my Government, I have the honor, &c."

In reply, I beg to state, on behalf of my Government, that I have taken note of the same and that I agree to the propositions as contained therein.

I have the honor to be

Very truly yours,

L. M. KARAHAN.

*Extraordinary Plenipotentiary  
Representative of the Union of  
Soviet Socialist Republics  
to the Republic of China.*





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